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Abstract	
“The Design of National Human Rights Institutions: Global Patterns of Diffusion and 
Strength” explores patterns of institutional design in the case of national human rights 
institutions (i.e. ombudsman, national human rights commission), seeking to understand 
why countries establish these bodies and give them certain mandated powers as reflected 
in their institutional design. The project answers two main questions about the global 
variation of institutional strength as a function of the design of these institutions: (1) 
What are the main global patterns of the institutional design of national human rights 
institutions? and (2) What explains variation in the institutional strength of national 
human rights institutions across borders?  
 The project makes two main contributions to the scholarship on international 
organisation and cross-border diffusion: the dataset of institutional design features, which 
operationalizes and measures six different dimensions of an institutional design index on 
the basis of report-based and survey data, is the first global dataset of its kind. 
Institutional strength is the original dependent variable that represents an index of six 
design features, as a synthesis of main mandated functions: 1) de jure legal independence; 
2) nature of the mandate; 3) autonomy from government control; 4) predominant de facto 
duties; 5) pluralism of representation; and 6) staff and financial resources. Institutional 
strength is a ranked categorical variable with three values (weak, medium, strong). 
 An additional contribution is the explanatory framework, which derives a number 
of hypotheses about global and regional determinants of institutional design from four 
main mechanisms that draw respectively on domestic and international, as well as 
material and social, factors (socialisation, incentive-setting, cost & benefit calculations 
and domestic identity). The global analysis has found statistically significant evidence 
that participation in the United Nations-led peer-review process for national human rights 
institutions accreditation makes countries more likely to have stronger institutions. This is 
in line with recent work about the role of UN-led peer review processes and provides 
support for socialisation and acculturation explanations that are facilitated by a global 
network. At the regional level, social learning and acculturation across borders takes 
place in regions with high density of strong such human rights institutions (i.e. Europe 
and the Americas) and where more ‘early adopting’ countries are located. Countries with 
strong democratic identities, which established their human rights institutions prior to 
1990, are both more likely to have strong institutions themselves and to motivate other 
governments to follow their lead. The analysis of global trends finds also that incentive-
setting plays a role both at the global and the regional levels, as countries that receive 
higher amounts of Overseas Development Assistance from the United States or states that 
are subjected to EU membership conditionality are more likely to have stronger human 
rights institutions.  
 The project follows a nested multi-method research design, which begins with a 
quantitative analysis of global trends as a backdrop for a qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA) focused on Europe, complemented by illustrative country institutional case 
studies. QCA finds two paths that are sufficient for European countries to establish strong 
institutions. Thirteen case studies present illustrative evidence of the QCA findings at the 
country/institution level.  
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	
	
1.1.	Brief	history	of	national	institutions	for	the	promotion	and	protection	of	
human	rights	
	An	 historic	 institution	 in	 Europe,	 where	 Sweden’s	 first	 Justice	 Ombudsman	 was	established	 in	 1809,	 domestic	 human	 rights	 institutions	 for	 the	 promotion	 and	protection	of	human	 rights	have	 since	become	a	 constant	presence	 in	virtually	 all	states	 of	 the	 world.	 Although	 not	 designed	 to	 carry	 out	 an	 explicit	 human	 rights	mandate	prior	to	the	formation	of	a	global	human	rights	regime	in	the	aftermath	of	World	 War	 II,	 the	 predominant	 model	 of	 the	 classic	 ombudsman	 was	 an	independent	 institution	 broadly	 mandated	 with	 citizen	 complaint-handling	 that	came	 to	 be	 complemented	 by	 a	 new	 institutional	 design	 intended	 to	 ensure	 the	protection	 and	 the	 promotion	 of	 human	 rights	 at	 the	 domestic	 level.	 The	 first	international	 move	 encourage	 governments	 to	 establish	 national	 bodies	 with	 a	human	 rights-related	mandate	 took	place	 in	 1946,	when	 the	Economic	 and	 Social	Council	 suggested	 that	 “information	 groups	or	 local	 human	 rights	 committees”	 be	formed	to	help	states	participate	in	international	fora	and	cooperate	with	the	United	Nations	 Commission	 on	 Human	 Rights	 (Pohjolainen	 2006;	 Kim	 2013a),	 but	 these	ideals	 did	 not	 gain	 salience	 until	 decades	 later.	 In	 1978,	 a	 conference	 in	 Geneva	developed	the	first	broad	set	of	standards	for	the	creation	of	such	institutions	on	the	basis	 of	 the	 existing	 classical	 ombudsman	model	 but	with	 an	 explicit	mandate	 to	promote	 and	 protect	 human	 rights.	 At	 the	 time,	 however,	 the	 definition	 of	 an	
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institutional	model	 for	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	was	 still	 vague	 (Carver	2010).				 An	 important	moment	 in	 the	 diffusion	 of	 human	 rights	 bodies	 that	 protect	and	 promote	 human	 rights	 is	 the	 first	 International	 Workshop	 on	 National	Institutions	 for	 the	 Promotion	 and	Protection	 of	Human	Rights	 on	 7th-9th	October	1991.	The	international	meeting	generated	a	set	of	general	guidelines	regarding	the	design	and	effectiveness	of	 these	domestic	bodies,	 entitled	 the	Paris	Principles.	 In	1992,	 the	 United	 Nations	 Human	 Rights	 Commission	 (UNHRC)	 adopted	 the	 Paris	Principles	 by	 Resolution	 1992/54	 of	 the	 UN	 (‘E/CN.4/RES/1993/55	 National	Institutions	for	the	Promotion	and	Protection	of	Human	Rights’	1993),	followed	by	the	 United	 Nations	 General	 Assembly’s	 Resolution	 48/134	 in	 1993	(‘E/CN.4/RES/1993/55	 National	 Institutions	 for	 the	 Promotion	 and	 Protection	 of	Human	 Rights’	 1993).	 With	 this	 recognition	 came	 also	 the	 creation	 of	 an	accreditation	process	through	an	independent	peer-review	process,	which	countries	choose	 to	 enter.	 The	 international	 accreditation	 body	 for	 the	 NHRIs	 is	 the	International	 Coordinating	 Committee	 of	 National	 Institutions	 for	 the	 Promotion	and	Protection	of	Human	Rights	(ICC)	through	its	Sub-Committee	on	Accreditation.	Although	it	 functions	in	coordination	with	the	UNHCR,	the	accreditation	process	is	carried	out	independently.	The	ICC	provides	a	list	of	over	100	NHRIs	with	different	accreditation	 statuses	 based	 on	 a	 four-point	 scale	 of	 compliance	 with	 the	 Paris	
Principles	 (‘National	 Human	 Rights	 Institutions	 Forum’	 2013).	 The	 accreditation	process	 results	 in	 three	 broad	 possible	 levels	 of	 compliance	 with	 the	 Paris	Principles,	 with	 A	 representing	 a	 fully	 compliant	 institution,	 A(R)	 being	 an	
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institution	 that	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 granted	 A	 status	 upon	 receipt	 of	 complete	documentation,	 B	 as	 a	 level	 for	 institutions	 that,	 upon	 having	 gone	 through	 the	accreditation	process,	are	found	not	to	be	fully	in	compliance	with	Paris	Principles,	and	finally	C	being	assigned	to	institution	that	do	not	meet	the	institutional	criteria	set	up	by	the	Paris	Principles.		 As	 stated	 by	 the	 Paris	 Principles,	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 are	vested	with	 competence	 to	 perform	 advisory	work	 for	 the	 national	 governments.	Their	 duties	 are	 also	 to	 facilitate	 cooperation	 between	 domestic	 state	 bodies	 and	international	 organisations,	 to	 maintain	 close	 ties	 with	 the	 United	 Nations	 and	organizations	 in	 its	 system	 as	 well	 as	 similar	 regional	 and	 national	 institutions	charged	with	the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights.	Their	responsibility	to	promote	and	protect	human	 rights	 can	be	 equated	broadly	with	 activity	meant	 to	ensure	 the	 harmonization	 of	 national	 legislation	 and	 practices	 with	 international	human	rights	instruments	of	which	the	country	is	a	member.	Building	on	Pegram’s	synthesis	 of	 the	main	 characteristics	 of	 the	NHRIs	 (Pegram	2010),	 their	 functions	based	on	the	Paris	Principles	are	as	follows:	
• Established	in	the	national	constitution	or	by	law;	
• Their	 role	 is	 clearly	 specified,	 and	 the	 mandate	 is	 as	 broad	 as	 possible,	addressing	human	rights	protection	and	promotion	
• Pluralism	 in	governing	 structures	 is	 reflected	 in	 representation	of	different	social	 and	 professional	 communities	 (i.e.	 university	 experts,	 NGOs,	 trade	unions,	trends	in	religious	or	philosophical	thought,	etc.);	
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• Independence	 from	 government	 agencies	 and	 representatives	 in	appointment	procedures	and	decision-making	processes;	
• Infrastructure	 commensurate	 to	 functions,	 with	 particular	 importance	attached	to	the	need	for	adequate	funding;	
• Ability	 to	perform	a	monitoring,	advisory	and	recommendation	 function	on	various	matters	relating	to	human	rights;	
• Each	national	institution	relates	to	regional	and	international	organizations;	
• Requirement	to	promote	public	awareness,	teaching	and	research	on	human	rights;	
• The	 possibility	 that	 NHRIs	 possess	 quasi-jurisdictional	 functions,	 e.g.	 the	handling	 of	 individual	 complaints	 or	 petitions	 on	 human	 rights	 grounds	(‘E/CN.4/RES/1993/55,	1993;	Pegram	2010).			 The	 main	 institutional	 functions	 of	 protection	 and	 promotion	 provide	 a	broad	scope	of	legal	mandate	for	a	set	of	institution	with	great	structural	diversity.	The	 literature	 on	national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 is	 not	 in	 agreement	 over	 one	definition	 of	 the	 NHRIs.	 The	 concept	 commonly	 refers	 to	 government-sponsored	bodies	 whose	 functions	 are	 specifically	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 promotion	 and	protection	of	human	rights	(Koo	and	Ramirez	2009),	but	the	scope	of	the	definition	is	 broad	 and	 encompasses	 varying	 institutional	 designs	 in	 different	 national	 and	regional	contexts.	Alternatively,	NHRIs	are	considered	“organizations,	or	permanent	bodies	established	by	states	to	implement	internationally	recognized	norms	in	their	domestic	 jurisdictions	 (Cardenas	 and	 Flibbert	 2005).”	 Country	 constitutions	 or	
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national	 statutory	 law	 guarantee	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 national	 human	 rights	institutions	 (Reif	 2004).	 Although	 NHRIs	 share	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 structural	 and	mandate	 similarities	 as	 autonomous	 bodies	 within	 the	 state	 responsible	 for	 the	promotion	 and	 protection	 of	 human	 rights	 (Carver	 2010;	 Goodman	 and	 Pegram	2012),	individual	states	usually	reconfigure	their	model	to	meet	local	needs	and	also	to	suit	domestic	priorities	(Cardenas	and	Flibbert	2005).			 The	broader	role	of	the	NHRIs	as	the	implementer	of	human	rights	law	at	the	domestic	 level	has	been	defined	more	clearly	 in	 the	past	years.	This	has	coincided	with	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 their	 number	 and	 also	 an	 extension	 of	 their	 shared	responsibilities.	 NHRIs	 have	 come	 to	 be	 recognized	 as	 important	 actors	 in	 the	processes	 of	 transmission	 of	 human	 rights	 norms	 from	 the	 international	 to	 the	domestic	 level	 and	 of	 national	 compliance	with	 global	 regulations	 (Goodman	 and	Pegram	2012).	 In	 the	case	of	 the	Optional	Protocol	 to	 the	Torture	Convention	and	the	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	Persons	with	Disabilities,	NHRIs	have	been	assigned	an	 unprecedented	 role	 in	 monitoring	 and	 implementing	 multilateral	 treaty	obligations	 (Carver	 2010).	When	working	 as	 a	 unified	 coalition,	NHRIs	 have	 been	able	 to	 participate	 in	 negotiation	processes	 and	 shape	 international	 human	 rights	norms,	like	the	Disability	Rights	Convention	and	the	UN	Declaration	on	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	People	(Goodman	and	Pegram	2012).	They	hold	a	formal	seat	at	the	UN	Human	Rights	 Council,	 thus	participating	 in	 global	 decision-making	 and	have	 also	drive	 change	 at	 the	 regional	 level	 through	 participation	 in	 regional	 associations	(Goodman	and	Pegram	2012).		
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	 Ombudsmen	and	human	 rights	 commissions	play	also	 an	 important	 role	 at	the	 regional	 level	 in	 Europe.	 They	 are	 the	 only	 independent	 domestic	 bodies	charged	 with	 the	 implementation	 of	 international	 and	 regional	 human	 rights	treaties	 ratified	 by	 governments.	 They	 have	 existed	 for	 over	 fifteen	 years	 as	 a	regional	network	affiliated	with	the	Council	of	Europe,	called	the	European	Group	of	National	 Human	 Rights	 Institutions.	 The	 regional	 network	 has	 assisted	 with	 the	accreditation	process	and	has	been	active	in	promoting	and	protecting	human	rights	in	 wider	 region.	 The	 national	 institutions	 have	 also	 been	 involved	 in	 the	enlargement	 process,	 as	 the	main	 independent	 domestic	 institutions	mandated	 to	assist	governments	with	the	harmonization	of	legislation	and	the	implementation	of	regional	 human	 rights	 treaties.	 The	 European	 Commission	 includes	 ombudsmen	and	human	rights	commissions	in	all	annual	country	progress	reports	on	states	that	are	 membership	 candidates.	 The	 institution	 is	 central	 to	 countries’	 efforts	 to	address	 adequately	 a	 range	 of	 rights-related	 issues	 such	 as	 the	 respect	 of	 human	rights	more	broadly,	the	protection	and	promotion	of	fundamental	rights,	social	and	political	 rights,	 as	 well	 as	 economic	 rights.	 The	 European	 Commission’s	recommendations	 target	 both	 the	 broader	 human	 rights	 mandate	 and	 the	 more	specific	scope	of	 their	mandates	which	varies	 from	country	 to	country,	addressing	particular	relevant	issues;	for	instance,	property	rights	in	cases	of	denationalization	and	 land	 restitution	 in	 Croatia	 or	 Montenegro,	 the	 prevention	 of	 torture	 and	 ill-treatment	by	police	forces	in	Albania,	Croatia,	Macedonia,	Serbia,	and	Montenegro.			
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1.2.	Research	questions	and	relevance	of	puzzle	
	A	 lot	of	 variation	occurs,	however,	 in	 institutional	mandates	and	 the	activities	 the	institutions	perform.	This	thesis	seeks	to	explore	the	reasons	for	this	variation	in	the	design	of	national	human	rights	institutions	around	the	world.	Independent	national	institutions	created	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights	are	commonplace	 in	 the	post-Cold	 War	 world,	 with	 more	 than	 140	 countries	 that	 have	 a	 human	 rights	commission	or	an	ombudsman	endowed	with	different	degrees	of	strength	to	carry	out	their	mandate.	Institutions	around	the	world	have	a	number	of	similar	general	characteristics	in	as	much	as	they	are	meant	to	be	independent	bodies	charged	with	rights	protection	and	promotion,	 and	usually	have	 the	power	 to	handle	 individual	complaints	 about	 rights	 violations.	 These	 differences	 are	 usually	 the	 result	 of	governments’	 efforts	 to	 adjust	 the	 institutional	 models	 to	 respond	 to	 domestic	realities.	 In	 the	 case	of	 several	 countries	 that	 adopted	 classical	 ombudsmen	early,	governments	decided	to	enlarge	the	institutional	mandate	to	address	human	rights	more	broadly.	 In	 an	 attempt	 to	 align	with	 the	 behaviour	 of	 other	 countries,	 some	governments	 also	 seek	 to	 strengthen	 the	 design	 of	 their	 ombudsmen	 by	 securing	their	de	jure	independence	and	their	autonomy	from	government.			 The	 body	 of	 academic	 scholarship	 on	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 is	relatively	small	but	has	increased	significantly	in	the	past	five	years.	Most	research	to	 date	 on	 these	 national	 bodies	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 diffusion	 (Koo	 and	 Ramirez	2009;	Pegram	2010;	Goodman	and	Pegram	2012)	and	the	effectiveness	with	which	(Linos	and	Pegram	2016)	 institutions	with	official	 status	of	national	human	rights	
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institution	 (NHRI)	 carry	 out	 their	 mandate	 and	 improve	 domestic	 human	 rights	records.	 Institutions	 are	 granted	 NHRI	 status	 through	 accreditation	 by	 the	International	 Coordinating	 Committee	 housed	 at	 the	 United	 Nations	 Office	 of	 the	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights.				 “The	 Design	 of	 National	 Human	 Rights	 Institutions:	 Global	 Patterns	 of	Diffusion	 and	 Strength”	 explores	 patterns	 of	 institutional	 design	 in	 the	 case	 of	national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 seeking	 to	 understand	why	 countries	 establish	these	 bodies	 and	 give	 them	 certain	 mandated	 powers	 as	 reflected	 in	 their	institutional	design.	The	project	aims	to	answer	two	main	questions	about	the	global	variation	of	 institutional	 strength	 as	 a	 function	of	 the	design	of	 these	 institutions:	(1)	What	are	the	main	global	patterns	of	the	institutional	design	of	national	human	rights	 institutions?	and	(2)	What	explains	variation	 in	 the	 institutional	strength	of	national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 across	 borders?	 An	 institution’s	 strength	 is	 a	function	of	its	design.	In	other	words,	strength	is	defined	in	terms	of	an	institution’s	mandated	 features	 and	main	 types	 of	 activities.	 However,	 strength	 does	 not	 take	into	account	the	effectiveness	of	the	institution	in	carrying	out	its	mandate.			 The	 project	 makes	 two	 main	 contributions	 to	 the	 scholarship	 on	international	 organisation	 and	 cross-border	 diffusion:	 the	 dataset	 of	 institutional	design	features,	which	operationalizes	and	measures	six	different	dimensions	of	an	institutional	design	 index	on	the	basis	of	report-based	and	survey	data,	 is	 the	 first	global	 dataset	 of	 its	 kind.	 Institutional	 strength	 is	 the	 original	 dependent	 variable	that	 represents	 an	 index	 of	 six	 design	 features,	 as	 a	 synthesis	 of	main	mandated	functions	(Meagher	2004;	International	Coordinating	Committee	of	NHRIs	2016):	1)	
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extent	of	de	jure	independence;	2)	nature	of	mandate;	3)	degree	of	autonomy	from	government;	 4)	 promotion	 and	protection	powers;	 5)	 degree	 of	 pluralism;	 and	6)	adequate	 resources.	 Institutional	 strength	 is	 a	 ranked	 categorical	 variable	 with	three	 values	 (weak,	medium,	 strong).	 Numeric	 data	 is	 generated	 through	 content	analysis	and	coding	of	institutional	reports	and	publicly	available	documents.		 An	 additional	 contribution	 is	 the	 explanatory	 framework,	 which	 derives	 a	number	 of	 hypotheses	 about	 global	 and	 regional	 determinants	 of	 institutional	design	 from	 four	 main	 mechanisms	 -	 socialisation,	 incentive-setting,	 cost-benefit	calculations	 and	 domestic	 identity	 -	 that	 draw	 respectively	 on	 domestic	 and	international,	as	well	as	material	and	social,	factors.	The	analysis	tests	a	number	of	hypotheses	for	each	mechanism.	Hypotheses	that	test	for	global	and	regional	effects	of	 socialization	 or	 acculturation	 are	 measured	 through	 the	 effect	 of	 having	undergone	the	UN-led	accreditation	process	or	by	being	 located	in	a	region	with	a	high	 density	 of	 strong	 institutions.	 In	 addition,	 two	main	 hypotheses	 test	 for	 the	effects	 of	 incentives	 on	 institutional	 strength	 –	 countries	 that	 receive	 Overseas	Development	Assistance	from	the	United	States	are	more	likely	to	have	institutions	with	a	stronger	design.	Similarly	impactful	on	institutional	design	are	the	incentives	that	the	European	Union	offers	states	that	are	candidates	for	membership.			 The	model	tests	also	a	hypothesis	about	the	effect	of	a	strong	human	rights	identity	 on	 the	 choices	 of	 governments	 to	 establish	 strong	 institutions.	 Countries	with	 strong	 human	 rights	 identities	 have	 longstanding	 traditions	 of	 liberal	democratic	 values	 as	 evidenced	 by	 establishing	 their	 ombudsman	 institutions	earlier	than	the	consolidation	of	the	Paris	Principles	as	a	regulatory	framework	and	
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the	global	institutional	network	linked	to	it.	Europe	is	the	region	with	the	most	early	adopting	countries.	A	 fourth	mechanism	tested	by	the	model	 is	 linked	to	domestic	cost-benefit	 calculations	by	 governments	 in	newly	democratized	 states,	which	 are	intended	 to	 secure	 the	 establishment	 of	 liberal	 democratic	 institutions	 as	 a	safeguard	 against	 potential	 democratic	 backsliding	 during	 the	 tenure	 of	 future	governments.			 The	 remainder	 of	 the	 introductory	 chapter	 will	 proceed	 as	 follows:	 it	presents	a	brief	overview	of	 the	history	of	national	 institutions	 for	 the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights,	highlighting	key	moments	in	their	diffusion	around	the	world.	It	continues	with	a	discussion	of	institutional	strength,	as	the	dependent	variable	 of	 the	 study,	 presenting	 briefly	 the	 conceptual	 scheme	 used	 for	 its	operationalization	 and	 the	 main	 causal	 mechanisms	 for	 which	 it	 seeks	 to	 find	evidence.	 The	 following	 sections	 of	 the	 introduction	 presents	 a	 summary	 of	 the	analytical	 framework,	 the	 theoretical	 debates	 to	 which	 it	 speaks,	 and	 the	 main	independent	 variables	 included	 in	 the	 analysis,	 succeeded	 by	 a	 review	 of	 the	methods	employed	 in	 the	project	 and	of	 the	project’s	 research	design	 it.	The	 final	section	of	the	introductory	chapter	gives	an	overview	of	the	structure	of	the	thesis	and	the	content	of	each	chapter.			
1.3.	What	is	institutional	strength?	
	I	 define	 institutional	 strength	 as	 a	 function	 of	 institutional	 design	 features,	which	consists	 of	 the	 aggregation	 of	 six	 different	 structural	 characteristics:	 legal	de	 jure	
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independent	 status,	 autonomy	 from	 government,	 broad	mandate	 to	 promote	 and	protect	 human	 rights,	 powers	 of	 investigation,	 pluralism	 of	 representation	 and	adequate	resources.	These	dimensions	of	strength	represent	a	synthesis	of	the	main	functions	 performed	 by	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions,	 as	 presented	 in	institutional	 mandates,	 country	 constitutions	 and	 national	 law.	 Institutional	strength	 is	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 formal	 attributes	 of	 institutional	 design	 and	 is	distinct	 from	 institutional	effectiveness	or	 impact.	The	strength	of	national	human	rights	institutions	can	have	an	impact	on	states’	human	rights	outcomes,	alongside	other	 domestic	 and	 international	 determinants	 of	 human	 rights	 performance.	However,	 the	 formal	 design	 attributes	 of	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 are	distinct	from	institutional	effectiveness	understood	as	human	rights	outcomes.		 I	 will	 introduce	 these	 dimensions	 briefly	 here,	 and	 the	 first	 chapter	 of	 the	thesis	 presents	 these	 design	 dimensions	 in	 greater	 detail.	 Autonomy	 from	government	 is	 measured	 with	 the	 help	 of	 four	 different	 indicators:	 financial	independence,	 appointment	 structure,	 government	 representation	 and	 reporting	structure.	 Adequate	 powers	 of	 investigation	 are	 measured	 as	 both	 mandated	strength	 or	 predominant	 performed	 functions,	 with	 two	 broad	 categories	 of	functions	 –	 human	 rights	 promotion	 and	 human	 rights	 protection.	 A	 national	institution	can	be	mandated	to	perform	either	set	of	functions,	or	can	be	vested	with	both	 sets	 of	 powers,	 thus	 being	 both	 in	 charge	 of	 promotion	 and	 protection.	 The	fourth	 dimension	 refers	 to	 pluralism	 of	 representation	 of	 as	 many	 strata	 of	 a	country’s	 society	 as	 possible	 and	 is	 operationalized	 as	 a	 measure	 of	 civil	 society	representation	 in	 decision-making.	 Finally,	 the	 dimension	 that	 captures	 whether	
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institutions	have	adequate	resources	is	defined	in	terms	of	finances	and	staff,	based	on	an	assessment	of	publicly	available	 information	regarding	each	 institution.	The	evaluation	 of	 whether	 financial	 and	 staff	 resources	 are	 sufficient	 is	 made	 on	 the	basis	of	explicit	statements	about	the	adequacy	of	resources	made	in	official	annual	reports	or	documents	included	on	institutional	websites.	A	relatively	small	number	of	 institutions	 make	 their	 annual	 budgets	 available	 online	 through	 inclusion	 in	annual	reports	of	activity,	 thus	 I	could	not	calculate	numerical	values	 for	different	levels	of	resources	across	all	countries	in	the	dataset.		 On	the	basis	of	the	data	collected	on	the	design	categories	presented	above,	I	compiled	 an	 original	 global	 dataset	 of	 design	 features	 for	 national	 human	 rights	institutions	in	194	countries	and	reduced	it	to	187	countries	in	the	analysis	due	to	missing	 data	 on	 a	 number	 of	 independent	 variables	 included	 in	 the	 model.	 The	scope	 of	 the	 dataset	 is	 larger	 than	 existing	 datasets,	 such	 as	 the	 one	 NHRI	 Data	Collection	 Project	 (Conrad,	 DeMeritt,	 and	 Moore	 2016)	 and	 the	 recent	 dataset	proposed	 by	 Pegram	 and	 Linos	 (Linos	 and	 Pegram	 2016),	 which	 focus	 only	 on	approximately	 100	 institutions	 that	 have	 undergone	 the	 UN-coordinated	accreditation	 process.	 The	 dataset	 that	 this	 project	 proposes	 differs	 from	 existing	databases	occur	also	in	relation	to	the	sources	of	data	collection	and	the	conceptual	scheme	used	to	operationalize	the	dependent	variable.	The	analysis	dataset	includes	the	 aggregated	 data	 on	 the	 dependent	 variable,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 institutional	strength	 index	and	also	data	on	9	 independent	variables	 and	one	 control	 variable	(GDP/per	capita).		
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1.4.	The	analytical	framework		The	 analytic	 framework	 builds	 on	 three	 main	 bodies	 of	 academic	 literature	 –	institutional	 design,	 cross-border	 diffusion	 and	 Europeanization.	 The	 multi-disciplinary	 literature	 on	 institutional	 design	 theory	 provides	 the	 conceptual	foundation	 for	 the	definition	of	 the	dependent	variable	 introduced	above	and	sets	the	 stage	 for	 the	 analytic	 approach	 to	 the	 complex	 sets	 factors	 that	 shape	institutional	 design	 at	 the	 national	 level.	 The	 analytical	 framework	 of	 the	 thesis	proposes	four	primary	explanations	and	hypotheses	that	test	the	effect	of	two	sets	of	 complementary	 factors	 on	 the	 strength	 of	 institutions	 created	 to	 promote	 and	protect	human	rights	at	the	national	level	–	on	the	one	hand,	both	international	and	domestic	 factors	account	 for	the	effects	of	cross-border	and	national	determinants	on	governments’	decisions	to	set	up	and	sustain	strong	independent	bodies	on	their	territories.	 Additionally,	 the	 nature	 of	 these	 factors	 can	 be	 either	 material	 or	ideational	 idealist,	 speaking	 to	main	 International	 Relations	 debates	 that	 contrast	the	traditions	of	rationalist	or	constructivist	scholarship.			 Each	factor	and	the	hypothesis	testing	its	effect	on	institutional	design	will	be	discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 a	 separate	 chapter.	 As	 a	 cursory	 introduction,	 I	will	 discuss	each	of	the	four	explanations	here.	A	state’s	national	 identity	that	is	grounded	in	a	longstanding	tradition	of	support	for	liberal	values	such	as	human	rights	provides	a	domestic	 environment	 that	 would	 be	 more	 favourable	 to	 establishing	 and	maintaining	 strong	national	 human	 rights	 institutions.	 Countries	with	 such	 strong	democratic	 traditions	 are	 among	 the	 states	 that	 adopted	 classical	 ombudsmen	
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earlier	 than	most	other	 states	around	 the	world,	 such	as	Finland,	 Sweden	or	New	Zealand.	 When	 such	 a	 national	 identity	 does	 not	 exist,	 the	 political	 and	 material	costs	 of	 establishing	 and	 maintaining	 a	 strong	 such	 institution	 may	 be	 too	 high.		Alternatively,	 in	 transitional	 states	 where	 liberal	 democracy	 is	 in	 its	 infancy	 and	does	not	 have	 a	 solid	 foundation	of	 strong	 institutions,	 governments	may	wish	 to	lock	 in	 such	 democratic	 bodies	 and	 give	 them	 a	 strong	 design	 as	 a	 measure	 of	defence	against	potential	detrimental	interference	by	subsequent	governments	with	different	political	interests.			 In	 the	 international	 sphere,	 actors	 such	 as	 the	European	Union,	 the	United	Nations	 or	 the	 United	 States	 can	 offer	 ideational	 and	 material	 incentives	 as	incentives	for	national	governments	to	support	sustainable	and	strong	independent	human	 rights	 institutions.	 Membership	 conditionality	 is	 a	 powerful	 regional	 tool	that	the	European	Union	employs	to	determine	candidate	states	to	harmonize	their	legislation	 and	 institutions	 with	 European	 standards	 required	 for	 full	 accession.	Since	 the	 2004	 wave	 of	 accession,	 the	 European	 Commission	 has	 included	 fully	independent,	 functional	 and	 effective	 ombudsmen	 and	human	 rights	 commissions	as	 commonplace	 recommendations	 in	 their	 yearly	 country	 reports	 that	 monitor	progress	of	candidate	countries.	In	addition,	countries	such	as	the	United	States	and	multilateral	 organizations	 like	 the	 European	 Union	 include	 in	 their	 foreign	 policy	foreign	aid	for	the	support	and	the	improvement	of	national	human	rights	records	that	 include	 strong	 institutions.	 A	 number	 of	 Preferential	 Trade	 Agreements	 also	have	 harder	 human	 rights	 conditionality	 that	 could	 reflect	 on	 the	 strength	 of	 the	
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independent	 bodies	 charged	 with	 human	 rights	 promotion	 and	 protection	nationally.			 Moreover,	 global	 networks	 can	 also	 create	 environments	 in	 which	socialization	and	learning	can	occur	through	peer	interaction	and	collaboration.	The	accreditation	process	supported	by	the	International	Coordinating	Committee	at	the	United	Nations’	Office	of	the	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	is	founded	on	a	process	of	peer-review	that	results	in	an	assessment	of	and,	when	needed,	a	set	of	recommendations	meant	to	improve	institutional	performance	and	effectiveness.		
	 The	explanatory	framework	for	institutional	design	builds	on	the	scholarship	on	 cross-border	 diffusion,	 which	 lends	 a	 mechanism-based	 perspective	 to	understanding	 processes	 of	 policy	 and	 institutional	 transfer	 across	 borders.	Complementing	the	analysis	is	the	literature	of	Europeanization,	which	provides	an	insightful	regional	perspective	to	 the	understanding	of	human	rights	 institutions	–	with	a	longstanding	liberal	democratic	tradition	and	its	membership	conditionality	programmes,	 the	 European	 Union	 has	 been	 a	 steady	 promoter	 of	 independent	national	bodies	charged	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights.	Europe	is	the	region	with	the	highest	number	of	such	bodies	with	a	strong	design	and	also	with	the	most	countries	 that	 adopted	 their	 classical	 ombudsmen	 earlier	 than	 most	 other	 states	around	the	world.			 The	 academic	 interest	 in	 diffusion	 originated	 in	 the	 natural	 sciences	 and	investigated,	 in	 general	 abstract	 terms,	 the	 transmission	 of	 characteristics	 or	elements	 from	 one	 unit	 to	 another	 in	 the	 natural	 world.	 In	 the	 social	 sciences,	however,	the	interest	in	diffusion	processes	jelled	in	the	past	three	decades,	with	a	
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stronger	push	toward	a	theorization	of	such	scholarship	occurring	only	in	the	past	decade.	Dissemination	processes	that	occur	at	the	individual	level	make	up	the	first	set	of	diffusion	phenomena	to	be	investigated	more	in	depth	by	social	scientists,	like	studies	 of	 the	 spread	 of	 innovations.	 In	 the	 past	 couple	 of	 decades,	 scholars	 of	international	 relations	 and	 political	 science	 have	 manifested	 an	 increasing	interested	in	explaining	the	triggers	and	conditions	that	determine	the	relationship	between	 institutional	 change	 and	 policy	 adoption	 in	 one	 country	 and	 another	country’s	 decision	 to	 establish	 the	 same	 institution	 and	 opt	 for	 the	 same	 policy	choice.	This	doctoral	project	focuses	not	simply	on	governments’	decisions	to	adopt	a	certain	institution	for	the	protection	and	promotion	of	human	rights,	but	also	links	the	patterns	of	institutional	creation	with	varying	levels	of	institutional	strength	as	a	function	of	institutional	design.		 Diffusion	 scholarship	 presents	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 variation	 in	 terms	 of	empirical	applications	and	the	identified	mechanisms	that	account	for	institutional	transfer.	 The	 conceptual	 nature	 of	 diffusion	 itself	 is	 also	 partly	 facilitating	 such	empirical	 diversity,	 as	 scholars	 have	 formulated	 definitions	 of	 diffusion	 that	 are	general	and	often	also	following	individual	arguments	and	different	academic	fields’	conventions.	 Recent	 years	 have	 seen	 a	 certain	 convergence	 of	 different	 analytic	tools	 and	 a	 very	 recent	 broad	 consensus	 over	 general	 categories	 of	 diffusion	phenomena	 and	 scholarly	 approaches.	 Although	 diffusion	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	interdependence	 (Gilardi	 2013),	 whether	 manifesting	 itself	 among	 individuals,	within	 a	 country,	 or	 across	 borders,	 for	 the	 analytic	 purposes	 of	 the	 fields	 of	comparative	 politics	 and	 international	 relations,	 the	 diffusion	 story	 is	 also	 about	
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internationalization	 as	 the	 determination	 of	 a	 country’s	 institutional	 and	 policy	decision-making	on	another	country’s	prior	choices.		 This	 thesis	 builds	 its	 argument	 on	 the	 contention	 that	 both	 domestic	 and	international	factors	–	be	they	global	or	regional	–	determine	the	design	of	national	human	rights	institutions.	A	common	view	in	international	relations	scholarship	on	diffusion	is	that	cross-border	factors	are	the	main	elements	that	can	have	an	impact	on	a	state’s	choice	to	adopt	a	new	type	of	institution	or	policy	(Elkins	and	Simmons	2005).	Domestic	factors,	however,	have	been	proven	to	play	a	role	in	a	government’s	decision	 to	 adopt	 an	 institution	 mandated	 with	 the	 promotion	 and	 protection	 of	human	rights,	with	factors	such	as	civil	society	activity	and	different	government’s	political	leaning	as	important	determinants	of	institutional	diffusion	across	borders	(Simmons	 2002).	 Additionally,	 diffusion	 processes	 can	 happen	 inter-regionally	and/or	 can	be	 region-driven,	 leading	 to	policy	 clustering	 in	one	 region	 (Meseguer	2006).	One	such	example	is	provided	by	the	study	of	policy	diffusion	driven	by	the	European	 Union	 is	 often	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 literature	 as	 the	 process	 of	Europeanization	 (Green	 Cowles,	 Caporaso,	 and	 Risse-Kappen	 2001;	 Featherstone	and	Radaelli	2003;	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier	2005;	Graziano,	Vink	2007).	The	analysis	 of	 the	 design	 of	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 presented	 below	provides	 statistically	 significant	 evidence	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 all	 three	 types	 of	determinants	 on	 government	 decisions	 to	 establish	 and	 maintain	 strong	independent	bodies	that	promote	and	protect	human	rights	on	their	territories.			 In	 the	 context	 of	 this	 project’s	 explanatory	 framework,	 the	 literature	 on	Europeanization	is	particularly	helpful	when	seeking	to	test	the	effect	of	European	
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Union-led	 incentives	 on	 countries	 that	 have	 had	membership	 candidate	 status	 at	some	 point	 since	 the	 2004	 wave	 of	 accession.	 Broadly	 defined	 as	 either	 the	“influence	of	the	EU”	or	the	“domestic	impact	of	the	EU,”	Europeanization	is	a	highly	debated	concept	with	a	relatively	recent	research	agenda	 that	began	at	 the	end	of	the	1990s	(Sedelmeier	2006).	Most	studies	on	Europeanization	concern	themselves	with	the	impact	and	effectiveness	of	European	integration	new	on	member	states	of	the	EU	measured	 as	 compliance	with	EU	policies	 (Goetz	 and	Meyer-Sahling	2008;	Ladrech	 2009;	 Schimmelfennig	 2012).	 Regional	 mechanisms	 that	 operate	 with	different	degrees	of	effectiveness	at	the	regional	level	manifests	in	policies	such	as	through	membership	 conditionality	 programs	 for	 candidate	 states,	 harmonization	strategies	 for	new	member	states,	bilateral	policy	agreements	within	the,	ENP	and	foreign	 aid	 ties	 in	 foreign	 relations	 with	 states	 outside	 its	 immediate	 zone	 of	influence	(Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier	2004).	The	European	Commission	issues	yearly	 country	 reports	 that	 assess	 the	 progress	 of	 candidate	 states	make	 in	 some	main	 policy	 areas	 of	 interest	 –	 for	 instance,	 economic	 stability	 and	 health,	corruption	 control,	 judicial	 reform,	 and,	 importantly,	 respect	 for	 human	 rights	through	 institutional	 capacity	 building	 and	 legal	 harmonization.	 Ombudsmen	 and	human	rights	institutions	represent	key	actors	in	these	reports,	as	they	are	charged	with	 the	 important	 policy	 tasks	 that	 ensure	 state	 institutions’	 respect	 for	 human	rights,	government	accountability	and	transparency	as	well	as	 the	 implementation	of	international	human	rights	law	in	domestic	environments.		 Empirical	 studies	 of	 cross-border	 institutional	 transfer	 often	 result	 in	 the	identification	 of	 mechanisms	 that	 help	 to	 explain	 triggers	 and	 scope	 conditions	
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driving	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 institution	 or	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 certain	 policy	 by	virtue	 of	 a	 relationship	 with	 another	 state.	 Certain	 diffusion	 mechanisms,	 like	competition,	 are	 investigated	 extensively	 through	 both	 conceptual	 and	 applied	research,	while	other	mechanisms,	like	learning,	have	been	over-conceptualized	but	not	operationalized	 in	equal	amounts	(Meseguer	2005).	As	a	result	of	 inconsistent	focus	 on	 empirics	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 an	 overarching	 theory	 of	 global	 diffusion,	 the	number	of	 such	mechanisms	of	diffusion	 identified	by	 the	 literature	 is	 large,	often	context-specific	 and	 data	 driven,	 and	 rarely	 fit	 for	 generalization.	 Only	 recently	there	 has	 been	 a	 move	 toward	 integration	 of	 such	 diffusion	 mechanisms	 into	broader	 categories	 that	 allow	 for	 more	 systematic	 theory	 building	 (Shipan	 and	Volden	2006;	Simmons,	Dobbin,	and	Garrett	2008;	Gilardi	2013).		 	
1.5.	Institutional	Design	
	In	 organizational	 theory,	 design	 is	 a	 commonplace	 term	 that	 refers	 primarily	 to	 a	process	 aimed	 at	 producing	 prescriptions,	 organizational	 charts	 and	 plans,	 and	adaptive	 rules	 for	 coping	 with	 unforeseen	 circumstances	 (Nystrom	 and	 Starbuck	1981;	Brunsson	and	Olsen	1993).	 In	this	sense,	design	 involves	an	 interest	 in	how	institutions	 might	 be,	 and	 ought	 to	 be,	 constructed,	 in	 order	 to	 meet	 human	purposes	best,	 function	well,	 and	 create	 improvement	 (Simon	1970).	Political	 and	sociological	 studies	 of	 institutions	 investigate	 design	with	 a	 focus	 on	 institutional	behaviour	 or	 structure	where	 reform	 only	 leads	 to	 demand	 for	more	 reform	 and	change	only	occurs	once	institutional	change	ahs	already	occurred	(March	and	Olsen	
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1976;	 March	 and	 Olsen	 1983;	 March	 and	 Olsen	 1984;	 March	 and	 Olsen	 1989;	Brunsson	 and	 Olsen	 1993;	 Olsen	 1997).	 To	 organizational	 sociologists,	 the	discretion	 and	 choice	 of	 institutional	 designers	 are	 constrained	 by	 environments	that	can	provide	 them	with	 “templates”	or	 “scripts.”	Moreover,	participants	assign	meaning	 to	 organizational	 structures	 making	 institutional	 change	 more	 difficult	(Powell	and	DiMaggio	1991;	Scott	and	Meyer	1994;	Scott	2008).			 The	above	perspectives	on	institutional	design,	however,	underrate	the	role	of	 intention	 that	 ensures	 the	 purposeful	 connections	 among	 different	 elements	 of	design	 (Olsen	 1997,	 p.	 206).	 Directly	 relevant	 for	 the	 argument	 proposed	 in	 this	thesis	 is	 the	 view	 that	 in	 fact	 “design	 signifies	 purposeful	 and	 deliberate	intervention	 that	 succeeds	 in	 establishing	 new	 institutional	 structures	 and	processes,	or	 rearranging	existing	ones,	 thereby	achieving	 intended	outcomes	and	improvements.	 That	 is,	 design	 is	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 chain	 of	 effects	 from	human	 purpose	 to	 desired	 results”	 (Olsen	 1997,	 p.	 205).	 When	 institutions	 are	studied	in	a	political	context,	it	becomes	apparent	that	political	and	public	support	for	 specific	designs	or	 institutional	design	 cannot	be	 taken	as	a	given.	 In	electoral	and	public-opinion	systems,	 like	democratic	governance,	conflicting	preferences	 in	the	 population,	 or	 causal	 and	 moral	 beliefs	 grounded	 in	 traditional	 perceptions	inform	 the	 openness	 toward	 providing	 support	 for	 certain	 types	 of	 institutional	design.	Importantly,	also,	the	same	properties	of	democratic	polities	which	create	a	space	for	design,	can	also	constrain	the	possibilities	for	exploiting	that	space	(Olsen	1997).		
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	 Additionally,	 the	 conceptualisation	 of	 the	 dependent	 variable	 speaks	 to	 a	body	 of	 more	 recent	 International	 Relations	 scholarship	 that	 engages	 with	 the	institutional	design	of	international	organisations	(Finnemore	1993;	Finnemore	and	Sikkink	 1998;	 Koremenos,	 Lipson,	 and	 Snidal	 2001;	 Koremenos	 and	 Snidal	 2003;	Jupille,	 Caporaso,	 and	 Checkel	 2003;	 Checkel	 2005).	 As	 domestic	 actors	 charged	with	 the	 implementation	 of	 human	 rights	 law,	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	reflect	 both	 the	 interests	 of	 national	 governments	 deciding	 to	 establish	 an	institution	 on	 their	 territories	 and	 of	 the	 other	 states	 and	 organisations	 that	coordinate	 the	 global	 and	 regional	 support	 systems	 in	 place	 (i.e.	 UN-based	 peer-review	 system	 for	 accreditation,	 or	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe,	 or	 the	 European	Commission	 and	 the	 regional	 networks	 like	 the	 Asia-Pacific	 Forum	 and	 the	European	 Network	 of	 National	 Human	 Rights	 Institutions).	 Given	 the	 nature	 of	mandates	 and	 of	 the	 positions	 of	 intermediaries	 between	 domestic	 governments,	other	 states,	 and	 international	 organisations,	 no	 single	 set	 of	 factors	 can	 give	 a	sufficient	 account	 of	 institutional	 strength.	 Rather,	 the	 interplay	 of	 ideational	 and	material	factors	explains	best	the	design	of	national	human	rights	ombudsmen	and	commissions.		
	
1.6.	Research	design	and	methods		The	project	follows	a	nested	multi-method	research	design	(Creswell	2003;	Creswell	2009),	which	begins	with	a	quantitative	analysis	of	global	trends	as	a	backdrop	for	qualitative	investigations	at	the	regional	 level	 in	Europe.	The	fourth	chapter	of	the	
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thesis	 seeks	 to	 understand	 the	 interplay	 of	 sufficient	 factors	 for	 institutional	strength	 in	 Europe	 and	 makes	 use	 of	 Qualitative	 Comparative	 Analysis	 (QCA),	following	it	with	a	brief	 illustrative	discussion	of	the	country	cases	selected	by	the	analysis.			 The	first	level	of	analysis	is	global	and	aims	to	trace	patterns	of	institutional	strength	and	its	determinants	around	the	world.	The	quantitative	global	dataset	 is	cross-sectional	 and	 covers	 data	 reported	 in	 2013	 (most	 report	 data	 collected	 in	2013	 reflects	 information	 about	2012).	The	dataset	 covers	data	on	187	 countries,	excluding	 overseas	 and	 autonomous	 territories	 as	 well	 as	 institutions	 in	 sub-national	 regions	 (such	 as	 Scotland,	 Northern	 Ireland	 and	 Puerto	 Rico)	 due	 to	missing	data	on	these	countries	on	many	of	the	independent	variables.	In	addition	to	the	 quantitative	 analysis	 at	 the	 global	 level,	 the	 thesis	 proposes	 also	 a	 qualitative	comparative	analysis	at	the	regional	level,	exploring	further	the	sufficient	conditions	for	occurrence	of	strong	institutions	in	Europe.	The	QCA-based	findings	sketch	out	a	research	agenda	for	the	study	of	institutional	design	to	be	explored	further	beyond	this	thesis.			 With	the	largest	number	of	strong	national	human	rights	institutions	and	the	most	 countries	 that	 have	 adopted	 their	 ombudsman	bodies	prior	 to	 the	 ‘boom’	 in	interest	 for	 the	establishment	of	 these	 independent	 liberal	democratic	 institutions	in	the	early	1990s,	Europe	presents	a	very	interesting	case	that	offers	a	view	on	the	regional	workings	of	factors	that	sufficient	for	certain	types	of	institutional	design.	The	qualitative	 regional	 data	 is	 in	 the	 form	of	 a	 crisp-set	Qualitative	Comparative	Analysis	 and	 analyses	 data	 on	 36	 countries	 from	 2013,	 and	 case	 studies	 present	
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historical	data	and	information	on	changes	that	may	have	happened	since	2013.	We	include	one	model	with	two	different	outcomes,	testing	the	impact	of	four	factors	on	two	main	definitions	of	the	outcomes	–	on	the	one	hand,	we	have	the	outcome	that	measures	 the	 occurrence	 of	 strong	 versus	 not	 strong	 (i.e.	 medium	 and	 weak)	institutional	 design	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 outcome	 that	 measures	 the	incidence	of	weak	versus	not	weak	(i.e.	strong	and	medium)	design.			 The	second	level	of	analysis	also	includes	a	section	that	presents	case	study	discussions	of	 the	 interplay	of	 the	relevant	regional	 factors	at	 the	national	 level	 in	the	 relevant	 cases	 found	 by	 the	 QCA.	 The	 case	 studies	 are	merely	 for	 illustrative	purposes	giving	a	brief	account	of	the	history	of	each	institution	and	the	factors	that	shape	it.	The	case	discussions	are	not	full-fledged	case	studies	in	this	version	of	the	analysis.	The	same	four	major	analytical	explanations	are	tested	at	both	the	global	and	 regional	 level.	The	number	of	 factors	 included	 in	 the	QCA	model	 is	 limited	 to	four	due	to	both	the	computational	limitations	of	the	QCA	as	a	method	and	the	lack	of	comparable	data	at	the	regional	level.	Future	research	could	explore	further	both	the	 regional	dimension	 in	other	 contexts	outside	of	Europe	and	also	 the	domestic	contexts	through	in-country	qualitative	interview	and	ethnographic	research.			
1.7.	Summary	of	main	findings	
	The	global	analysis	 finds	evidence	 that	 the	combination	of	a	number	of	significant	ideational	 and	 material	 factors,	 which	 operate	 both	 across	 borders	 and	domestically,	 has	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 institutional	 strength.	 Socialization	
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processes	 facilitated	 by	 institutional	 network	 participation	 explain	 a	 stronger	institutional	design	both	at	the	global	and	regional	levels.	Participation	in	the	UN	led	peer-review	 process	 for	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 accreditation	 makes	countries	more	likely	to	have	stronger	institutions.	In	other	words,	the	accreditation	process	based	on	peer-review	and	the	benefits	of	belonging	to	the	global	community	of	 NHRIs	 create	 the	 necessary	 environment	 for	 governments	 to	 learn	 from	 each	other	 how	 to	 strengthen	 the	 design	 of	 their	 institutions.	 Through	 peer-review,	members	of	 governments	 in	 countries	with	 strong	NHRIs	provide	 feedback	 to	 the	country	 seeking	 accreditation	 or	 re-accreditation.	 This	 targeted	 feedback	 is	 in	 the	form	of	recommendations	about	necessary	measures	for	an	institution	to	be	fully	in	compliance	with	the	Paris	Principles.			 Socialisation	 can	 also	 explain	 variation	 in	 strength	 at	 the	 regional	 level.		Social	 learning	 and	 acculturation	 across	 borders	 take	 place	 in	 regions	 with	 high	density	of	strong	such	human	rights	institutions.	Europe	and	the	Americas	have	the	most	national	human	rights	institutions	with	a	strong	design.	The	analysis	finds	that	social	learning	can	take	place	if	countries	are	located	in	regions	with	a	high	density	of	 strong	NHRIs	 in	 their	proximity.	The	strongest	such	effect	 is	evident	 in	Europe,	which	 the	 region	 with	 the	 most	 early	 adopting	 countries.	 For	 instance,	 the	Scandinavian	 countries	 are	 the	 countries	 that	 have	 the	 longest	 history	 of	 the	ombudsman	 institution.	 Sweden	 created	 its	 earliest	 version,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	Parliamentary	 Ombudsman,	 in	 the	 early	 19th	 century.	 Around	 the	 world,	 all	institutions	 make	 reference	 to	 the	 Swedish	 ombudsman	 as	 the	 historical	institutional	model	they	aim	to	follow.	Finland	was	the	second	earliest	adopter,	and	
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Sweden	is	the	country	to	have	set	the	model	for	it	as	well.	When	the	first	version	of	a	parliamentary	 ombudsman	 was	 established	 in	 Finland,	 the	 country	 was	 part	 of	Sweden.	 Later	 in	 the	 20th	 century,	 the	 institution’s	 mandate	 was	 expanded	 to	include	also	more	explicit	human	rights	duties	as	required	by	the	Sub-Committee	for	Accreditation	and	the	European	Commission.			 Countries	with	strong	democratic	 identities,	which	established	their	human	rights	 institutions	 prior	 to	 1980,	 are	 both	more	 likely	 to	 have	 strong	 institutions	themselves.	 The	 analysis	 of	 global	 trends	 finds	 also	 that	 incentive-setting	 plays	 a	role	 both	 at	 the	 global	 and	 the	 regional	 levels,	 as	 countries	 that	 receive	 higher	amounts	of	Overseas	Development	Assistance	from	the	United	States	are	more	likely	to	have	stronger	human	rights	institutions.	One	such	example	is	Afghanistan	which	in	 the	 past	 ten	 years	 has	 received	 the	 highest	 amount	 of	 financial	 development	support	 from	 the	 United	 States.	 The	 Afghani	 Independent	 Human	 Rights	Commission	 has	 a	 strong	 design	 and	 is	 financed	 primarily	 through	 international	development	funds	donated	to	the	institution	directly.			 States	 that	 have	 been	 subjected	 to	 membership	 conditionality	 by	 the	European	Union	are	also	more	 likely	 to	have	stronger	 institutions.	Since	 the	2004	wave	 of	 enlargement,	 Brussels	 has	 instituted	 a	 monitoring	 and	 assistance	framework	 of	 conditionality	 intended	 to	 offer	 guidance	 and	 incentives	 for	 newly	democratized	countries	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	to	align	their	legislation	and	institutions	with	norms	and	practices	in	the	old	members	states	in	Western	Europe.	In	 the	 country	monitoring	 reports	 that	 the	European	Commission	 issues	annually,	national	 ombudsmen	 and	 human	 rights	 commissions	 figure	 prominently	 as	 the	
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main	 independent	 institutions	 charged	 with	 the	 domestic	 implementation	 of	regional	human	rights	treaties.	The	European	Commission	regards	these	bodies	as	key	domestic	 actors	 that	 can	offer	 support	 and	advice	 to	national	 governments	 in	their	 efforts	 to	 harmonize	 legislation,	 consolidate	 liberal	 democratic	 institutions,	and	improve	the	human	rights	situation	in	the	country.	The	significant	role	that	they	play	 in	 the	context	of	accession	 to	 the	European	Union	 is	evident	as	 the	strongest	regional	effects	visible	in	the	global	analysis.		
1.8.	Structure	of	the	thesis	
	The	 thesis	 is	 organised	 in	 four	 major	 chapters.	 The	 first	 chapter	 introduces	 the	dependent	 variable,	 presenting	 the	 main	 conceptual	 scheme	 for	 the	operationalization	of	all	six	dimensions	of	institutional	strength,	and	the	descriptive	statistics	 of	 the	 global	 variation	 across	 the	 indicators	 included	 in	 the	dataset.	 The	second	 chapter	 presents	 the	 explanatory	 framework	 for	 the	 analysis,	 grounding	them	 in	 the	 scholarship	 on	 cross-border	 diffusion,	 Europeanisation,	 and	institutional	design.	Moreover,	 this	 chapter	positions	 the	 ideal	 types	proposed	 for	testing	 in	the	main	theoretical	debates	 in	 International	Relations	and	Comparative	Political	work	on	Europe.			 The	 third	 chapter	 elaborates	 on	 quantitative	model	 selected	 for	 the	 global	analysis,	 presents	 descriptive	 statistics	 on	 the	 main	 independent	 variables,	 and	presents	 the	 results	 of	 the	 logit	 model.	 The	 second	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 discusses	more	in	detail	the	findings	of	the	analysis	in	view	of	the	hypotheses	that	were	tested	
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as	well	as	their	theoretical	and	analytical	implications.	The	fourth	chapter	sets	forth	a	qualitative	 comparative	analysis	of	national	human	 rights	 institutional	design	 in	Europe.	 First,	 it	 presents	briefly	QCA	as	 a	method	and	 its	 appropriateness	 for	 the	regional	 analysis	 of	 institutional	 strength.	 It	 reviews	 the	 main	 four	 analytical	explanations	and	the	corresponding	hypotheses	testing	factors	that	are	relevant	for	understanding	 sufficient	 conditions	 that	 specific	 to	 the	 institutional	 strength	 in	Europe.	The	second	half	of	the	fourth	chapter	presents	brief	case	studies	of	all	cases	identified	by	QCA	as	meeting	 the	conditions	of	sufficiency	 in	 the	regional	analysis,	focusing	in	particular	on	strong	versus	not	strong	institutions.	Concluding	remarks	round	up	the	main	findings	of	the	thesis	and	proposes	avenues	for	further	research.														
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Chapter	2:	The	Dependent	Variable:	The	Conceptualisation	
and	Measurement	of	Institutional	Strength		
	
2.1.	Introduction	This	chapter	introduces	the	dependent	variable	of	the	doctoral	thesis		–	institutional	strength.	 The	 thesis	 conceptualises	 institutional	 strength	 as	 a	 function	 of	 an	institution’s	design,	which	consists	of	 a	 set	of	 formal	 characteristics	 that	 shape	 its	capacity	 to	perform	 its	mandated	duties.	Although	structural	 features	have	a	clear	impact	 on	 an	 institution’s	 capacity	 to	 implement	 its	 mandate,	 the	 distinction	between	design	and	effectiveness	or	performance	is	key	in	the	context	of	this	thesis.	Institutional	 strength	 does	 not	 capture	 any	 dimension	 of	 effectiveness	 nor	 the	extent	to	which	national	institutions	succeed	in	influencing	successfully	government	policy-making	 in	 their	 countries	or	 contribute	 to	 improving	human	 rights	 records	domestically.	Effectiveness	aspects	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.	Institutional	strength	 is	 a	 composite	 variable	 made	 up	 of	 thirteen	 indicators	 organised	 along	these	six	main	dimensions	of	institutional	design.	The	conceptual	scheme	employed	for	 the	 operationalization	 of	 the	 dependent	 variable	 is	 made	 up	 of	 six	 main	categories	 of	 design	 –	 broad	 human	 rights	 mandate,	 de	 jure	 independence,	autonomy	 from	 government,	 promotional	 and	 protection	 activities,	 pluralism	 of	representation,	and	adequate	resources.			 The	 dataset	 of	 institutional	 design	 features	 is	 global	 in	 scope	 and	 contains	data	 on	 194	 national	 institutions.	 Due	 to	 limitations	 of	 data	 on	 some	 of	 the	 key	
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independent	variables,	the	analysis	dataset	is	reduced	to	187	country/institutions.	I	collected	 data	 for	 the	 operationalisation	 of	 the	 thirteen	 indicators	 from	 annual	reports,	 country	 constitutions	 and	 other	 legal	 documentation	 that	 present	institutional	mandates,	as	well	as	other	information	that	is	available	publicly	on	the	national	 human	 rights	 institutions’	 webpages	 or	 in	 Internet-based	 archives	 of	documents	in	their	websites.	Textual	data	is	coded	with	the	help	of	manual	content	analysis	 using	 a	 three-point	 scale	 for	 each	 indicator.	 I	 aggregate	 the	 data	 for	 all	thirteen	indicators	into	one	index	with	three	categories	of	institutional	strength	(1	for	 weak;	 2	 for	 medium;	 3	 for	 strong).	 This	 scale	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 three-point	assessment	 system	 that	 the	 Sub-Committee	 on	 Accreditation	 at	 the	 International	Coordination	 Committee	 of	 NHRIs	 uses.	 The	 analysis	 of	 annual	 reports	 proposes	very	 similar	 results	 as	 the	UN-based	body	 for	 the	 institutions	 that	had	undergone	accreditation	 in	 2013	 –	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 a	 few	 countries,	 both	 assessments	score	 accredited	 countries	 in	 generally	 similar	 ways.	 The	 institutional	 design	dataset,	however,	goes	beyond	the	scope	of	the	accreditation	process	and	includes	over	40	countries	that	have	never	sought	accreditation	with	the	UN	body.	Data	on	these	institutions	was	collected	from	two	main	sources	–	official	documents	such	as	annual	 reports	 and	 legislation,	 when	 available,	 and	 a	 survey	 instrument	administered	globally	via	email	and	post.			 The	chapter	begins	with	a	section	that	 introduces	 the	dependent	variable	–	institutional	strength	–	and	the	conceptual	scheme	that	underlies	the	six	dimensions	of	institutional	design	captured	by	the	categorical	variable.	The	definition	of	the	six	dimensions	is	 followed	by	a	discussion	of	their	operationalization	and	the	thirteen	
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individual	 indicators	 that	 form	 it.	 The	 chapter	 continues	with	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	data	collection	methods	–	textual	and	survey-based	–	presenting	in	detail	the	types	of	 sources	 used	 for	manual	 content	 analysis.	 After	 discussing	 the	 differences	 and	similarities	 between	 the	 original	 dataset	 collected	 for	 this	 thesis	with	 the	 scoring	given	 by	 the	 Sub-Accreditation	 committee	 to	 institutions	 that	 seek	 accreditation	with	the	UN,	the	chapter	offers	more	detail	on	the	formal	characteristics	of	existing	institutions	 that	 have	 not	 undergone	 the	 UN-led	 accreditation	 process.	 The	 third	section	 of	 the	 chapter	 gives	 a	 closer	 view	 of	 each	measure	 of	 institutional	 design	with	the	help	of	descriptive	statistics	that	represent	patterns	 in	the	global	dataset.	The	chapter	concludes	with	remarks	about	 the	contributions	 the	originality	of	 the	data	and	 the	 contribution	 this	dataset	 can	make	 to	 the	 field	as	well	 as	avenues	 to	improve	and	expand	on	it.	
	
	
2.2.The	strength	of	national	human	rights	institutions		The	 conceptual	 scheme	 of	 institutional	 power	 builds	 on	 an	 understanding	 that	institutions	are	not	all	alike	and	that,	despite	a	degree	of	policy	convergence	across	the	globe,	different	domestic	and	 international	 factors	shape	 institutional	 strength	differently	 around	 the	 globe.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 strength	 of	 national	 independent	institutions	 mandated	 to	 promote	 and	 protect	 human	 rights,	 six	 dimensions	 of	institutional	represent,	 in	aggregated	form,	a	convergence	toward	global	similarity	in	the	institutional	model	that	countries	prefer	to	adopt.	This	conceptual	framework	
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is	 unique	 and	 operationalizes	 formal	 attributes	 that	 can	 be	 observed	 in	 national	institutions	mandated	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights	across	the	globe.	These	dimensions	 provide	 a	 synthesis	 of	 the	 main	 mandated	 functions	 of	 independent	human	 rights	 bodies	 at	 the	 national	 level,	 drawn	 from	 their	 national	 legal	frameworks,	 official	 mandates	 and	 yearly	 reports.	 They	 represent	 also	 a	systematization	 of	 the	 main	 functions	 linked	 to	 institutional	 design	 that	 the	International	 Coordinating	 Committee	 of	 National	 Institutions	 for	 the	 Promotion	and	Protection	of	Human	Rights	recommend	for	the	assessment	of	compliance	with	Paris	 Principles	 in	 the	 accreditation	 process.	 In	 the	 Sub-Committee	 for	Accreditation’s	recommendations	for	peer-reviewers,	constitutive	elements	of	these	six	dimensions	overlap	and	are	necessarily	inter-dependent	–	a	broad	human	rights	mandate	 would	 not	 be	 effectively	 implemented	 if	 the	 institution	 were	 not	autonomous	 from	 government	 intervention,	 or	 if	 it	 lacked	 adequate	 resources	 to	carry	out	 its	 activities.	 Similarly,	 de	 jure	 independent	 status	would	not	 result	 in	 a	strong	 design	 or	 an	 effective	 institution	 if	 government	 representatives	 had	significant	power	of	decision	regarding	the	institution’s	activity.				 Institutional	 strength	 is	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 formal	 attributes	 of	institutional	 design	 and	 is	 distinct	 from	 institutional	 effectiveness	 or	 impact.	National	human	rights	institutions	around	the	globe	have	different	design	attributes	depending	on	 the	nature	of	 their	mandate,	 the	degree	of	 independence,	autonomy	from	government,	the	predominant	activities,	as	well	as	the	inclusion	of	civil	society	and	resources.	These	formal	design	characteristics	vary	across	institutions,	and	each	attribute	 is	 present	 in	 varying	 degrees	 in	 each	 institution.	 To	 that	 end,	 the	
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dependent	 variable,	 institutional	 strength,	 measures	 variation	 in	 formal	 design	attributes	 in	 terms	 of	 degree	 and	 as	 distinct	 from	 the	 effectiveness	 or	 impact	 of	institutional	design.			 In	 the	 case	 of	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions,	 effectiveness	 is	 primarily	equated	with	the	institutional	impact	on	human	rights	records	at	the	national	level.	When	 a	 national	 human	 rights	 institution	 has	 also	 an	 international	 mandate	 of	human	 rights	 promotion,	 such	 as	 the	 Danish	 Institute	 for	 Human	 Rights,	 the	effectiveness	of	an	institution	results	in	an	impact	on	human	rights	outcomes	across	borders.	Accredited	NHRIs,	 for	 instance,	 have	been	 found	 to	 act	 as	 intermediaries	between	 the	United	Nations	and	national	governments	 (Pegram,	2015).	They	seek	to	influence	states’	human	rights	performance	both	directly	in	multilateral	forums,	through	 persuading	 government	 officials	 of	 the	 appropriateness	 of	 human	 rights-compliant	 behaviour,	 and	 indirectly,	 by	 enhancing	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 United	Nations	as	an	orchestrator	through	information	sharing	on	compliance	gaps	to	UN	monitoring	mechanisms	and	fortifying	their	own	independent	status	and	activities	within	UN	procedures	(Pegram,	2015).		 As	 such,	 institutional	 strength	 can	 be	 one	 of	 the	 determinants	 of	 human	rights	outcomes	alongside	many	 factors	 that	 can	have	an	 impact	on	human	 rights	records.	 But	 the	 relationship	 between	 institutional	 strength	 and	 institutional	effectiveness	is	not	one	of	equivalence.	In	other	words,	a	country	that	has	a	national	human	rights	institution	ranked	as	‘strong’	in	this	dataset	does	not	necessarily	have	a	 strong	 human	 rights	 record	 (see,	 for	 instance,	 the	 case	 of	 Russia).	 Similarly,	 a	country	with	 a	 very	 good	 human	 rights	 record,	 such	 as	 Sweden,	 does	 not	 have	 a	
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strong	 national	 human	 rights	 institution.	 Understanding	 the	 correlation	 between	institutional	 strength	 as	 a	 function	 of	 institutional	 design	 and	 human	 rights	outcomes	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	research	project.			
Table	2.1	Dimensions	of	institutional	strength	
Six	dimensions	of	institutional	strength	Nature	of	human	rights	mandate	Extent	of	de	jure	independence	Degree	of	autonomy	from	government	Promotion	and	protection	powers	Degree	of	pluralism		Adequate	resources	
	
2.2.1.	A	broad	human	rights	mandate	is	one	of	the	main	recommendations	of	the	Sub-Accreditation	Committee	of	the	International	Coordinating	Committee	at	United	Nations	OHCHR	for	institutions	that	are	effective	(Sub-Committee	on	Accreditation	2013).	The	 scope	of	 the	mandate	 ensures	 that	no	 category	of	 human	 rights	 is	 left	outside	of	 the	 institution’s	competence	and	the	national	human	rights	body	would	be	able	to	address	all	cases	of	human	rights	violation	that	are	seeking	the	assistance	of	 the	 independent	 institution’s	staff	members.	The	call	 for	a	broader	mandate	 for	human	 rights	 promotion	 and	 protection	 can	 be	 linked	 historically	 to	 the	establishment	 of	 the	 human	 rights	 commission.	 In	 the	 mid-1990s	 the	 number	 of	human	rights	commissions	 founded	around	the	world	registered	a	sharp	 increase.	In	 addition,	 a	 number	 of	 countries	 with	 existing	 ombudsmen	 expanded	 on	 their	
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institutional	mandates	either	to	include	a	broad	spectrum	of	human	rights	in	their	mandate	or	to	make	their	human	rights	promotional	and	protective	duties	explicit.	The	mandate	that	is	inclusive	of	all	human	rights	became	also	a	central	criterion	to	the	 assessment	 of	 good	 institutional	 performance	 in	 the	 peer-review	 process	established	 in	 the	 mid-1990s	 by	 the	 United	 Nations	 OHCHR	 as	 part	 of	 the	accreditation	process.		
Figure	2.1.	Nature	of	institutional	mandate	
			 I	 code	 all	 institutions	 in	 the	 dataset	 according	 to	 the	 following	 coding	scheme:	 if	 an	 institution	 does	 not	 have	 a	 broad	 human	 rights	 mandate,	 it	 is	 not	coded	as	a	‘strong’	institution.	Countries	with	institutions	that	have	a	partial	human	rights	 mandate	 are	 coded	 as	 having	 ‘medium’	 strength	 unless	 other	 design	dimensions	position	 them	 in	 the	 ‘weak’	 category.	A	partial	 human	 rights	mandate	can	 cover	 only	 certain	 categories	 of	 rights,	 such	 as	 women’s	 rights	 and	 gender	equality,	as	is	the	case	of	the	Swiss	Commission	of	Women’s	Issues	or	the	Swedish	Equality	Ombudsman	or	be	a	classical	ombudsman	institution	that	 is	not	explicitly	
Dimension	1:	Nature	of	Mandate	 Nature	of	human	rights	mandate	
S:	Broad	human	rights	
M:	Partial	or	classical	ombudsman	W:	No	human	rights	mandate	or	no	institution	
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mandated	 to	 promote	 or	 protect	 human	 rights	 but	 can	 handle	 human	 rights	violation	 cases	between	 individuals	 and	members	of	 the	official	 administration	 as	well	 as	 human	 rights	 cases	 when	 no	 other	 independent	 human	 rights	 mandated	authority	in	the	country	handles	it.	Such	an	example	of	a	classical	ombudsman	is	the	Romanian	 People’s	 Advocate,	 which	 has	 a	 limited	 human	 rights	 mandate	 as	 it	 is	primarily	 set	 up	 to	 investigate	 cases	 of	 violations	 committed	 by	 state	 officials	against	citizens.	Countries	show	a	great	deal	of	uniformity	in	this	category	with	all	strong	 institutions	 have	 a	 broad	 human	 rights	mandate.	 In	 this	 category,	 Ukraine	presents	 an	 interesting	 case	of	 an	 institution	 that	 is	de	 jure	 given	 a	broad	human	rights	mandate,	but	whose	 range	of	 activities	 included	 in	 annual	 reports	 is	 in	 fact	more	limited.	Sweden’s	Equality	Ombudsmen,	who	works	to	combat	discrimination	on	 grounds	 of	 sex,	 transgender	 identity	 or	 expression,	 ethnic	 origin,	 religion	 or	other	belief,	disability,	sexual	orientation	or	age.	Its	mandate	is	not	broadly	inclusive	of	 human	 rights	 issues	 focusing	 on	 rights	 linked	 to	 social	 equality.	 One	 other	institutional	 feature	 that	 confirms	 a	 ‘medium’	 strength	 design	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	Swedish	 Equality	 Ombudsman	 is	 the	 institution’s	 de	 jure	 status	 as	 a	 government	agency	 rather	 than	 an	 independent	 institution	 linked	 to	 the	 Parliament	(Diskriminerings	 Ombudsmannen	 2016).	 The	 UN-based	 Sub-Committee	 for	Accreditation	granted	the	institution	B	status	in	2011,	when	the	Ombudsman	sought	accreditation	for	the	first	time.	Switzerland	provides	an	example	of	a	country	with	weak	 ombudsman	 institutions	 due	 to	 their	 limited	 mandate	 focused	 on	 the	promotion	 and	protection	of	 one	 type	of	 rights	 and	 their	 lack	of	 independence	 as	
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government	 agencies.	 The	 Federal	 Commission	 for	 Feminine	 Issues	 (Commission	fédérale	pour	les	questions	féminines)	and	the	Federal	Commission	Against	Racism.			 	
2.2.2.	 De	 jure	 independence	 is	 a	 key	 dimension	 of	 a	 strong	 institution.	 I	operationalize	 de	 jure	 independence	 with	 the	 help	 of	 two	 indicators	 –	 type	 of	institution	 (a	 body	 with	 independent	 status	 granted	 through	 law,	 government	agency,	or	NGO)	and	the	type	of	law	establishing	it	and	its	powers.	The	confirmation	of	 independent	 status	 by	 inclusion	 in	 country	 constitution	 and	 national	 law	 is	regarded	as	a	safeguard	against	potential	threats	on	the	part	of	the	Executive	to	the	institution’s	independence	or	permanency	(Sub-Committee	on	Accreditation	2013).	As	 recommended	 by	 the	 United	 Nations-based	 International	 Coordinating	Committee,	 institutional	 establishment	 through	 inclusion	 in	 a	 constitutional	 or	legislative	 text	 that	makes	 explicit	 its	 independent	 status	 is	 vital	 to	 its	 successful	performance	 without	 interference	 from	 political	 interests	 that	 can	 fluctuate	 with	changes	 in	 government.	 The	 significance	 of	 independent	 status	 for	 national	institutions	has	gained	salience	since	the	end	of	World	War	II,	with	the	promotion	of	liberal	 democratic	 institutions	 around	 the	world.	 The	 United	 Nations	 and	 foreign	policy	agendas	of	the	United	States	and	Europe	have	regarded	de	jure	independence	through	 inclusion	 in	 as	 a	 guarantee	 for	 institutional	 longevity	 –	 human	 rights	institutions	 alongside	 other	 bodies,	 such	 as	 anticorruption	 agencies	 and	 central	banks	are	broadly	charged	with	the	promotion	and	protection	of	citizens’	rights	as	well	 as	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 of	 government	 (World	 Bank.	 2000;	International	 Council	 on	 Human	 Rights	 Policy.,	 United	 Nations.,	 and	 Office	 of	 the	
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High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights.	2005;	OECD	2007;	USAID	2006;	Bini	Smaghi	2007;	ENNHRI	2014).			 In	 the	 academic	 realm,	 scholarship	 on	 central	 banks	 has	 focused	 more	extensively	on	understanding	and	measuring	 institutional	 independence,	 speaking	of	 institutional	 independence	 as	 a	 pre-condition	 to	 good	 monetary	 policymaking	and	 a	 fundamental	 of	 insuring	 the	 maintenance	 of	 low	 inflation	 policy	 and	 low	unemployment	(Cukierman,	Webb,	and	Neyapti	1992;	Cukierman	and	Webb	1995;	Franzese	1999;	Stiglitz	1998;	Bernhard,	Broz,	 and	Roberts	Clark	2002;	McNamara	2002;	de	Haan,	Masciandaro,	and	Quintyn	2008).	Independence	is	perhaps	the	most	contentious	 issue	 informing	 the	 design	 of	 NHRIs	 (A.	 Smith	 2006).	 A	 very	 small	number	of	studies	about	NHRIs	examine	closely	their	independence,	discussing	the	breadth	of	 the	concept	and	the	different	design	elements	that	could	be	considered	constitutive	of	 institutional	 independence	 (Carver	2014;	Linos	and	Pegram	2015).	According	 to	 Carver	 (2014:	 22),	 NHRI	 independence	 incorporates	 nine	 factors:	‘statutory	 basis,	 appointment	 process,	 criteria	 for	 membership,	 term	 of	 office,	conflict	 of	 interest	 provisions,	 remuneration,	 immunities	 enjoyed	 by	 institution	members,	whether	or	not	they	can	receive	direct	instruction	from	the	government,	and	the	procedure	for	removal	of	a	member’.	To	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	no	study	to	 date	 offers	 a	 numeric	measure	 of	 independence	 in	 the	 case	 of	 national	 human	rights	institutions.			 A	measure	of	de	jure	independence	ought	to	capture	the	extent	to	which	the	legal	 stability	 of	 an	 institution’s	 independence	 is	 granted	 through	 law	 and	constitution	 seen	 as	 a	 safeguard	 against	 potential	 government	 intervention	 that	
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could	weaken	 its	 powers.	 The	 two	 factors	 that	make	up	 the	 independence	 –	 legal	status	and	de	jure	independence	–	operate	at	different	moments	of	an	institution’s	existence.	Namely,	de	jure	independence	is	a	factor	tied	to	the	establishment	of	the	institution,	 at	 the	 constitutional	 moment,	 while	 legal	 status	 is	 linked	 to	 the	operation	of	an	institution.	However,	both	indicators	have	an	effect	on	the	operation	of	the	institution.		
 I	 code	 all	 institutions	 in	 the	 dataset	 according	 to	 the	 following	 coding	scheme:	 if	 the	 national	 human	 rights	 institution	 is	 a	 public	 body	 whose	 legal	independent	status	is	guaranteed	through	country	constitution	and	national	law,	it	is	 ranked	as	 ‘strong’.	 If	 a	 country’s	 institution	 is	established	as	a	ministerial	office	directly	subordinated	to	the	Executive	and	its	legal	status	is	not	guaranteed	through	national	 law	 or	 country	 constitution	 (i.e.	 only	 through	 government	 decree),	 the	institution	is	that	country’s	institution	is	ranked	as	‘medium.’	Countries	without	an	independent	 public	 body	 designated	 specifically	 to	 promote	 and	 protect	 human	rights	 through	 country	 constitution	 and	 primary	 legislation	 are	 ranked	 as	 ‘weak.’	Italy	 provides	 such	 an	 example	 of	 a	 country	 that	 has	 a	 network	 of	 regional	ombudsmen	 established	 through	 regional	 and	 local	 statutory	 law	 but	 no	 single	national	 ombudsman	 founded	 through	 inclusion	 in	 the	 Constitution	 or	 a	 legal	background	 for	 its	 establishment.	According	 to	 the	 Italian	Constitution,	 towns	 are	granted	autonomy	and	can	therefore	provide	the	 legal	basis	 for	a	 local	or	regional	Ombudsman	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 provisions	 in	 their	 local	 constitutions	 (International	Ombudsman	Institute	2010).		
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Figure	2.2.	Extent	of	de	jure	independence	
		
2.2.3.	 Autonomy	 from	 government	 intervention	 is	 a	 third	 dimension	 of	institutional	 design	 I	 operationalize	 for	 bodies	 charged	 with	 the	 promotion	 and	protection	 of	 human	 rights	 at	 the	 national	 level.	 Autonomy	 from	 government	intervention	and	independence	are	two	closely	linked	dimensions	of	design	–	in	the	context	of	this	thesis,	it	is	important	to	differentiate	between	the	two,	as	the	former	is	a	de	facto	characteristic	that	captures	the	legal	framework	for	the	type	of	body	the	national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 are.	 While	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 the	separation	 between	 institutional	 activity	 and	 the	 Executive,	 de	 jure	 independence	through	inclusion	in	national	law	or	constitution	does	not	always	translate	into	real	autonomy	 from	 government	 intervention.	 I	 operationalize	 autonomy	 from	government	intervention	with	the	help	of	four	indicators	that	capture	the	extent	to	
Dimension	2:	Extent	of	de	jure	independence	
De	jure	independence	
S:	Independent		
M:	Govt	ministry/agency	
W:	Research	centre	or	NGO	
Legal	status	
S:	Constitution	&	national	law	
M:	Government	decree	
W:	no	independent	public	body	with	HR	mandate	
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which	 representatives	 of	 the	 Executive	 are	 involved	 in	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	institution	 or	 the	 management	 of	 its	 annual	 budget:	 financial	 autonomy,	appointment	structure,	government	involvement	in	decision-making,	and	reporting	system.			 The	appointment	mechanism	in	place	for	the	leadership	of	the	institution	is	a	measure	 of	 autonomy	 from	 the	 Executive	 and	 other	 types	 of	 interference	 with	decision-making,	 based	 on	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	 appointment	 system	 for	 each	institution	–	when	the	Parliament	is	the	instance	that	makes	decisions	on	appointing	leaders	 of	 the	 institution,	 its	 autonomy	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 greater	 than	 when	 the	Executive	is	involved	in	appointing	the	institutional	Board,	the	Ombudsman,	or	the	Chief	 Commissioner.	 When	 the	 Parliament	 appoints	 or	 is	 the	 final	 instance	 to	approve	 the	 Ombudsman	 or	 the	 Chief	 Commissioner,	 the	 institution	 is	 ranked	 as	‘strong’.	If	the	Government	appoints	the	head	of	the	institution,	the	national	human	rights	 institution	 is	 considered	 of	 ‘medium’	 strength.	 If	 the	 institution	 is	 a	 non-governmental	 organisation	 with	 leadership	 appointed	 by	 an	 NHRI	 board	 or	 a	committee	 alone,	 without	 any	 accountability	 or	 oversight	 mechanism,	 or	 if	 an	institution	has	no	clearly	defined	appointment	structure,	the	institution	is	ranked	as	‘weak’.	 The	 decision	 to	 rank	 NHRIs	 with	 NGO	 status	 as	 ‘weak’	 rests	 on	 the	assumption	 that	 the	 accountability	 system	 in	which	 elected	 officials	 are	 the	main	deciding	 instance	 in	 the	 processes	 of	 leadership	 appointment	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 an	effective	safeguard	against	threats	to	the	autonomy	of	NHRIs	and,	more	broadly,	to	its	strength.		
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	 An	 institutional	 budget	 included	 in	 the	 state	 annual	 budget	 represents	 a	greater	 commitment	 to	 guarantee	 the	 constant	 annual	 provision	 of	 funds	 to	 the	human	rights	body,	while	reliance	on	a	mix	of	funds	by	the	Executive	and	donations	from	external	organizations	presents	 less	of	a	guarantee	of	financial	 independence	and	successful	activity.	The	official	source	of	funding	is	stated	in	the	documents	that	frame	 the	 legal	 activity	 of	 the	 national	 institution.	 Additionally,	 the	 system	 of	institutional	 reporting	 is	 an	 indicator	 of	 the	 primary	 audience	 and	 intended	recipient	 of	 the	 institutions’	 annual	 reports	 and,	 when	 appropriate,	 also	 human	rights	reports.	Reporting	entails	a	degree	of	institutional	accountability	to	social	and	political	 actors	 and,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 Executive	 is	 the	 unique	 target	 of	 its	reporting,	is	also	a	measure	of	degree	of	autonomy	from	government	intervention.		 In	order	to	code	the	third	dimension	of	design	I	aggregate	the	scores	across	the	 four	 indicators	 according	 to	 the	 following	 scheme:	 If	 a	 country	 is	 ranked	 as	‘strong’	 in	 at	 least	 three	 of	 the	 four	 indicators,	 it	 is	 coded	 as	 ‘strong’	 in	 the	 third	dimension	 of	 institutional	 design.	 For	 the	 indicator	 that	 measures	 financial	independence,	an	institution	is	ranked	as	strong	if	its	budget	is	guaranteed	through	inclusion	in	the	state	budget	and	the	final	yearly	amounts	are	decided	on	every	year	by	 Parliament.	 If	 Government	 alone	 decides	 on	 the	 institution’s	 budget	 without	approval	 by	 Parliament	 and	 without	 inclusion	 in	 the	 yearly	 state	 budget,	 the	institution	is	ranked	as	‘medium’.	If	the	institution	has	another	financing	structure,	more	 closely	 tied	 to	 the	 government,	 it	 is	 ranked	 as	 weak	 –	 such	 an	 example	 is	Benin’s	Human	Rights	 Commission,	whose	 sources	 of	 funding	 are	 linked	 to	 active	paying	membership	 in	 the	 organisation	 and	whose	 budget	 is	 administered	by	 the	
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National	 Treasury	 in	 collaboration	 with	 the	 Commission’s	 own	 Treasury	Department.			 The	 third	 indicator	 of	 autonomy	 from	 government	measures	 the	 extent	 to	which	 government	 representatives	 are	 involved	 in	 decision-making	 and	 the	leadership	 of	 the	 national	 human	 rights	 institution.	 When	 the	 institution	 is	 a	government	 agency	 or	 has	 the	 country’s	 Prime	 Minister	 as	 leader,	 government	representation	in	decision-making	is	considered	‘high’.	A	number	of	countries	have	institutions	where	 government	 involvement	 in	 leadership	 and	 decision-making	 is	high	 –	 Albania’s	 Ombudsman,	 Bangladesh,	 Benin,	 Chad,	 Costa	 Rica,	 Gabon,	Guatemala,	among	others.	If	one	or	more	government	representatives	are	members	of	 a	pluralist	Board	alongside	other	 representatives	of	 social	 groups	 (civil	 society,	academics,	 Parliament,	 political	 parties)	 that	 supports	 the	 Ombudsman	 or	 the	President	 of	 the	 national	 human	 rights	 institution,	 government	 involvement	 is	ranked	 as	 ‘medium’.	 If	 the	 Executive	 does	 not	 participate	 in	 decision-making,	 the	institution	is	ranked	as	having	‘no’	government	representation.			 The	fourth	indicator	of	the	degree	of	autonomy	from	government	measures	the	reporting	mechanism	in	place	at	 the	 institution	as	a	 test	 for	 the	accountability	system	 that	 assesses	 its	 annual	 activity	 –	 if	 an	 institution	 reports	 on	 its	 annual	activity	 directly	 to	 Parliament	 and	 the	 wider	 public,	 it	 is	 ranked	 as	 ‘strong’.	 If	 it	reports	to	the	government	and	the	country	president	alone,	as	is	the	case	in	Gabon,	Guinea,	and	France,	it	is	ranked	as	‘medium’.	If	the	national	human	rights	institution	reports	 to	 the	 public	 alone	 through	 issuing	 research	 or	 press	 reports	 and	 has	 no	explicit	reporting	system	in	place,	it	is	ranked	as	‘weak’.	
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Figure	2.3.	Degree	of	autonomy	from	government	
			 As	 a	 general	 assessment	 of	 the	 degree	 of	 autonomy	 from	 government,	 I	aggregate	the	four	indicators	to	obtain	one	composite	measure	for	this	dimension	of	design.	When	a	country	has	two	indicators	on	which	it	is	ranked	as	‘strong’	and	gets	two	 indicators	coded	as	either	 ‘medium’	or	 ‘weak,’	 it	 is	 coded	at	 least	 ‘medium’	 in	the	third	dimension	of	design.	Cases	in	which	at	least	three	indicators	were	ranked	as	‘medium’	were	coded	as	at	least	‘medium’,	with	the	exception	of	countries	which	rank	as	‘strong’	in	one	of	the	four	dimensions.			 	
Dimension	3:	Degree	of	autonomy	from	government	
Financial	autonomy	
S:	Parliament	&	state	budget	
M:	Government	
W:	Other	&	donations	or	none	
Appointment	structure		
S:	Parliament	approval	
M:	Government,	PM,	governont,	president	
W:	other,	self-appointed,	or	none	
Government	represetation	in	decision-making	
S:	None	or	advisory/non-voting	
M:	Partial	
W:	High	
Reporting	to:	
S:	Parliament	&	public	
M:	Government	(mainly)	
W:	Public	alone		
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2.2.4.	Powers	of	Investigation	and	Predominant	Activities	
	A	 fourth	 dimension	 of	 institutional	 design	 offers	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	powers	 of	
investigation	 and	 predominant	 activities	 that	 an	 institution	 performs.	 Often	institutional	mandates	and	legal	regulatory	frameworks	specify	the	scope	of	activity	in	general	terms,	leaving	the	spectrum	of	daily	functions	to	be	determined	by	each	institution.	My	assessment	of	actual	activity	is	based	on	activity	mentioned	in	their	annual	reports	for	2012-2013	and	also	the	projects	listed	on	institutional	webpages.	A	 strong	 national	 human	 rights	 institution	 has	 a	 double	 human	 rights	 mandate,	which	encompasses	both	promotion	and	protection	activities.	The	mandated	tasks	of	institutions	vary	across	countries	and	also	across	time.	The	list	below	presents	a	synthesis	of	main	types	of	competencies	encountered	in	many	institutions,	grouped	by	main	categories	of	competencies:		Reporting	
• Periodic	(annual)	drafting	of	public	reports		
Complaint	handling	and	semi-judicial	powers	
• Handle	complaints	of	human	rights	violations	from	individuals		
• Carry	out	investigations	in	cases	of	human	rights	violations		
• Provide	advice	to	alleged	victims	of	human	rights	violations		
• Mediate	between	all	parties	impartially		
• Pronounce	binding	judgments	in	cases	of	human	rights	violations		
• Represent	victims	in	court	and	take	part	in	legal	settlements		
• Impose	fines	and	penalties		
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Government	advising		
• Propose	amendments	of	laws	to	prevent	human	rights	violations		
• Advice	government	on	harmonisation	with	international	human	rights	law		Participation	in	regional	and	international	networks	
• Be	a	member	of	regional	and	international	networks	of	human	rights	institutions		
• Participate	in	regular	meetings	of	regional	and	international	human	rights	networks		Research	and	awareness	raising	
• Conduct	research	on	human	rights	issues	in	the	country		
• Carry	out	campaigns	for	awareness	raising		
		 A	 strong	 institution	 can	be	mandated	 to	perform	most	of	 the	 above	duties,	and	 most	 institutions	 have	 a	 mix	 of	 preventive	 and	 protection	 powers.	 Classical	ombudsman	institutions	have	mostly	complaint	handling	responsibilities	in	cases	of	violations	by	public	administration	officials,	with	very	few	institutions	having	quasi-judicial	powers	such	as	pronouncing	biding	judgments	and	imposing	sanctions.	An	ombudsman	 with	 a	 strong	 human	 rights	 mandate	 or	 a	 strong	 human	 rights	commission	 perform	 a	 range	 of	 activities	 related	 to	 all	 human	 rights	 violations,	including	promotional	activity	and	research.				 Often,	however,	countries	do	not	perform	all	the	activities	they	are	mandated	to	carry	out.	The	discrepancy	between	mandated	powers	and	actual	predominantly	performed	 activities	 is	 informative	 in	 itself	 in	 as	 much	 as	 political,	 financial,	 and	
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social	factors	can	determine	these	differences	and	constrain	institutional	activity	as	stated	in	its	mandate	or	performed	in	the	everyday.	For	the	purposes	of	this	thesis,	the	 measure	 of	 institutional	 powers	 is	 an	 aggregate	 of	 the	 assessment	 of	 both	investigatory	and	predominant	duties,	capturing	both	de	jure	and	reported	de	facto	responsibilities	 with	 the	 help	 of	 four	 indicators	 –	 mandated	 promotional	 power;	mandated	protection	power;	predominantly	promotional	activities;	predominantly	protection	activities.	The	highest	level	of	human	rights	protection	strength	is	given	by	 the	 capacity	 to	 carry	 out	 investigations,	 apply	 fines	 or	 sanctions,	 the	 power	 to	represent	 cases	 in	 a	 court	 and,	 in	 very	 few	 institutions,	 semi-judicial	 powers.	Medium	 level	 of	 strength	 consists	 of	 advisory	 powers	 when	 working	 with	government,	case	advisory	role,	investigation	and	mediation.	Weak	institutions	from	the	point	of	view	of	protection	duties	have	very	limited,	or	no	power	at	all,	to	carry	out	 investigations	or	handle	complaints	at	a	minimum.	This	 is	 the	case	with	some	institutions	 that	 only	 have	 promotional	mandates,	 such	 as	 the	Norwegian	Human	Rights	Centre.			 Strong	promotion	powers	involve	education,	awareness	raising	and	research	on	 human	 rights	 issues	 in	 the	 country.	 Institutions	 with	 ‘medium’	 powers	 to	promote	human	rights	generate	general	reports	on	human	rights	in	the	country	and	limit	 their	 activity	 to	 research	 on	 specific	 human	 rights	 issues.	 The	 Romanian	Human	 Rights	 Institute	 offers	 is	 an	 example	 of	 a	 generally	 weak	 institution	 with	only	 a	 limited	 promotional	 mandate	 focused	 on	 research	 about	 general	 human	rights	 issues	 in	 Romania	 and	 abroad,	 which	 is	 disseminated	 largely	 online.	
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Institutions	with	very	limited	or	no	powers	of	promotion,	such	as	the	Ombudsman	Office	of	Trinidad	and	Tobago,	can	have	predominantly	protection	powers.		 When	coding	 the	 institutions	 in	 this	 fourth	dimension	of	design,	 I	weighted	indicators	such	that	all	institutions	that	were	ranked	as	‘strong’	in	both	the	‘de	facto	protection’	 and	 ‘predominantly	 protection’	 functions	 as	 ‘strong’	 even	 if	 their	promotional	duties	were	ranked	as	‘medium’	level.	If	a	country	is	ranked	as	‘strong’	in	at	least	three	of	the	four	indicators,	it	is	coded	as	‘strong’	in	three	dimensions	of	institutional	 design.	When	 a	 country	 has	 two	 indicators	 on	which	 it	 is	 ranked	 as	‘strong’	 and	gets	 two	 indicators	 coded	as	 either	 ‘medium’	or	 ‘weak,’	 it	 is	 coded	as	‘medium’	 in	the	third	dimension	of	design.	Cases	 in	which	at	 least	three	indicators	were	ranked	as	‘medium’	were	coded	as	‘medium.’	When	a	country	has	very	limited	or	no	powers	of	promotion	or	protection,	or	does	not	have	an	institution	at	all,	it	is	coded	as	‘weak.’	
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Figure	2.4.	Promotion	and	protection	powers	
	
	
	
	
Dimension	4:		Promotion	&	Protection	Powers	
Mandated	activities	
Promotion	
S:	Education	&	awareness	raising	
M:	Annual	reports	to	public	
W:	None/only	protection	
Protection	
S:	Penalty/quasi-judicial	
M:	Advisory,	case	advisory,	investigtion	
W:	None/only	research	
Predominant	activities	
Promotion	
S:	Education	&	awareness	raising	
M:	Annual	reports	to	public	
W:	None/only	protection	
Protection	
S:	Penalty/quasi-judicial	
M:	Advisory,	case	advisory,	investigtion	
W:	None/only	research	
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2.2.5.	Pluralism	of	Representation	A	fifth	dimension	of	design	captures	the	degree	of	pluralism	of	representation	in	institutional	 decision-making.	 Despite	 seeking	 to	 address	 a	 broad	 spectrum	 of	rights-related	issues	for	all	citizens	in	a	country,	plurality	of	representation	is	not	a	common	 feature	 included	 in	 the	design	of	most	 institutions.	 In	 its	broadest	 sense,	pluralism	 of	 representation	 entails	 concrete	 efforts	 by	 the	 national	 human	 rights	institution	 to	 involve	 representatives	 of	 different	 societal	 groups	 in	 leadership	 or	decision-making.	The	reports	issued	by	the	Sub-Committee	on	Accreditation	do	not	give	 a	 consistent	 definition	 of	 pluralism,	 emphasising	 various	 factors	 of	 interest	linked	 to	 this	 dimension	 of	 design	 in	 different	 accreditation	 reports.	 In	 earlier	reports,	the	emphasis	was	on	the	establishment	of	ties	with	different	social	groups	within	 civil	 society	 at	 large,	 through	 involvement	 in	 institutional	 decision-making	and	 also	 through	 collaborations.	 In	 more	 recent	 reports,	 the	 Sub-Committee	 on	Accreditation	 emphasises	 the	 need	 to	 support	 equality	 of	 representation	 through	the	 involvement	 of	 women	 as	 well	 as	 different	 ethnic	 and	 minority	 groups.	 An	example	 of	 an	 institution	with	 high	 level	 of	 pluralism	 is	 the	 German	 Institute	 for	Human	Rights,	which	has	15	voting	members	in	its	Board	of	Trustees,	representing	a	 number	 of	 different	 civil	 society	 organisations	 and	 regional	 branches	 of	 the	Institute	(German	Institute	for	Human	Rights	2016).	Moreover,	 the	Board	includes	nine	 non-voting	 members	 that	 are	 government	 officials	 from	 different	 ministries	and	departments	whose	activity	is	linked	to	human	rights	issues.	An	additional	form	of	 affiliation	 with	 the	 Institute	 is	 membership-based.	 The	 2016	 version	 of	 the	Institute’s	 webpage	 lists	 64	 individuals	 and	 organisations	 that	 are	 ‘registered	
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associate’	 members	 (German	 Institute	 for	 Human	 Rights	 2016).	 This	 kind	 of	pluralist	 and	 inclusive	 institutional	 setup	 is	 rare	 among	 national	 human	 rights	institutions,	with	most	 bodies	 having	 very	 limited	 or	 no	 direct	 collaboration	with	civil	society.				 In	order	to	measure	pluralism	of	representation,	I	propose	an	indicator	that	quantifies	 the	 involvement	 of	 civil	 society	 through	 the	 presence	 of	 NGO	representatives	through	consultation	during	the	meetings	of	the	institutional	Board	or	 of	 other	 institutional	 decision-making	 body.	 Although	 the	 measure	 does	 not	capture	the	entire	extent	to	which	a	national	human	rights	 institution	may	engage	with	 civil	 society	 actors,	 it	 captures	 one	 of	 the	 main	 important	 dimensions	 of	pluralism	of	representation.	This	definition	of	the	indicators	is	also	in	line	with	the	main	 requirement	 of	 pluralism	 listed	 by	 the	 Sub-Committee	 on	 Accreditation	 in	their	 interpretation	of	 the	Paris	Principles	when	assessing	 institutional	design	and	performance	as	part	of	the	accreditation	process.	On	this	dimension,	a	great	deal	of	variation	 is	 registered	 even	 in	 institutions	 that	 are	 otherwise	 fully	 functional	 and	have	also	been	accredited	by	the	Sub-Committee	on	Accreditation	at	the	A-level	of	strength.			 An	institution	is	ranked	as	 ‘strong’	on	this	dimension	of	design	if	 it	engages	with	NGO	representatives	by	 involving	 them	in	decision-making.	Medium	strength	represents	a	lower	level	of	engagement	with	NGOs,	as	evidenced	through	reporting	collaborative	 activities	 and	 programmes	 in	 the	 annual	 report	 and	 on	 the	institutional	webpages.	If	a	national	human	rights	institution	does	not	have	any	type	of	NGO	involvement,	it	is	ranked	as	‘weak’	on	this	category.	
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Figure	2.5.	Degree	of	pluralism	 	
	
2.2.6.	Human	and	Financial	Resources	A	 sixth	 dimension	 of	 institutional	 design	 represents	 human	 and	 financial	
resources	available	to	a	human	rights	institution	in	order	to	function	according	to	its	mandate	and	 its	 full	capacity.	This	dimension	 is	measured	with	the	help	of	 two	indictors	–	adequate	staff	and	adequate	financial	resources.	This	is	the	dimension	on	which	 the	 least	 information	 is	 available	 publicly.	 While	 a	 number	 of	 institutions	include	 detailed	 budgets	 and	 staff	 lists	 in	 their	 annual	 reports,	 a	 large	 number	 of	institutions	do	not	offer	financial	details	and	sometimes	no	information	about	staff	members	either.	Most	institutions,	however,	make	a	qualitative	assessment	of	their	human	and	monetary	resources	 in	their	annual	reports	or	on	their	 Internet	pages.	This	 qualitative	 assessment	 informs	 the	 coding	 of	 the	 data	 included	 in	 the	
Dimension	5:		Degree	of	pluralism	 NGO	representation	
S:	High	presence	in	decision-making		
M:	Low	engagement	
W:	None	
		 67	
institutional	 strength	 dataset.	 Whenever	 budgets	 were	 available,	 the	 qualitative	information	was	corroborated	with	details	about	sources	of	funding	and	use	of	such	funding	for	staff	salaries	and/or	projects.			
Figure	2.6.	Adequate	resources		
				 The	 two	 indicators	 I	 propose	 –	 adequate	 staff	 and	 adequate	 financial	resources	–	are	coded	on	a	three-point	scale	primarily	on	the	basis	of	a	qualitative	assessments	 of	 adequate	 funding	 as	 expressed	 in	 annual	 reports	 and	 institutional	webpages.	All	accredited	NHRIs	have	made	such	information	publicly	available,	also	
Dimension	6:		Adequate	resources	
Financial	
S:	Sufsicient	annual	budget	
M:	Low/partial	or	dependent	on	donor	funding	W:	Insufsicient	or	unsuccessful	at	securing	funds	
Stafsing	
S:	Sufsicient	or	no	mention	otherwise	
M:	low	or	insufsicient			
W:	none	
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in	response	to	the	requirement	included	in	the	Paris	Principles	to	declare	and	assess	sufficient	funds	and	resources.	Such	qualitative	evaluation	of	resources	is	often	also	available	 in	 the	 accreditation	 reports.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 new	 EU	member	 states	 and	candidate	 countries,	 such	 information	 is	 also	assessed	qualitatively	 in	 the	 country	progress	 reports.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 publicly	 available	 information,	 I	 code	 all	institutions	in	the	dataset	according	to	the	following	coding	scheme:	if	a	country	has	enough	financial	resources	or	makes	no	explicit	reference	to	insufficient	resources	when	 reporting	 on	 its	 finances	 and	 staffing,	 it	 is	 ranked	 as	 ‘strong’	 for	 this	dimension.	If	the	institution	reports	on	its	funding	and	staff	as	existing	but	being	low	or	highly	dependent	on	external	grant	money,	the	country	is	ranked	as	‘medium’	on	the	two	resource	indicators.	If	the	institution	makes	a	clear	reference	in	its	reports	that	funding	is	insufficient	or	that	it	has	made	unsuccessful	efforts	to	secure	funding	and	adequate	staff	in	2012-2013	to	perform	all	duties	it	is	mandated	to	carry	out,	it	is	ranked	as	‘weak’	on	this	dimension.	
	
2.3.	Institutional	Strength	and	the	UN-led	Accreditation	Scale		The	institutional	strength	index	proposed	here	has	country/institution	as	a	unit	of	analysis	and	makes	up	a	global	dataset	 that	proposes	 institutional	strength	 in	194	countries.	Due	to	missing	data	on	some	of	the	independent	variables,	the	number	of	cases	used	 for	 analysis	 in	 the	 following	 chapter	was	 reduced	 to	187.	The	 index	 is	original	and	captures	institutional	strength	on	a	three-point	categorical	scale	(1-3),	where	institutions	ranked	as	‘3’	are	considered	strong,	with	‘2’	indicating	medium-
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strength	 institutions,	 while	 the	 ‘1’	 category	 encompasses	 countries	 with	 weak	institutional	 power	 due	 to	 either	 the	 lack	 of	 an	 institution	 or	 the	 existence	 of	 an	institution	 that	 is	 not	 de	 jure	 functional,	 or	 inadequately	 fulfilling	 its	 mandated	functions.	 I	 carried	 out	 manual	 two-step	 aggregation	 of	 indicators:	 first,	 the	individual	 indicators	 were	 aggregated	 in	 the	 six	main	 dimensions	 of	 institutional	design,	which	 in	 their	 turn	were	 aggregated	 in	 the	 three-category	 ranked	 ordinal	variable.	All	countries	without	an	institution	are	coded	‘weak’	for	all	indicators	and	all	 six	 dimensions.	 Data	 on	 all	 six	 dimensions	 of	 strength	 is	 aggregated	 into	 one	index	on	a	three-point	scale	including	the	values	‘strong,’	‘medium’,	‘weak’.			 While	the	operationalization	and	coding	proposed	in	this	thesis	are	different	from	 the	 existing	 United	 Nations-based	 peer	 review	 framework	 of	 institutional	assessment,	they	are	highly	comparable	and	reach	similar	results	in	the	case	of	most	accredited	 institutions.	 An	 important	 aspect	 where	 the	 two	 types	 of	 institutional	assessment	 bear	 differences	 lies	 in	 the	 tool	 of	measurement.	 The	main	 difference	between	 my	 assessment	 and	 the	 one	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 Sub-Committee	 on	Accreditation	 is	 that	 the	 one	 I	 propose	 here	 focuses	 exclusively	 on	 institutional	design	 features.	 The	 dependent	 variable	 only	 focuses	 on	 the	 measurement	 of	features	 that	 make	 up	 design	 attributes	 linked	 to	 legal	 framework,	 mandates,	powers	of	 investigation,	 infrastructure,	and	degree	of	autonomy	from	government.	The	 Sub-Committee	 on	 Accreditation	 has	 developed	 a	 set	 of	 guidelines	 for	 peer-reviewers	(Sub-Committee	on	Accreditation	2013)	that	 include	an	assessment	of	a	number	of	design	 features	–	predominantly	de	 jure	 independence,	autonomy	from	government	intervention,	and	availability	of	sufficient	funds	–	as	well	as	a	number	of	
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elements	that	are	linked	to	the	institutions’	effectiveness	in	implementing	its	human	rights	mandate.	Country	reports	 include	detailed	 information	on	 institutions’	 level	of	 compliance	 with	 Paris	 Principles,	 including	 legal	 framework,	 relationship	 with	government,	 and	 financial	 stability,	 and	 go	 beyond	 this	 information	 to	 cover	 also	aspects	linked	to	institutional	performance	–	for	instance,	the	extent	to	which	each	institution	is	integrated	in	a	regional	network	of	institutions,	or	the	degree	to	which	it	engages	effectively	with	government	and	can	influence	policy-making,	or	the	types	and	 numbers	 of	 cases	 of	 human	 rights	 violations	 it	 investigates	 successfully.	 The	SCA	evaluation	goes	beyond	the	scope	of	an	institutional	design	assessment.			 The	peer-review	system	of	assessment	is	a	largely	qualitative	assessment	of	institutional	health,	 assessing	both	 institutional	mandates	 and	 the	 effectiveness	of	the	main	programs	and	activities	carried	out	in	the	past	five	years.	The	reports	can	also	make	 reference	 to	 the	 political	 context	 in	 the	 country	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 is	relevant	for	the	good	functioning	of	the	institution.	Based	on	the	evaluation,	the	Sub-Committee	on	Accreditation	recommends	one	of	 three	possible	statuses	–	A	status	for	 institutions	 considered	 to	 be	 in	 full	 compliance	 with	 the	 Paris	 Principles;	 B	status	 for	 institutions	 considered	 to	 be	 in	 partial	 compliance	 with	 the	 Paris	Principles;	 C	 status	 for	 countries	 that	 do	 not	 have	 a	 functional	 institution.	 If	countries	 decide	 to	 apply	 for	 re-accreditation,	 the	 peer-review	 process	 repeats	 at	five-year	intervals.		 It	 is	 important	 to	 highlight,	 however,	 that	 the	 two	 types	 of	 institutional	evaluation	have	significant	similarities.	First,	the	peer-review	assessment	process	of	institutions	 which	 have	 sought	 accreditation	 is	 conducted	 with	 the	 assistance	 of	
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interviews	 or	 questionnaires	 based	 on	 interpretive	 issues	 regarding	 the	 Paris	Principles	 set	 up	 by	 the	 Sub-Committee	 on	 Accreditation	 at	 the	 International	Coordinating	 Committee	 of	 NHRIs	 (Sub-Committee	 on	 Accreditation	 2013).	Similarly,	my	 assessment	 of	 institutional	 design	 is	 based	 on	 an	 analysis	 of	 annual	reports,	 legal	 documents,	 and	 individual	 surveys.	 Second,	 the	 explicit	 aim	 of	 each	evaluation	 is	different:	 the	SCA	 seeks	 to	 assess	 the	degree	of	 compliance	with	 the	Paris	 Principles	 and	 goes	 on	 to	 further	 specify	 these	 criteria	 in	 terms	 of	 both	institutional	design	and	performance,	while	my	institutional	strength	scale	captures	only	 design	 features	 of	 institutions.	 It	 is	 not	 surprising,	 however,	 that	 these	 two	scales	 result	 in	 the	 same	 scores	 for	 a	 number	 of	 strong	 institutions	 that	 have	undergone	 the	 accreditation	process,	 as	 often	 institutions	with	 strong	designs	 are	also	better	at	carrying	out	their	mandate	effectively.	My	assessment	of	institutional	strength	in	the	case	of	C-level	institutions	does	not	align	with	the	assessment	of	the	SCA	in	the	accreditation	process.	Certain	countries	without	a	national	human	rights	institution,	such	as	the	United	States	and	Italy,	can	have	alternative	institutions	for	the	 promotion	 and	 protection	 of	 human	 rights,	 such	 as	 regional	 and	 local	ombudsmen	offices.	In	Annex	E,	I	re-estimate	the	model	to	include	four	categories	of	institutional	strength	of	the	dependent	variable.		 Arguably	 the	 most	 significant	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 scales	 of	measurement	is	the	coding	of	‘weak’	institutions	and	the	inclusion	in	the	dataset	of	countries	that	do	not	have	any	institution	mandated	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights	 at	 the	 national	 level.	 The	 main	 definition	 and	 operationalisation	 of	 the	dependent	 variable	 in	 the	ologit	 and	multinomial	models	 included	 in	 the	 analysis	
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proposes	 an	 aggregate	 measure	 of	 ‘weak	 institutions’	 that	 groups	 countries	 with	weak	NHRIs	 in	 the	 same	category	as	 countries	without	a	human	rights	 institution	that	 operates	 with	 a	 human	 rights	 mandate	 at	 the	 country	 level.	 Based	 on	 the	indicators	included	in	the	definition	of	institutional	strength,	all	C-level	institutions	are	 ‘weak’,	 by	 lacking	 de	 jure	 independence,	 a	 human	 rights	 mandate,	 by	 not	operating	 autonomously	 from	 government	 or	 by	 having	 very	 limited	 activity	 of	promotion	and	protection.			 As	 such,	 a	 number	 of	 institutions	have	been	 assessed	differently	 and	 given	different	 scores	 in	 the	 two	scales.	 In	Libya,	 the	activity	of	 the	National	Council	 for	Civil	Liberties	and	Human	Rights	is	constrained	by	conflict	and	political	instability	–	the	 Sub-Committee	 for	 Accreditation	 accredited	 it	 with	 a	 B	 status	 in	 2014.	 The	design	of	the	institution	as	set	up	by	legislation	and	indicated	by	official	institutional	documentation	in	2013,	however,	presents	it	as	a	strong	institution.	The	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	Institute	of	Human	Rights	Ombudsmen	has	accreditation	status	A,	after	many	years	of	having	been	assessed	as	a	B	status	institution	that	needed	to	address	concerns	about	full	compliance	with	Paris	Principles.	On	the	basis	of	low	pluralism	of	 representation	 and	 limited	 resources,	 in	 this	 thesis’	 dataset,	 the	 institution	 is	assessed	 as	 having	medium-level	 strength.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Romania,	 the	 institution	that	has	been	put	forward	for	accreditation	is	the	Human	Rights	Institute,	which	was	given	C	status	by	the	Sub-Committee	for	Accreditation.	This	institute,	however,	has	very	 limited	 activity	 and	 appears	 to	have	no	powers	beyond	 the	ones	 of	 research	and	 promotion.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Romania	 has	 a	 classical	 ombudsman	 office,	 the	Romanian	People’s	Advocate,	which	 is	much	more	active	and	has	powers	of	rights	
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promotion	 and	 protection.	 In	 the	 original	 dataset	 of	 this	 thesis,	 the	 People’s	Advocate	is	included	and	assessed.			 			
2.4.	Data	Collection	and	Coding	
	The	dataset	 contains	original	data	 coded	manually	 for	all	 countries	 in	 the	dataset.	The	 dataset	 has	 the	 advantage	 of	 being	 global,	 thus	 making	 possible	 the	investigation	of	global	patterns.	The	data,	however,	are	cross-sectional	and	collected	for	the	year	2013,	whether	reported	in	2012	or	in	2013.	The	cross-sectional	nature	of	the	data	is	dictated	by	the	lack	of	publicly	available	historical	information	about	the	design	of	all	institutions	around	the	world.	In	this	context,	the	lack	of	over-time	global	information	about	the	entire	global	population	of	national	institutions	creates	a	trade-off	between	the	sample	size	and	the	temporal	dimension	of	the	dataset.	In	its	final	 form,	 the	dataset	 contains	 complete	 information	about	187	countries,	having	dropped	 7	 states	 on	which	 data	 on	 the	 dependent	 variable	 existed,	 but	 on	which	data	were	missing	for	a	number	of	independent	variables.		
	
2.4.1.	Internet-based	archival	data	
	The	 data	 collection	 process	 consisted	 of	 three	 main	 stages	 aimed	 at	 compiling	systematic	quantitative	 institutional	data	 for	 a	dataset	 consisting	of	 a	 total	 of	187	
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countries.	Data	collection	began	with	internet-based	searches	of	keywords	–	country	name,	 in	 combination	 with	 one	 of	 the	 following:	 “human	 rights	 institutions,”	“national	 human	 rights	 commission,”	 “NHRI”.	 This	 stage	 generated	 an	 archive	 of	official	institutional	documents	on	all	institutions	included	in	the	dataset.	Sources	of	primary	 data	 on	 institutional	 mandates	 and	 formal	 attributes	 are	 Internet-based	and	include	NHRI	websites	and	the	databases	of	organizations	which	coordinate	the	activity	of	national	human	rights	institutions	at	the	global	and	regional	levels,	such	as	 the	 International	 Coordinating	 Committee	 of	 National	 Institutions,	 National	Human	 Rights	 Institutions	 Forum,	 European	 Group	 of	 National	 Human	 Rights	Institutions,	South	East	Asia	NHRI	Forum,	 the	Network	of	African	National	Human	Rights	 Institutions,	 and	 the	 Asia	 Pacific	 Forum	 of	 National	 Human	 Rights.	 All	accredited	NHRIs	have	a	website	and,	with	few	exceptions,	their	electronic	profiles	are	 organized	 similarly	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 categories:	 mission	 statement,	 vision,	founding	 document	 and	 legislation,	 annual	 reports,	 various	 activities,	 events	 and	news,	 etc.	 The	 data	 consist	 of	 documents	 representing	 legal	 mandates	 of	 NHRIs,	revised	mandate	laws,	mission	statements,	national	constitutions	in	which	the	role	and	functions	of	the	human	rights	institution	are	listed.	For	information	specifically	about	 ombudsman	 institutions,	 the	 International	 Ombudsman	 Institute	 has	 a	database	 with	 contact	 information	 and	 legislation.	 University-based	 archives	dedicated	 to	 human	 rights	 are	 located	 at	 Harvard	 University	 and	 University	 of	Minnesota	 and	 provide	 access	 to	 some	 legal	 documents	 about	 human	 rights	institutions.		
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	 All	documents	were	checked	against	the	information	available	at	the	National	Human	Rights	Institutions	Database	(‘NHRI	Database	-	Raoul	Wallenberg	Institute’	2013)	 and	 the	 International	 Labour	 Organization’s	 NATLEX	 database	 of	 national	labour,	social	security	and	related	human	rights	legislation	maintained	by	the	ILO’s	International	 Labour	 Standards	 Department	 (‘NATLEX	 Database,	 ILO,	 2013)	NATLEX	was	also	a	source	of	human	rights	institutions	legislation	in	a	small	number	of	 cases	 for	 which	 country	 data	 were	 missing	 due	 to	 malfunctioning	 or	 inactive	websites.	 The	 NHRI	 Database	 contains	 annual	 reports	 and	 other	 human	 rights	reports	 issued	by	a	number	of	 institutions	around	the	world	–	although	a	valuable	resource,	the	archive	of	documents	is	incomplete	and	does	not	contain	all	resources	available	 on	 institutional	 webpages.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis,	 the	 NHRI	Database	did	provide	an	additional	check	for	the	completeness	of	yearly	reports	and	other	institutional	documents	used	in	the	coding	process.	NATLEX	was	an	important	source	 of	 country	 constitution	 documentation	 and,	 in	 a	 small	 number	 of	 country	cases,	also	of	the	legal	framework	established	for	the	creation	of	their	human	rights	institutions.	 Such	 legal	 materials	 were	 helpful	 for	 collecting	 information	 on	 the	breadth	of	 institutional	mandates,	 relationship	with	 the	Executive,	 and	 sometimes	also	 the	 model	 used	 for	 financing	 the	 institution	 and	 the	 degree	 of	 pluralism	 of	representation.	 The	 extent	 of	 information	 included	 in	 country	 constitutions	 and	legal	framework	papers	varies	significantly	from	country	to	country.	Annual	reports	available	 on	 institutional	webpages	 and	 in	 some	 cases	 also	 in	 the	NHRI	Database	provided	the	additional	information	needed	to	complete	coding	of	all	six	dimensions	of	 institutional	 design.	 When	 English	 versions	 of	 legislative	 texts	 were	 missing,	
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Internet	 searches	 were	 performed	 in	 foreign	 languages,	 among	 which	 French,	Spanish,	 or	 Portuguese	were	 the	most	 common.	 It	 is	worth	 noting,	 however,	 that	none	 of	 the	 Internet	 databases	 contained	 all	 the	 institutional	 information	 or	 legal	documents	pertaining	to	the	NHRI.				
2.4.2.	Content	Analysis		 	The	 second	 stage	 of	 data	 collection	 consisted	 of	 content	 analysis	 of	 text-based	information.	The	archive	of	collected	documents	–	annual	institutional	reports,	ICC	records,	 institutional	 records	 available	 online	 and	 national	 legal	 documents	 on	ombudsman	 and	human	 rights	 commissions	 –	made	up	 the	 body	 of	 text	 that	was	coded	 resulting	 in	 the	 disaggregated	 data	 on	 the	 thirteen	 indicators	 measuring	various	aspects	of	institutional	design.	Klaus	Krippendorff	defined	content	analysis	the	method	as	“a	research	technique	for	making	replicable	and	valid	inferences	from	texts	(or	other	meaningful	matter)	to	the	contexts	of	their	use	(Krippendorff	2013).	As	a	 technique,	 it	 involves	specialized	procedures	that	need	to	be	made	explicit	 to	the	reader.	Although	not	necessarily	set	in	linear	order,	six	main	elements	are	vital	to	 all	 content	 analyses:	 textual	 data,	 research	 question,	 context,	 analytical	constructs,	 abductive	 inference-making,	 and	 validating	 evidence.	 Incorporating	these	 elements,	 the	 analyst	 needs	 to	 take	 the	 following	 steps	 constitutive	 of	 the	research	 design	 of	 content	 analyses.	 For	 data-making	 purposes,	 however,	 the	analyst	 unitizes,	 samples	 and	 codes	 the	 textual	 data;	 subsequently,	 data	 are	
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simplified	 or	 reduced,	 most	 commonly	 through	 the	 use	 of	 established	 statistical	methods	(Krippendorff	2013).			 For	 textual	 coding	 of	 institutional	 reports	 and	 official	 documents	 in	 this	project,	 I	 employed	 simple	 manual	 content	 analysis	 for	 identification	 of	 key	information	 and	 coding	 purposes.	 I	 did	 not	 make	 use	 of	 content	 analysis	 for	inferential	 purposes	 or	 for	 inductive	 ends	with	 the	 goal	 of	 generating	 descriptive	data	 on	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 the	 texts	 as	 a	 whole,	 through	 the	 use	 of	 word	frequency	 analysis,	 word	 clouds	 or	 discourse	 analysis.	 Close	 reading	 of	 the	documents	for	deductive	purposes	allowed	me	to	analyse	the	content	of	the	text	and	identify	the	information	that	was	necessary	for	coding.	I	discuss	the	coding	scheme	in	detail	above,	when	I	present	each	dimension	of	institutional	design.					 Institutional	 reports	 and	 official	 documents	 such	 as	 country	 constitutions,	institutional	 mandates	 and	 legal	 framework	 regulating	 the	 design	 and	 activity	 of	national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 were	 collected	 in	 six	 different	 languages	 –	English,	 French,	 Spanish,	 Romanian,	 Portuguese,	 and	 Swedish	 –	 of	 which	 I	 have	advanced	 reading	 knowledge.	 A	 number	 of	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 in	countries	where	the	above	languages	are	not	spoken	have	information	available	in	English	on	their	websites.	One	exception	to	the	rule	was	the	Bulgarian	Ombudsman	Office,	which	only	had	information	available	in	Bulgarian	–	I	used	the	help	of	Google	Translate	 and	 also	 input	 from	 a	 native	 speaker	 of	 Russian	 to	 help	 with	 cross-checking	some	of	the	relevant	information	about	the	institution.	All	documents	were	coded	in	English	and	based	on	a	coding	scheme	written	in	English	and	translated	for	each	language.		
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	 Textual	 data	 was	 coded	 manually,	 according	 to	 the	 information	 provided	primarily	in	institutional	annual	reports	and,	when	needed,	additional	sources	were	used	 to	 provide	 details	 on	 all	 thirteen	 indicators	 of	 strength.	 The	 textual	 unit	 of	analysis	 is	 the	 paragraph,	 as	 individual	words	 are	 seen	 in	 a	 broader	 context.	 The	assessment	of	 institutional	design	was	made	possible	by	 the	close	reading	of	each	document	 –	 information	 about	 legal	mandate,	 activity,	 and	 performance	 is	 factual	and,	 when	 publicly	 available,	 is	 also	 explicit	 and	 easy	 to	 identify	 in	 the	 texts.	Generally	the	annual	reports	follow	a	clear	structure,	focusing	on	the	assessment	of	certain	 main	 elements	 of	 institutional	 performance	 every	 year	 and	 presenting	changes	 in	 relation	 to	 prior	 years	 –	 although	 the	 extent	 of	 detail	 and	 the	writing	style	 may	 differ,	 most	 reports	 tend	 to	 encompass	 facts	 about	 main	 types	 of	promotional	 activities	 coordinated,	 the	 financial	 situation	 of	 each	 institution,	collaborative	work	in	regional	and	international	networks,	and	more	often	than	not	concrete	 details	 about	 cases	 of	 complaints	 and	 human	 rights	 violations	 that	 have	been	 the	 object	 of	 investigation	 in	 the	 past	 year.	Moreover,	 institutional	websites	tend	to	display	similar	information	about	the	structure	and	the	activity	of	each	body,	which	 can	 be	 grouped	 in	 three	 broad	 substantive	 categories	 –	 the	 founding	documents	and	 legal	 framework	of	activity,	 the	types	of	protection	and	promotion	activities	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 institution,	 and	 an	 archive	 with	 various	 types	 of	documents.	In	most	cases,	these	documents	are	annual	reports,	although	a	number	of	institutions	only	have	a	limited	number	of	them	available,	substantive	reports	on	different	human	 rights	 issues	 in	 the	 country,	 press	 releases,	 and	 in	 the	 rare	 cases	when	 the	 institution	 also	 carries	 out	 development	work	 abroad	 –	 like	 the	Danish	
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Institute	 for	 Human	 Rights	 –	 also	 reports	 on	 human	 rights	 records	 of	 countries	where	projects	have	taken	place.		 		 The	third	data	collection	stage	focuses	on	the	institutions	that	are	functioning	ombudsmen	 and	 human	 rights	 commissions	 on	 which	 not	 much	 information	 is	publicly	 available	 and	 which	 do	 not	 hold	 ICC	 accreditation.	 The	 process	 of	accreditation	 requires	 countries	 under	 peer-review	 to	 submit	 documentation	 that	details	 their	 mandates,	 infrastructure,	 and	 activities	 that	 are	 in	 line	 with	 the	guidelines	formulated	in	the	Paris	Principles.	A	prerequisite	is	also	the	maintenance	of	an	Internet	identity	and	an	electronic	archive	of	main	legal	documents	and	annual	reports.	Hence	information	on	institutional	design	can	be	compiled	and	coded	more	easily	in	the	case	of	institutions	that	have	undergone	the	accreditation	process,	due	to	easier	access	to	information.	In	some	cases,	however,	institutions	that	do	not	have	accreditation	status	with	the	UN	such	as	Sweden	or	Finland,	for	instance,	also	have	electronic	archives	of	documents	that	are	partly	available	in	English	translation.	For	the	 purposes	 of	 defining	 the	 frame	 for	 survey	 administration,	 I	 included	 all	 non-accredited	institutions	in	the	population	of	interest.			
2.4.3.	Survey		
2.4.3.1.	Survey	design	
	In	 the	 fourth	 stage	 of	 data	 collection	 and	 coding,	 I	 used	 a	 survey	 instrument	administered	online	and	on	paper	to	46	institutions,	which	will	be	described	more	
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at	length	below.	Its	administration	occurred	in	three	phases,	the	third	completed	in	early	 January	2015.	This	 survey-based	data	 collection	process	 ran	 in	parallel	with	report-based	 data	 collection,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 triangulating	 results	 and,	 to	 the	extent	 possible,	 making	 up	 for	 missing	 information	 in	 the	 surveys.	 The	 survey	instrument	was	designed	for	the	purpose	of	collecting	data	in	a	systematic	manner	about	 the	 institutions	 that	 had	 little	 information	 that	 was	 publicly	 available	 and	were	often	were	not	accredited	by	the	UN’s	ICC	as	of	the	end	of	2013.	The	frame	of	the	survey	consisted	of	all	names	of	46	institutions,	with	their	contact	information.	The	online	platform	used	for	the	design	of	the	survey	is	created	and	supported	by	Google	 and	 allows	 for	 the	 selection	 of	 nine	 different	 types	 of	 questions.	 Upon	sending	 out	 the	 online	 survey,	 eight	 email	 addresses	 of	 ombudsman	 and	 human	rights	commissions	located	in	African	countries	generated	return	emails	with	error	messages	about	failed	delivery.	In	order	to	increase	the	chance	of	survey	response,	the	 online	 survey	 was	 printed	 on	 paper	 and	 shipped	 by	 surface	 mail	 to	 all	 the	institutions	in	46	countries.				 Central	to	the	design	of	surveys	is	the	idea	of	measurement,	which	refers	to	the	assignment	of	numbers	to	objects	and	events	(Groves	2009,	p.	2).	A	survey	is	‘fit	for	purpose’	when	we	have	descriptive	and/or	relational	questions	that	require	two	simultaneous	forms	of	inference	–	measurement	and	representation	(Groves	2009,	p.42).	Though	questions	 in	 the	survey	 instrument	designed	 for	 the	non-accredited	institutions	 are	 both	 descriptive	 and	 are	 formulated	 with	 the	 main	 purpose	 of	understanding	 descriptive	 characteristics	 of	 institutional	 design	 in	 relation	 to	 the	main	dimensions	included	in	the	conceptual	frame.	It	is	important	to	consider	also	
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survey	 error,	 due	 to	 the	 global	 scope	 of	 the	 survey	 and	 the	 unpredictability	 of	responses.	 These	 challenges	 are	 compounded	 by	 the	 rather	 conflicting	 evidence	from	prior	research	regarding	response	rates	 to	online	surveys	–	 though	reported	response	rates	can	vary	from	study	to	study,	one	generally	agreed	upon	conclusion	in	 the	 literature	 is	 that	 it	 is	 indeed	hard	 to	predict	 the	 response	 rate	 to	 an	online	survey	and	 that	 the	expectation	 is	 that	paper-based	surveys	delivered	 through	 in-person	 interviews	 yields	 the	 highest	 number	 of	 responses.	 Given	 the	 geographic	location	of	 the	 countries	 to	be	 covered	by	 the	 survey,	 in-person	administration	of	the	 survey	 interview	 is	 unrealistic,	 leaving	 online	 and	 paper-based	 self-administered	 questionnaires	 as	 the	 only	 viable	 option.	 In	 order	 to	 facilitate	responses,	 the	 survey	was	 translated	 into	 French	 as	well,	 as	 roughly	 one	 third	 of	non-accredited	institutions	are	located	in	countries	that	have	Romance	languages	as	official	languages	–	French,	Francophone,	Spanish	or	Portuguese	speaking	counties.		 At	the	same	time,	the	self-administered	nature	of	the	survey	instrument	and	the	 clarity	of	 the	questions	 included	 in	 it	 facilitates	 responses	on	 the	 four	 aspects	identified	as	essential	by	the	literature	on	survey	designs:	comprehension,	retrieval,	judgment	 and	 reporting	 (Groves	 2009).	 The	 persons	 answering	 the	 questions	 are	active	 staff	 members	 (oftentimes	 in	 executive	 positions)	 at	 the	 institutions	contacted	by	the	primary	investigator	and	are	familiar	with	all	concepts	included	in	the	 questionnaire.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 survey	 instrument	 is	 an	 essential	 tool	 of	systematic	 data	 collection	 and	 of	 operationalization	 as	 part	 of	 the	 process	 of	descriptive	 inference	 and	 a	 first	 step	 necessary	 for	 researching	 a	 number	 of	institutions	 that	 have	never	 before	 been	 the	 object	 of	 investigation.	 To	 the	 extent	
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that	 a	 concept’s	 operational	 definition	 specifies	 the	 procedures	 (operations)	 that	will	permit	difference	between	individuals/institutions	in	respect	of	the	concepts	to	be	 specified	 more	 specifically	 (Bryman	 and	 Cramer	 2005),	 this	 survey	 of	 non-accredited	 institutions	 is	 an	 important	 analytical	 and	 methodological	 step	 in	 the	process	 of	 operationalization	 of	 institutional	 power	 as	 a	 theoretical	 concept	 into	observable	variables	that	can	help	to	explain	in	a	systematic	manner	the	variation	in	institutional	design	among	institutions	across	the	globe.			 Data	 collected	 from	 the	 surveys	 is	 integrated	 in	 the	 broader	 dataset	 of	institutional	power.	Depending	on	each	 institution’s	design,	 its	national	 institution	was	grouped	in	one	of	the	existing	–	strong	(3),	medium	(2),	weak	(1).	Survey	data	allows	for	a	triangulation	of	report-based	information,	whenever	available,	and	also	makes	 possible	 the	 further	 specification	 for	 the	 dependent	 variable	 based	 on	information	otherwise	not	publicly	accessible.	The	conceptual	scheme	used	for	the	design	of	 the	 survey	 is	 identical	 to	 the	one	 created	 for	 the	 content	 analysis	of	 the	institutional	documents	and	reports,	yielding	results	that	can	be	coded	along	the	six	dimensions	of	strength	and	ultimately	in	the	index	values.		
2.4.3.2.	Discussion	of	survey	results		In	 the	dataset	of	187	observations,	a	 total	of	25%	of	country/institutions	are	non-accredited	 ombudsman	 and	 human	 rights	 commissions,	 with	 the	 largest	 number,	21,	 located	 in	 Africa,	 out	 of	 a	 total	 of	 54	 on	 the	 continent.	 Europe	 has	 10	 such	institutions,	 which	 represents	 23%	 of	 all	 countries	 included	 in	 the	 regional	
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classification.	The	non-accredited	group	shows	an	interesting	pattern	of	state-level	and	sub-regional	institutional	establishment	and	design	among	countries	that	share	cultural	ties	throughout	history	–	Czech	Republic,	Estonia,	Finland,	Latvia,	Lithuania,	and	 Montenegro.	 Out	 of	 the	 seven	 countries,	 Finland	 and	 Estonia	 have	 the	 two	oldest	 human	 rights	 institutions	 in	 the	 world,	 established	 in	 1919	 and	 1938	respectively,	 while	 Lithuania	 and	 Latvia	 adopted	 their	 institutions	 in	 subsequent	years	after	 independence	 from	 the	Soviet	Union,	1994	and	1995	respectively.	The	Americas	have	8	 such	non-accredited	 institutions,	 representing	23.5%	of	 the	 total	on	 the	 continent,	with	 the	majority	 being	 the	 same	 institutions	model	 as	 in	most	Spanish	 speaking	 countries,	 namely	 defensoria	 del	 pueblo.	 Asia	 has	 7%	 non-accredited	 institutions,	 representing	 14.5%,	 and	 has	 comparatively	 the	 largest	number	 of	 countries	without	 any	 national	 human	 rights	 institution	 as	 of	 2013,	 at	least	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 data	 collection	 and	 research	 performed	 for	 this	 project.	Oceania	 presents	 a	 special	 case,	 as	 it	 has	 a	 relatively	 small	 number	 of	 national	institutions	with	the	vested	authority	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights,	namely	4,	out	which	three	are	strong	and	two	are	non-accredited.	A	large	number	of	island	nations	 in	 the	 region	 are	 integrated	 in	 a	 regional	 network	 called	 the	 Pacific	Ombudsman	 Alliance,	 alongside	 the	 Australian	 Commonwealth	 Ombudsman	 and	New	Zealand’s	Office	of	 the	Ombudsman.	A	number	of	countries,	 such	as	Vanuatu,	Solomon	 Islands,	 and	 Samoa	 do	 not	 have	 accredited	 ombudsman	 institutions,	 but	hold	 ombudsman	 representatives	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Pacific	 Ombudsman	 Alliance.	 A	number	 of	 governments	 in	 the	 Pacific	 Rim	 do	 not	 have	 ombudsman	 institutions	(Nauru,	Niue,	Palau,	Kiribati,	Federated	States	of	Micronesia,	Marshall	 Islands,	and	
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Tuvalu),	but	are	granted	seats	for	non-ombudsman	representatives	at	the	meetings	of	the	regional	alliance.		 The	 survey	 response	 rate	 is	 32.6%,	 with	 15	 countries	 out	 of	 46	 in	 total	having	 completed	 the	 online	 and	 paper-based	 survey.	 The	 distribution	 of	institutional	 strength	 across	 the	 respondent	 countries	 is	 evenly	 split	 amongst	countries	with	institutions	with	medium-strength	NHRIs	and	countries	with	strong	NHRIs.	The	regional	distribution	of	respondent	countries	across	the	two	dimensions	of	strength,	however,	shows	a	clear	preference	for	strong	institutions	in	Europe	to	complete	 the	 survey	 (Cyprus,	 Czech	 Republic,	 Estonia,	 Finland,	 Latvia,	 Lithuania).	Uruguay’s	 Defensoria	 is	 the	 sole	 institution	 located	 outside	 of	 Europe	 to	 have	completed	the	survey.	Additionally,	with	the	exception	of	Malta,	all	other	medium-strength	institutions	that	have	completed	the	survey	are	located	outside	of	Europe	(Belize,	 Côte	 d'Ivoire,	 Guinea,	 Haiti,	 Pakistan,	 Saint	 Kitts	 and	 Nevis	 as	 well	 as	Trinidad	and	Tobago).	More	specifically,	Pakistan	is	the	only	country	with	a	medium	strength	 institution	 that	 is	 located	 in	 Asia,	 and	 Côte	 d'Ivoire	 is	 the	 only	 African	institution	 that	 responded	 to	 the	 survey,	 with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 medium-strength	respondent	institutions	being	located	in	Central	and	Latin	America.	
Table	2.2.	Distribution	of	survey	response	countries	by	strength		 	
Country	 Strength	level	Belize	 Medium	Côte	d'Ivoire	 Medium	Cyprus	 Strong	Czeck	Republic	 Strong	Estonia	 Strong	Finland	 Strong	Guinea	 Medium	
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Haiti	 Medium	Latvia	 Strong	Lithuania	 Strong	Malta	 Medium	Pakistan	 Medium	Saint	Kitts	and	Nevis	 Medium	Trinidad	and	Tobago	 Medium	Uruguay	 Strong		
	 On	the	basis	of	the	survey	results,	the	following	institutions	are	assessed	as	‘strong’	 –	 Cyprus,	 Czech	 Republic,	 Estonia,	 Finland,	 Iraq,	 Latvia,	 Lithuania,	Montenegro,	 Samoa,	 Uruguay,	 and	 Uzbekistan.	 In	 addition	 to	 having	 full	 de	 jure	independence,	 a	 broad	 human	 rights	 mandate	 and	 being	 fully	 autonomous	 from	government,	 all	 of	 these	 strong	 institutions	 present	 also	 an	 overall	 high	 level	 of	institutional	performance	across	all	dimensions,	despite	more	variation	in	three	of	the	 six	 dimensions.	 Similarly	 to	 other	 countries	 in	 the	 global	 dataset,	 surveyed	countries	 presented	 the	 same	 high	 degree	 of	 variation	 along	 three	 dimension	 of	institutional	 strength,	 namely	 power	 of	 investigation,	 adequate	 resources	 and	pluralism	 of	 representation.	 The	 scores	 given	 to	 institutions	 based	 on	 the	 survey	results	were	integrated	in	the	dataset	of	the	dependent	variable.			
	
2.5.	Dimensions	of	institutional	strength		
	This	section	presents	the	general	patterns	of	institutional	strength	in	the	dataset.	It	begins	with	the	descriptive	results	of	the	regional	distribution	of	country	cases	and	
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their	levels	of	strength	and	continues	with	a	presentation	of	the	distribution	of	cases	by	level	of	strength	for	each	indicator	of	institutional	design.		
2.5.1.	General	trends	and	regional	distribution		The	 general	 global	 trends	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 institutional	 strength	 present	 a	rather	balanced	picture,	with	strong	institutions	being	more	numerous,	totalling	70	or	37%,	and	a	total	of	65	medium	level	institutions,	which	represent	35%	of	the	187	total.	Countries	that	have	no	or	a	poorly	performing	institution	belong	in	the	weak	category,	with	52	in	total,	which	is	about	28%.			
Table	2.3.	Distribution	of	institutional	strength	in	Africa	
AFRICA	
Weak	 Medium	 Strong	Benin	 Algeria	 Burundi	Comoros	 Angola	 Egypt	Equatorial	Guinea	 Botswana	 Ghana	Eritrea	 Burkina	Faso	 Kenya	Madagascar	 Cote	D’Ivoire	 Malawi	Niger	 Cabo	Verde	 Mauritania	Republic	of	the	Congo	 Cameroon	 Namibia	Sao	Tome	&	Principe	 Central	African	Republic	 Rwanda	Suriname	 Chad	 Sierra	Leone		 Democratic	Rep	of	Congo	 South	Africa		 Djibouti	 Tanzania		 Ethiopia	 Togo		 Gabon	 Uganda		 Guinea	 Zambia		 Lesotho	 	
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	 Liberia	 		 Mali	 		 Mauritius	 		 Morocco	 		 Mozambique	 		 Nigeria	 		 Senegal	 		 Seychelles	 		 South	Sudan	 		 Sudan	 		 Swaziland	 		 The	Gambia	 		 Tunisia	 		 Zimbabwe	 			
Table	2.4.	Distribution	of	institutional	strength	in	the	Americas	
	
AMERICAS	
Weak	 Medium	 Strong	Antigua	&	Barbuda	 Belize	 Argentina	Barbados	 Grenada	 Bolivia	Brazil	 Haiti	 Canada		Cuba	 Honduras	 Chile	Dominica	 Jamaica	 Colombia	Dominican	Rep.	 St	Kitts	and	Nevis	 Costa	Rica	Guyana	 St	Lucia	 Ecuador	St	Vincent	&	Grenadines	 Trinidad	&	Tobago	 El	Salvador	United	States	 	 Guatemala		 	 Mexico		 	 Nicaragua		 	 Panama		 	 Paraguay		 	 Peru		 	 Uruguay		 	 Venezuela			
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Table	2.5.	Distribution	of	institutional	strength	in	Asia	
	
ASIA	
Weak	 Medium	 Strong	Bhutan	 Bahrein	 Afghanistan	Brunei	 Bangladesh	 India	Cambodia	 Iraq	 Indonesia	China	 Israel	 Jordan	Iran	 Khazakhstan	 South	Korea	Japan	 Kuwait	 Mongolia	Laos	 Kyrgyzstan	 Nepal	Lebanon	 Malaysia	 Philippines	Libya	 Maldives	 Qatar	Myanmar	 Pakistan	 Thailand	Oman	 Sri	Lanka	 Timor-Leste	Saudi	Arabia	 Tajikistan	 Uzbekistan	Singapore	 	 	Syria		 	 	Turkmenistan	 	 	United	Arab	Emirates	 	 	Vietnam	 	 	Yemen	 	 		
	
	
Table	2.6.	Distribution	of	institutional	strength	in	Europe	
	
EUROPE	
Weak	 Medium	 Strong	Belarus	 Austria	 Albania	Iceland	 Azerbaijan	 Armenia	Italy	 Belgium	 Croatia	Monaco	 Bosnia&Herzegovina	 Cyprus	Switzerland	 Bulgaria	 Czech	Republic	Turkey	 Liechtenstein	 Denmark		 Macedonia	 Estonia		 Malta	 Finland	
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	 Moldova	 France		 Netherlands	 Georgia		 Norway	 Germany		 Romania	 Greece		 Slovakia	 Hungary		 Slovenia	 Ireland		 Sweden	 Latvia		 	 Lithuania		 	 Luxembourg		 	 Montenegro		 	 Poland		 	 Portugal		 	 Russian	Fed.		 	 Serbia		 	 Spain		 	 Ukraine		 	 United	Kingdom			
Table	2.7.	Distribution	of	institutional	strength	in	Oceania	
	
OCEANIA	
Weak	 Medium	 Strong	Fiji	 Vanuatu	 Australia	Kiribati	 	 New	Zealand	Marshall	Islands	 	 Samoa	Fed	States	of	Micronesia	 	 	Palau	 	 	Papua	New	Guinea	 	 	Solomon	Islands	 	 	Tonga	 	 	Tuvalu	 	 				 The	regional	distribution	of	institutions	across	five	different	regions	provides	evidence	 that	 Africa	 has	 the	 largest	 overall	 number	 of	 national	 bodies	 for	 the	
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promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights	(53),	out	of	which	the	majority	are	at	the	medium	 level	of	strength	(29).	The	next	 largest	number	 is	 located	 in	Europe	(46),	which	 is	 also	 the	 region	 where	 the	 largest	 number	 of	 strong	 institutions	 can	 be	found	(25).	The	region	with	the	smallest	number	of	institutions	and	also	with	weak	institutions	is	Asia	(18).			
Table	2.8.	Summary	of	regional	distribution	of	institutional	strength	
	 Weak	 Medium	 Strong	
Africa	 10	 29	 14	
Americas	 9	 8	 16	
Asia	 18	 12	 12	
Europe	 6	 15	 25	
Oceania	 9	 1	 3		 		 Based	on	descriptive	analysis	of	the	187	observations	in	the	dataset,	strong	institutions	are	evenly	distributed	across	regions	as	percentages	of	the	total	number	of	 country/institutions	 in	 each	 of	 the	 five	 regions,	 with	 the	 Americas	 having	 the	highest	percentage,	44%.	Europe,	Africa,	and	the	Asia	have	similar	percentages.	As	far	as	the	accreditation	status	is	concerned,	the	findings	corroborate	results	of	prior	studies,	placing	Europe	at	 the	 top	of	 the	 list	with	 the	highest	density,	66%,	out	of	which	 over	 61%	 being	 at	 the	medium	 or	 strong	 levels	 of	 strength	 and.	 A	 slightly	larger	number	of	Asian	countries,	namely	18	of	them	and	37.5%	of	all	states	on	the	continent,	 have	 no	 national	 institution	 mandated	 to	 promote	 and	 protect	 human	rights	as	reported	in	2012,	at	least	as	a	result	of	my	data	collection	process.			
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2.5.2.	Discussion	of	distribution	for	each	indicator		 	We	 will	 turn	 now	 to	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 variation	 in	 the	 number	 of	 countries	distributed	across	 the	 three	 levels	of	 assessment	 for	each	 indicator	of	design.	The	dimensions	 consisting	 of	more	 than	 one	 indicator	 are	 also	 presented	 in	 tables	 of	aggregate	values.	
	
2.5.2.1.	Nature	of	mandate	
	
Figure	2.7.	Frequency	global	distribution	of	HR	institutions		
	(3	=	strong;	2	=	medium;	1	=	weak)			
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	 A	strong	national	human	rights	institution	has	a	broad	mandate	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights.	Variation	 in	 this	dimension	 is	operationalized	as	 three-level	 ordinal	 variable,	 ranking	 from	 highest	 value	 for	 institutions	 with	 a	 broad	mandate	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights,	to	the	middle	value	for	institutions	with	a	partial	human	rights	mandate.	As	illustrated	by	their	annual	reports	and	also	noted	SCA’s	2014	report,	the	Ukrainian	Parliament	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights	performs	 activities	 in	 line	 with	 a	 broad	 mandate	 of	 promotion	 and	 protection,	though	 its	 de	 facto	 mandate	 includes	 a	 vaguely	 specified	 promotion	 power,	designated	as	the	promotion	of	“the	legal	awareness	of	the	public.”	The	25	B-status	institutions	 are	 largely	 in	 compliance	 with	 the	 broad	mandate	 requirement,	 with	Belgium,	 Macedonia,	 Maldives,	 Mali,	 Slovakia,	 and	 Sweden	 having	 a	 commission	with	 a	 partial	 human	 rights	 mandate	 or	 a	 classical	 ombudsman	 model	 with	 no	explicit	human	rights	provisions.	C-status	institutions	like,	Benin,	Iran	and	Romania	have	 a	 broad	 human	 rights	mandate	 but	 are	 otherwise	 largely	 not	 in	 compliance	with	 the	 Paris	 Principles,	 while	 Antigua	 and	 Barbuda,	 Barbados,	 Madagascar,	Switzerland	have	only	a	partial	or	not	an	explicit	human	rights	mandate.			
Table	2.9.	Nature	of	mandate	per	level	of	institutional	strength	
Nature	of	Mandate					 	Broad	HR	Mandate	 Partial	Mandate	or	Classical	Ombudsman	 	Other	or	none	Strong	 	69	 	60%	 1	 3.7%	 0	 0	Medium	 41	 35.65%	 23	 85.19%	 0	 0	Weak	 5	 4.35%	 3	 11.11%	 45	 100%	Total	 115	 29	 45	
		 93	
	
	
	
Figure	2.8.	Nature	of	institutional	mandate	
	
2.5.2.2.	Extent	of	de	jure	independence	
	Independence	is	understood	as	de	jure	legal	status	of	an	independent	institution	(or	not)	and	operationalized	with	the	help	of	two	indicators	measuring	the	legal	status	of	the	institution	(explicitly	established	as	an	independent	body	or	not)	as	well	as	a	second	indicator	measuring	the	level	of	inclusion	in	national	law	by	ranking	the	type	of	official	document	was	used	to	establish	the	institution.			
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Figure	2.9.	De	jure	independence	dimension	(aggregate)	
		 The	 first	 indicator	used	 to	measure	 independence,	 de	 jure	 legal	 status,	 is	 a	three-level	ordinal	variable	with	the	 following	values	–	strong,	 if	 the	human	rights	institution	 has	 de	 jure	 independent	 status	 stated	 in	 its	 founding	 documents;	medium	if	it	is	an	agency	operating	within	a	government	ministry;	and	weak	if	the	institution	 is	 an	NGO	with	 human	 rights	mandate	 or	 a	 research	 institute	 that	 has	NHRI	status.	An	example	of	a	weak	institution	is	for	instance	Iceland,	which	has	an	active	NGO,	the	Human	Rights	Centre	charged	with	research	on	human	rights	issues,	and	 a	 government	 ombudsman	 office	 with	 responsibilities	 partly	 or	 indirectly	linked	 to	 human	 rights,	 but	 no	 independent	 institution	 with	 a	 human	 rights	mandate.	Countries	 that	have	 strong	 institutions	have	also	given	 their	 institutions	
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fully	 independent	 status.	 In	 addition,	 60	 countries	 with	 medium	 strength	institutions	have	 also	 given	 them	 independence	 status.	 Four	 countries	 in	 the	data	set	 –	 Gabon,	 Liechtenstein,	 Pakistan,	 as	 well	 as	 Saint	 Kitts	 and	 Nevis	 –	 have	established	institutions	that	do	not	have	full	de	jure	independence.		
Table	2.10.	Institutional	type	per	level	of	institutional	strength 
Institutional	Type			 	Independent	 Government	agency	or	ministerial	office	 	NGO	or	none	Strong	 	70	 	50.72%	 0	 0	 0	 	Medium	 60	 43.48%	 4	 100%	 0	 	Weak	 8	 5.8%	 0	 0	 45	 100%	Total	 138	 4	 45		
	
Figure	2.10.	Type	of	institution	
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	A	second	indicator	used	to	measure	de	jure	independent	status	is	given	by	the	level	of	inclusion	of	an	institution	in	national	law,	ranging	from	strong	independent	status	through	official	declaration	 in	 the	 text	of	 the	 country	constitution	or	national	 law,	middle	strength	given	through	official	decree	or	other	government-issued	act,	or	no	such	de	jure	independence	at	all.	All	strong	level	institutions	are	established	through	inclusion	 in	 country	 constitutions	 or	 national	 law.	 138	 countries	 in	 the	 world	established	their	institutions	through	national	law	or	constitution,	with	nearly	51%	of	 them	 being	 also	 assessed	 as	 strong	 institutions,	 while	 61	 institutions	 have	medium-level	 strength.	 Three	 institutions	 –	 Bahrain,	 Kazakhstan	 and	 Kuwait	 –	established	 theirs	 through	a	presidential	decree	or	government-issued	act.	Among	the	countries	with	weak	institutions,	Iceland	is	the	country	that	has	a	national	NGO	mandated	with	human	rights	promotion	work.		
	
Table	2.11.	Integration	in	national	law/Legal	status	
Integration	in	national	law	/	Legal	status		 National	law	or	constitution	 Government	or	presidential	decree/act		 	NGO	or	none	Strong	 	70	 	50.72%	 0	 0	 46	 	Medium	 61	 44.2%	 3	 100%	 0	 	Weak	 7	 5.07%	 0	 0	 0	 100%	Total	 138	 3	 46	
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Figure	2.11.	Legal	status	
	
2.5.2.3.	Degree	of	autonomy	from	government	 	
	Autonomy	from	government	is	understood	as	the	institution’s	capacity	to	carry	out	its	 functions	 without	 interference	 by	 the	 national	 government.	 This	 dimension	 is	measured	 with	 the	 help	 of	 four	 different	 indicators	 that	 represent	 the	 main	elements	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 government	 and	 independent	 human	 rights	institutions:	 financial	 independence,	 appointment	 structure,	 government	representation	and	reporting	structure.	In	aggregate	terms,	the	degree	of	autonomy	from	 government	 is	 high	 among	 76	 institutions,	 encompassing	 both	 strong	 and	
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medium-level	bodies,	while	48	institutions	are	operate	with	a	degree	of	government	intervention	in	decision-making.		
	
Figure	2.12.	Autonomy	from	government		The	 first	 measure	 of	 autonomy	 from	 government	 is	 the	 degree	 of	 financial	autonomy	and	is	measured	on	a	three-point	scale	on	the	basis	of	the	source	for	the	institutional	 budget,	 namely	 whether	 the	 institution	 obtains	 the	 majority	 of	 its	funding	from	Parliament,	as	a	fixed	percentage	sum	out	of	the	annual	state	budget,	or	 it	gets	 its	 financial	 support	primarily	 from	the	government	or	 the	president,	or	has	 very	 different	 sources	 of	 financing	 such	 as	 donations	 from	 international	institutions	of	private	donors.	95	institutions	in	total	receive	their	funding	from	the	Parliament	 directly	 and	 often	 through	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 separate	 category	 in	 the	
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national	 budget.	 61	 out	 of	 these	 institutions	 are	 also	 considered	 strong,	while	 29	institutions	display	medium-level	strength	while	being	financially	independent	from	government.	40	 institutions	receive	their	 funding	 from	the	government	directly	or	through	presidential	funds,	including	seven	institutions	that	are	otherwise	assessed	to	be	strong	–	Australia,	Burundi,	France,	Ghana,	Greece,	Jordan	and	Zambia.		
Table	2.12.	Financial	independence	
Financial	independence			 Predominantly	Parliament	or	national	budget	 Predominantly	government	or	presidential	funds		 		Other	Strong	 	61	 	64.21%	 7	 17.5%	 2	 3.85%	Medium	 29	 30.53%	 32	 80%	 3	 5.77%	Weak	 5	 5.26%	 1	 2.5%	 47	 90.38%	Total	 95	 40	 52	
	
	
Figure	2.13.	Financial	autonomy	from	government	
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	The	appointment	structure	is	also	measured	on	a	three-point	scale:	the	highest	level	of	autonomy	is	assigned	to	institutions	who	require	Parliamentary	appointment	of	the	director/head	of	 the	 institution;	 the	middle	 level	of	autonomy	 is	attained	 if	an	institution	 required	 government,	 governor	 general,	 ministerial,	 or	 presidential	approval	 for	 the	 selection	 of	 its	 director/head;	 institutions	 with	 a	 different	appointment	 system	 are	 coded	 as	 0.	 83	 institutions	 in	 total	 require	 Parliament	approval	 for	 the	 appointment	 of	 the	 institution’s	 leader	 and	 committee,	 with	 57	strong	being	ranked	as	strong	institutions.	Of	the	strong	institutions,	Germany	and	Denmark,	whose	 institutions	are	set	up	as	human	rights	 institutions	with	a	strong	research	 component	 and	 little	 to	no	 judicial	powers,	have	appointment	 structures	that	 are	 completely	 separate	 from	 other	 state	 institution.	 47	 institutions	 have	appointment	structures	that	are	 fully	or	primarily	reliant	on	the	Parliament,	while	16	of	them	allow	a	degree	of	government	involvement		(Australia,	Cameroon,	Egypt,	France,	 Greece,	 India,	 Kenya,	 Luxembourg,	 Malaysia,	 Mauritius,	 Morocco,	 Nepal,	Nigeria,	Palestine,	Philippines,	Zambia).		
Table	2.13.	Appointment	structure 
Appointment	structure			 	Parliament	approval		 Government	or	presidential	approval		 	Other	Strong	 	57	 	68.67%	 11	 23.4%	 2	 3.51%	Medium	 24	 28.92%	 34	 72.34%	 6	 10.53%	Weak	 2	 2.41%	 2	 4.26%	 49	 85.96%	Total	 83	 47	 57		
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Figure	2.14.	Leadership	appointment	structure 		 A	 third	measure	 of	 autonomy	 from	government	 is	 given	by	 an	 indicator	 of	government	 representation	 in	 decision-making	 processes	 at	 the	 institution.	 30	institutions	 have	 high	 involvement	 of	 government	 in	 decision-making,	 while	 109	institutions	 present	 a	 low	 degree	 of	 government	 involvement	 in	 institutional	functioning.	 Seven	 strong	 institutions	 present	 a	 high	 level	 of	 government	representation	 in	 decision-making	 –	 Colombia,	 Egypt,	 France,	 Greece,	 India,	Luxembourg,	and	Nepal.	For	instance,	Colombia’s	Defensor	establishes	contact	with	the	 international	 community	with	 the	 help	 of	 government	mediation,	while	 Egypt	has	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Parliament	 as	 an	 active	 participant	 in	 the	 governing	 of	 the	country’s	national	human	rights	 institution.	20	 institutions	at	 the	medium	 level	of	
57
47
83
Total 187
0
20
40
60
80
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y o
f c
ou
nt
rie
s/i
ns
titu
tio
ns
-1 0 1 2
Leadership appointment structure
		 102	
strength	show	high	presence	of	government	 in	decision-making,	while	Benin,	 Iran,	and	Turkey	have	weak	institutions	in	which	the	extent	of	government	intervention	is	high.	
	
Table	2.14.	Government	representation	in	decision-making 
Government	representation	in	decision-making			 	High		 	Low		 	None		Strong	 	7	 	23.33%	 63	 57.8%	 0	 0	Medium	 20	 66.67%	 42	 38.53%	 2	 4.17%	Weak	 3	 10%	 4	 3.67%	 46	 95.83%	Total	 30	 109	 48			
	
Figure	2.15.	Government	representation	in	decision-making 
48
109
30
Total 187
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y o
f c
ou
nt
rie
s/i
ns
titu
tio
ns
-1 0 1 2
Government representation in decision making
		 103	
	 Reporting	mechanisms	are	 linked	 to	 institutional	 autonomy	on	 the	basis	of	the	varying	target	audience	for	the	annual	activity	reports	and,	whenever	available,	the	 country	 human	 rights	 reports	 issued	 by	 such	 national	 institutions.	 Reporting	implies	a	degree	of	institutional	accountability	to	social	and	political	actors.	Thus,	an	institution	 could	 be	 reporting	 officially	 to	 the	 Parliament	 and	 the	 public,	 the	government	and	the	president,	or	none	of	the	above.	103	institutions	state	that	they	report	to	the	Parliament	directly	and	to	the	domestic	public,	while	32	of	them	report	exclusively	or	mainly	 to	a	government	or	government-administered	agency,	prime	minister,	 or	 the	 president	 (for	 instance,	 Australia,	 Cameroon,	 France,	 India,	Luxembourg,	Mauritius,	Morocco,	Nepal,	and	Nigeria).		
	
Table	2.15.	Reporting	to	government	
Reporting	to	government		 Parliament	and	the	public	 Government	and	president	 	None		Strong		 	65	 	63.11%	 5	 15.63%	 0	 0	Medium	 34	 33.01%	 27	 84.38%	 3	 5.77%	Weak	 4	 3.88%	 0	 0	 49	 94.23%	Total	 103	 32	 52	
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Figure	2.16.	Reporting	to	state	institutions	
	
2.5.2.4.	Promotion	and	protection	powers	 	
	Adequate	 powers	 of	 investigation	 are	 measured	 through	 an	 assessment	 of	predominantly	performed	functions,	on	the	basis	of	 information	publicly	available,	using	two	broad	categories	of	functions	–	human	rights	promotion	and	human	rights	protection.	 A	 national	 institution	 can	 be	 mandated	 to	 perform	 either	 set	 of	functions,	or	can	be	vested	with	both	sets	of	powers,	 thus	being	both	 in	charge	of	promotion	and	protection.	In	other	words,	institutions	can	have	de	facto	powers	of	promotion	and	protection	vested	through	a	broad	human	rights	mandate,	but	only	perform	 certain	 functions	 that	 make	 it	 predominantly	 a	 protection	 or	 promotion	
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institution.	Promotion	 is	measured	as	high	 if	 institutions	 engage	 in	 education	 and	training	 as	 well	 as	 human	 rights	 research,	 with	 low	 power	 being	 given	 by	 the	publication	of	just	annual	reports	of	activity,	and	no	such	power	at	all	for	institution	that	do	not	perform	any	of	 the	above	activities.	Protection	 strength	 can	be	high	 if	institutions	 have	 quasi-judicial	 power	 and	 low	 power	 if	 the	 institution	 only	performs	an	 advisory	 role,	 or	have	no	 such	power	of	 at	 all.	According	 to	 the	 SCA,	human	rights	institutions	can	have	quasi-judicial	powers	–	when	they	do,	however,	they	 need	 to	 meet	 certain	 obligations,	 namely	 to	 seek	 an	 amicable	 settlement	through	 reconciliation,	 a	 binding	 decision	 or	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 confidentiality;	 to	inform	petitioners	of	their	rights	and	available	remedies	as	well	as	promote	direct	access	to	them;	hear	complaints	and	transmit	them	to	competent	authorities;	finally	they	can	make	recommendations	to	competent	authorities	regarding	such	cases	of	human	 rights	 violations.	 The	 difference	 between	 de	 jure	 mandated	 investigative	powers	and	the	predominant	functions	performed	in	regular	institutional	activities	is	 important	 as	 it	 highlights	 the	 distinction	 between	 mandated	 functions	 and	practice.	 This	 difference	 can	 be	 a	 result	 of	 many	 factors,	 including	 internal	 and	external	 determinants	 –	 the	 coding	 performed	 for	 a	 study	 that	 builds	 on	 a	 global	dataset	provides	a	cursory	understanding	of	patterns	of	design	across	countries	and	regions.	Case-based	studies	that	also	 incorporate	qualitative	data	are	better	suited	to	allow	a	more	in-depth	look	at	the	situation	in	each	country/institution.				
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Table	2.16.	Predominantly	promotional	activities	
Predominantly	promotion	activities			 Education	and	research	 	Reports	 	None		Strong		 64	 	73.56%	 6	 18.75%	 0	 	Medium	 21	 24.14%	 25	 78.13%	 18	 26.47%	Weak	 2	 2.3%	 1	 3.13%	 50	 73.53%	Total	 87	 32	 68	
	
Table	2.17.	Predominantly	protection	activities 
Predominantly	protection	activities			 	Quasi-judicial	 	Advisory	 	None		Strong	 	60	 	58.25%	 10	 37.04%	 0	 0	Medium	 41	 39.81%	 16	 59.26%	 7	 12.28%	Weak	 2	 1.94%	 1	 3.7%	 50	 87.72%	Total	 103	 27	 57	
	
	
Figure	2.17.	Predominantly	promotional	activities 
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Figure	2.18.	Predominantly	protection	activities 	 In	 the	 case	 of	 strong	 human	 rights	 institutions,	 87	 institutions	 have	predominantly	promotional	functions,	with	Albania,	Armenia,	Ukraine	having	few	or	no	 mandated	 promotion	 functions.	 Though	 not	 mandated	 with	 such	 powers,	Armenia’s	Human	Rights	Defender	performs	such	activities	and	includes	them	in	the	annual	reports.	In	line	with	their	mandate,	Albania	and	Ukraine	have	rather	limited	promotion	 powers	 as	 evidenced	 by	 their	 reported	 activities.	 Human	 rights	institutions	vested	with	 limited	protection	powers	are	Denmark,	France,	Germany,	Greece,	 Jordan,	 South	 Korea,	 while	 60	 strong	 institutions	 have	 high	 protection,	quasi-judicial	 powers.	 Actual	 protection	 power	 is	 limited	 for	 Denmark,	 Egypt,	France,	Germany,	Greece,	Jordan,	South	Korea,	and	Ukraine.		
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2.5.2.5.	Degree	of	pluralism		The	 fifth	 dimension	 refers	 to	 pluralism	 of	 representation	 of	 as	 many	 strata	 of	 a	country’s	 society	 as	 possible	 and	 is	 operationalized	 as	 a	 measure	 of	 civil	 society	representation	in	decision-making.	If	NGO	involvement	is	high,	representatives	are	active	members	of	institutional	boards	and	have	the	right	to	propose	activities	and	vote	for	or	against	decisions.	Institutions	display	a	lot	of	variation	in	this	dimension,	with	a	large	number	of	institutions	at	all	levels	of	accreditation	allowing	limited	or	no	civil	society	involvement.		This	is	the	dimension	that	registers	the	most	variation,	as	countries	with	 institutions	that	 function	at	all	 levels	permit	different	degrees	of	NGO	presence	in	their	activities.	While	some	institutions	may	collaborate	with	NGOs	for	 the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	 rights	 in	 their	 respective	 countries	or	consult	 them	 regarding	 human	 rights	 violations,	 they	 often	 do	 not	 allow	 NGO	representatives	 to	 be	 active	 members	 in	 their	 boards	 or	 have	 decision-making	power.	 Out	 of	 the	 70	 countries	 ranked	 as	 strong,	 only	 nine	 (Armenia,	 Burundi,	Cyprus,	 France,	 Germany,	 Greece,	 Qatar,	 Togo,	 and	 Uruguay)	 allow	 civil	 society	representatives	 to	 participate	 in	 decision-making	 processes	 in	 their	 NHRIs.	 30	others	perform	at	a	low	level	of	pluralism,	while	29	independent	institutions	ranked	as	strong	do	not	engage	at	all	with	NGOs.		
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Table	2.18.	NGO	representation	in	institutional	decision-making	
NGO	representation	in	decision-making			 	High	 	Low	 	None/N/A	Strong	 	9	 	60%	 32	 60.38%	 29	 24.37%	Medium	 4	 26.67%	 21	 39.62%	 39	 32.77%	Weak	 2	 13.33%	 0	 0	 51	 42.86%	Total	 15	 53	 119	
	
	
Figure 2.19. NGO representation in institutional decision-making 
 A	second	measure	of	the	relationship	that	institutions	have	with	NGOs	is	focused	on	the	reporting	mechanisms	set	up	by	each	institution	and	whether	it	included	NGO’s.	Only	 14	 strong	 institutions	 and	 eight	medium-level	 ones	 state	 explicitly	 that	 they	share	 their	 reports	 with	 NGOs,	 while	 49	 strong	 and	 34	 at	 the	 medium	 level	 of	
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strength	 make	 their	 reports	 public	 and	 mention	 civil	 society	 as	 some	 of	 the	beneficiaries	of	their	work	without	targeting	them	directly.	Similar	to	the	indicator	that	measures	NGO	 involvement	 in	 decision-making	 processes,	 the	 distribution	 of	the	indicator	that	assesses	the	extent	of	reporting	to	NGOs	is	skewed	in	the	direction	opposite	 to	 the	 indicators	 that	 measure	 the	 independence	 and	 autonomy	 of	institutions.			
Table	2.19.	Reporting	to	NGOs	
Reporting	to	NGOs			 	High	 	Low	 	None/N/A	Strong	 14	 	60.87%	 49	 57.65%	 7	 8.86%	Medium	 8	 34.78%	 34	 40%	 22	 27.85%	Weak	 1	 4.35%	 2	 2.35%	 50	 63.29%	Total	 23	 85	 79		
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Figure 2.20. Reporting to NGOs 
	
2.5.2.6.	Adequate	resources	
	The	 sixth	 dimension	 of	 institutional	 power	 represents	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 an	institution	has	adequate	infrastructural	resources	to	operate	and	fulfil	its	mandated	duties.	This	dimension	is	operationalized	with	the	help	of	two	indicators	–	adequate	resources	and	adequate	staffing.	99	institutions	across	all	 levels	of	strength	do	not	report	having	inadequate	funding,	while	117	report	having	adequate	staffing	or	do	not	 mention	 explicitly	 being	 in	 need	 of	 additional	 staff	 members.	 40	 institutions	mention	 being	 in	 need	 of	 more	 funding,	 and	 22	 of	 them	 in	 need	 of	 more	 staff	members	to	carry	out	their	mandated	functions.	These	two	indicators	measure	the	
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financial	and	staff	resources	capacity	based	on	explicit	statements	in	annual	reports,	public	documents,	and	institutional	websites.	As	such,	it	assesses	only	clearly	stated	need	and	does	not	include	in	its	measurement	financial	or	staffing	needs	that	were	not	 made	 public	 or	 explicit.	 A	 fair	 assumption	 to	 make	 is	 that	 most	 institutions	would	probably	benefit	 from	more	 funding	and	adequate	staff,	even	when	they	do	not	make	such	needs	explicit.		
	
Figure	2.21.	Adequate	financial	resources	
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Table	2.20.	Adequate	financial	resources	
Adequate	financial	resources			 	High	 	Low	 	None/N/A	Strong	 	59	 59.6%	 10	 25%	 1	 2.08%	Medium	 35	 35.35%	 28	 70%	 1	 2.08%	Weak	 5	 5.05%	 2	 5	 46	 95.83%	Total	 99	 40	 48		
	
Figure	2.22.	Adequate	staff	resources	 						
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Table	2.21.	Adequate	staff	resources	
Adequate	staff	resources			 	High	 	Low	 	None/N/A	Strong	 	67	 75.260%	 2	 9.09%	 1	 2.08%	Medium	 46	 39.32%	 17	 77.27%	 1	 2.08%	Weak	 4	 3.42%	 3	 13.64	 46	 95.83%	Total	 117	 22	 48	
	
2.6.	Conclusion		This	 chapter	 has	 presented	 the	 dependent	 variable	 for	 the	 thesis	 –	 institutional	strength	–	discussing	the	conceptual	scheme	that	guided	its	operationalisation	and	introducing	the	original	dataset	of	thirteen	different	design	features.	The	conceptual	scheme	 consists	 of	 six	 dimensions	 of	 institutional	 design	 –	 broad	 human	 rights	mandate,	 de	 jure	 independence,	 autonomy	 from	 government,	 predominant	activities,	pluralism	of	 representation,	as	well	as	 financial	and	staff	 resources.	The	dataset	 is	 cross-sectional	 and	 presents	 data	 for	 2012-2013	 collected	 from	institutional	 reports	 and	 official	 documentation,	 which	 is	 coded	 with	 the	 help	 of	content	analysis	on	a	 three-point	scale	(1	weak;	2	medium;	3	strong).	Data	on	 the	thirteen	 indicators	 is	 aggregated	 into	 one	 composite	 variable	 –	 the	 institutional	design	 index.	 The	 chapter	 presents	 also	 a	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 the	operationalisation	 for	each	 indicator	and	presents	also	descriptive	statistics	 for	all	countries	in	the	dataset.			 The	 dataset	 of	 design	 features	 for	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 is	original.	The	data	making	up	the	dataset	of	the	different	dimensions	of	institutional	
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power	is	cross-sectional	due	to	lack	of	publicly	available	information	in	the	form	of	institutional	reports	or	documents.	Although	it	does	not	capture	change	over	time,	this	 cross-sectional	 dataset	 offers	 a	 valuable	 first	 insight	 into	 the	 design	 of	independent	institutions	at	the	national	level.	Linos	and	Pegram	have	collected	data	on	institutional	performance	and	a	number	of	institutional	design	characteristic	for	accredited	institutions,	based	on	reports	issued	by	countries	carrying	out	the	peer-review	process	at	the	SCA	(Linos	and	Pegram	2015).	The	original	data	collected	for	this	 thesis	 is	 global	 and	 includes	 observations	 for	 over	 40	 institutions	 that	 never	underwent	 the	accreditation	process.	Moreover,	 it	 assesses	 institutional	design	on	the	 basis	 of	 institutional	 reports	 and	 country-level	 legislative	 documents,	 in	 a	manner	 similar	 to	 the	 evaluation	 carried	 out	 by	 the	 SCA,	 for	 over	 180	 countries	which	have	an	institution	regardless	of	whether	they	ever	sought	accreditation	with	the	UN.		 The	next	logical	step	in	institutional	design	data	collection	and	generation	is	to	expand	the	dataset	to	include	over-time	data.	I	expect	that	collection	of	over-time	data	 on	 the	 annual	 performance	 of	 these	 institutions	will	 be	 easier	 in	 the	 coming	years.	A	positive	development	in	this	direction	is	the	tendency	in	the	past	years	for	an	 increasing	 number	 of	 independent	 national	 bodies	 to	 systematize	 the	information	 about	 their	 mandate	 and	 yearly	 activities	 on	 their	 websites.	 Making	such	 institutional	 documentation	 available	 publicly	 and	 online	 facilitates	 the	collection	of	global	data,	which	would	otherwise	be	 impossible	due	to	high	cost	of	travel	to	such	a	large	number	of	institutions	and	lack	of	access	to	document	archives	in	 the	UN.	Given	 that	over-time	change	 in	 institutional	power	 tends	 to	be	gradual,	
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slow,	 and	 in	 the	majority	 of	 institutions	 takes	 place	 in	 a	 positive	 direction,	 panel	data	collected	at	5-year	intervals	would	be	sufficiently	illustrative.			 	
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2.7.	Annex	
A.	Institutional	Design	Survey	(English	Version)	1.	What	country	is	your	institution	located	in?		2.	Do	you	have	a	mandate	to	protect	and	promote	human	rights?			
Mark	only	one	oval.		
• Yes		
• No			3.	Are	there	specific	human	rights	excluded	from	your	institution’s	mandate?			Please	specify	below.			4.	Your	institution	was	established	through	(please	select	from	the	list	below):			
Mark	only	one	oval.			
• Inclusion	in	the	country	Constitution		
• National	law		
• Parliamentary	decree			
• Other:			5.	What	statute	does	your	institution	have?			
Mark	only	one	oval.			
• Ministerial	office		
• Government	agency	
• Parliamentary	commission		
• Independent	organization			
• Other:				
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6.	What	are	the	main	functions	that	you	are	mandated	to	perform?	*		Please	select	all	that	apply:		
• Periodic	(annual)	drafting	of	public	reports		
• Handle	only	complaints	of	human	rights	violations	referred	by	a	Member	of	Parliament	or	the	Government		
• Handle	complaints	of	human	rights	violations	from	individuals		
• Carry	out	investigations	in	cases	of	human	rights	violations		
• Provide	advice	to	alleged	victims	of	human	rights	violations		
• Mediate	between	all	parties	impartially		
• Pronounce	binding	judgments	in	cases	of	human	rights	violations		
• Represent	victims	in	court	and	take	part	in	legal	settlements	Impose	penalties		
• Propose	amendments	of	laws	to	prevent	human	rights	violations		
• Advice	government	on	harmonisation	with	international	human	rights	law		
• Be	a	member	of	regional	and	international	networks	of	human	rights	institutions		
• Participate	in	regular	meetings	of	regional	and	international	human	rights	networks		
• Conduct	research	on	human	rights	issues	in	the	country		
• Carry	out	campaigns	for	awareness	raising		7.	Of	the	functions	you	are	mandated	to	perform,	please	select	the	functions	you	spend	most	of	your	time	working	on.			Please	select	4	items	from	the	list	below:		
• Periodic	(annual)	drafting	of	public	reports		
• Handle	complaints	of	human	rights	violations	from	individuals		
• Carry	out	investigations	in	cases	of	human	rights	violations		
• Provide	advice	to	alleged	victims	of	human	rights	violations		
• Mediate	between	all	parties	impartially		
• Pronounce	binding	judgments	in	cases	of	human	rights	violations		
• Represent	victims	in	court	and	take	part	in	legal	settlements	Impose	penalties		
• Propose	amendments	of	laws	to	prevent	human	rights	violations		
• Advice	government	on	harmonisation	with	international	human	rights	law		
• Be	a	member	of	regional	and	international	networks	of	human	rights	institutions		
• Participate	in	regular	meetings	of	regional	and	international	human	rights	networks		
• Conduct	research	on	human	rights	issues	in	the	country		
• Carry	out	campaigns	for	awareness	raising		
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	8.	Are	NGOs/members	of	civil	society	participating	in	decision-making	at	your	institution?			
Mark	only	one	oval.		
• NGOs/civil	society	are	not	present	at	Board	meetings	nor	consulted		
• NGOs/civil	society	are	consulted	by	the	Board	but	do	not	attend	Board	meetings		
• NGOs/civil	society	are	represented	but	have	no	voting	power	at	regular	Board	meetings		
• NGOs/civil	society	are	active	members	of	the	Board		9.	Are	representatives	of	the	Government	participating	in	decision-making	at	your	institution?		
Mark	only	one	oval.		
• Government	representatives	are	not	present	at	Board	meetings	nor	consulted		
• Government	representatives	are	consulted	by	the	Board	but	do	not	attend	Board	meetings		
• Government	representatives	are	represented	but	have	no	voting	power	at	regular	Board	meetings		
• Government	representatives	are	active	members	of	the	Board		10.	Who	appoints	the	Ombudsman/Commissioner/Head	at	your	institutions?		
Mark	only	one	oval.		
• Parliament	Government	President		
• By	public	election		
• The	Board/Council	of	Directors	at	your	institution		
• Self-appointed		
• Other:		11.	Who	appoints	the	Board/Council	of	Directors	at	your	institutions?		Mark	only	
one	oval.		
• Parliament		
• Government		
• President		
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• By	public	election		
• The	Ombudsman/Commissioner/President	of	your	institution	
• Self-appointed		
• Other:		12.	To	whom	does	your	institution	report	on	its	activities?		Please	select	all	that	apply.			
• Parliament		
• Government		
• President		
• The	public		
• Regional	organizations		
• International	organizations			
• Other:			13.	Please	name	all	the	regional	networks/organization	of	which	your	institution	is	a	member:		14.	Please	name	all	the	international	networks/organization	that	your	institution	is	a	member	of:		15.	How	many	members	of	full-time	staff	does	your	institution	have?				16.	How	many	members	of	staff	at	your	institution	have	legal	training?				17.	What	is	your	institution's	yearly	budget?			If	no	exact	number	is	available,	an	approximate		value	is	fine.			18.	What	are	the	main	sources	of	your	budget?		Please	select	all	the	apply.			
• Government	through	national	budget		
• Government	directly	(through	an	office/ministry)	
• Parliament		
• Donations	through	fundraising			
• Other:			19.	Can	the	researcher	contact	you	with	follow-up	questions?		
Mark	only	one	oval.			
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• Yes		
• No			20.	Please	write	the	full	address	and	contact	information	of	your	institution.	
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B.	Etude	de	structure	institutionnelle		1.	Dans	122quell	pays	se	trouve	votre	institution?			2.	Est	votre	institution	mandatée	pour	la	protection	et	la	promotion	des	droits	de	l’homme?		Cochez	la	bonne	réponse:			
• 	Oui		
• Non			3.	Existe-t-il	des	droits	de	l’homme	exclus	du	mandat	de	votre	institution?			Merci	de	mentionner	les	droits	en	dessous:			4.	Votre	institution	a	été	établie	par:			Cochez	toutes	les	bonnes	réponses:				
• Constitution	nationale		
• Loi	nationale		
• Décision	parlementaire		
• Autre			
• 	En	cas	d'autre,	merci	de	mentionner	le	document	en	dessous:			5.	Quel	est	le	statut	de	votre	institution?			Cochez	toutes	les	bonnes	réponses:				
• Institution	ministérielle		
• Agence	gouvernementale		
• Commission	parlementaire		
• Organisation	indépendante		
• Autre			En	cas	d'autre,	merci	de	mentionner	le	statut	en	dessous:					
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	6.	Quelles	sont	les	fonctions	principales	incluses	dans	le	mandat	de	votre	institution?		Cochez	toutes	les	bonnes	réponses:		
• Rédaction	régulière	(annuelle)	de	rapports	publics		
• Traitement	des	plaintes	référées	seulement	par	des	membres	du	Parlement	ou	du	gouvernement		
• Traitement	des	plaintes	déposées	par	des	individus/particuliers		
• Conduite	d’investigations	en	cas	de	violation	des	droits	de	l’homme		
• Prestation	de	conseils	aux	victimes	ayant	subi	des	violations	des	droits	de	l’Homme		
• Médiation	impartiale	entre	les	parties		
• Le	prononcé	d’arrêts	obligatoires	en	cas	de	violations	des	droits	de	l’homme		
• Représentation	légale	des	victimes	et	participation	au	règlement	juridique		
• Imposition	de	sanctions/amendes		
• Modification	de	la	législation	pour	la	prévention	des	violations	des	droits	de	l’homme		
• Prestation	de	conseils	au	gouvernement	en	matière	d’harmonisation	avec	la	législation	internationale	relative	aux	droits	de	l’homme		
• Etre	membre	des	réseaux	d’institutions	relatives	à	la	protection	et	à	la	promotion	des	droits	de	l’homme	au	niveau	régional	et	international		
• Participation	aux	événements	organises	par	les	réseaux	d’institutions	relatives	à	la	protection	et	à	la	promotion	des	droits	de	l’homme	au	niveau	régional	et	international		
• Publication	d’études	et	de	rapports	sur	la	situation	nationale	des	Droits	de	l’homme		
• Organisation	de	campagnes	pour	sensibiliser	le	grand	public	aux	violations	des	droits	de	l’homme		7.	Quelles	sont	les	fonctions	de	quelles	l’institutions	occupe	plus	fréquemment?			Cochez	les	quatre	plus	fréquentes	activités		
• Rédaction	régulière	(annuelle)	de	rapports	publics		
• Traitement	des	plaintes	référées	seulement	par	des	membres	du	Parlement	ou	du	gouvernement		
• Traitement	des	plaintes	déposées	par	des	individus/particuliers		
• Conduite	d’investigations	en	cas	de	violation	des	droits	de	l’homme		
• Prestation	de	conseils	aux	victimes	ayant	subi	des	violations	des	droits	de	l’Homme		
• Médiation	impartiale	entre	les	parties		
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• Le	prononcé	d’arrêts	obligatoires	en	cas	de	violations	des	droits	de	l’homme		
• Représentation	légale	des	victimes	et	participation	au	règlement	juridique		
• Imposition	de	sanctions/amendes		
• Modification	de	la	législation	pour	la	prévention	des	violations	des	droits	de	l’homme		
• Prestation	de	conseils	au	gouvernement	en	matière	d’harmonisation	avec	la	législation	internationale	relative	aux	droits	de	l’homme		
• Etre	membre	des	réseaux	d’institutions	relatives	à	la	protection	et	à	la	promotion	des	droits	de	l’homme	au	niveau	régional	et	international		
• Participation	aux	événements	organises	par	les	réseaux	d’institutions	relatives	à	la	protection	et	à	la	promotion	des	droits	de	l’homme	au	niveau	régional	et	international		
• Publication	d’études	et	de	rapports	sur	la	situation	nationale	des	Droits	de	l’homme		
• Organisation	de	campagnes	pour	sensibiliser	le	grand	public	aux	violations	des	droits	de	l’homme		8.	Est-ce	que	les	ONG/les	membres	de	la	société	civile	prennent	part	au	processus	décisionnel	de	votre	institution?				Cochez	la	bonne	réponse:				
• Les	ONG/les	membres	de	la	société	civile	ne	sont	pas	présents	ou	consultés	pendant	les	réunions	du	Conseil	de	votre	institution.			
• Les	ONG/les	membres	de	la	société	civile	sont	consultés	par	le	Conseil,	mais	n’assistent	pas	aux	réunions.			
• Les	ONG/des	membres	de	la	société	civile	assistent	aux	réunions	mais	n’ont	pas	le	droit	de	voter.			
• Les	ONG/les	membres	de	la	société	civile	sont	membres	à	part	entière	du	Conseil.			9.	Est-ce	que	des	représentants	gouvernementaux	prennent	part	au	processus	décisionnel		de	votre	institution?		Cochez	la	bonne	réponse:				
• Des	représentants	gouvernementaux	ne	sont	pas	présents	ou	consultés	pendant	les	réunions	du	Conseil	de	votre	institution.			
• Des	représentants	gouvernementaux	sont	consultés	par	le	Conseil,	mais	n’assistent	pas	aux	réunions.			
• Des	représentants	gouvernementaux	assistent	aux	réunions	mais	n’ont	pas	le	droit	de	voter.			
• Des	représentants	gouvernementaux	sont	membres	à	part	entière	du	Conseil.	
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		10.	Qui	est	responsable	de	la	nomination	du	médiateur/ombudsman/directeur	de	votre		institution?		Cochez	toutes	les	bonnes	réponses:				
• Le	parlement		
• Le	gouvernement		
• Le	président		
• Les	citoyens	au	moyen	d’élections		
• Le	Conseil		
• Auto-proclamation			11.	Qui	est	responsable	de	la	nomination	du	Conseil	de	votre	institution			Cochez	toutes	les	bonnes	réponses:				
• Le	parlement		
• Le	gouvernement		
• Le	président		
• Les	citoyens	au	moyen	d’élections		
• Médiateur/ombudsman/directeur	de	votre	institution	
• Auto-proclamation		
• Autre			En	cas	d'autre,	merci	de	mentionner	l'institution	responsable	en	dessous:			12.	A	qui	devez	vous	rendre	compte	de	vos	activités	sous	la	forme	de	rapports	?		Cochez	toutes	les	bonnes	réponses:			
• Le	parlement		
• Le	gouvernement		
• Le	président		
• Les	citoyens		
• Organisation	régionale		
• Organisation	internationale			13.	Veuillez	citer,	s’il	vous	plait,	les	organisations	régionaux	et	internationaux	a	qui	votre	institution	rendre	compte.			14.	Veuillez	citer,	s’il	vous	plait,	les	réseaux	régionaux	et	internationaux	dont	votre	institution	est	membre.				15.	Quel	est	le	nombre	de	membres	de	votre	personnel?				
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16.	Combien	de	membres	du	personnel	ont	suivi	une	formation	en	droit?			17.	Quel	est	le	budget	annuel	de	votre	institution?	Donnez	une	approximation	si	vous	ne	pouvez	pas	mentionner	le	montant	exact.				18.	Quelles	sont	les	principales	sources	de	financement	de	votre	budget?	Cochez	toutes	les	bonnes	réponses:				
• Le	gouvernement	dans	le	cadre	du	budget	national		
• Le	gouvernement	par	le	biais	d’un	ministère	(merci	de	mentionner	le	nom	du	ministère)		
• Le	parlement		
• Dons	obtenus	par	levée	de	fonds		
• Autres			19.	Veuillez	citer,	s’il	vous	plait,	d'autres	sources	de	financement.			20.	Donnez-vous	l’autorisation	au	chercheur	de	vous	contacter	pour	obtenir	plus	d’informations?	Cochez	la	bonne	réponse:				
• Oui		
• Non			21.	Merci	de	noter	vos	coordonnées	exactes	au	sein	de	votre	institution.	  										
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Chapter	3:	Determinants	of	Institutional	Design	in	the	Case	
of	National	Human	Rights	Institutions	
	
3.1.	Introduction		
	This	 chapter	 introduces	 the	 explanatory	 framework	 for	 institutional	 strength	 as	 a	function	of	design	in	the	case	of	formal	bodies	set	up	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights	 at	 the	 national	 level.	 The	 model	 draws	 on	 three	 bodies	 of	 academic	scholarship	 –	 cross-border	 diffusion,	 Europeanization,	 and	 constructivist	scholarship	 on	 national	 identities	 –	 and	 furthers	 their	 understanding	 of	 factors	determining	countries’	commitment	through	the	establishment	of	good	governance	institutions	 at	 the	 national	 level.	 The	 literature	 of	 diffusion	 investigates	 the	determinants	of	the	cross-border	transmission	of	institutions	and	policies.	Its	main	focus	 is	 on	 the	 role	 that	 international	 actors,	 such	 as	 regional	 or	 international	organizations	 or	 neighboring	 countries,	 play	 as	 agents	 of	 change	 at	 the	 national	level.	 Organizations	 such	 as	 the	 United	 Nations	 and	 the	 European	 Union	 are	influential	international	actors	that	offer	material	and	ideational	incentives	to	states	in	support	of	stronger	national	human	rights	institutions	(Pegram	2010;	D.	W.	Kim	2009;	Kim	2013).		 The	explanatory	 framework	presents	 four	main	mechanisms	that	consist	of	the	interplay	between	two	sets	of	factors	–	international	vs.	domestic	and	material	vs.	 ideational.	 As	 scholars	 of	 Europeanization	 have	 shown	 (Schimmelfennig	 and	
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Sedelmeier	 2004;	 Grabbe	 2006;	 Sedelmeier	 2006;	 Sedelmeier	 2011),	 institutions	and	 practices	 can	 be	 adopted	 in	 response	 to	 incentives	 offered	 by	 the	 European	Union,	 which	 are	 felt	 particularly	 strongly	 in	 Eastern	 and	 Central	 European	countries	 that	 have	 joined	 the	 Union	 since	 2004	 and	 have	 been	 subjected	 to	accession	 conditionality.	Additionally,	 some	governments	 can	decide	 to	 adopt	 and	support	 the	 activity	 of	 stronger	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 in	 response	 to	domestic	factors	–	executives	in	states	that	have	recently	transitioned	to	democracy	could	 aim	 to	 lock	 in	 democracy	 through	 the	 establishment	 of	 strong	 liberal	democratic	 institutions	 such	 as	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions.	 Moreover,	domestic	 characteristics	 such	 as	 a	 social	 and	 cultural	 commitment	 to	 liberal	democracy	 that	has	manifested	 itself	 through	 ratifying	 international	human	 rights	instruments	 and	 having	 strong	 human	 rights	 records	 can	 create	 a	 favorable	environment	for	the	creation	of	a	strong	national	human	rights	institution.			 The	 remainder	 of	 the	 chapter	 is	 organized	 as	 follows:	 first,	 it	 introduces	briefly	 the	 dependent	 variable,	 institutional	 strength,	 and	 its	 operationalization	along	six	dimensions	of	institutional	design	features.	Second,	it	presents	in	detail	the	analytical	model	that	consists	of	two	sets	of	factors,	–	international	vs.	domestic	on	the	one	hand	and	material	vs.	ideational,	on	the	other	hand	–	hypothesized	to	have	an	 effect	 on	 institutional	 strength.	 Third,	 it	 discusses	 in	 depth	 four	 causal	mechanisms	that	explain	the	effect	of	the	above-mentioned	factors	on	institutional	strength	 –	 domestic	 cost	 and	 benefit	 calculations,	 incentive-setting,	 identity	 as	linked	to	human	rights,	and	socialization	or	acculturation.	A	number	of	hypotheses	
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propose	 systematic	 tests	 of	 the	 four	 mechanisms	 and	 discuss	 indicator	operationalization	that	builds	on	existing	scholarship.		
3.2.	Institutional	Design	and	Its	Determinants		The	analytical	 framework	presented	in	this	chapter	proposes	a	set	of	explanations	for	 global	 patterns	 of	 institutional	 strength	 in	 the	 case	 of	 national	 human	 rights	institutions.	These	causal	explanations	propose	ideal	types	that	build	on	two	major	lines	of	debate	 in	 international	 relations	 theory	and	propose	 four	different	 sets	of	factors	 accounting	 for	 cross-border	 variation	 in	 institutional	 design	 –	 domestic	factors	versus	international	factors	and	material	versus	ideational	factors.	In	order	to	 explicate	 the	 two	 dimensions	 that	 structure	 the	 analytical	 framework	 and	 the	explanations	 it	 provides	 for	 hypothesis	 testing,	 I	 will	 turn	 to	 a	 presentation	 of	international	relations	theory	from	an	institutionalist	approach.		 Many	 theories	 of	 international	 politics	 embrace	 a	 two-stage	 conception	 of	world	organization	echoing	 the	Westphalian	nation-state	order	 in	 its	 fundamental	distinction	between	domestic	political	spheres	and	the	 international	realm	(March	and	 Olsen	 1998).	 In	 the	 first	 stage,	 the	 state	 imposes	 unity	 and	 coherence	 on	domestic	society	(Habermas	1996),		a	coherence	grounded	in	a	complex	set	of	laws	and	 institutions	 as	 well	 as	 a	 national	 identity	 that	 overpowers	 other	 competing	identities.	 Within	 the	 boundaries	 of	 the	 nation-state,	 national	 identity	 and	 other	political	 identities	 are	 essential	 to	 structuring	 behavior	 and	 rules	 of	 appropriate	behavior.	Institutions	that	are	linked	to	these	identities	infuse	the	state	with	shared	
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meaning,	 while	 domestic	 political	 processes,	 including	 political	 socialization,	participation,	 and	 discourse,	 generate	 coherent	 state	 actors	 out	 of	 the	inconsistencies	of	 the	many	diverse	 individuals	 forming	a	nation-state	(March	and	Olsen	1998,		pp.	944-945).	In	the	second	stage,	these	domestic	systems	compete	and	cooperate	 in	 the	 international	 spheres,	 in	 pursuit	 of	 state	 interests.	 International	political	life	is	less	institutionalized	and	more	anarchical,	while	individual	states	are	expected	to	behave	like	rational	actors	that	reach	mutually	satisfactory	agreements	making	 use	 of	 all	 available	 resources	 to	 maximize	 distinct	 national	 benefits	 and	reach	separate	state	goals.	Thus	political	order	 is	defined	primarily	as	 “negotiated	connections	 among	 externally	 autonomous	 and	 internally	 integrated	 sovereigns”	(March	and	Olsen	1998,	p.	945).			 The	second	dimension	making	up	the	analytical	framework	opposes	material	and	 ideational	 factors.	 This	 dichotomy	 informs	 the	main	 theoretical	 divide	within	IR:	 on	 the	 one	hand,	 the	neorealist	 and	neoliberal	 scholarship	 traditions	 view	 the	structure	of	the	international	system	as	a	distribution	of	material	capabilities	and,	in	the	 case	 of	 the	 latter	 as	 a	 combination	 of	 material	 capabilities	 and	 institutional	superstructure	 (Keohane	 1984).	 This	 view	 of	 the	 world	 functions	 according	 to	 a	consequentialist	perspective	 that	sees	society	as	constituted	by	 individuals	 for	 the	fulfilment	of	individual	ends.	Politics	is	an	aggregation	of	individual	preferences	into	collective	 actions	 by	 means	 of	 bargaining,	 negotiation,	 coalition	 formation	 and	exchange	(Downs	1957;	Riker	1962;	March	and	Olsen	1998;	Coleman	2008).	On	the	other	 hand,	 constructivists	 see	 the	 international	 system	 as	 a	 distribution	 of	 ideas	and	 recognize	 the	 substantial	 role	 of	 identities,	 rules	 and	 institutions	 in	 shaping	
		 131	
human	behaviour,	a	view	informed	by	an	idealist	ontology	(Wendt	1999).	Informed	by	the	logic	of	appropriateness,	actions	are	seen	as	rule-based	and	as	matching	with	the	obligations	of	 that	 identity	or	 role	 to	 a	 specific	 situation.	 Identities	more	 than	interests	and	socially	constructed	rules	and	practices	more	than	individual	rational	expectations	motivate	action	(Cerulo	1997).	Identities	and	norms	are	constitutive	as	well	 as	 regulative	 and	 are	 molded	 by	 social	 interaction	 and	 experience	 (Ruggie	1988;	Ruggie	 and	Kratochwill	 1986;	Young	1989;	Wendt	1999;	Katzenstein	1997;	Finnemore	1996).		
Table	3.0.	Analytical	framework	of	institutional	strength	
Factors	 Material	factors	 Social	factors	
	
Domestic	
factors	
	Cost	calculations	Benefit	calculations		
	Human	rights	identity		
	
International	
factors	
	Incentive	setting	(Indirect	coercion)	 	Socialisation		(Acculturation)			 		 Analytically	 distinctive,	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 theoretical	 model,	rationalist	and	constructivist	explanations	are	treated	as	potentially	complementary	and	not	only	competing.	Important	theoretical	distinctions	mark	the	putative	divide	between	constructivist	and	rationalist	approaches	to	the	study	of	institutions,	such	as,	among	many,	the	degree	to	which	institutions	structure	and	constitute	identities	and	 preferences	 (Jupille,	 Caporaso,	 and	 Checkel	 2003).	 Nonetheless,	 a	 problem-driven,	empirically	oriented	perspective	makes	such	divides	much	less	meaningful.	
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Middle	range	social	scientific	perspectives	bridge	this	theoretical	gap	by	focusing	on	specifying	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 institutions	 matter	 and	 the	 precise	 causal	path	that	the	mechanisms	specify	(Jupille,	Caporaso,	and	Checkel	2003).	Within	the	framework	of	this	analytical	framework,	the	mechanisms	inscribed	in	the	rationalist	logic	 focus	on	telling	a	story	of	 institutional	strength	to	which	material	 factors	are	central,	 objective	 characteristics	 of	 organizational	 performance	 or	 the	 political	actors’	 rational	 calculations	 condition	 the	 transfer	 of	 certain	 policies	 and	institutions	across	borders.	Policy	makers	select	the	best	alternatives	from	a	range	of	options	on	the	basis	of	an	assessment	of	consequences	(March	and	Olsen	1998,	pp.	 949-951)	 which	 institutional	 adoption	 had	 in	 other	 countries	 and	 potential	consequences	of	future	adoption	in	their	domestic	environment.			 From	 a	 constructivist	 point	 of	 view,	 a	 state’s	 decision	 to	 establish	 an	institution	 or	 adopt	 a	 policy	 that	 other	 states	 have	 adopted	 is	 an	 indication	 of	commitment	 to	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 appropriate	 global	 or	 regional	 standard	 of	behaviour.	Institutional	change	is	not	driven	by	knowledge	acquisition	or	a	focus	on	the	 relationship	 between	 adoption	 and	 its	 outcomes,	 but	 rather	 on	 the	 desire	 to	imitate	 the	 prior	 model	 decisions	 of	 states	 perceived	 as	 the	 most	 successful	 or	powerful.	From	this	perspective,	countries	are	expected	to	commit	to	human	rights	regardless	 of	 the	 compliance	 and	 monitoring	 mechanisms	 built	 into	 the	 ratified	human	rights	instruments,	as	long	as	the	provisions	of	the	human	rights	treaties	and	institutions	 help	 them	affirm	 their	 normative,	 ideological,	 or	 cultural	 beliefs	 (Cole	2009a).	Evidence	of	normative	pressures	at	the	global	and	regional	levels	as	well	as	the	existence	of	 imitation/socialization	 in	country	 integration	 in	 the	global	human	
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rights	 regime	 through	 NHRI	 adoption	 or	 treaty	 ratification,	 which	 supports	 a	constructivist	 hypothesis,	 has	 been	 found	 in	 both	 qualitative	 (Pegram	 2010)	 and	quantitative	 studies	 (Wotipka	 and	 Tsutsui	 2008;	 Cole	 2009b;	 Koo	 and	 Ramirez	2009).				 Patterns	 of	 decentralized	 diffusion	 systems	 have	 been	 the	 object	 of	investigations	 at	 the	 subnational	 level,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 American	federalism.	The	first	systematic	analyses	of	policy	diffusion	in	the	US	were	published	in	1940s,	and	focused	on	the	spread	of	innovation	across	states	that	are	treated	as	“policy	 laboratories”	 and	 proliferated	 with	 works	 on	 the	 spread	 of	 different	categories	 of	 policies	 across	 state	 borders	 (Walker	 1969;	 Gray	 1973;	 Berry	 and	Berry	 1990;	 Volden	 2006;	 Shipan	 and	 Volden	 2006).	Within	 potentially	 adopting	polities,	 domestic	 policymakers	 can	 express	 preferences	 and	 formulate	 goals	 for	policy	innovation.	Such	domestic	actors	can	be,	among	many,	the	electorate,	elected	politicians,	appointed	bureaucrats,	 interest	groups,	and	policy	advocates	(Dolowitz	and	 Marsh	 1996;	 Shipan	 and	 Volden	 2008).	 Their	 capabilities	 (Volden	 2006)	coupled	with	the	environment	in	which	they	operate	and	their	access	to	information	(Weyland	2005)	can	affect	the	adoption	and	implementation	of	certain	new	policies	and	institutions.	As	is	the	case	with	the	establishment	of	human	rights	institutions	at	the	national	level,	national	governments	are	the	main	actors	deciding	the	powers	of	national	human	rights	institution	in	different	countries.	These	domestic	actors	make	decisions	regarding	the	establishment	and	powers	of	 institutions	with	potential	 to	limit	 their	 own	 freedom	 to	 protect	 its	 own	 citizens	 for	 different	 reasons	 –	 in	 line	with	rationalist	arguments,	domestic	actors	could	see	costs	and/or	benefits	to	such	
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decision	 and	 could	 also	 be	 responding	 to	 pressure	 exercised	 by	 other	 domestic	factors.		
3.2.1.	Domestic	cost	and	benefit	calculations	
	First,	we	consider	domestic	cost	and	benefit	calculations	that	national	governments	make	when	they	decide	to	establish	a	strong	national	human	rights	institution	or	to	consolidate	 the	 design	 of	 an	 existing	 one.	 Although	 processes	 of	 cross-border	diffusion	can	have	an	 impact	on	states’	decisions	 to	establish	strong	human	rights	institutions,	domestic	political	context	is	key	to	their	existence	and	good	functioning	over-time.	Given	their	nature,	human	rights	institutions	are	intended	to	operate	as	accountability	frameworks	at	the	domestic	level	–	as	such,	human	rights	institutions	are	designed	primarily	to	hold	governments	accountable	for	violations	against	their	own	 citizens.	 The	distinct	 role	 of	 human	 rights	 regimes	 is	 to	 empower	 citizens	 to	challenge	 the	 domestic	 activities	 of	 their	 own	 governments	 (Moravcsik	 2000).	 By	this	logic,	we	can	expect	that	countries	that	have	strong	human	rights	records	and	a	tradition	of	support	for	citizens’	rights	ought	to	incur	very	small	political	costs	when	they	decide	to	have	a	strong	national	human	rights	institution.	It	 is	also	likely	that	countries	 with	 a	 longstanding	 tradition	 of	 democracy	 established	 a	 classical	ombudsman	even	prior	to	the	formation	of	the	international	human	rights	regime	in	the	aftermath	of	World	War	 II,	as	 is	 the	case	with	Sweden,	Finland,	among	others.	With	 limited	amendments	and	only	 incurring	small	material	costs,	countries	could	expand	the	mandate	of	such	institutions	to	include	also	safeguarding	human	rights.		
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	 What	 can	 we	 expect	 to	 happen	 if	 countries	 do	 not	 have	 a	 history	 of	democracy	and	little	to	no	domestic	tradition	of	establishing	and	supporting	strong	institutions	for	the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights?	Newly	democratized	states	are	the	most	likely	to	seek	to	lock	in	democracy	for	fear	of	its	destabilization	and	 backsliding	 in	 the	 longer	 run	 (Moravcsik	 2000).	 By	 the	 same	 logic,	 once	politicians	 take	 into	 account	 the	 political	 future	 of	 a	 state	 in	 their	 cost-benefit	analyses	of	 supporting	 the	establishment	of	 strong	human	rights	 institutions,	 they	aim	 to	 constrain	 the	 behaviour	 of	 subsequent	 national	 governments.	 Considering	the	 risk	 that	 opposing	 interests	 may	 gain	 traction	 in	 the	 future	 and	 that	 other	political	 actors	 could	 change	 the	 course	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 citizens	 and	authorities	 (Moe	 1990),	 governments	 may	 seek	 to	 “lock	 in”	 favoured	 policies	(Moravcsik	2000)	in	an	attempt	to	secure	them	as	much	as	possible	from	the	actions	of	 future	 governments.	 Democratic	 regimes	 endeavor	 to	 prevent	 political	retrogression	 or	 “backsliding”	 into	 tyranny.	 As	 such,	 national	 human	 rights	institutions	 represent	 both	 a	 salient	 and	 symbolic	 constraint	 and	 ultimately	 are	triggers	meant	 to	 oppose	 a	 possible	 breach	 of	 democratic	 order.	 In	 other	 words,	sovereignty	 costs	 are	 weighed	 against	 establishing	 a	 strong	 human	 rights	institution,	 whereas	 greater	 political	 stability	 may	 be	 weighted	 in	 favor	 of	 it	(Moravcsik	2000).	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 view	 that	hypothesizes	 that	 social	 actors	 are	responsive	 to	 external	 socialization	 and	 often	 altruistically	 motivated,	 republican	liberal	 theories	 work	 under	 the	 assumption	 that	 states	 are	 self-interested	 and	rational	 in	 their	 pursuit	 of	 different	 national	 interests.	 	 These	 national	 benefits	reflect	variation	in	the	nature	of	domestic	pressures	and	representative	institutions	
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(Doyle	 1986;	 Russett	 1993;	 Snyder	 1991;	 Bailey,	 Goldstein,	 and	 Weingast	 1997;	Moravcsik	1997;	Van	Evera	1999;	Legro	and	Moravcsik	1999;	Moravcsik	2000).			 Surrendering	national	discretion	represents	an	agency	cost	at	 the	domestic	level.	By	design	 these	national	 institutions	are	 set	up	de	jure	 to	hold	governments	accountable	for	the	implementation	of	international	human	rights	agreements.	They	are	also	created	to	function	independently	from	government	intervention,	so	at	least	formally,	 they	 can	 pose	 a	 risk	 to	 governments	 that	 would	 risk	 a	 higher	 loss	 of	sovereignty	 from	 their	 activity.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 national	 institutions	 mandated	 to	promote	 and	 protect	 human	 rights,	 the	 agency	 cost	 of	 establishing	 a	 strong	institution	 can	 be	 too	 high	 for	 some	 governments	 to	 undertake	 –	 a	 clear	 such	example	are	countries	with	autocratic	regimes.	This	cost,	however,	 is	perceived	as	lower	 than	 the	 loss	 of	 sovereignty	 incurring	 when	 delegating	 to	 an	 international	agent.	All	other	 things	equal,	governments	 tend	to	be	skeptical	of	delegation	to	an	international	 authority	 due	 to	 both	 the	 sovereignty	 cost	 that	 this	 surrender	 of	national	 discretion	would	 entail	 and	 also	 their	 interest	 in	maintaining	 short-term	discretion	to	shape	collective	behavior	or	redistribute	wealth	as	they	see	fit.			 The	 scope	 of	 activity	 that	 these	 institutions	 have	 at	 the	 national	 level	represents	at	 least	an	equally	high	agency	cost	 for	governments	as	 the	ratification	international	human	rights	 treaties	which	have	 little	power	of	enforcement.	While	the	need	for	government	support	to	establish	a	strong	national	human	rights	body	that	is	functional	over	the	long	run	gives	the	executive	a	degree	of	influence	over	the	institution’s	 activity	 and	 effectiveness.	 A	 strong	 institution,	 however,	 is	 de	 jure	independent	and	also	de	facto	autonomous	from	political	intervention	so	the	cost	of	
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having	 it	 monitor	 the	 relationship	 between	 state	 institutions	 and	 citizens	 can	 be	high.	Generally	speaking,	the	lower	the	costs,	the	more	likely	states	are	to	establish	strong	institutions.	Depending	on	the	type	of	political	regime	at	the	domestic	level,	such	 costs	 can	 potentially	 be	 very	 high	 and	 higher	 even	 than	 when	 ratifying	international	or	 regional	human	rights	 treaties	 that	 “lack	 teeth.”	Costs	 incurred	as	linked	 to	 policy	 change,	 unintended	 consequences,	 and	 limited	 flexibility	 of	 were	found	 significant	 explanatory	 factors	 that	 states	 weigh	 against	 the	 benefits	 of	democratic	 lock-in	 when	 they	 commit	 to	 the	 international	 Convention	 Against	torture.	In	the	case	of	country	commitment	to	the	CAT	through	signing	or	ratifying	it,	 Goodliffe	 and	 Hawkins	 find	 that	 normative	 conformity	 and	 costs	 both	 matter	(Goodliffe	 and	 Hawkins	 2006).	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 democratic	 countries,	 it	would	be	fair	to	expect	the	political	costs	of	establishing	such	institutions	to	be	low,	at	least	in	principle,	as	the	mandate	and	work	of	such	independent	bodies	are	in	line	with	the	country’s	existing	liberal	democratic	values	and	national	human	rights	legal	frameworks.			 But	often	these	new	human	rights	institutions	can	represent	a	change	in	the	long-standing	democratic	practices	of	countries	with	strong	human	rights	records.	More	 specifically,	 binding	 international	 or	 regional	 obligations	 represent	 an	increased,	if	modest,	risk	of	nullification	of	domestic	laws	without	a	corresponding	increase	 in	 the	 expected	 stability	 of	 domestic	 democracy	 (Moravcsik	 2000).	 One	particular	example	is	the	case	of	countries	that	do	not	have	a	constitutional	court	–	as	 Great	 Britain,	 for	 instance	 –	 judicially	 imposed	 harmonization	 by	 international	agreement	 marks	 a	 significant	 innovation	 (Drzemczewski	 1983).	 From	 this	
		 138	
perspective,	 the	 defense	 of	 “national	 sovereignty”	 nearly	 equates	 the	 defense	 of	national	 ideals,	 political	 culture,	 and	 even	 democratic	 practices,	which	 is	 a	 reality	informing	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	 framers	 of	 the	 post-World	 War	 II	 human	 rights	documents	and	their	academic	advisers	(McKeon	1949;	Moravcsik	2000).				 In	the	empirical	analysis	focused	on	the	ratification	and	compliance	with	the	treaty	 of	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights,	 Moravcsik	 operationalizes	 newly	democratized	 states	 based	 on	 whether	 the	 country	 was	 “within	 30	 years	 of	becoming	a	democracy”	in	1950,	when	the	ECHR	system	was	established	–	a	country	would	not	be	considered	a	stable	democracy	if	it	had	not	been	clearly	established	by	1950,	a	new	democracy	if	it	maintained	continuous	democratic	status	since	between	1920-1950,	and	a	stable	democracy	 if	 it	had	been	a	stable	democracy	since	before	1920	 (Moravcsik	 2000).	 In	 their	 dataset	 of	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	Compliance,	 Grewal	 and	 Voeten	 proposed	 a	 new	 robust	 measure	 of	 newly	democratized	countries	that	captures	change	over-time	for	countries	between	1960	and	2006.	 Countries	members	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe	 are	 coded	 on	 the	 basis	 of	whether	they	were	within	10	years	of	becoming	a	democracy	or	did	not	yet	receive	a	10	on	the	Polity	scale.	Additionally,	countries	ranking	below	6	on	the	Policy	scale	are	considered	non-democracies	(Grewal	and	Voeten	2013).			 The	 indicator	 for	 newly	 democratized	 states	 included	 in	 this	 model	 is	operationalized	by	drawing	on	these	two	prior	measures,	but	makes	use	of	the	data	from	the	Freedom	in	the	World	Reports	instead	of	Polity	IV,	due	to	the	larger	number	of	countries	included	in	the	former	dataset.	The	Freedom	in	the	World	Index	captures	for	 each	 country	 ‘the	 electoral	 process,	 political	 pluralism	 and	 participation,	 the	
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functioning	 of	 the	 government,	 freedom	 of	 expression	 and	 of	 belief,	 associational	and	 organizational	 rights,	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 and	 personal	 autonomy	 and	 individual	rights’	(Freedom	House	2016).	A	country	receives	the	highest	score	if	political	rights	come	 closest	 to	 the	 ideals	 suggested	 by	 a	 checklist	 of	 questions,	 beginning	 with	whether	 there	 are	 free	 and	 fair	 elections,	 whether	 those	 who	 are	 elected	 rule,	whether	 there	 are	 competitive	 parties	 or	 other	 political	 groupings,	 whether	 the	opposition	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 and	 has	 actual	 power,	 and	 whether	 minority	groups	have	reasonable	(Freedom	House	2016).			 The	 measure	 of	 whether	 a	 country	 is	 ‘newly	 democratized’	 is	 a	 binary	variable	developed	using	the	Freedom	House	global	data	and	focused	on	capturing	change	 at	 the	 time	 when	 the	 rate	 of	 establishment	 of	 national	 human	 rights	institutions	 peaked	 in	 the	 early	 to	 mid-1990s.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 analysis,	 a	country	is	considered	newly	democratized	and	thus	is	assigned	the	value	of	“1”	if	its	status	 in	 the	Freedom	House	 reports	 from	1989-1993	 stayed	 the	 same,	 as	 “partly	free”	(PF)	with	no	change	 in	 the	direction	of	either	“free”	(F)	or	“not	 free”	(NF).	A	country	gets	 a	 value	of	 “1”	 also	 if	 its	 status	 changes	 to	 “free”	 (F)	 it	 the	 same	 time	interval.	 Robustness	 checks	 were	 run,	 using	 the	 Polity	 IV	 dataset	 of	 degrees	 of	democracy	and	autocracy	(please	see	Annex	E,	following	Chapter	4,	and	Tables	4.11,	4.12,	 4.13,	 and	 4.14)	 and	 the	 status	 of	 new	 democracy	 developed	 by	 Grewal	 and	Voeten	 (2013).	 The	 results	 of	 the	 analysis	 including	 Freedom	House	 data	 include	187	 observations.	 The	 analysis	 that	 makes	 use	 of	 the	 Polity	 IV	 data	 includes	 a	smaller	number	of	observations	(159),	for	which	data	on	countries’	position	on	the	scale	of	democratization/autocracy	are	available.	
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Hypothesis:	1.	 A	 newly	 democratic	 state	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 have	 a	 strong	 institution	 for	 the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights	at	the	national	level.		
3.2.2.	Incentive-setting			Incentive-setting	is	an	international	level	mechanism	that	refers	to	the	pressure	that	certain	 international	 organizations	 and	 powerful	 states	 put	 on	 other	 countries	 to	establish	of	institutions	or	policies.	In	the	case	of	human	rights,	these	incentives	are	positive	 in	 nature	 and	 resemble	 more	 a	 system	 of	 reward	 mechanisms.	 The	disbursement	 of	 overseas	 development	 assistance	 by	 European	 states	 and	institutions	as	well	as	by	the	Washington-based	INGOs,	for	instance,	is	often	tied	to	meeting	a	number	of	human	rights	standards.	The	European	Commission	 includes	recommendations	 for	 the	creation	and	capacity	building	of	 functional	ombudsmen	and	human	rights	commissions	in	all	country	progress	reports	for	candidates	states.	Additionally,	 the	 European	 Union	 included	 human	 rights	 clauses	 in	 their	 existing	international	 agreements	with	 states	 outside	 of	 Europe,	 such	 in	 Africa,	 Caribbean	and	 Pacific	 states	 (Fierro	 2003;	 Bartels	 2005).	 The	 continuation	 of	 such	development	funding	programs	is	usually	linked	to	whether	countries	met	some	of	the	conditions	set	as	part	of	the	earlier	stages	of	projects.	Within	the	framework	of	this	 explanatory	 framework,	 countries	 that	 entered	 the	 types	 of	 agreements	discussed	above	are	expected	to	have	established	stronger	independent	institutions	for	the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights.		
		 141	
	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 both	 human	 rights	 agreements	 in	 general	 and	human	 rights	 requirements	 attached	 to	 preferential	 trade	 agreements	 (PTA)	 or	official	 development	 assistance	 (ODA)	 between	 international	 organizations	 and	national	 governments	 have	 an	 intrinsically	 non-coercive	 nature.	 In	 the	 diffusion	literature	this	type	of	cross-border	phenomenon	has	been	sometimes	discussed	and	labeled	 as	 coercion	 (Gilardi	 2013),	 whether	 manifested	 directly	 or	 indirectly	(Pegram	 2010).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 NHRIs,	 Pegram	 finds	 evidence	 of	 indirect	 coercion	being	 at	 work	 when	 countries	 decide	 whether	 or	 not	 to	 establish	 their	 own	institution.	 Looking	 beyond	 human	 rights	 research	 at	 the	 institutional	 diffusion	literature,	the	findings	of	empirical	research	about	domestic	institutional	reform	by	international	 political	 economy	 and	 development	 scholars	 has	 found	 mixed	evidence	 of	 such	 external	 pressure	 being	 effective.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	explanations	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 such	 instruments	 of	 external	 influence	 in	 domestic	policy	areas	are	not	equivalent	mechanisms	in	the	realm	of	human	rights	and	thus	do	not	necessarily	provide	a	robust	account	of	 institutional	design	across	borders.	For	 instance,	 studies	 on	 the	 effect	 of	 IFI’s	 requirements	 do	 not	 find	 conclusive	evidence	 of	 a	 relationship	 between	 World	 Bank	 loan	 and	 credit	 programs	 and	pension	reform	in	Latin	America	(Weyland	2007).	Also,	countries	dependent	upon	IFI	 loans	 sometimes	 resist	 pressure	 and	 do	 not	 comply	 fully	 with	 international	recommendations,	 though	 this	effect	may	be	partly	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 IFIs	 target	countries	that	are	more	recalcitrant	to	reform	in	the	first	place	(Weyland	2007).	In	certain	cases,	however,	pressure	for	reform	can	be	used	by	national	governments	to	garner	otherwise	missing	domestic	support	to	push	policy	adoption	in	social	areas	
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of	 their	 interest	 (Gilardi	 2013)	 and	 in	 areas	 where	 institutional	 structures	 are	developed	 enough	 to	 offer	 compensation	 to	 losers	 (Mukherjee	 and	 Singer	 2010).	Incentive-setting	is	a	more	appropriate	label	for	what	is	at	work	when	we	speak	of	human	rights	institutional	strength,	given	intrinsic	positive	nature	of	the	incentives	offered	 to	 governments	 –	 whether	 money	 in	 the	 form	 of	 overseas	 development	assistance,	a	partnership	through	a	Preferential	Trade	Agreement,	or	conditionality	tied	to	the	prospect	of	membership	in	the	European	Union.				 Certain	 international	 agreements	 like	 the	 Preferential	 Trade	 Agreements	(PTA)	carry	human	rights	conditionality	imposed	on	signatory	states.	A	number	of	countries	with	strong	human	rights	records	link	ODA	disbursement	to	good	human	rights	 performance	 in	 recipient	 countries.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 countries’	 ratification	 of	international	 human	 rights	 treaties,	 the	 impact	 of	 such	 incentives	 has	 not	 always	been	proven	significant.	Neither	the	fact	that	a	country	is	a	recipient	of	foreign	aid	in	the	 form	 of	 overseas	 development	 assistance	 or	 loans	 from	 the	 International	Monetary	Fund	(Simmons	2002)	nor	the	amount	of	ODA	received	is	an	indicator	of	a	country’s	higher	likelihood	of	ratifying	human	rights	treaties	(Wotipka	and	Tsutsui	2008).	 Coercion	 through	 human	 rights	 conditionality	 has	 been	 linked	 to	 PTAs,	 in	particular	 to	 those	 agreements	 that	 set	 hard	 human	 rights	 standards	 (Hafner-Burton	2005)(Hafner-Burton	2009).	Replicating	the	same	report-based	dataset	and	analysis	carried	out	by	Hafner-Burton	on	PTAs	signed	in	1966/67-2009,	Spilker	and	Böhmelt	 found	 that	 states	 agree	on	 'hard'	human	 rights	 standards	 in	PTAs	only	 if	they	have	a	general	propensity	to	abide	by	human	rights	 in	the	first	place	(Spilker	and	 Böhmelt	 2013).	 By	 re-fitting	 the	 model	 for	 an	 omitted	 variable	 selected	 to	
		 143	
reflect	 the	 reality	of	 countries	 at	 the	domestic	 level,	 the	 authors	 show	 that	 in	 fact	PTAs	are	unlikely	to	affect	human	rights	compliance	(Spilker	and	Böhmelt	2013).		 	European	Union	policies	with	 regard	 to	 its	 enlargement	 strategies	provide	another	 illustration	 of	 incentive-setting	 at	work	 through	 EU	 conditionality	 tied	 to	the	 prospect	 of	 membership	 offered	 to	 candidate	 countries	 and	 harmonization	policies	 in	 new	 member	 states.	 The	 success	 that	 the	 EU	 has	 had	 in	 employing	conditionality	strategies	has	been	inconsistent	and	highly	dependent	on	the	nature	of	the	policy	to	be	adopted	and	the	domestic	context	–	such	is	the	case	of	minority	rights	in	countries	experiencing	ethnic	conflict	and	where	the	cost	of	compliance	are	too	high	(Schimmelfennig	2012).	In	addition	to	adoption	costs	and	the	credibility	of	conditionality,	factors	such	as	the	clarity	and	formality	of	EU	requirements	and	the	size	and	speed	of	rewards	as	well	 inform	national	policy	reform	in	response	to	EU	conditionality	(Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier	2004).			 As	 the	 EU	 enlarged	 toward	 the	 east,	 to	 incorporate	 Central	 and	 Eastern	European	 countries,	 it	made	use	of	 a	 system	of	 external	 incentives	 to	 support	 the	transfer	of	rules,	policies,	and	institutions	across	borders	as	part	of	the	negotiations	for	 membership.	 The	 logic	 driving	 EU	 conditionality	 is	 a	 “bargaining	 strategy	 of	reinforcement	 by	 reward,	 under	 which	 the	 EU	 provides	 external	 incentives	 for	 a	target	 government	 to	 comply	with	 its	 conditions(Schimmelfennig	 and	 Sedelmeier	2004).”	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier	speak	of	two	major	contexts	for	this	kind	of	EU	 driven	 external	 governance	 in	 Central	 and	 European	 Union:	 democratic	conditionality	centres	on	“the	fundamental	political	principles	of	the	EU,	the	norms	of	 human	 rights	 and	 democracy	 (669).”	 This	 first	 context	 of	 conditionality	 began	
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after	 the	 fall	 of	 communism	 when	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 European	 countries	embarked	 on	 the	 transitional	 path	 to	 democracy.	 At	 this	 stage,	 the	 EU	 aims	 to	establish	 institutional	 ties,	 such	 as	 association,	 followed	 by	 the	 opening	 of	 the	accession	 process.	 Democratic	 conditionality	 becomes	 the	 backdrop	 for	 accession	negotiations,	 when	 the	 EU	 sets	 in	 motion	 a	 second	 type	 of	 conditionality,	 acquis	conditionality,	based	on	the	specific	rules	of	the	acquis	communautaire.	Membership	is	the	key	external	incentive	for	rule	transfer.	In	the	case	of	the	Central	and	Eastern	European	 countries,	 the	 EU	 made	 extensive	 pre-accession	 alignment	 a	 condition	even	prior	to	the	start	of	accession	negotiations.1			 Research	 on	 the	 integration	 of	 human	 rights	 in	 accession	 conditionality	 is	limited,	although	human	rights	have	been	part	and	parcel	of	the	EU	requirements	of	democratic	consolidation	in	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries.	The	prospect	of	 enlarging	 the	 EU	 to	 include	 countries	 from	 the	 Eastern	 bloc	 led	 to	 the	incorporation	of	 human	 rights	 as	part	 of	 the	 integration	process.	 The	 first	 human	rights	 requirements	 for	 candidate	 states	 were	 enforced	 after	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	War	 and	 once	 the	 Yugoslav	 war	 brought	 to	 light	 the	 deeply	 troubling	 effects	 of	human	 rights	 violations.	 In	 1993,	 the	 EU	 formulated	 the	 ‘Copenhagen	 Criteria’,	 in	order	 to	 prepare	 post-communist	 transitional	 states	 for	 membership	 by	 setting	political	 standards	 to	 be	met	 prior	 to	 the	 start	 of	 formal	 accession	 negotiations	 –	stable	 institutions	 guaranteeing	 democracy,	 the	 rule	 of	 law,	 human	 rights	 and	protection	of	minorities	(de	Búrca	2003;	Grabbe	2006;	Sedelmeier	2011).	In	the	one	extensive	study	of	 the	role	of	human	rights	 in	EU	conditionality,	Conant	 finds	 that																																																																						
		 145	
transitional	democracies	have	made	progress	in	respecting	human	rights,	but	these	commitments	have	remained	shallow.	Moreover,	the	process	of	transition	to	liberal	democracy	is	at	high	risk	of	being	reversed	(Conant	2014).			 Returning	to	our	dependent	variable,	existing	scholarship	has	found	that	for	accredited	 NHRIs,	 “indirect	 coercion”	 as	 informing	 states’	 decision	 to	 establish	NHRIs,	though	this	mechanism	only	manifests	indirectly(Pegram	2010).	More	direct	coercive	 policy	 transfer	 can	 occur	 in	 settings	 characterized	 by	 colonialism,	democracy	promotion	and	post-conflict	scenarios	where,	but	these	tools	do	not	have	an	equally	strong	 impact	on	human	rights	performance	 in	an	unmediated	manner.	Evidence	of	such	coercive	measures	is	linked	to	conditionality	as	part	of	the	World	Bank	judicial	and	administrative	reform	packages	or	to	EU	accession	conditionality	for	new	member	states	(Pegram	2010).	In	the	case	of	NHRIs	in	developing	countries,	the	 regional	 influence	 of	 the	 EU	 on	 national	 governments	 measured	 as	 a	 PTA	agreement	 with	 human	 rights	 conditionality	 has	 not	 been	 found	 statistically	significant	 when	 measuring	 developing	 countries’	 decision	 to	 establish	 such	 an	institution	at	the	national	level	(Kim	2013b).	Although	INGOs	have	an	influence	on	domestic	 human	 rights	 performance,	 Kim	 found	 no	 evidence	 that	 coercion	 is	 at	work.	 The	 institutionalization	 of	 human	 rights	 promotion	 and	 protection	 through	the	 activity	 of	 an	 independent	 national	 body	 can	 no	 doubt	 be	 the	 result	 of	international	influence.	The	nature	of	this	influence	with	regard	to	human	rights	is	more	likely	to	be	“soft”	rather	than	directly	coercive	as	may	be	the	case	with	other	types	 of	military	 or	 economic	 policy	 transfer	 across	 borders.	 Incentives,	 whether	materials	of	ideational,	are	more	likely	to	have	an	effect	on	governments’	decisions	
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to	 support	 the	 establishment	 and	 capacity	 building	 of	 a	 strong	 national	 human	rights	institution.		 I	propose	 three	 indicators	 that	capture	 incentives	offered	by	 three	kinds	of	actors:	incentive-setting	through	PTA	are	bilateral	agreements	with	strong	or	weak	human	 rights	 standards.	 Data	 on	 such	 agreements	 in	 which	 countries	 enter	 is	available	only	up	to	2009	–	the	slow	rate	of	over-time	change	in	whether	countries	enter	PTAs	in	the	early	21st	century	makes	2009	data	a	good	approximation	of	the	situation	 in	 the	 timeframe	 of	 our	 dataset	 2012-2013.	 The	 effects	 of	 such	 an	agreement	on	institutional	strength	are	not	immediate,	so	the	lag	between	the	time	of	signing	and	 the	 time	of	 the	cross-sectional	data	of	our	analysis	also	account	 for	this	effect.	Another	 indicator	 is	a	binary	measure	of	conditionality	 imposed	by	 the	European	Union	on	states	that	are	members	or	candidates	since	the	2004	wave	of	accession.	 Requirements	 of	 human	 rights	 performance	 and	 the	 strengthening	 of	institutional	 capacity	are	 tied	 to	 the	benefits	of	European	Union	membership.	The	third	 indicator	 that	 captures	 the	 effect	 of	 incentives	 at	 the	 global	 level	 is	operationalized	 as	 the	 amount	 of	 development	 assistance	 received	 by	 countries	from	 main	 donor	 countries,	 such	 as	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 European	 Union,	which	are	the	principles	international	actors	that	promote	of	human	rights	as	part	of	their	foreign	policy.					
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Hypotheses:	2.	 Countries	 that	 have	 entered	 a	PTA	with	 strong	human	 rights	 conditionality	 are	more	likely	to	have	stronger	national	human	rights	institutions.	
	3.	 Countries	 that	 have	been	 subjected	 to	EU	accession	 conditionality	 (since	2004)	are	more	likely	to	have	stronger	national	human	rights	institutions.		4.	States	that	are	recipients	of	higher	amounts	of	ODA	from	the	EU	or	US	are	more	likely	to	have	strong	national	human	rights	institutions.	
	
3.2.3.	Identity	
	According	 to	 the	 constructivist	 school	 of	 thought,	 some	 governments’	 decision	 to	establish	strong	institutions	mandated	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights	at	the	national	 level	 are	 informed	by	 a	 certain	 identity	 that	manifests	 also	 in	 relation	 to	human	 rights.	 In	 other	words,	 some	 societies	 identify	 collectively	 as	 democracies	with	 longstanding	traditions	of	respect	 for	human	rights	and	sometimes	also	their	promotion	abroad.	Following	this	logic,	countries	with	a	strong	attachment	to	high	levels	 of	 human	 rights	 promotion	 and	 protection	 are	 expected	 to	 have	 strong	national	 human	 rights	 institutions.	 Such	 cases	 are,	 for	 instance,	 the	 Scandinavian	countries	which	have	some	of	the	oldest	ombudsman	institutions	in	the	world	and	have	remained	strong	promoters	of	democracy	and	human	rights	across	borders.		
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	 In	 broad	 strokes,	 identity	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 “a	 property	 of	 intentional	actors	 that	 generate[s]	 motivational	 and	 behavioral	 dispositions”	 (Wendt	 1999).	Additionally,	 it	 is	 fundamentally	 subjective	 and	 rooted	 in	 an	 actor’s	 self-understanding,	 but	 incorporates	 both	 internal	 and	 external	 structures.	 States	 are	such	 actors	with	 certain	 essential	 properties	 that	 constitute	 one	 such	 identity	 for	each	state	(Campbell	1958).	State	identity	always	has	a	material	base,	many	bodies	and	a	territory,	plus	a	consciousness	and	memory	of	a	collective	Self	as	a	separate	locus	of	thought	and	activity	(Wendt	1999).	Two	main	characteristics,	which	help	to	shed	 light	 on	 the	 constitution	 of	 identities	 as	 they	 apply	 to	 states,	 are	 types	 and	roles.	 A	 type	 is	 a	 “label	 applied	 to	 persons	who	 share	 (or	 are	 thought)	 to	 share)	some	 characteristic	 or	 characteristics,	 in	 appearance,	 behavioral	 traits,	 attitudes,	values,	 skills	 (e.g.	 language),	 knowledge,	 opinions,	 experience,	 historical	commonalities	 (like	 region	 or	 place	 of	 birth),	 and	 so	 on”	 (Fearon	 1997).	 This	simultaneously	 self-organizing	 and	 social	 quality	 can	 be	 seen	 clearly	 in	 the	 states	system	where	type	identities	correspond	to	“regime	types”	or	“forms	of	state”	(Cox	1987).	Such	a	type	is	also	represented	by	shared	beliefs	in	the	rights	of	citizens	by	virtue	of	being	human	and	the	state’s	institutional	responsibility	to	safeguard	them	through	 specific	 institutions	 and	 policies.	 Thus	 a	 society’s	 citizens	 can	 come	together	in	their	common	views	on	a	culture	of	rights,	and	with	governmental	and	institutional	 support	 can	 become	 viewed	by	 other	 states	 as	 countries	with	 strong	human	 rights	 identities.	 Role	 identities	 take	 the	 dependency	 on	 culture	 and	 thus	
Others	one	step	further.	Such	characteristics	that	account	for	the	role-like	nature	of	an	 identity	 are	 pre-social	 and	 exist	 exclusively	 in	 relation	 to	 Other.	 From	 this	
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perspective,	 the	 intrinsic	 qualities	 that	 will	 make	 a	 country	 democratic	 are	complemented	by	the	position	that	the	countries	occupies	in	the	international	order	and	the	following	behavioral	norms	toward	Other	ones	possessing	relevant	counter-identities	(Crowe	and	Meade	2007;	Burke	1980;	Stryker	1980;	Wendt	1999).			 A	strong	human	rights	identity	is	reflected	by	the	history	of	a	state’s	behavior	toward	 its	 own	 citizens	 and	 also	 by	 its	 formal	 structures	 of	 rights	 protection	 and	promotion.	The	Universal	Periodic	Review	process	carried	out	by	the	United	Nations	Office	 of	 Human	 Rights	 Commissioner	 mentions	 in	 its	 reports	 some	 state	characteristics	 that	 can	 constitute	 a	 definition	 of	 a	 country’s	 strong	 human	 rights	identity	 (Universal	Periodic	Review,	2007).	Such	examples	are	 the	efforts	 take	 the	form	of	implementation	measures	of	international	human	rights	and	the	passing	of	national	 legislation	 that	 strengthens	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 a	 country’s	citizens.	Other	 indications	of	 strong	human	rights	 identity	 can	be	a	general	public	awareness	of	human	rights,	an	active	civil	society	that	engages	in	the	prevention	of	human	 rights	 violations,	 and	 the	 political	 will	 to	 cooperate	 with	 regional	 and	international	human	rights	mechanisms.			 A	 country’s	 history	 of	 independent	 rights	 protection	 and	 prevention	practices	 can	 be	 seen	 an	 indicator	 of	 its	 commitment	 to	 having	 a	 strong	 human	rights	 record	 and	 thus	 to	 establishing	 stronger	 human	 rights	 institutions.	 In	 the	1990s,	 once	 the	 Paris	 Principles	 as	 a	 regulatory	 international	 framework	 and	 the	accreditation	 process	 came	 into	 force,	 the	 human	 rights	 commission	 was	established	as	a	standard	model	for	the	independent	national	body	that	is	mandated	to	 promote	 and	 protect	 human	 rights.	 The	 institutional	 model	 preceding	 the	
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commission	was	the	classical	ombudsman.	The	first	one	ever	to	have	been	created	was	in	Sweden,	where	the	Swedish	Ombudsman	for	Justice	was	established	in	1809,	followed	by	Finland	in	1919,	Demark	in	1955,	Norway	in	1962	and	spread	through	other	parts	of	the	world	to	New	Zealand	in	1962,	and	Australia	in	1977	(Reif	2004;	Koo	 and	 Ramirez	 2009).	 In	 a	 number	 of	 countries,	 the	 human	 rights	 commission	functions	in	parallel	with	the	classical	ombudsman,	having	a	mandate	more	directly	focused	 on	 human	 rights,	 while	 in	 other	 countries	 the	 only	 independent	 body	charged	with	human	rights	promotion	and	protection	is	the	relatively	recent	(post-1990s)	human	rights	commission.	The	original	idea	of	the	classical	ombudsman	was	far	from	the	ideals	of	human	rights,	also	due	to	the	lack	of	an	international	human	rights	regime	until	years	after	World	War	II.	Although	initially	their	main	functions	focused	 on	 ensuring	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 public	 administration,	 they	 have	 come	 to	incorporate	 human	 rights	 values	 in	 their	 mandates	 through	 a	 focus	 on	 the	protection	of	citizens’	right	to	information,	fair	treatment,	and	transparency	in	their	interactions	with	the	public	administration	(Reif	2004;	Koo	and	Ramirez	2009).	The	early	 establishment	 of	 a	 classical	 ombudsman	 institution	 is	 an	 indication	 of	 a	country’s	 willingness	 to	 empower	 its	 citizens	 to	 exercise	 their	 citizens’	 rights	through	petitioning	grievances	regarding	public	administration.			 Human	rights	identity	has	not	been	operationalized	per	se	in	prior	studies	of	national	 human	 rights	 institution	 diffusion	 or	 of	 human	 rights	 treaty	 design.	 But	most	 studies,	 however,	 consider	 important	 the	 measurement	 of	 a	 domestic	dimension	 such	 as	 a	 historical	 tradition	 to	 support	 human	 rights.	 For	 instance,	 a	country’s	 Western	 heritage	 or	 its	 human	 rights	 record,	 as	 indicators	 of	 a	
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commitment	to	the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights,	are	not	significant	to	the	country’s	decision	to	establish	a	classical	ombudsman	(Koo	and	Ramirez	2009).	The	country’s	cultural	traditions,	measured	through	religious	affiliation,	are	also	not	good	predictors	of	commitment	to	human	rights	treaties	and	their	implementation	on	the	ground	(Simmons	2002)	(Cole	2009b).		 To	 the	 extent	 that	 a	 country	 has	 proven	 to	 be	 generally	 more	 inclined	 to	promote	 and	 protect	 the	 rights	 of	 its	 own	 citizens,	 one	 could	 also	 expect	 it	 to	establish	a	strong	national	human	rights	institution.	In	the	context	of	this	model	of	human	 rights	 institutional	 strength,	 human	 rights	 identity	 is	 operationalized	with	the	 help	 of	 one	 indicator	 that	 registers	 a	 country’s	 ratification	 of	 a	 strong	 human	rights	 treaty.	 The	 selection	 of	 the	 international	 human	 rights	 treaty	 with	 the	strongest	 enforcement	 mechanism	 is	 based	 on	 a	 classification	 which	 ranks	 14	different	 human	 rights	 treaties,	 with	 the	 Optional	 Protocol	 of	 the	 Convention	Against	 Torture	 and	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Court	 as	 the	 strongest	 to	 their	stronger	 enforcement	 mechanisms,	 such	 as	 the	 Court’s	 mandate	 to	 carry	 out	independent	 prosecutor	 investigations	 and	 the	 Optional	 Protocol	 that	 allows	 an	international	 inspection	 system	 for	 places	 of	 detention	 (Dutton	 2012,	 please	 see	chapter	Annex	for	table).	By	the	same	token,	if	a	country	is	a	signatory	of	the	treaty	of	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Court,	 that	 country	 is	 expected	 to	 be	more	 likely	 to	commit	to	establishing	and	maintaining	a	strong	national	human	rights	institution.	The	 second	measure	 of	 a	 strong	 human	 rights	 institutional	 identity	 is	 whether	 a	country	adopted	a	classical	model	of	ombudsman	institution	before	1990s.	The	first	half	of	the	1990s	marked	a	time	when	the	largest	number	of	national	human	rights	
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institutions	was	 created	 and	 the	 Paris	 Principles	were	 established.	 This	 indicator	captures	a	country’s	commitment	to	the	promotion	and	protection	of	citizens’	rights	prior	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Paris	 Principles	 as	 international	 regulatory	framework	 and	 the	 peer	 review	 process	 linked	 to	 it.	 	 A	 country	 that	 is	 an	 early	adopter	of	a	classical	ombudsman	institution	is	more	likely	to	have	a	strong	national	human	 rights	 institution	 in	2013,	whether	 this	 institution	 is	 a	 stronger	 version	of	the	existing	classical	ombudsman,	which	was	given	a	broader	human	rights	mandate	as	well,	or	in	the	form	of	a	human	rights	commission	established	after	the	creation	of	the	Paris	Principles	framework	that	promotes	their	establishment.		Hypotheses:	5.	Countries	that	have	ratified	the	Treaty	of	the	ICC	and	the	Optional	Protocol	of	the	Convention	against	Torture	are	more	likely	to	have	stronger	national	human	rights	institutions.		6.	Countries	 that	 are	early	 adopters	of	 classical	ombudsman	 institutions	are	more	likely	to	have	strong	national	human	rights	institutions	today.	
	
3.2.4.	Socialisation	
	Socialization	is	a	mechanism	telling	a	constructivist	causal	story	about	the	diffusion	of	 institutions.	 Socialization	 tells	 an	 account	 of	 diffusion	 as	 a	 process	 driven	 by	normative	 and	 socially	 constructed	 institutional	 and	 policy	 properties	 (Checkel	
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2005;	 Gilardi	 2013).	 It	 follows	 the	 idealist	 or	 constructivist	 logic	 by	 which	policymakers	decide	in	favor	of	institutional	and	policy	adoption	as	they	attempt	to	conform	to	what	they	perceive	as	a	more	widely	accepted	role	or	position	in	a	global	or	 regional	 context.	 Although	 there	 is	 relatively	 little	 consensus	 regarding	 one	unique	definition	or	a	set	of	manifestations	of	 socialization	(Alderson	2001),	most	constructivist	 scholars	 engaged	 in	 the	 study	 of	 socialization	 agree	 on	 some	broad	parameters	of	an	analysis	of	such	processes.	They	acknowledge	the	significance	of	norms	 and	 values	 as	 principles	 to	 be	 shared	 among	 states	 organized	 as	 part	 of	international	 networks	 and	 diffused	 within	 these	 networks	 through	 the	coordination	of	IOs	(Alderson	2001;	Whitehead	2001;	Bearce	and	Bondanella	2007).	Domestic	politics	can	play	a	large,	sometimes	determining,	role	in	defining	national	norms	 and	 values,	 but	 local	 conditions	 and	 national	 politics	 alone	 do	 not	 explain	many	of	policy	choices	states	make.	The	normative	context	influences	the	behaviour	of	policymakers	and	of	mass	publics	who	may	elect	or	 constrain	decision-makers.	The	normative	 context	 is	 subject	 to	 change	 over	 time	 and,	 as	 internationally	 held	norms	 and	 values	 change,	 they	 generate	 coordinated	 shifts	 in	 interests	 and	behaviour	across	borders	and	institutions	(Finnemore	1996).	As	demonstrated	by	a	rather	large	number	of	scholars,	IOs	can	play	an	important	role	in	socializing	states	to	 accept	 new	 political	 goals	 and	 new	 values	 that	 have	 lasting	 impacts	 on	international	 political	 processes	 such	 as	 the	 structure	 of	 states	 themselves,	 the	workings	of	the	international	political	economy,	etc.	(Finnemore	1993).			 In	terms	of	institutional	strength,	policymakers	in	one	country	can	learn	from	their	peers	in	other	countries	about	institutional	design	by	participating	in	regional	
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or	 international	 fora	where	 structural	 characteristics	 of	 human	 rights	 institutions	are	 discussed.	 The	 study	 of	 socialization	works	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 states	 are	embedded	in	dense	networks	of	transnational	and	international	social	relations	that	shape	their	perceptions	of	the	world	and	their	role	in	that	world	(Finnemore	1996;	Ruggie	1988).	Within	these	networks,	states	define	their	interests	not	as	a	result	of	external	threats	or	pressure	from	domestic	groups	but	rather	through	shared	norms	and	 values,	 which	 structure	 and	 give	 meaning	 to	 political	 life.	 Human	 rights	networks	 are	 regional	 or	 global,	 and	 can	 incorporate	 specifically	 institutions	with	NHRI	 accredited	 status,	 like	 the	 European	 Network	 of	 National	 Human	 Rights	Institutions	and	the	Asia	Pacific	Forum;	they	can	also	be	more	general	in	scope	and	global	 in	 membership,	 such	 as	 the	 United	 Nations’	 International	 Coordinating	Committee	of	National	Human	Rights	Institutions.	The	regular	meetings	of	member	states	 are	 focused	 on	 the	 accreditation	 process	 coordinated	 by	 the	 NHRI	International	 Coordinating	 Committee	 at	 the	 OHCHR	 based	 on	 a	 peer-monitoring	and	assessment	instrument	and	provides	a	setting	for	governments	and	institutional	representatives	 to	 learn	 from	 one	 another.	 This	 learning	 process	 can	 promote	reform	that	can	result	in	a	strengthening	of	institutional	powers.				 A	 primary	 methodological	 challenge	 for	 the	 study	 of	 socialization	 is	 the	differentiation	 between	 processes	 of	 social	 learning	 and	 acculturation.	 Both	mechanisms	 are	 contingent	 upon	 the	 international	 context	 in	 which	 states	 make	their	decisions	and	the	nature	of	the	relationships	states	form	with	the	networks	to	which	they	belong.	For	instance,	Finnemore	and	Sikkink	speak	of	processes	of	new	norm	diffusion	as	 ‘cascades’	 taking	place	 through	the	 international	system	(1998).	
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They	see	the	mechanism	at	work	as	linked	closely	to	the	existence	of	‘peer	pressure’	fuelled	 also	 by	 material	 sanctions,	 but	 these	 characteristics	 of	 the	 nature	 of	relationships	 among	 state	 and	 institutional	 members	 of	 international	 networks	belong	more	to	processes	of	acculturation.			 Acculturation	 is	 the	 process	 by	 which	 “actors	 adopt	 the	 beliefs	 and	behavioral	patterns	of	the	surrounding	culture,	without	actively	assessing	either	the	merits	 of	 those	 beliefs	 and	 behaviors	 or	 the	 material	 costs	 and	 benefits	 of	conforming	 to	 them	 (Goodman	 and	 Jinks	 2013).”	 Unlike	 socialization,	 some	processes	 of	 acculturation	 can	 involve	 also	 shaming,	 thus	 leading	 to	 the	 same	incomplete	 learning,	 where	 institutions	 are	 created	 without	 the	 norms	 they	represent	being	internalized	–	for	instance,	such	human	rights	institutions	would	be	created	 to	 conform	 to	 the	 expectations	 of	 good	 governance	 practice	 in	 a	 certain	community	 of	 states.	 The	 human	 rights	 norms	 associated	 with	 the	 institutions	themselves,	 however,	 would	 not	 be	 fully	 internalized,	 even	 in	 cases	 where	institutions	have	a	strong	design.	Unlike	processes	of	persuasion,	which	emphasizes	the	 content	 of	 a	 norm	 or	 a	 belief	 and	 leads	 to	 a	 change	 of	 interests	 or	 identities,	acculturation	 stops	 short	 of	 the	 internalization	 of	 norms	 and	 beliefs	 about	appropriate	behavior,	highlighting	the	relationship	of	the	actor	to	a	reference	group	of	 wider	 cultural	 environment	 (Kelman	 1958;	 Goodman	 and	 Jinks	 2013).	 To	 the	extent	that	acculturation	depends	on	the	individual’s	integration	in	a	social	context,	the	process	at	work	is	partly	identical	to	the	one	of	socialization,	although	the	latter	leads	to	attitude	change	as	a	result	of	the	interactions	with	the	group	to	which	one	belongs	(J.	R.	Smith	and	Hogg	2008).	The	pressure	 for	an	 individual	 to	conform	to	
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the	acceptable	behaviors	and	norms	of	a	reference	group	(Meyer	and	Rowan	1977;	Zucker	1977;	Powell	and	DiMaggio	1991;	Scott	and	Meyer	1994;	Yzer	2012),	usually	situated	 in	 their	surrounding	environments,	 can	 take	place	 through	 the	process	of	identification	with	a	certain	group	with	which	an	 individual	wishes	to	establish	or	maintain	a	satisfying	self-defining	relationship.	But	the	end	result	of	acculturation	is	usually	 a	 superficial	 level	 of	 conformity	 or,	 in	 some	 circumstances,	 the	 partial	internalization	of	taken-for-granted	norms.	By	way	of	contrast,	socialization	leads	to	an	internalization	of	norms	and	values	that	are	learned	as	a	result	of	membership	in	a	certain	networked	community.		 Both	qualitative	and	quantitative	studies	of	human	rights	have	indicated	that	international	and	regional	network	influence	is	likely	to	contribute	to	the	adoption	of	 institutions,	 leading	 to	 a	 kind	 of	 reflexive	 emulation	 behavior	 as	 a	 result	 of	persuasion	 (Simmons	 2002).	 In	 a	 study	 of	 human	 rights	 ratification	 in	 160	countries,	looking	in	particular	at	three	main	human	rights	agreements	signed	in	the	period	1984-2003,	Hathaway	finds	that	if	a	country	lies	in	a	region	in	which	human	rights	 norms	 are	 highly	 valued,	 it	 will	 have	 an	 increased	 chance	 that	 a	 state	will	ratify	 a	 human	 rights	 treaty	 as	well.	 Her	 results	 are	 statistically	 significant	 in	 the	case	of	the	CAT,	states’	acceptance	of	CAT	enforcement	under	Articles	21	and	22,	the	ICCPR	 and	 CEDAW.	 Though	 Hathaway’s	 analysis	 does	 not	 draw	 conclusions	regarding	mechanisms	of	diffusion,	 these	significant	 findings	are	the	regional	 level	indicate	 a	 possible	 social	 learning	 effect	 taking	 place	 in	 the	 case	 of	 human	 rights	treaty	 ratification	 (Hathaway	 2007).	 Similarly,	 the	 ratification	 of	 human	 rights	treaties	 at	 the	 individual	 treaty	 level	 occurs	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 governments	
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looking	 for	 external	 guidance	 in	making	 international	 human	 rights	 commitments	(Simmons	2002).	These	behavioral	patterns	can	be	the	result	of	regional	trends,	as	ratification	 by	 countries	 in	 the	 same	 region	 appears	 to	 impact	 subsequent	ratification	by	other	states	(Wotipka	and	Tsutsui	2008).		 The	 few	 studies	 that	 focus	 on	 NHRI	 establishment	 find	 evidence	 that,	similarly	 to	 human	 rights	 treaty	 ratification,	 regional	 networks	 are	 relevant	 to	countries’	 decisions	 to	 establish	 such	 an	 institution	 (Pegram	 2010).	 In	 a	 history	analysis	 of	 NHRI	 establishment,	 Koo	 and	 Ramirez	 find	 that	 regional	 adoption	densities	 and	 international	 conferences	 fostering	 human	 rights	 developments	 are	positively	 correlated	 with	 higher	 rates	 of	 ombudsman	 and	 human	 rights	commission	establishment	(2009).		 Pegram	 identifies	 acculturation	 at	 work	 alongside	 socialization	 processes,	from	which	it	differs	in	the	degree	it	integrates	shaming	processes	when	belonging	to	a	community	of	states,	 such	as	a	regional	organization	 like	 the	European	Union	(2010).	Evidence	of	acculturation	has	been	found	in	both	qualitative	(Pegram	2010)	and	quantitative	studies	(Kim	2013),	where	the	former	makes	a	case	for	such	causal	mechanism	being	 at	work	 in	 global	 diffusion	of	NHRIs	 in	 general,	while	 the	 latter	finds	evidence	for	shaming	in	the	relationship	between	international	organizations	and	 developing	 nations	 in	 the	 process	 of	 establishing	 NHRIs.	 Socialisation	 and	acculturation	differ	in	as	much	as	the	latter	implies	shaming	that	leads	to	the	same	policy	 or	 institutional	 outcome	 as	 socialization	which	 is	 a	 form	 of	 social	 learning	facilitated	by	participation	in	a	peer	network.	Kim	argues	that,	in	the	case	of	NHRIs	established	in	developing	countries,	“naming	and	shaming”	strategies	carried	out	by	
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INGOs	work	to	determine	states	to	establish	an	NHRI.	The	event	history	analysis	he	carries	 out	 shows	 that	 this	mechanism	 operates	 in	 two	 steps	 –	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	INGOs	 criticize	 some	 governments’	 human	 rights	 records	 in	 general,	 putting	pressure	 on	 them	 to	make	 structural	 changes	 to	 address	 their	 shortcomings	 and	also	 supporting	 local	 activist	 organizations	 in	 their	 own	 efforts	 to	 persuade	 the	political	 class	 to	 conform	 to	 international	 recommendations	 (Wiseberg	2003;	Kim	2013).	 In	 addition,	 some	 governments	 that	 become	 targets	 of	 sustained	international	 criticism	choose	 to	 establish	NHRIs	 as	 a	 form	of	political	 concession	and	demonstration	of	political	will	to	seek	a	longer-term	institutional	solution	that	would	redress	its	human	rights	record	(Kim	2013).	Acculturation	is	measured	with	the	help	of	two	indicators	–	shaming	as	the	number	of	recent	human	rights	reports	issued	 about	 each	 country	 and	 network	 density	 as	 the	 level	 of	 integration	 in	 an	international	network	of	INGOs	as	a	measure	of	these	largely	populist	human	rights	institutions’	 mediation	 of	 discourses	 between	 elite	 INGOs	 and	 targeted	 national	governments	(Kim	2013).	While	Kim’s	findings	are	significant	in	the	context	of	the	study	 of	 the	 activity	 of	 INGOs,	 their	 scope	 is	 limited	 to	 developing	 countries	 and,	among	them,	to	the	ones	that	have	poor	human	rights	records.			 When	 considering	 the	 strength	 that	 countries	 bestow	 the	 institutions	 that	they	set	up	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights	at	the	national	level,	we	can	expect	a	 similar	 process	 of	 acculturation	 to	 be	 at	 work	 at	 the	 global	 level.	 The	 UN	coordinated	 accreditation	 process	 can	 lead	 to	 socialization	 and	 acculturation,	 as	institutional	 learning	 across	 borders	 can	 take	 place	 through	 the	 mobilization	 of	shame	or	through	collaboration	by	enabled	by	participation	in	the	same	networks.	
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For	 states	whose	 institutions	 are	 considered	 for	 accreditation	 and	also	monitored	every	 five	 years	 as	part	 of	 the	 re-accreditation	process,	 the	 general	 strengthening	effect	 of	 such	 a	 mechanism	 can	 be	 increased	 by	 the	 recommendations	 of	 the	accreditation	reports.	The	accreditation	process	leads	to	recognition	as	members	of	the	international	community	of	NRHIs	and	is	expected	to	lead	to	countries	aiming	to	strengthen	 their	 human	 rights	 institutions.	 Accredited	 NHRIs	 are	 vested	 with	competence	 to	 perform	 advisory	 work	 for	 the	 national	 governments	 with	cooperation	and	maintain	close	ties	with	the	United	Nations	and	organizations	in	its	system	 as	 well	 as	 similar	 regional	 and	 national	 institutions	 charged	 with	 the	promotion	 and	 protection	 of	 human	 rights.	 Their	 responsibility	 to	 promote	 and	protect	 human	 rights	 can	 be	 equated	 broadly	 with	 activity	 meant	 to	 ensure	 the	harmonization	of	national	legislation	and	practices	with	international	human	rights	instruments	 of	 which	 the	 country	 is	 a	 member.	 The	 assessment	 and	 monitoring	processes	 carried	 out	 by	 peer	 countries	 and	 institutions	 as	members	 of	 the	NHRI	community	 operate	 as	 mechanisms	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 shame,	 with	 the	 potential	 to	incite	 institutional	 change.	 In	 their	 study	 on	 NHRI	 and	 implementation	 of	 human	rights	 law	 at	 the	 country	 level,	 Linos	 and	 Pegram	 find	 that	 international	 human	rights	agreements	and	the	peer	review	process	more	specifically	play	a	key	role	in	determining	countries	to	establish	these	national	institutions	for	the	promotion	and	protection	 of	 human	 rights	 (2014).	 This	 finding	 is	 confirmed	 also	 in	 their	 natural	experiment	of	the	effect	of	the	Paris	Principles	on	countries’	decision	to	establish	an	NHRI.	Their	work	makes	use	of	UN-based	reports	of	institutional	performance	and	is	based	on	a	dataset	of	only	accredited	NHRIs	(Linos	and	Pegram	2015).		
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	 In	 the	 case	 of	 human	 rights	 institutions’	 strength,	 I	 am	 proposing	 two	different	 measures	 of	 socialization	 and	 acculturation.	 The	 first	 indicator	 that	captures	 a	 socialization	 and	 acculturation	 effect	 is	 the	 regional	 density	 of	 strong	national	human	rights	institutions.	Two	world	regions	have	a	high	density	of	strong	institutions	 –	 Europe	 and	 the	 Americas,	 with	 Africa	 and	 Asia	 having	 a	 medium	density	level	and	Oceania	and	the	Pacific	having	the	lowest.	The	second	indicator	of	socialization,	 which	 could	 indicate	 the	 presence	 of	 acculturation	 phenomena,	 is	linked	to	the	United	Nations-led	peer	review	accreditation	process	established	soon	after	the	creation	of	the	Paris	Principles	in	the	early	1990s.	Although	countries	with	institutions	 at	 all	 three	 levels	of	design	 seek	accreditation,	we	 contend	 that	 states	that	 underwent	 the	 accreditation	 process	 by	 the	 International	 Coordination	Committee	for	NHRIs	up	to	2008-2009	are	more	likely	to	have	strong	human	rights	institutions	in	2013.	In	this	study’s	dataset,	UN	accreditation	data	is	coded	as	binary	(‘yes’	for	countries	who	have	undergone	the	accreditation	process/’no’	for	countries	that	do	not	have	UN	accreditation)	regardless	of	the	level	of	strength	they	have.	An	important	 methodological	 concern	 linked	 to	 the	 indicator	 that	 we	 propose	 is	whether	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 UN	 accreditation	 process	 could	 be	 the	 effect	 of	 self-selection	due	to	the	fact	that	only	countries	with	strong	institutions	in	the	first	place	might	 decide	 to	 enter	 the	 UN	 peer-review	 accreditation	 process.	 In	 this	 case,	accreditation	 as	 such	 would	 not	 play	 a	 causal	 role	 as	 the	 cost	 of	 undergoing	 the	accreditation	 process	 is	 too	 low	 and	no	major	 institutional	 adjustments	would	 be	necessary.	In	order	to	seek	accreditation,	however,	 institutions	are	not	required	to	
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have	 reached	 the	 A-level	 status.	 In	 fact,	 accredited	NHRIs	 have	 different	 levels	 of	design.			Hypotheses:	7.	 States	 that	 have	 undergone	 the	 UN-led	 institutional	 accreditation	 process	 are	more	likely	to	have	stronger	national	human	rights	institutions.		8.	Countries	that	are	located	in	regions	with	a	high	density	of	strong	national	human	rights	institutions	are	more	likely	to	have	strong	national	human	rights	institutions	
	
	
3.3.	Conclusion		
	In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 have	 introduced	 the	 analytic	model	 of	 institutional	 strength	 for	national	 human	 rights	 institutions.	 The	 model	 presents	 a	 2x2	 table	 mapping	 the	interplay	of	two	sets	of	factors	hypothesized	to	impact	on	countries’	decisions	to	set	up	 a	 stronger	 institutional	 design.	 International	 organizations	 like	 the	 United	Nations	 or	 the	 European	 Union	 exert	 their	 influence	 at	 both	 regional	 and	 global	levels	 through	 accession	 conditionality	 and	 the	 peer-review	 accreditation	 process	assessing	 compliance	 with	 the	 Paris	 Principles.	 Material	 incentives	 are	 tied	 to	institutional	practices	that	promote	liberal	democratic	values,	while	peer	networks	facilitate	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 environment	 fertile	 for	 learning	 and	 emulation.	 Such	cross-border	diffusion	phenomena	are	concurrent	with	domestic	factors	–	countries	
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with	 democratic	 traditions	 and	 strong	 human	 rights	 identities	 demonstrated	through	the	ratification	of	international	legal	instruments	are	expected	to	establish	stronger	 institutions	 for	 the	 promotion	 and	 protection	 of	 human	 rights.	Additionally,	 governments	 in	 states	 that	 have	 recently	 transitioned	 to	 democracy	establish	 stronger	 liberal	 democratic	 institutions	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 lock	 in	democracy.			 Four	mechanisms	 capture	 the	 causal	 processes	 presented	 the	 literature	 as	linking	 the	 above	 factors	with	 institutional	 design	 characteristics.	 First,	 incentives	set	 by	 international	 institutions,	 such	 as	material	 rewards	 in	 the	 form	 of	 ODA	 or	membership	 in	 the	 European	 Union	 motivate	 governments	 to	 support	 stronger	human	 rights	 institutions	 on	 their	 national	 territories.	 The	 European	 Union	 is	 a	particular	 actor	 with	 influence	 on	 the	 regional	 stage	 through	 accession	conditionality	imposed	on	candidate	states	since	2004.	Second,	norm-based	effects	on	 institutional	 design	 can	 be	 explained	 through	 interactions	 with	 other	governments	 in	 networked	 settings	 such	 as	 the	 UN-led	 community	 of	 accredited	NHRIs.	Cross-border	learning	about	institutions	and	their	powers	is	also	more	likely	to	happen	in	regions	with	high	density	of	strong	institutions,	such	as	Europe	or	the	Americas.	 Third,	 domestic	 characteristics	 such	 as	 a	 strong	 liberal	 democratic	identity	 that	 has	 demonstrated	 a	 country’s	 commitment	 to	 international	 human	rights	 instruments	 is	 a	more	 fertile	 ground	 for	 stronger	 institutions	mandated	 to	promote	 and	 protect	 human	 rights.	 A	 fourth	 mechanism	 is	 also	 linked	 to	 the	domestic	sphere	and	explains	institutional	strength	as	linked	to	the	cost	and	benefit	calculations	of	political	elites	that	aim	to	lock	in	democracy	in	transitional	states.	By	
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the	same	logic	long-term	democracies	are	expected	to	set	up	strong	institutions	as	the	 political	 costs	 associated	 with	 such	 an	 independent	 and	 strong	 human	 rights	institution	 on	 their	 territory	 are	 minimized	 in	 democratic	 settings	 where	 liberal	values	are	already	inscribed	in	the	existing	legal	framework.		 Drawing	 from	 theoretical	 and	 empirical	 work	 on	 institutional	 diffusion,	Europeanization	 and	 constructivist	 scholarship	 on	 country	 identity,	 I	 formulate	 a	number	 of	 different	 hypotheses	 to	 be	 tested	 through	 statistical	 analysis	 in	subsequent	 chapters.	 The	 indicators	 I	 propose	 draw	 on	 existing	 scholarship	 in	International	 Relations	 and	 Comparative	 Politics	 and,	 whenever	 necessary,	 refine	existing	measures	 and	 design	 new	 ones	 that	 encapsulate	 more	 appropriately	 the	processes	that	impact	on	the	institutional	strength	of	national	bodies	charged	with	the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights	at	 the	national	 level.	The	 following	chapter	 gives	 the	 quantitative	 empirical	 analysis	 that	 tests	 these	 theory-driven	hypotheses	on	an	global	dataset.		
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3.4.	Annex	
Table	3.2.	Fourteen	Human	Rights	Treaties	and	Levels	of	Enforcement	
Mechanisms	(Dutton,	2012)	
Level	of	
Enforcement	
Description	of	Mechanism	 Human	Rights	Treaty	1-	weakest	 State	must	file	reports	 ICCPR	(1966);	ICESCR	(1966);	CERD	(1966);	CEDAW	(1980);	CAT	(1984);	CRC	(1989)	2-	weak	 States	make	complaints	for	committee	 Article	41	ICCPR	(1966);	Article	21	CAT	(1984)	3-moderate	 Individuals	file	complaints	with	committee	 Optional	Protocol	ICCPR	(1966);	Article	14	CERD	(1966);	Article	22	CAT	(1984);	Optional	Protocol	CEDAW	(1999)	4-stronger	 Committee	may	visit	state	 Optional	Protocol	CAT	(2003)	5-strongest	 Independent	prosecutor	investigations	 ICC	(1998)									
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Chapter	4:	Global	Analysis	of	Institutional	Design	in	the	Case	of	
National	Institutions	Mandated	to	Promote	and	Protect	Human	
Rights		
	
4.1.	Introduction	
	This	 chapter	 introduces	 the	 statistical	 analysis	 that	 tests	 empirically	 the	model	 of	institutional	 strength	 for	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions.	 First,	 it	 gives	 a	 brief	overview	of	 the	 ordinal	 logit	model	 and	 the	multinomial	 logit	model	 that	 test	 the	global	 impact	 of	 independent	 variables	 on	 the	 three-point	 ordered	 categorical	variable,	institutional	design.	The	former	model	assumes	that	the	three	categories	of	the	dependent	 variable	 (weak,	medium,	 strong)	 are	 ordered	 in	 a	meaningful	way,	although	the	distance	between	them	is	unknown.	The	multinomial	logit	model	does	not	 build	 on	 the	 assumption	 of	 ordinality	 and	 relaxes	 its	 intrinsic	 restrictions	 on	probabilities.	 The	 multinomial	 logit	 model	 (MNLM)	 is	 the	 most	 commonly	 used	statistical	model	for	nominal	outcomes	with	more	than	two	categories.			 The	 model	 consists	 of	 the	 ordered	 categorical	 dependent	 variable	 –	institutional	strength,	–	and	the	nine	explanatory	variables	that	are	hypothesised	to	have	an	effect	on	it	(plus	GDP/capita	as	a	control	variable).	Institutional	strength	is	defined	as	a	function	of	institutional	design	features,	which	is	a	composite	variable	made	 up	 of	 six	 dimensions.	 Four	 different	 mechanisms	 account	 for	 the	 causal	relationship	between	the	nine	determinants	of	institutional	design	and	the	outcome	(i.e.	socialization,	human	rights	identity,	incentive-setting,	as	well	as	cost	and	benefit	
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calculations).	The	second	part	of	the	chapter	presents	definitions	for	each	indicator	and	gives	details	of	the	level	of	measurement	for	each	variable	as	well	as	its	coding	scheme.			 The	 results	 of	 the	 statistical	 analysis	 find	 evidence	 of	 five	 different	theoretical	explanations	of	institutions	strength	in	the	case	of	national	human	rights	institutions.	 Whether	 a	 country	 has	 undergone	 the	 UN-led	 accreditation	 process	appears	 to	 have	 the	 strongest	 effect	 on	 the	 likelihood	 of	 establishing	 a	 strong	national	 human	 rights	 institution.	 A	 country’s	 early	 adopter	 status	 shows	 that	 an	early	 commitment	 to	 liberal	 democratic	 values	 has	 also	 a	 statistically	 significant	impact	on	institutional	strength.	The	higher	regional	density	of	strong	institutions	in	a	 region	 is	 a	 significant	predictor	 of	 the	 likelihood	 to	 establish	 stronger	bodies	 to	promote	and	protect	human	rights	domestically.	Variables	that	measure	incentive-based	effects	on	institutional	strength	have	also	statistically	significant	coefficients	in	 the	 model,	 such	 as	 overseas	 development	 assistance	 disbursed	 by	 the	 US.	 or	membership	 conditionality	 that	 the	 European	 Union	 introduced	 since	 the	 2004	wave	of	accession.	The	global	effects	on	European	Union	influence	through	overseas	development	 assistance	 is	 not	 statistically	 significant	 in	 the	 model.	 Being	 a	 new	democracy	 that	 transitioned	 from	 authoritarianism	 from	 1989	 to	 1993	 has	 a	negative	 effect	 on	 institutional	 strength,	 and	 so	 does	 a	 country’s	 joining	 a	preferential	trade	agreement	with	strong	human	rights	standards.				 The	findings	of	the	analysis	provide	evidence	that	three	causal	mechanisms	are	 at	 work	 when	 seeking	 to	 understand	 global	 patterns	 of	 human	 rights	institutional	 design.	 Socialisation	 tells	 a	 story	of	 rule	 transfer	 and	policy	 adoption	
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through	 cross-border	 learning	 from	 countries	with	 strong	human	 rights	 identities	that	 have	 committed	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 classical	 ombudsman	 before	 the	1990s	and	earlier	than	most	countries	around	the	world.	Strong	and	long-standing	commitment	to	the	institutionalised	protection	of	rights	on	national	territory	is	an	indicator	 of	 strong	 domestic	 identity	 of	 liberal	 democracy	 and	 respect	 for	 rights,	which	 can	provide	a	more	 fertile	 environment	 for	 stronger	national	human	 rights	institutions.	Institutional	design	isomorphism	is	more	likely	to	occur	in	regions	with	high	 density	 of	 strong	 institutions,	 such	 as	 Europe	 and	 the	 Americas,	 due	 to	government	deciding	 to	establish	stronger	 institutions	 in	an	attempt	 to	align	 their	human	 rights	 and	 institutional	 policy	 choices	 with	 a	 standard	 perceived	 as	appropriate	 at	 the	 regional	 level.	 Socialisation	 and	 acculturation	 processes	 are	driven	 by	 idealist	 factors	 can	 also	 be	 at	 work	 across	 borders	 when	 they	 are	coordinated	 through	 the	 efforts	 of	 the	 United	 Nations,	 through	 institutional	accreditation.	 In	 contrast	 to,	 material	 factors	 inform	 mechanisms	 like	 incentive-setting,	which	 is	 found	to	be	provided	by	powerful	regional	organisations,	such	as	the	 European	 Union,	 has	 made	 use	 of	 external	 governance	 tools	 such	 as	conditionality	 that	 includes	 human	 rights	 legislation	 and	 stable	 democratic	institutions	when	 it	 has	 negotiated	with	 candidate	 states	 since	 the	 2004	wave	 of	accession.		
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4.2.	The	logit	statistical	models	–	brief	introduction		 	Institutional	 strength	 is	 a	 three-point	 ordered	 categorical	 variable,	with	 a	 ranking	that	 assumes	 an	 ordering	 of	 difference	 degrees	 of	 strength	 –	 some	 human	 rights	institutions	are	strong,	while	others	have	medium-level	strength,	and	some	of	them	have	weak	ones.	The	ordered	 logit	model	 (ORM)	has	 a	dependent	 variable	 that	 is	categorical	and	contains	categories	that	can	be	ordered	in	a	meaningful	way	in	the	context	 of	 the	 study.	 A	 distinctive	 characteristic	 of	 this	model	 is	 that,	 despite	 the	categories	 of	 the	 response	 variable	 being	 ordered,	 the	 distances	 between	 these	categories	are	unknown.	In	other	words,	the	difference	between	the	three	categories	of	strength	for	each	indicator	is	not	a	continuous	variable	with	numerical	values	that	can	exactly	measure	 these	differences	 in	 strength	as	 they	occur	 in	 the	 institutions	globally.	 Each	 indicator	 is	 a	 latent	 categorical	 variable	 with	 each	 dimension	 of	strength	 capturing	 a	 change	 in	 the	 degree	 of	 its	 occurrence	 whose	 metric	 is	unknown	–	the	difference	in	strength	between	the	weak	and	medium	level	strengths	on	the	one	hand	and	the	medium	to	strong	categories	in	each	indicator	are	not	the	same,	even	if	the	numeric	value	on	the	ordinal	scale	(0-1-2)	may	be	the	same.					 McKelvey	and	Zavoina	introduced	the	logit	version	of	the	ordinal	regression	model	 in	terms	of	an	underlying	 latent	variable	(McKelvey	and	Zavoina	1975)	and	shortly	 thereafter	 in	 biostatistics	 McCullagh	 referred	 to	 the	 logit	 version	 as	 the	proportional-odd	model.	The	ORM	is	nonlinear,	and	the	magnitude	of	the	change	in	the	 outcome	 probability	 for	 a	 given	 change	 in	 one	 of	 the	 independent	 variables	depends	 on	 the	 levels	 of	 all	 the	 independent	 variables.	 Given	 that	 different	
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assumptions	of	ordering	can	sometimes	lead	to	different	ways	of	ordering	and	also	different	 conclusions	 (Miller	 and	 Volker	 1985)	 the	 intrinsic	 ordering	 of	 the	categorical	variable	ought	to	be	justified	substantively	in	the	context	of	the	analysis.	Additionally,	 best	 practice	 indicates	 that	 results	 of	 ordinal	 models	 ought	 to	 be	compared	with	 results	 from	models	 that	 do	 not	 assume	ordinality.	 	 This	 is	 also	 a	recommended	approach	due	to	the	restrictions	that	ORM	apply	on	the	relationship	between	the	independent	variables	and	the	probabilities	of	the	(three	in	our	case)	outcome	categories.			 In	this	analysis,	both	an	ordinal	logit	and	a	multinomial	logit	model	are	fit,	as	the	 latter	 does	 not	 build	 on	 the	 assumption	 of	 ordinality	 and	 relaxes	 its	 intrinsic	restrictions	 on	 probabilities.	 The	 multinomial	 logit	 model	 (MNLM)	 is	 the	 most	commonly	 used	 statistical	 model	 for	 nominal	 outcomes	 with	 more	 than	 two	categories.	The	model	essentially	fits	separate	binary	logits	for	each	pair	of	outcome	categories	 (Long	 and	 Freese	 2014).	 These	 outcome	 categories	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	unordered.	Even	when	an	outcome	 is	ordered,	MNLM	can	be	used	as	a	 sensitivity	test,	when	the	parallel	regression	assumption	is	rejected	or	there	are	other	doubts	about	 the	ordinality	 of	 the	dependent	 variable.	 Compared	 to	 ordinal	 logit	models,	the	potential	loss	of	efficiency	in	using	models	for	nominal	outcomes	is	outweighed	by	 avoiding	 potential	 bias.	 Additionally,	 MNLM	 captures	 differences	 between	different	 outcome	 categories	 and	 makes	 possible	 the	 exploration	 of	 the	relationships	between	separate	binary	relationships	between	independent	variables	and	each	of	the	outcome	categories.	 		 	
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4.3.	Explanatory	variables		The	measure	 of	 whether	 a	 country	 is	 ‘newly	 democratized’	 is	 a	 binary	 variable	developed	using	 the	Freedom	House	global	data	and	 focused	on	 capturing	 regime	change	 at	 the	 time	 when	 the	 rate	 of	 establishment	 of	 national	 human	 rights	institutions	 peaked	 in	 the	 early	 to	 mid-1990s.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 analysis,	 a	country	is	considered	newly	democratized	and	thus	is	assigned	the	value	of	“1”	if	its	status	 in	 the	Freedom	House	 reports	 from	1989-1993	 stayed	 the	 same,	 as	 “partly	free”	(PF)	with	no	change	 in	the	direction	of	either	“free”	(F)	or	“not	 free”	(NF)	or	change	 in	 status	 to	 “free”	 (F)	 it	 the	 same	 time	 interval.	 A	 national	 institution	 in	 a	country	 not	 considered	 “newly	 democratized”	 and	 assigned	 the	 value	 of	 “0”	 if	 its	status	is	consistently	“not	free”	or	“free”	for	the	indicated	period	of	five	years.				 A	 country’s	 strong	 liberal	 democratic	 identity,	 in	 particular	 strong	 human	rights	 identity	 is	 coded	 as	 a	 binary	 variable,	 with	 the	 value	 of	 “1”	 if	 a	 countries’	human	rights	identity	is	considered	strong	and	“0”	if	a	state’s	human	rights	identity	is	 considered	 weak.	 A	 country	 has	 a	 strong	 human	 rights	 identity	 if	 it	 shows	commitment	 to	 liberal	 democratic	 values	 such	 as	 international	 human	 rights	standards	 through	 ratifying	 international	 human	 rights	 treaties	 that	 have	 strong	enforcement	 mechanisms.	 The	 operationalization	 is	 based	 on	 Dutton’s	 study	 of	ratification	of	human	rights	 treaties,	which	offers	a	 ranking	of	14	different	human	rights	treaty	strength	based	on	their	varied	levels	of	enforcement	mechanism.			 National	 human	 rights	 institutional	 strength	 could	 also	 be	 associated	 with	whether	a	country	established	its	institution	early,	prior	to	1990,	when	the	Paris	
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Principles	as	the	international	framework	regulating	the	establishment	and	activity	of	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 around	 the	 globe,	was	 put	 under	 discussion	and	 later	 put	 in	 place	 by	 the	 United	Nations	 Office	 for	 the	High	 Commissioner	 of	Human	Rights.	 If	a	country	is	an	early	adopter,	 it	 is	coded	as	“1”	and	if	 it	 is	not	an	early	adopted,	it	is	assigned	“0”	as	a	value.			 Institutional	strength	can	also	be	a	result	of	socialisation	and	acculturation	processes	for	institutions	that	have	undergone	the	UN-led	accreditation	process	and	been	 integrated	 in	 the	 global	 community	 of	 NHRIs.	 In	 the	 dataset	 for	 this	 thesis,	institutions	that	underwent	the	accreditation	process	during	two	years	prior	to	the	year	 of	 data	 collection	 2013	 receive	 a	 score	 of	 “1”	 and	 the	 ones	 that	were	 never	accredited	or	were	accredited	in	the	years	following	data	collection	are	coded	as	“0.”		 As	 a	measure	 of	 states’	 response	 to	 incentive	 setting	 is	 the	binary	 variable	that	 indicates	whether	 or	 not	 they	 have	 signed	Preferential	 Trade	 Agreements	
with	 strong	 human	 rights	 conditionality.	 If	 in	 2012	 a	 state	 has	 entered	 a	 PTA	with	 strong	 human	 rights	 conditionality,	 it	 is	 coded	 as	 “1”;	 if	 states	 have	 entered	PTAs	 with	 low	 human	 rights	 standards	 or	 other	 trade	 agreements	 with	 no	preferential	 clause,	 they	 are	 coded	 as	 “0.”	 Data	 on	 PTAs	 with	 human	 rights	conditionality	is	drawn	from	the	Spilker	and	Boehmelt	dataset	(Spilker	and	Böhmelt	2013),	which	 re-created	 the	dataset	 utilized	by	Hafner-Burton	 in	 her	 study	of	 the	effect	 of	 PTAs	 on	 government	 repressive	 practices.	 The	 dataset	 in	 Spilker	 and	Boehmelt	right	censored	at	2009	values;	given	the	over-time	slow	rate	of	change	in	states	 entering	 PTAs,	 the	 rate	 of	 PTA	 adoption	 in	 2009	 can	 be	 considered	 a	 fair	estimation	of	the	adoption	rate	in	the	year	of	interest	for	this	analysis,	2012.		
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	 	A	government	could	create	a	strong	national	human	rights	institution	also	as	a	response	to	European	Union	accession	conditionality	 imposed	onto	candidate	and	new	member	states.	The	variable	is	a	binary,	with	the	value	of	“1”	for	countries	that	have	joined	the	European	Union	since	2004	or	were	candidate	states	in	2013,	and	 the	 value	 of	 “0”	 for	 member	 states	 that	 joined	 prior	 to	 2004.	 The	 source	 of	information	 on	 the	 basis	 of	which	 data	was	 coded	 is	 the	 European	 Commission’s	webpage	 on	 the	 enlargement	 process.	 Financial	 incentives	 such	 as	 Overseas	
Development	 Assistance	 disbursed	 by	 Western	 countries	 as	 part	 of	 their	democracy	promotion	programs	are	linked	to	human	rights	conditions	intended	for	recipient	countries	to	meet,	including	requirements	linked	to	the	establishment	and	capacity	 building	 of	 NHRIs.	 Thus,	 a	 government’s	 decision	 to	 establish	 a	 strong	national	human	rights	 institution	can	be	 tied	 to	 its	being	 the	 recipient	of	 a	higher	amounts	 of	 ODA	 from	 the	 main	 international	 donors	 in	 support	 of	 democracy	promotion	–	the	United	States	and	the	European	Union.	Data	is	in	current	prices,	in	US	Dollars,	calculated	in	millions.	The	source	of	the	data	is	the	OECD	Query	Wizard	for	 International	Development	 Statistics	 (QWIDS)	 and	values	 are	 averaged	 for	 the	years	1990-2013.		 	A	government’s	decision	to	have	a	strong	national	human	rights	 institution	could	 be	 linked	 also	 to	 a	 regional	 learning	 effect	 –	 in	 other	words,	 if	 a	 country	 is	located	 in	 a	 region	 with	 a	 high	 density	 of	 strong	 national	 human	 rights	
institutions,	 it	 is	more	 likely	 to	have	a	strong	 institution	 itself.	Given	 the	regional	distribution	 of	 strong	 institutions	 across	 the	 five	 regions	 (Americas,	 Europe,	 Asia,	Africa,	 and	 Oceania),	 two	 regions	 stand	 out	 as	 having	 a	 high	 density	 of	 strong	
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national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 –	 Europe	 and	Americas	 (0.51),	while	 the	 other	three	have	low	density	(0.30	for	Asia,	0.33	for	Africa,	and	0.21	for	Oceania).	Coding	is	 based	 on	 own	 calculations.	 Gross	 Domestic	 Product	 is	 also	 used	 as	 a	 control	variable,	testing	for	the	effect	of	income	per	capita	on	institutional	strength.		
Table	4.1.	Codebook	for	all	variables	in	the	model	
Variable	 Obs	 Unique	 Mean	 Median	 Min	 Max	Strength	 187	 3	 2.096	 2	 1	 3	NewDem_89/93	 187	 2	 0.118	 0	 0	 1	ICCCATop	 187	 2	 0.620	 1	 0	 1	PTAhard	 187	 2	 0.508	 1	 0	 1	EUmem2004	 187	 2	 0.097	 0	 0	 1	ODAEU	 187	 147	 104.378	 31.86	 0	 858.71	UDAUS	 187	 138	 75.127	 10.19	 0	 2003.86	Adens	 187	 3	 0.442	 0.51	 0.21	 0.51	Adopt	 187	 2	 0.140	 0	 0	 1	UNAccr	 187	 2	 0.513	 1	 0	 1	logGDPcap	GDPcap	 187	187	 186	186	 8.560	14436.55	 8.602	5440		 5.525	251	 12.003	163352	
	
	
4.4.	Ordered	Logit	Model	and	Estimation	In	an	ordered	logit	model	the	estimated	output	is				 	 	 	 	 y*	=	xβ	+	εi,			where	i	is	the	observation	and	ε	is	the	random	error.	The	marginal	change	in	y*	with	respect	to	xk	is:	
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∂y*/∂xi	=	βi			 Because	Y*	is	unknown,	its	true	metric	is	unknown.	The	value	of	y*	depends	on	the	identification	assumption	we	make	about	the	variance	of	errors.	As	a	result,	the	 marginal	 change	 in	 Y*	 cannot	 be	 interpreted	 without	 standardizing	 by	 the	estimated	 standard	 deviations	 of	 Y*.	 For	 the	 case	 a	 total	 of	 nine	 independent	variables,	the	ORM	looks	as	follows:			 y*	=	α	+	βxi	+	βx2	+	βx3	+	βx4	+	βx5	+	βx6	+	βx7	+	βx8	+	βx9	+	ε1		 	Using	the	data	in	the	model	of	institutional	strength,	we	use	ologit	to	fit	the	model		 Pr(strength	=	m	|	xi)	–	F(τm	–	xβ)	–	F(τm-1	–	xβ)		where	 Pr	 is	 the	 probability	 of	 observing	 y	 =	 m	 for	 given	 values	 of	 the	 x’s	corresponds	to	the	region	of	the	distribution	where	y*	falls	between	τm-1	and	τm.		The	mathematical	expression	of	the	model	of	institutional	strength	is	as	follows:		y*	=	α	+	βNewDem	+	βICCCATop	+	βPTAhard	+	βEUmem2014	+	βODAEU	+		βODAUS	+	βADens	+	βAdopt	+	βUNAcc	+	βlogGDPcap	+	ε1	
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Table	4.2.	Model	1	(full	model)	
Model	1	(full	model)	
Strength	 Coef.	 St.	err.	 p	value	 Odds	ratio	 St.	err.	or	NewDem_89/93	 -	0.2022	 0.4838	 0.676	 0.8169	 0.3952	ICCCATop	 0.2739	 0.3609	 0.448	 1.3150	 0.4747	PTAhard	 -0.0920	 0.3659	 0.801	 0.9121	 0.3337	EUmem2004	 1.4960**	 0.6302	 0.018	 4.4639**	 2.8131	ODAEU	 -0.0006	 0.0013	 0.645	 0.9994	 0.0013	ODAUS	 0.0018**	 0.0008	 0.020	 1.0018**	 0.0008	Adopt	 1.0324**	 0.5089	 0.042	 2.8078**	 1.4289	Adens	 3.9461**	 1.7971	 0.028	 51.7343**	 92.9742	UNAccr	 2.6769***	 0.3883	 0.000	 14.5400***	 5.6469	logGDPcap	 -	0.0742	 0.1209	 0.540	 0.9285	 0.1123	/cut	1	/cut	2	 1.4087	3.8010	 	 	 1.4087	3.8011	 	Prob	>	chi2	=	0.0000,	N	=	187			***	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.01	level	**	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.05	level	*	indicates	values	significant	at	the	p<0.10	level	
	
4.5.	Hypothesis	tests	The	 effect	 of	 having	 undergone	 the	 United	 Nations	 process	 of	 accreditation	 on	institutional	power	is	significant:			 	LRx2	=	5.64,	df	=	1,	p<0.02		The	 effect	 of	 having	 undergone	 the	 United	 Nations	 process	 of	 accreditation	 on	institutional	power	is	significant:			 	LRx2	=	47.51,	df	=	1,	p<0.01	
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The	 effect	 of	 having	 adopted	 a	 classical	 ombudsman	 before	 1990	 on	 institutional	power	is	significant:		 LRx2	=	4.12,	df	=	1,	p<0.05		The	 effect	 of	 the	 higher	 regional	 density	 of	 strong	 (A-level)	 institutions	 on	institutional	power	is	significant:		 	LRx2	=	4.82,	df	=	1,	p<0.01		The	 effect	 of	 having	 received	 overseas	 development	 assistance	 from	 the	 United	States	is	significant:		 LRx2	=	5.39,	df	=	1,	p<0.05	
		 A	 plot	 of	 average	 marginal	 effects	 of	 each	 independent	 variable	 on	 the	outcome	 probability	 offers	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 magnitudes	 of	 effects	 of	 each	independent	 variable	 on	 the	 outcome	 probability.	 In	 the	 plot,	 the	 horizontal	 axis	indicates	the	magnitude	of	the	effect,	with	the	letters	within	the	graph	marking	the	discrete	change	for	each	outcome.	This	plot	offers	a	quick	overview	of	the	effects	of	independent	 variables	 and	 helps	 also	 to	 identify	 the	 variables	 whose	 effect	 is	significant	 and	 thus	 worthy	 of	 further	 investigation.	 This	 plot	 offers	 a	 visual	illustration	 of	 the	 magnitude	 of	 the	 effects	 that	 individual	 independent	 variables	have	on	the	outcome.	From	the	plot,	it	is	evident	that	the	magnitude	of	the	effects	of	
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five	variables	on	 the	outcome	probability	 is	 greater:	EUmem2004,	UNAccr,	Adens,	Adopt,	and	ODAUS.	Among	the	four,	the	effect	of	a	change	in	one	unit	for	the	UNAccr	(i.e.	whether	or	not	an	institution	has	UN	accreditation	or	not)	 is	the	greatest.	The	second	largest	effects	are	due	to	a	one	standard	deviation	increase	in	the	amount	of	overseas	development	assistance	that	a	country	receives	from	the	United	States	and	is	 strongest	 on	 weak	 and	 strong	 institutions	 and	 not	 as	 great	 on	 medium	 level	institutions	and,	additionally,	 to	whether	a	country	has	been	objected	to	European	Union	conditionality.	The	third	significant	effect	on	institutional	power	is	due	to	the	existence	 of	 a	 high	 density	 of	 strong	 (A-level)	 institutions	 in	 the	 region	 where	 a	country	 is	 based.	 A	 factor	 change	 in	 whether	 a	 country	 is	 an	 early	 adopter	 of	 a	classical	 ombudsman	 institutional	 model	 has	 also	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 the	probability	that	a	country	establishes	a	weak	or	a	strong	institution.				
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Figure	4.1.	Plot	of	marginal	effects	of	independent	variables	on	outcome	
probability	(*	indicates	p<0.05)	NB	A	breakdown	and	discussion	of	the	
standardized	estimates	of	the	marginal	change	in	y	can	be	found	in	the	Annex.	
		The	 plots	 below	 represent	 visually	 the	 predicted	 and	 cumulative	 probabilities	 for	the	 ordered	 logit	 model.	 Cumulative	 probabilities	 measure	 the	 probability	 of	observing	 a	 given	 category	 or	 lower.	 Two	 of	 the	 variables	 that	 are	 statistically	significant	in	the	analysis	are	continuous	and	thus	lend	themselves	to	visual	graphs	of	effects	on	the	outcome	probability	by	outcome	level	(weak,	medium	and	strong),	namely	 ODA	 from	 the	 United	 States	 and	 the	 density	 of	 strong	 institutions	 in	 the	region.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 both	 variables,	 the	 most	 significant	 impact	 that	 the	 two	variables	 have	 is	 on	 the	 probability	 of	 having	 an	 institution	with	 a	 strong	 design,	with	 the	medium	 level	 line	registering	a	slight	 rise	 followed	by	a	decline.	 In	other	
WMS
WM S
WMS
W* M S*
WMS
W* M S*
W* M S*
W* M S*
W* M* S*
WMS
SD increase      
SD increase      
SD increase      
SD increase      
SD increase      
SD increase      
SD increase      
SD increase      
SD increase      
SD increase      
 NewDem_8993toPFF   ICCCATop   PTAhard   EUmem2004   ODAEU   ODAUS   Adopt   Adens   UNAccr   logGDPcap   
-.16 -.07 .03 .12 .21
Marginal Effect on Outcome Probability
		 179	
words,	 the	 higher	 the	 amount	 of	 ODA	 from	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 higher	 the	probability	is	of	a	country	having	institutions	with	a	strong	design.	More	specifically,	the	 findings	mean	 that	 countries	 that	 are	 located	 in	Europe	 and	 the	Americas	 are	more	 likely	 to	 establish	 medium	 and	 strong	 institutions,	 while	 the	 probability	 of	having	a	strong	design	is	lower	in	Oceania,	Africa	and	Asia.				
	
Plots	of	predicted	and	cumulative	probabilities	on	the	three	ordered	outcome	
categories	
	
					
					
Figure	4.2.	Predicted	probabilities:	Density	of	strong	institutions	in	region						
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Figure	4.3.	Cumulative	probabilities:	Density	of	strong	institutions	in	region	
Figure	4.4.	Predicted	probabilities:	ODA	from	the	US			
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Figure	4.5.	Cumulative	probabilities:	ODA	from	the	US		 										 		
Figure	4.6.	Predicted	probabilities:	ODA	from	the	EU			
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Figure	4.7.	Cumulative	probabilities:	ODA	from	the	EU			In	addition	 to	 the	 two	statistically	significant	variables,	we	plot	also	 the	change	 in	predicted	 probabilities	 of	 institutional	 strength	 in	 relation	 to	 changes	 in	 the	GDP/capita	 of	 each	 country.	 Although	 not	 statistically	 significant,	 the	 effect	 of	GDP/capita	 is	 positive	 on	 the	 probability	 of	 establishing	 medium	 and	 weak	institutions	and	negative	in	the	case	of	institutions	with	a	strong	design.				
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Figure	4.8.	Predicted	probabilities:	GDP/capita		
	
Figure	4.9.	Cumulative	probabilities:	GDP/capita		
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	 In	order	to	measure	the	effect	that	the	four	statistically	significant	variables	have	on	the	outcome,	we	fit	three	ordinal	logit	models	–	the	full	model,	a	model	with	only	 the	 significant	 explanatory	 factors,	 and	 a	 third	 model	 with	 the	 independent	variables	that	were	not	significant	 in	the	full	model	–	and	perform	likelihood	ratio	tests	on	them.		
Table	4.3.	Results	of	ordinal	logit	(Models	2	and	3)	
Strength	 Coef.	 St.	err.	 Model	2	 St	Err	 Model	3	 St	Err	NewDem_89/93	 -	0.2022	 0.4838	 -0.6587	 0.4524	 	 	ICCCATop	 0.2739	 0.3609	 1.3111***	 0.3140	 	 	PTAhard	 -0.0920	 0.3659	 0.5432*	 0.2949	 	 	ODAEU	 -0.0006	 0.0013	 0.0020**	 0.0009	 	 	EUmem2004	 1.4960**	 0.6302	 	 	 1.5272**	 0.6147	ODAUS	 0.0018**	 0.0008	 	 	 0.0016**	 0.0006	Adopt	 1.0324**	 0.5089	 	 	 1.0319**	 0.4927	Adens	 3.9461**	 1.7971	 	 	 3.9309***	 1.4845	UNAccr	 2.6769***	 0.3883	 	 	 2.7272***	 0.3618	logGDPcap	 -	0.0742	 0.1209	 0.0946	 0.1096	 	 	/cut	1	/cut	2	 1.4087	3.8010	 	 0.9709	2.6581	 	 2.0183	4.3996	 	***	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.01	level	**	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.05	level	*	indicates	values	significant	at	the	p<0.10	level		 	In	 Annex	 E,	 I	 re-estimate	 the	model	 using	 four	 categories	 of	 strength,	 separating	between	countries	with	weak	institutions	and	countries	without	an	NHRIs.			
4.6.	Post-estimation	tests	Since	 the	 ordered	 logit	 model	 estimates	 one	 equation	 over	 all	 levels	 of	 the	dependent	variable,	a	concern	is	whether	our	one-equation	model	is	valid	or	a	more	flexible	model	is	required.	We	can	test	this	hypothesis	with	the	test	for	proportional	
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odds	 test	 (the	Brant	 test	 or	 “omodel	 logit”	 of	 parallel	 regression	 assumption.	 The	Brant	 test	 is	 an	 approximate	Wald	 test	 that	 estimates	 the	 unconstrained	 and	 the	constrained	 models,	 comparing	 the	 estimates	 from	 binary	 logit	 models	 fit	 for	individual	variables,	and	tests	the	restrictions	in	the	null	hypothesis.	It	is	important	to	 note,	 however,	 that	 while	 the	 null	 hypothesis	 might	 be	 rejected	 because	 βm’s	differ	by	m,	Brant	notes	that	the	null	hypothesis	could	be	rejected	because	of	other	departures	 from	the	specified	model).	Thus,	 the	 tests	may	cast	doubt	on	 the	basic	model	but	do	not	indicate	what	the	appropriate	model	might	be.	The	test	statistic	is	only	 significant	 at	 the	 90%	 level	 significant	 test	 statistic	 (chi2	 =	 16.49;	 p>0.10;	df=10).	Based	on	the	results	of	the	binary	logits,	the	largest	violation	is	for	the	Adens	and	also	for	PTAhard	and	ODAUS,	which	indicates	that	the	differences	in	these	three	variables	matter	more	for	whether	a	countries	have	a	weak	national	human	rights	institution	 (please	 see	Annex	 for	 full	 results).	 As	 an	 additional	 test	 of	 the	 parallel	regression	 assumption	 we	 used	 the	 command	 “omodel	 logit”	 command	 –	 when	applied	to	 the	basic	model,	 the	results	(Chi2	=	20.07,	df	=	10,	p<0.05)	suggest	also	that	 the	 parallel	 regression	 assumption	 is	 violated	 at	 the	 95%	 confidence	 level,	calling	 thus	 for	 fitting	 a	more	 flexible	model,	 such	 as	 the	 logit	model.	More	 often	than	 not	 in	 real-life	 applications	 of	 the	 ordinal	 logit	model,	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 the	parallel	regression	is	rejected.	Best	practice	recommends	fitting	a	model	that	relaxes	the	parallel	 regression	assumption,	 such	as	 the	multinomial	 logit	model,	when	 the	parallel	regression	assumption	has	been	violated.				
		 186	
4.7.	The	multinomial	logit	model			The	multinomial	logit	model	can	be	thought	of	as	simultaneously	fitting	binary	logits	for	all	comparisons	among	the	alternatives	–	in	other	words,	for	a	multinomial	logit	model	fits	separate	binary	models	for	the	effects	of	independent	variables	on	each	of	three	 categories	 of	 the	outcome,	 institutional	 strength,	 by	 comparison	 to	 the	base	level,	low	institution.	The	general	formal	statement	of	this	type	of	model	is		 ln	Ωm|b	(x)	=	ln	Pr	(y	=	m|x)	/	Pr	(y	=	b|x)	=	xβm|b	for	m	=	1	to	J		These	J	equations	can	be	solved	to	compute	the	probabilities	for	each	outcome.	The	probabilities	will	 be	 the	 same	 regardless	 of	 the	 base	 outcome	b	 that	 is	 used.	 In	 a	model	with	an	outcome	that	has	three	categories	and	fit	the	model	with	alternative	1	as	the	base	outcome,	where	one	would	obtain	estimates	Est	β2|1	and	Est	β3}1	with	β1|1	=	0.	The	probability	equation	is			 Pr	(y	=	m}x)	=	exp	(xβm|1)	/	sumJj=1	[exp	(xβj|1)]		In	the	case	of	our	model,	the	formal	statement	is	as	follows:		 ln	Ω2|1	(xi)	=	β0,	2|1	+	β1,	2|1NewDem	+	β2,	2|1ICCCATopt	+	β3,	2|1PTAhard	+			+	β4,	2|1		EUmem2004	+	β5,	2|1ODAEU	+	β6,	2|1ODAUS	+	β7,	2|1	Adopt	+	β8,	2|1Adens	+			+	β9,	2|1UNAccr	+	β10,	2|1logGDPcap		
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ln	Ω3|1	(xi)	=	β0,	3|1	+	β1,	3|1NewDem	+	β2,	3|1ICCCATopt	+	β3,	3|1PTAhard	+			+	β4,	3|1		EUmem2004	+	β5,	3|1ODAEU	+	β6,	3|1ODAUS	+	β7,	3|1	Adopt	+	β8,	3|1Adens	+			+	β9,	3|1UNAccr	+	β10,	3|1logGDPcap			 The	full	model	is	specified	and	results	listed	in	terms	of	coefficient	estimates	for	both	level	1	(low	strength)	as	the	base	outcome	and	level	3	(strong	institution)	as	the	base	outcome.	Although	the	effect	of	 the	variables	on	the	outcome	does	not	change,	 fitting	 the	model	with	 two	different	base	outcomes	allows	 to	 capture	also	the	 effect	 of	 the	 independent	 variables	 on	 the	 institutions	 that	 belong	 in	 the	category	 that	 is	 considered	 the	 base.	 The	 same	 four	 independent	 variables	 that	appeared	as	significant	in	the	ordinal	logit	model	are	significant	in	the	multinomial	
logit	model.	The	latter,	however,	allows	us	to	see	the	effect	of	independent	variables	on	different	levels/categories	of	the	outcome.													
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Table	4.4.	Multinomial	model	1	
	
Model	1	(full	model,	base	1/W)	
Strength	 Coef.	 St.	err.	 p	value		1	 base		 	 	2	NewDem_89/93	 	-	0.2483	 	0.6618	 	0.707	ICCCATop	 0.0296	 0.5057	 0.953	PTAhard	 0.7806	 0.5498	 0.156	EUmem2004	 1.6223	 1.1553	 0.160	ODAEU	 -0.0004	 0.0022	 0.846	ODAUS	 0.0118	 0.0073	 0.105	Adopt	 -.3403	 0.8339	 0.683	Adens	 4.8254*	 2.4851	 0.052	UNAccr	 1.7181***	 0.5634	 0.002	logGDPcap	 -0.0117	 0.1831	 0.949	3	NewDem_89/93	 	-	0.7317	 	0.8366	 	0.382	ICCCATop	 0.5475	 0.5980	 0.360	PTAhard	 0.2812	 0.6344	 0.658	EUmem2004	 2.8360**	 1.2041	 0.019	ODAEU	 -0.0008	 0.0025	 0.750	ODAUS	 0.0119	 0.0073	 0.103	Adopt	 0.6121	 0.8308	 0.461	Adens	 3.3008	 2.9513	 0.263	UNAccr	 3.7573***	 0.6324	 0.000	logGDPcap	 0.0168	 0.2107	 0.936	Prob	>	chi2	=	0.0000,	N	=	187			***	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.01	level	**	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.05	level	*	indicates	values	significant	at	the	p<0.10	level					
		 189	
Table	4.5.	Multinomial	model	2		
Model	1	(full	model,	base	2/M)	
Strength	 Coef.	 St.	err.	 p	value	1	NewDem_89/93	 	0.2483	 	0.6618	 	0.707	ICCCATop	 -0.0296	 0.5056	 0.953	PTAhard	 -0.7806	 0.5498	 0.156	EUmem2004	 -1.6223	 1.1553	 0.160	ODAEU	 -0.0004	 0.0022	 0.846	ODAUS	 -0.0118	 0.0073	 0.105	Adopt	 0.3403	 0.8339	 0.683	Adens	 -5.8253**	 2.4851	 0.052	UNAccr	 -1.7181***	 0.5634	 0.002	logGDPcap	 0.0117	 0.1831	 0.949	2	 base		 	 	3	NewDem_89/93	 	-0.4834	 	0.6697	 	0.470	ICCCATop	 0.5179	 0.4986	 0.299	PTAhard	 -0.4995	 0.4814	 0.299	EUmem2004	 1.2136*	 0.6857	 0.077	ODAEU	 -0.0004	 0.0017	 0.829	ODAUS	 0.0001	 0.0011	 0.924	Adopt	 0.9523	 0.5888	 0.106	Adens	 -1.5250	 2.7098	 0.574	UNAccr	 2.0392***	 0.4970	 0.000	logGDPcap	 0.0286	 0.1616	 0.860	Prob	>	chi2	=	0.0000,	N	=	187			***	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.01	level	**	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.05	level	*	indicates	values	significant	at	the	p<0.10	level					
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4.8.	Hypothesis	tests	
	The	 effect	 of	 having	 undergone	 the	 United	 Nations	 process	 of	 accreditation	 on	institutional	power	is	significant:			 	LRx2	=	36.64,	df	=	1,	p<0.01		The	effect	of	being	an	EU	member	or	candidate	state	since	2004	is	significant:			LRx2	=	6.55,	df	=	1,	p<0.05			 	An	 alternative	 test	 for	 the	 hypotheses	 that	 the	 effects	 of	 all	 independent	variables	 in	 the	 models	 are	 equal	 to	 0	 is	 the	Wald	 test,	 which	 confirms	 that	 the	strongest	effects	are	of	EUmem2004	and	UNAccr	variables,	 followed	by	Adens	and	Adopt	 and	 ODAUS,	 although	 their	 p	 values	 are	 not	 significant	 in	 the	multinomial	model.				 A	 plot	 of	 average	 marginal	 effects	 of	 each	 independent	 variable	 on	 the	outcome	 probability	 offers	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 magnitudes	 of	 effects	 of	 each	independent	 variable	 on	 the	 outcome	 probability.	 In	 the	 plot,	 the	 horizontal	 axis	indicates	the	magnitude	of	the	effect,	with	the	letters	within	the	graph	marking	the	discrete	change	for	each	outcome.	This	plot	offers	a	quick	overview	of	the	effects	of	independent	 variables	 and	 helps	 also	 to	 identify	 the	 variables	 whose	 effect	 is	significant	and	thus	worthy	of	further	investigation.	From	the	plot,	it	is	evident	that	
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the	magnitude	of	the	effects	of	four	variables	on	the	outcome	probability	is	greater:	UNAccr,	 Adens,	 Adopt,	 and	 ODAUS.	 The	 plot	 indicates	 that	 the	marginal	 effect	 of	independent	variables	on	the	outcome	for	the	multinomial	logit	model	is	similar	to	the	results	in	the	plot	of	marginal	effects	in	the	ordinal	logit	model.	Among	the	four,	the	effect	of	a	change	in	one	unit	for	the	UNAccr	(i.e.	whether	or	not	an	institution	has	UN	accreditation	or	not)	is	the	greatest,	with	an	effect	on	all	three	categories	of	the	outcome,	institutional	strength.	The	second	large	effect	is	due	to	a	one	standard	deviation	increase	in	the	amount	of	overseas	development	assistance	that	a	country	receives	 from	 the	United	States	 and	 is	 strongest	on	all	 categories	of	 institutions	–	weak,	medium,	and	strong.	A	factor	change	in	whether	a	country	is	an	early	adopter	of	 a	 classical	 ombudsman	 institutional	 model	 has	 also	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 the	probability	that	a	country	establishes	a	strong	 institution	–	unlike	the	effect	 in	the	ordinal	 logit	model,	 in	 the	multinomial	model	 the	 early	 adoption	 of	 an	 institution	does	not	have	an	effect	on	weak	institutions.	A	high	density	of	strong	institutions	in	the	 region	 where	 a	 country	 is	 located	 also	 has	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 the	 weak	institutions	category	of	the	outcome.			
		 192	
	
Figure	 4.10.	 Plot	 of	 marginal	 effects	 of	 independent	 variables	 on	 outcome	
probability	(*	indicates	p<0.05)	
		 The	 marginal	 effects	 plot	 shows	 that	 the	 probability	 of	 each	 outcome	category	of	institutional	strength,	is	predicted	to	change	based	on	variations	in	eacn	explanatory	 variable	 holding	 the	 other	 independent	 variables	 constant	 at	 their	mean	values.	Similar	 to	 the	results	of	 the	analysis	 for	 the	ordinal	 logit	model,	 four	independent	variables	are	significant	in	the	analysis	and	have	a	direct	effect	on	the	three	outcome	categories.	Two	variables	have	a	comparatively	stronger	effect	on	the	three	 categories	 of	 the	 outcome:	 one	 standard	 deviation	 change	 in	 the	 amount	 of	ODA	that	a	country	receives	has	a	significant	effect	on	all	the	probability	of	the	weak	and	medium	levels	of	the	outcome	category,	holding	all	other	independent	variables	constant,	 with	 the	 strongest	 effects	 on	 the	 medium	 and	 strong	 level	 categories.	
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Additionally,	a	discrete	change	in	status	from	having	no	UN	accreditation	to	having	undergone	the	accreditation	process	has	statistically	significant	effects	on	all	three	categories	 of	 outcome	 strength,	 holding	 all	 other	 explanatory	 variables	 constant,	with	 the	strongest	on	 the	strong	 level	 institutions.	The	change	 in	 the	position	of	a	country	in	a	region	with	a	high	density	of	A-level	institutions	as	opposed	to	a	region	with	 low	 density	 of	 strong	 institutions	 has	 a	 statistically	 significant	 effect	 on	 the	probability	of	a	country	to	have	a	weak	institution,	but	no	effect	on	the	probability	of	 having	 a	 medium	 or	 a	 strong	 institution,	 when	 holding	 all	 other	 independent	variables	constant	at	their	mean	values.	A	discrete	change	in	a	country’s	status	of	EU	member	 or	 candidate	 since	 2004	 has	 a	 statistically	 significant	 effect	 on	 a	 the	probability	 of	 countries	 having	 A-level	 institutions	 and	 no	 statistically	 significant	effect	on	the	probability	of	having	a	weak	or	medium	level	institution,	when	holding	all	other	variables	constant.			 Similar	 to	 the	 predicted	 probabilities	 for	 the	 ordinal	model,	we	 fit	 plots	 of	predicted	 and	 cumulative	 probabilities	 for	 three	 variables,	 of	 which	 two	 are	statistically	significant,	density	of	strong	institutions	in	a	region	and	ODA	from	the	United	States.	The	plots	show	largely	similar	trends	with	the	ordinal	model,	but	with	a	more	dramatic	drop	 in	effect	at	 lower	values	of	ODA	for	weak	 institutions	and	a	sharp	increase	followed	by	a	steady	decrease	on	the	probability	of	having	a	medium	level	 institution.	The	effect	on	the	strong	 institutions	remains	the	most	significant.	In	the	case	of	the	effect	of	change	in	the	regional	density	on	the	outcome,	once	more,	countries	 in	Europe	and	 the	Americas	are	more	 likely	 to	have	strong	and	medium	institutions	and	 less	 likely	 to	have	weak	 institutions.	Additionally,	we	plotted	also	
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the	 effect	 that	 a	 unit	 change	 in	 GDP/capita	 has	 on	 the	 outcome	 probabilities	 and	have	found	a	negative	impact	on	the	probability	of	having	a	strong	institution	and	a	positive	one	on	institutions	with	a	design	that	is	at	the	medium	level	of	strength.	
	
Plots	of	predicted	and	cumulative	probabilities	on	the	three	outcome	categories	
	
Figure	4.11.	Predicted	Probability:	Density	of	strong	institutions	in	region	
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Figure	4.12.	Cumulative	probability:	Density	of	strong	institutions	in	region	
	
Figure	4.13.	Predicted	probabilities:	GDP/capita		
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Figure	4.14.	Cumulative	probabilities:	GDP/capita		
	
	
Figure	4.15.	Predicted	probabilities:	ODA	from	the	US		
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Figure	4.16.	Cumulative	probabilities:	ODA	from	the	US	
	
Figure	4.17.	Predicted	probabilities:	ODA	from	the	EU	
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Figure	4.18.	Cumulative	probabilities:	ODA	from	the	EU	
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4.9.	Discussion	of	results	
	
4.9.1.	Human	Rights	Identity	A	strong	domestic	identity	grounded	in	values	of	liberal	democracy	and	a	history	of	respect	 for	human	rights	create	 fertile	environments	 in	which	governments	create	strong	institutions	and	support	their	efforts	to	carry	out	their	mandate	to	promote	and	 protect	 human	 rights.	 The	 model	 in	 this	 thesis	 proposes	 two	 ways	 of	operationalising	 human	 rights	 identity:	 first,	 a	 country’s	 early	 adopter	 status	 is	considered	 a	 proxy	 for	 a	 country’s	 human	 rights	 identity,	 understood	 as	 a	commitment	 to	 institutionalize	 the	protection	of	 its	citizens’	 rights	and	 the	rule	of	law.	Second,	a	country’s	commitment	to	international	human	rights	instruments	can	be	a	measure	of	a	strong	 identity	grounded	 in	respect	 for	human	rights	especially	when	 countries’	 ratify	 international	 human	 rights	 treaties	 that	 bind	 states	 with	strict	 standards	 of	 enforcement	 such	 as	 the	 Convention	 Against	 Torture	 and	 the	International	Criminal	Court.			 The	analysis	finds	that	effect	of	a	country	being	an	early	adopter	of	a	classical	ombudsman	institution	on	institutional	strength	in	2013	is	statistically	significant.	A	country	 is	 an	 early	 adopter	 if	 it	 established	 an	 institution	 before	 the	 formal	international	structures	put	in	place	in	the	early	1990s	began	the	regulation	of	the	establishment	 and	 consolidation	 of	 human	 rights	 institutions	 globally.	 The	 early	adoption	of	an	institution	is	an	indicator	of	a	country’s	sense	of	duty	to	protect	 its	citizens,	 democratic	 values	 and	 safeguard	 the	 implementation	 of	 international	standards	of	human	rights.	The	measure	of	an	institution’s	early	adoption	aims	also	
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to	capture	the	temporal	dimension,	by	aiming	to	capture	the	impact	of	a	historical	allegiance	 to	 the	 institutionalization	of	democratic	values	on	 institutional	 strength	decades	 later.	 The	 early	 adoption	 of	 a	 national	 human	 rights	 institution	 can	 be	understood	as	both	a	process	is	linked	to	cross-border	diffusion	and	as	a	domestic	characteristic	that	is	important	for	the	creation	and	maintenance	of	strong	national	human	 rights	 institutions.	 In	 line	 with	 the	 constructivist	 school	 of	 thought,	 some	governments’	decision	 to	have	a	national	human	rights	 institution	with	a	stronger	design	is	rooted	in	a	certain	identity	built	on	a	longstanding	tradition	of	respect	for	rights	 and	 democratic	 values.	 Some	 societies	 identity	 collectively	 as	 democracies	and	are	expected	to	have	stronger	institutions	for	the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights.	As	illustrated	by	the	data	in	the	below	table,	early	adopting	countries	have	institutions	of	different	strength	levels	today,	but	the	predominant	design	type	is	strong,	followed	by	the	medium	level	of	strength.			 The	relevance	of	early	adopters	is	twofold:	on	the	one	hand,	they	represent	longstanding	 supporters	of	 liberal	 institutions	with	 strong	democratic	 identity;	on	the	 other	 hand,	 they	 can	 also	 be	 role	 models	 for	 learning	 across	 borders	 at	 the	regional	 level.	 In	 other	 words,	 countries	 whose	 governments	 learn	 about	 early	adopters	 in	 their	 neighbourhood	 are	more	 likely	 to	 follow	 in	 their	 footsteps	 and	establish	 strong	 national	 institutions	 themselves.	 The	 regional	 distribution	 of	 the	early	 adopters	 covers	 all	 five	 regions	 of	 the	 world,	 but	 the	 strong	 and	 medium	institutions	are	primarily	based	in	Europe	and	Latin	America.	These	are	also	the	two	regions	that	have	the	overall	highest	density	of	strong	institutions.	Amongst	these,	the	 Scandinavian	 countries	 and	 Estonia	 appear	 to	 indicate	 evidence	 of	 a	 sub-
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regional	effect,	which	have	some	of	the	oldest	ombudsman	institutions	in	the	world	and	 have	 remained	 strong	 promoters	 of	 democracy	 and	 human	 rights	 across	borders.	The	one	Scandinavian	country	that	 is	not	an	early	adopter	is	Norway	–	in	2015,	 the	 first	 independent	 national	 human	 rights	 institution	 was	 established	 in	Oslo.				 	 	 Table	4.6.	Early	adopting	countries	
Country	 Year	 Strength	Australia	 1986	 strong	Austria	 1982	 medium	Barbados	 1987	 weak	Benin	 1989	 weak	Canada	 1977	 strong	Denmark	 1987	 strong	Estonia	 1938	 strong	Finland	 1919	 strong	France	 1947	 strong	Guatemala	 1985	 strong	Haiti	 1987	 medium	Hungary	 1989	 strong	Libya	 1985	 weak	New	Zealand	 1977	 strong	Nicaragua	 1986	 strong	Pakistan	 1987	 medium	Philippines	 1987	 strong	Poland	 1987	 strong	Portugal	 1975	 strong	Saint	Lucia	 1982	 medium	Samoa	 1988	 strong	Spain	 1978	 strong	Sweden	 1980	 medium	Switzerland	 1976	 weak	Togo	 1987	 strong	Trinidad	&	Tobago	 1976	 medium	
		 202	
	 The	second	indicator	of	a	country’s	identity	as	linked	to	human	rights	is	not	measuring	 institutionalization	 but	 rather	 a	 state’s	 commitment	 to	 international	human	 rights	 instruments	 through	 their	 ratification.	Although	 the	direction	of	 the	relationship	 between	 design	 and	 being	 a	 signatory	 of	 two	 instruments	 that	 have	strong	 enforcement	mechanisms	 (ICC	 and	CAT	Optional	 Protocol)	 is	 positive,	 it	 is	not	 statistically	 significant	 in	 the	 full	 model.	 In	 the	 model	 that	 excludes	 the	 four	variables	that	are	statistically	significant	 in	the	full	model,	excluding	also	the	early	adopter	 variable	 from	 the	 model,	 being	 a	 signatory	 of	 the	 ICC	 and	 CAT	 Optional	Protocol	becomes	statistically	significant.			 In	 the	 framework	 of	 this	 analysis,	 we	 find	 evidence	 that	 human	 rights	identity	 matters	 for	 NHRI	 strength	 when	 measured	 as	 countries’	 early	 adopter	status.	The	finding	about	the	stronger	effect	that	the	presence	of	an	early	adopter	in	the	 region	 makes	 a	 twofold	 original	 contribution	 to	 the	 constructivist	 literature,	speaking	both	to	the	scholarship	on	the	role	of	national	liberal	democratic	identity	(Cox	 1987;	Wendt	 1999;	 Fearon	 1997)	 and	 to	 the	work	 on	 social	 learning	 across	borders	that	manifests	itself	more	visibly	at	the	regional	level.	The	status	of	an	early	adopting	country	is	in	itself	a	predictor	of	both	that	country	having	a	strong	national	human	rights	 institution	and	of	 a	 tendency	among	neighboring	 countries’	 to	 learn	from	 its	 example	 and	 establish	 strong	 institutions	 themselves.	 Europe	 and	 the	Americas	 are	 the	 regions	with	 the	 highest	 density	 of	 strong	 institutions	 and	 both	have	countries	 that	are	early	adopters.	Europe	 in	particular	 is	 the	region	with	 the	highest	 number	 of	 early	 adopting	 countries.	 The	 regional	 effect	 in	 our	 model	confirms	findings	in	the	existing	literature	on	human	rights	treaty	ratification,	which	
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discusses	 regions’	 tendency	 toward	 isomorphism,	where	 states	mimic	 ratification	patterns	 of	 neighbours	 regardless	 of	 their	 commitment.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 national	human	 rights	 institutions,	 early	 adopters	 model	 a	 long-standing	 commitment	 to	strong	designs	for	other	countries	 in	the	region	which	either	that	 learn	from	them	how	 to	 establish	 such	 strong	 institutions,	 or	 simply	 copy	 the	 institutional	 design	without	fully	internalising	the	democratic	values	it	promotes	and	protects.	
	
4.9.2.	Socialisation	and	acculturation	
	Socialisation	 is	 a	mechanism	 that	 traces	 a	 constructivist	 causal	 path	 for	 diffusion	processes,	seeing	them	as	driven	by	normative	and	socially	constructed	properties.	In	 a	 world	 driven	 by	 constructivist	 principles,	 policymakers	 decide	 in	 favour	 of	institutional	and	policy	adoption	in	an	attempt	to	conform	to	what	they	perceive	as	more	 appropriate	 in	 a	 global	 or	 regional	 context.	 Norms	 and	 values	 are	 shared	amongst	members	of	 international	networks,	 through	socialisation	processes	such	as	 learning,	 imitation,	 or	 acculturation	 coordinated	 by	 IOs.	 Acculturation	 is	 the	process	 by	 which	 actors	 embrace	 the	 beliefs	 and	 behavioural	 patterns	 of	 the	surrounding	 culture,	 without	 assessing	 mode	 in-depth	 either	 the	 merits	 of	 those	ideas	 or	 the	 material	 costs	 and	 benefits	 of	 confirming	 to	 them.	 In	 certain	 cases,	acculturation	 can	 lead	 to	 only	 the	 partial	 internalisation	 of	 norms,	 in	 particular	when	countries	are	shamed	 into	adopting	a	certain	 institution	that	are	considered	apt	in	a	certain	context.		
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	 Our	 analysis	 finds	 evidence	 of	 two	main	 types	 of	 socialisation	 processes	 –	one	 associated	 with	 accreditation	 received	 from	 the	 UN	 Sub-Committee	 on	Accreditation	 at	 the	 International	 Coordinating	 Committee	 for	 National	 Human	Rights	 Institutions	 and	 a	 second	 one	 linked	 to	 the	 regional	 context	 in	 which	institutions	 are	 located.	 As	 evidenced	 by	 the	 results	 of	 both	 the	 ordered	 and	 the	unordered	models,	countries	that	have	undergone	the	UN	accreditation	process	are	more	likely	to	have	a	strong	national	human	rights	institution.	A	second	significant	result	 that	 provides	 further	 evidence	 for	 socialization	 shows	 that	 higher	 regional	density	 of	 strong	 institutions	 has	 an	 impact	 on	 individual	 countries’	 institutional	strength.	In	other	words,	if	a	country	is	located	in	a	region	where	strong	institutions	are	predominant,	it	is	more	likely	to	have	a	stronger	institution.	This	effect	is	not	felt	in	 the	 case	 of	 medium-level	 strength	 institutions,	 but	 the	 impact	 on	 the	 strong	institutions	is	significant.				 The	 first	 significant	 result	 shows	 evidence	 that	 the	 accreditation	 process	leads	 to	 recognition	 as	members	 of	 the	 international	 community	 of	 NRHIs	 and	 is	expected	to	 lead	to	countries	aiming	to	strengthen	their	human	rights	 institutions.	As	 such,	 one	 can	 argue	 that	 countries	 that	 have	 undergone	 the	 UN	 accreditation	process	 are	more	 likely	 to	 seek	 to	 strengthen	 their	 institutions	 and	 be	 similar	 to	other	countries	 in	 the	NHRI	network,	as	a	 form	of	post-accreditation	cross-border	learning.	 Thus,	 they	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 have	 stronger	 institutions	 over	 time,	provided	 they	 enter	 the	 accreditation	 process	 with	 a	 less	 strong	 institution.	Additionally,	this	finding	would	also	hold	for	strong	institutions	as	that	entered	the	
		 205	
peer-review	 process,	 as	 they	 are	 also	 more	 likely	 to	 support	 and	 maintain	 their	strong	design	over-time.			 For	states	with	whose	institutions	are	considered	for	accreditation	and	also	monitored	 every	 five	 years	 as	 part	 of	 the	 re-accreditation	 process,	 the	 general	strengthening	effect	of	such	a	mechanism	 is	enhanced	by	 the	recommendations	of	the	 accreditation	 reports.	 Institutions	 of	 different	 levels	 of	 design	 can	 apply	 for	accreditation	with	the	UN	and,	depending	on	their	strength,	receive	one	of	 three	a	statuses	–	A,	B,	or	C.	Re-accreditation	every	five	years	can	recommend	a	change	in	status,	 reflecting	 a	modification	 of	 design	 since	 the	 previous	 peer-review	process.	Accredited	 NHRIs	 are	 vested	 with	 competence	 to	 perform	 advisory	 work	 for	 the	national	 governments	 with	 cooperation	 and	 maintain	 close	 ties	 with	 the	 United	Nations	 and	 organizations	 in	 its	 system	 as	 well	 as	 similar	 regional	 and	 national	institutions	 charged	 with	 the	 promotion	 and	 protection	 of	 human	 rights.	 Their	responsibility	 to	 promote	 and	 protect	 human	 rights	 can	 be	 equated	 broadly	with	activity	meant	to	ensure	the	harmonization	of	national	legislation	and	practices	with	international	 human	 rights	 instruments	 of	 which	 the	 country	 is	 a	 member.	 Once	accepted	 into	 the	 network	 of	 NHRIs,	 the	 benefits	 of	 being	 an	 A-level	 institution	could	motivate	countries	to	mobilize	resources	and	improve	the	design	of	their	own	national	institution.	The	institutions	that	are	assessed	to	be	in	full	compliance	with	the	 Paris	 Principles	 become	 voting	 members	 of	 the	 International	 Coordination	Committee	and	can	themselves	take	part	in	the	peer-review	process	of	other	states’	institutions.		
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	 	Our	 findings	 indicate	 that	 socialization	 and	 acculturation	 processes	 are	 at	work.	The	indicators	capture	both	elements	of	social	learning	and	certain	aspects	of	acculturation.	 Through	 peer-review	 processes	 and	 an	 incentive-based	 system	 of	participation	 in	 global	 networks,	 international	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 UN	 have	 a	global	effect	in	determining	countries	to	establish	stronger	institutions.	Empirically,	however,	 UN	 accreditation	 is	 neither	 a	 sufficient	 nor	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	institutional	strength.	The	assessment	and	monitoring	processes	carried	out	by	peer	countries	 and	 institutions	 as	 members	 of	 the	 NHRI	 community	 operate	 as	mechanisms	 that	 exert	 social	 influence	 with	 the	 potential	 to	 incite	 institutional	change	 through	 the	 activation	 of	 shame	 or	 by	 offering	 positive	 reinforcement	through	 ‘back-patting.’	 In	 other	 words,	 conformity	 to	 a	 certain	 global	 or	 regional	standard	of	institutional	design	can	be	an	indication	of	superficial	commitment	to	a	structure	that	is	strong	by	design	but	does	not	indicate	a	true	belief	in	the	values	it	promote.	 Countries	 can	 decide	 to	 establish	 an	 institution	 in	 order	 to	 abide	 by	appropriate	 international	 standards,	 as	 prescribed	 by	 the	 International	Coordination	 Committee	 at	 the	UN,	 but	 this	 commitment	 could	 be	 superficial	 and	would	 not	 match	 the	 human	 rights	 record	 of	 the	 country	 more	 broadly.	 An	alternative	 explanation	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 UN	 accreditation	 would	 be	 self-selection,	which	would	see	countries	with	strong	institutions	enter	the	peer-review	process	as	the	 costs	 of	 institutional	 adjustments	 they	 would	 incur	 prior	 to	 entering	 the	accreditation	process	would	be	very	low	for	them.	This	explanation,	however,	does	not	 account	 for	 the	 reality	 that	 countries	 with	 institutions	 at	 different	 levels	 of	
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design	seek	accreditation	or	 for	 the	change	 in	 institutional	 strength	 for	accredited	NHRIs	over	time.		
	
Figure	4.19.	The	distribution	of	accredited	institutions	by	strength			 	The	 second	 variable	 in	 our	 model	 that	 has	 a	 significant	 impact	 on	 the	outcome	 and	provides	 evidence	 of	 socialization	processes	 is	 the	density	 of	 strong	institutions	 in	 the	 region	 in	which	 each	 institution	 is	 located.	 This	 is	 the	 variable	that	 captures	 a	 global	 regional	 effect	 as	 relates	 to	 institutional	 strength	 and	 the	cross-border	diffusion	within	regional	country	networks.	In	other	words,	countries	that	are	in	the	proximity	of	other	countries	with	strong	institutions	are	more	likely	to	 want	 to	 emulate	 their	 example	 or	 learn	 from	 them	 how	 to	 create	 a	 strong	institution	themselves.		
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	 According	 to	 socialisation	 scholarship,	 the	 cross-border	 diffusion	 of	institutional	strength	as	a	norm	is	more	likely	to	happen	if	a	country	is	embedded	in	a	wider	 environment	 that	 accepts	 strong	 human	 rights	 institution	 as	 appropriate	regional	 human	 rights	 norms.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 normative	 and	 mimetic	processes	 are	 very	 important,	 as	 countries	 embrace	 human	 rights	 discourse	 and	create	 human	 rights	 institutions	 to	 comply	 with	 standards	 that	 can	 be	 seen	 as	constitutive	 of	 a	 regional	 community	 of	 states.	 The	 salience	 of	 the	 stronger	institutional	design	becomes	more	 influential	and	 leads	to	greater	change	as	more	countries	 affirm	 its	 appropriateness.	 Learning	 at	 the	 regional	 level	 can	 occur	through	 two	 different	 processes	 –	 policy-makers	 in	 one	 country	 can	 learn	 from	governments	in	a	neighbouring	country	as	they	become	increasingly	aware	of	other	strong	institutional	designs	in	their	proximity	and	become	more	likely	to	copy	what	other	 countries	 do	 with	 respect	 to	 institutional	 developments.	 Additionally,	 the	political	 culture	 of	 a	 region	 as	 reflected	 in	 countries’	 commitment	 to	 establishing	strong	 human	 rights	 institutions	 exerts	 a	 positive	 influence	 on	 the	 formation	 of	strong	institutional	designs.	The	more	states	in	a	region	share	the	high	standards	of	institutional	design,	the	more	they	are	seen	as	constitutive	and	appropriate	regional	standards	for	states	that	consider	themselves	part	of	this	regional	community.			 The	 two	 regions	with	 the	 highest	 density	 of	 strong	 institutions	 are	 Europe	and	the	Americas.	Although	the	region	with	the	 largest	number	of	national	human	rights	 institutions	 is	 Africa,	 the	 proportion	 of	 strong	 institutions	 is	 lower	 on	 the	African	 continent	 than	 in	 Europe	 or	 the	 Americas.	 In	 the	 past	 decades,	 national	human	 rights	 institutions	 have	 become	 increasingly	 important	 actors	 on	 the	
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European	stage,	with	their	design	and	performance	being	considered	a	measure	of	countries’	 commitment	 to	 human	 rights	 institutionalization	 and	 alignment	 with	international	 standards.	 For	 instance,	 the	 performance	 of	 national	 human	 rights	institutions	 is	 included	 in	 the	assessment	of	 the	general	performance	of	candidate	states	and	also	of	new	member	states.	The	move	toward	strengthening	the	design	of	these	institutions	is	a	dynamic	process	that	has	seen	transformations	over-time.	In	recent	 years	 alone,	 for	 example,	 countries	 such	 as	 Sweden	 and	 Norway,	 with	longstanding	 democratic	 traditions	 of	 rights	 protection	 and	 promotion,	 are	establishing	national	human	rights	institutions	that	have	strong	mandated	powers.	Both	countries	have	had	weak	institutions,	with	Sweden	having	a	system	of	multiple	institutions	promoting	and	protecting	rights	disaggregated	by	type	(e.g.	equality	and	anti-discrimination,	 women’s	 rights,	 children’s	 rights,	 etc.)	 and	 Norway	 having	 a	university-based	 human	 rights	 institute	 that	 focused	 primarily	 on	 the	 academic	study	of	human	rights.			 The	 predominant	 model	 of	 national	 human	 rights	 institution	 in	 Latin	America	 is	 the	 hybrid	 ombudsman	 model	 called	 ‘Defensoría	 del	 Pueblo,’	 usually	mandated	with	the	protection	of	citizens’	rights	when	interacting	with	government,	the	support	and	monitoring	of	the	rule	of	law	and	the	defence	of	human	rights	more	broadly.	Examples	of	a	strong	design	of	such	institutions	are	the	Defensorías	of	Peru	and	 Colombia	 –	 they	 work	 in	 collaboration	 with	 both	 national	 governments	 and	fellow	national	human	rights	 institutions	 in	 the	region	and	have	mandates	 that	go	beyond	the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights	through	complaint	handling,	investigations,	monitoring	and	advising	policy-
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multiple	development	projects	that	target	the	improvement	of	human	rights	in	less	developed	 areas	 of	 the	 two	 countries,	 thus	 targeting	 the	 citizens	 directly	 and	participating	actively	in	the	improvement	of	their	lives	and	ultimately	the	countries’	human	rights	records.			 Important	 to	 consider,	however,	 is	also	 the	 fact	 that	 regional	effects	on	 the	probability	of	having	strong	institutions	can	also	be	the	result	of	other	factors	that	manifest	themselves	in	Europe	and	Latin	America.	Institutional	strength	is	but	one	aspect	of	what	appropriate	human	rights	standards	are	 in	 these	two	regions	–	 the	two	parts	of	 the	world	have	 the	strongest	 legal	human	rights	 frameworks	and	 the	regional	 treaty	 tools	 with	 the	 strongest	 enforcement	mechanisms.	 The	 Council	 of	Europe	 has	 long	 functioned	 as	 the	 backdrop	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 a	 European	Network	 of	 National	 Human	 Rights	 Institutions	 –	 regular	 meetings	 of	 national	institutional	representatives	took	place	alongside	annual	conferences	organized	by	the	Council	 of	 Europe	 for	many	 years	 until	 2014,	when	 the	European	Network	 of	NHRIs	was	officially	founded.	The	effect	of	membership	in	the	Council	of	Europe	is	not	a	statistically	significant	factor	our	global	model.		 This	 is	 the	 first	 study	 that	 finds	 evidence	 of	 socialisation	 when	 explaining	institutional	 strength	 in	 the	 case	 of	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions.	 The	statistically	significant	indicator	that	captures	socialization	effects	at	the	global	level	is	whether	a	country	has	undergone	 the	UN	accreditation	process	by	2013.	At	 the	regional	 level,	 statistically	 significant	 indicators	 that	 capture	 socialization	 are	 the	density	of	strong	institutions	and	the	presence	of	an	early	adopter	in	a	region.	The	findings	 from	 this	 quantitative	 analysis	 make	 an	 original	 contribution	 to	 the	
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literature	 that	 finds	 evidence	 of	 socialization	 and	 acculturation	 process	 in	 the	countries’	decisions	of	adopting	national	human	rights	 institutions.	When	 focusing	on	the	sample	of	countries	that	have	accreditation,	studies	have	found	that	the	Paris	Principles	 can	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 explaining	 the	 spike	 in	 number	 of	 NHRI	establishment	in	the	early	1990s.	Moreover,	the	existence	of	a	world	populated	by	a	lot	of	 institutional	networks	makes	 it	more	 likely	 for	countries	to	establish	human	rights	 commissions,	 although	 not	 equally	 likely	 to	 create	 classical	 ombudsmen.		Qualitative	studies	also	support	these	findings	about	institutional	creation	and	NHRI	diffusion	across	borders	and	speak	also	of	 the	mobilization	of	global	shame	 in	 the	case	 of	 developing	 countries	 that	 establish	 NHRIs	 (D.	 Kim	 2013b)	 and	 of	acculturation	 processes	 in	 the	 particular	 case	 of	 EU	 candidate	 countries	 that	 are	subjected	to	conditionality	prior	to	accession.			
4.9.3.	Incentive-setting		An	 international	 level	 mechanism,	 incentive-setting	 refers	 to	 different	 forms	 of	pressure	 that	 international	 organizations	 and	 powerful	 states	 apply	 on	 other	countries	to	establish	or	strengthen	the	capacity	of	 institutions	and	support	policy	change.	In	the	case	of	human	rights,	these	incentives	are	generally	positive	in	nature	and	resemble	more	a	system	of	rewards.	The	model	proposed	in	this	thesis	tests	for	the	 impact	 of	 three	 indicators	 capturing	 incentives	 set	 by	 three	 different	 types	 of	actors.	The	literature	on	cross-border	diffusion	proposes	that	 individual	states	can	create	 incentives	 for	other	 states	 to	have	better	overall	human	rights	 records	and	
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also	stronger	human	rights	institutions	through	provisions	in	bilateral	Preferential	Trade	 Agreements.	 Similarly,	 ODA	 disbursed	 by	 individual	 states	 or	 Washington	Consensus	Institutions	has	been	hypothesised	to	have	a	positive	effect	on	countries’	human	rights	records	or	governments’	decision	to	enter	international	human	rights	treaties,	 although	 evidence	 of	 such	 effects	 has	 been	 either	 mixed	 or	 not	 lending	them	 support	 (Simmons	 2002;	 Wotipka	 and	 Tsutsui	 2008).	 A	 third	 type	 of	incentive-setting	across	borders	occurs	at	 the	regional	 level	and	 is	coordinated	by	the	European	Union	as	part	of	its	membership	conditionality	imposed	on	candidate	states	since	the	2004	wave	of	accession.			 The	 analysis	 in	 this	 thesis	 finds	 also	 evidence	 for	 the	 effect	 of	 incentive-setting	 on	 institutional	 design	 in	 the	 case	 of	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions.	 A	one-unit	 change	 in	 the	 average	 amount	 of	 ODA	 the	 United	 States	 disbursed	 to	countries	 around	 the	 world	 from	 1990-2013	 has	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 the	probability	of	having	stronger	institutional	design.	This	finding	would	offer	support	for	 the	 liberal	 hypothesis	 of	 the	 effect	 of	 financial	 incentives	 on	 institutional	strength.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 consider,	 however,	 the	 argument	 that	 the	 US	 would	perhaps	offer	more	funds	in	the	form	of	ODA	to	countries	that	already	have	strong	national	human	rights	institutions.	Thus,	the	causal	pathway	proposed	in	the	model	would	 be	 reversed	 and	 ODA	 would	 not	 motivate	 states	 to	 strengthen	 weaker	institutions.	 In	 this	 case,	 ODA	 would	 become	 a	 reward	 for	 well-performing	institutions	 and	 not	 an	 incentive	 for	 the	 strengthening	 of	 institutional	 design	 in	countries	with	weaker	 institutions.	 In	 the	multinomial	 logit	 model,	 which	 relaxes	the	 assumption	 or	 ordering	 of	 the	 three	 categories	 of	 institutional	 strength,	 this	
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effect	 is	 no	 longer	 statistically	 significant.	 The	 causal	 explanation	 for	 their	differential	 effects	 of	 ODA	 on	 institutional	 design	 at	 different	 levels	 strength	 can	only	be	illuminated	further	by	case-based	qualitative	work.		 More	 specifically,	 the	 results	 of	 the	 above	 analysis	 offer	 statistically	significant	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 the	 hypothesis	 that	 ODA-based	 democracy	promotion	efforts	 led	by	the	US.	Although	scholarship	regarding	domestic	support	for	liberal	internationalism	has	waned	in	Washington	DC	in	the	past	decade	(Zakaria	1997;	Kupchan	2002;	Kupchan	and	Trubowitz	2007)	due	also	to	a	perceived	lack	of	effectiveness,	development	efforts	have	remained	a	priority	among	policymakers	as	illustrated	by	the	amount	of	overall	development	assistance	funds	disbursed	by	the	US	over	the	last	decade.	From	the	1990	until	2013,	the	amount	of	global	ODA	nearly	quadrupled,	peaking	in	2005	and	recovering	after	a	slow	decline,	returning	to	high	levels	 in	 2011.	Moreover,	 since	 the	1970s	 support	 for	 each	 country	 to	 establish	 a	functional	 and	 strong	 human	 rights	 institution	 has	 become	 a	 central	recommendation	 in	multilateral	 democracy	 promotion,	 such	 as	 that	 of	 the	United	Nations	(UNHCHR).		This	is	also	monitored	in	country	human	rights	reports	carried	out	 by	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 State	 and	 international	 nongovernmental	organizations,	 such	 as	 Amnesty	 International	 and	 Human	 Rights	 Watch.	 To	 the	extent	 that	 capacity	 building	 improves	 over-time	 as	 a	 result	 of	 continued	development	 efforts,	 higher	 amounts	 of	 development	 funds	 may	 have	 an	 even	stronger	impact	on	democratic	institutions	by	virtue	of	both	the	increased	funds	and	of	the	improved	capacity	on	the	ground.			
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Figure	4.20.	Total	of	ODA	by	US	1990-2013	
	 	
Figure	4.21.	Total	of	ODA	by	EU	member	states	1990-2013			 Another	 form	 of	 incentive-setting	 is	 manifest	 through	 human	 rights	conditionality	 tied	 to	 the	 signing	of	preferential	 trade	agreements	between	 states.	Prior	 research	 has	 found	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 the	 liberal	 agenda	 that	 links	 the	
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national	 level	 effectiveness	 of	 singing	 international	 agreements	 through	 entering	Preferential	 Trade	 Agreements	 with	 strong	 human	 rights	 conditionality	 (Hafner-Burton	2009).	We	find	no	evidence	in	favour	of	a	causal	effect	that	incentive-setting	through	 bilateral	 preferential	 trade	 agreements	 would	 have	 on	 institutional	strength.	 In	 our	 full	model	whether	 a	 country	 is	 a	 signatory	of	 a	PTA	with	 strong	human	rights	standards	has	a	positive	relationship	with	institutional	design,	but	the	results	 are	 not	 statistically	 significant.	 In	 the	 model	 which	 is	 restricted	 to	 the	variables	 that	are	not	significant	 in	 the	 full	model,	excluding	US-disbursed	aid,	 the	effect	of	whether	a	country	has	entered	a	preferential	trade	agreement	with	strong	human	 rights	 standards	 is	 statistically	 significant.	 This	 restricted	model	 provides	evidence	of	significant	impact	on	institutional	design	of	variables	that	are	otherwise	not	statistically	significant	in	the	full	model,	such	as	ODA	from	the	European	Union	and	 the	 ratification	 of	 international	 human	 rights	 treaties	 that	 have	 strong	enforcement	mechanisms	such	as	 the	Optional	Protocol	of	 the	Convention	Against	Torture	and	the	International	Criminal	Court.	While	other	variables	in	the	full	model	have	offered	support	to	mechanisms	that	could	also	account	for	such	identity-based	and	 Europe-led	 explanations	 of	 institutional	 design,	 these	 the	 effects	 in	 the	restricted	model	do	not	fully	explain	global	phenomena.	Qualitative	studies	may	be	better	suited	to	tease	out	causal	explanations	of	such	impact	that	are	not	manifest	at	the	global	level	as	measured	in	the	full	model.		 When	compared	to	the	ODA	disbursed	by	the	European	Union,	 the	effect	of	the	US	and	EU	contributions	on	institutional	design	is	not	a	direct	reflection	of	the	general	amount	of	development	assistance	for	the	period	1990-2013.	The	EU	states	
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in	total	allocated	more	development	funds	than	the	US	in	the	span	of	the	23	years,	with	the	former	disbursing	$26693.50	million	and	the	latter	$18002.68	million	to	a	slightly	higher	number	of	countries	–	147	received	funds	from	the	EU,	and	138	from	the	 US.	 A	 significant	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 total	 average	 amounts	 is	 in	 the	maximum	sum	allocated	in	the	span	of	23	years	per	country	–	during	the	indicated	period	of	time,	the	EU	and	the	US	have	had	the	same	country	as	the	main	beneficiary	for	their	funds,	Iraq.	The	country	has	received	the	most	funds	overall	in	the	past	23	years,	Iraq,	namely	an	average	of	$2003.86	million	by	the	US	disbursed	to	Iraq	and	$858.71	million	by	EU	states.		
									Figure	4.22.	Predicted	probabilities:	ODA	from	the	EU			
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								Figure	4.23.	Cumulative	probabilities:	ODA	from	the	EU			 The	 global	 impact	 of	 Overseas	 Development	 Assistance	 disbursed	 by	 the	European	 Union	 is	 not	 a	 statistically	 significant	 determinant	 in	 this	 model	 of	institutional	design,	but	 the	European	Union’s	system	of	 regional	 incentives	at	 the	appears	 significant	 in	 the	 model	 that	 explains	 institutional	 design	 globally.	 The	analysis	provides	 evidence	of	 incentive-setting	being	at	work	at	 the	 regional	 level	through	 a	 measure	 of	 conditionality	 specific	 to	 the	 European	 Union	 as	 part	 of	membership	negotiation	processes	since	the	2004	wave	of	accession.	Conditionality	is	 a	 bargaining	 strategy	 through	 which	 the	 EU	 has	 sought	 to	 offer	 rewards	 to	reinforce	rule	transfer	by	transitional	post-communist	states	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	 (Schimmelfennig	 and	 Sedelmeier	 2004;	 Kelley	 2004;	 Grabbe	 2006;	Sedelmeier	 2011).	 This	 form	 of	 external	 governance	 of	 post-communist	 states	begins	even	prior	to	the	accession	negotiations	and	ends	only	once	the	accession	is	
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complete.	 Schimmelfennig	 and	 Sedelmeier	 speak	 of	 two	 main	 contexts	 of	 EU	external	 governance	 as	 manifested	 in	 Central	 and	 East	 European	 countries:	 first,	democratic	conditionality	begins	early	in	the	post-communist	transition	process	and	is	 linked	 to	 the	 transfer	 of	 fundamental	 political	 principles	 of	 the	 EU,	 such	 as	 the	norms	of	 human	 rights	 and	democracy	 (Schimmelfennig	 and	 Sedelmeier	2004).	 It	takes	the	form	of	institutional	ties,	such	as	association,	and	the	actual	beginning	of	the	 accession	 process.	 Extensive	 pre-accession	 alignment	 of	 rights-centred	 rule	transfer	 is	 central	 to	 the	 EU	 process	 of	 external	 governance	 in	 preparation	 for	membership	 negotiations	 and	 subsequent	 integration	 (Sedelmeier	 2011).	 Once	accession	negotiations	begin,	democratic	conditionality	is	not	longer	at	centre	stage,	and	acquis	 conditionality	 is	 the	new	conditionality	 context	 that	 takes	prominence.	This	form	of	conditionality	places	membership	as	the	ultimate	key	incentive	for	rule	transfer	 and,	 in	 order	 to	 be	 implemented	 successfully,	 requires	 also	 a	 favourable	domestic	 environment	 with	 few	 veto	 players	 and	 low	 costs	 associated	 with	 rule	adoption	(Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier	2004).			 EU	 integrated	 human	 rights	 in	 the	 requirements	 for	 integration	 of	 Central	and	East	European	states	after	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	with	the	1993	‘Copenhagen	Criteria’.	 In	 preparation	 for	 the	 formal	 accession	 negotiations,	 post-communist	transitional	states	had	 to	establish	stable	 institutions	safeguarding	democracy,	 the	rule	 of	 law,	 human	 rights	 and	 the	 protection	 of	minority	 (de	Búrca	 2003;	 Grabbe	2006;	 Schimmelfennig	 and	 Sedelmeier	 2004;	 Conant	 2014).	 EU	 Conant	 finds	 that	post-communist	democracies	have	made	progress	 in	 respecting	human	rights,	but	these	 human	 rights	 commitments	 remain	 shallow	 and	 transitions	 to	 rights-
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respecting	 democracies	 are	 reversible	 (2014).	 Institutional	 change	 in	 the	 case	 of	gender	 equality	 institutions	 has	 been	 linked	 to	 a	 combination	 of	 government	partisan	preferences	and	veto	players	account	for	a	lock-in	effect	prior	to	accession,	which	 can	 contribute	 to	 their	 persistence	 after	 the	 EU’s	 sanctioning	 power	weakens(Sedelmeier	 2009).	 In	 the	 particular	 case	 of	 national	 human	 rights	institutions,	Pegram	identifies	EU	conditionality	as	a	mechanism	that	can	explain	the	adoption	of	NHRIs	in	Eastern	and	Central	European	countries	(2010).			
Table	4.7.	Candidate	and	new	member	states,		
year	of	institutional	establishment	and	strength	level		
	
Country	 Year	 Strength	Albania	 1999	 strong	Bulgaria	 2004	 medium	Croatia	 1991	 strong	Cyprus	 1991	 strong	Czech	Republic	 1991	 strong	Estonia	 1938	 strong	Hungary	 1989	 strong	Latvia	 1995	 strong	Lithuania	 1994	 strong	Macedonia	 1991	 medium	Malta	 2003	 medium	Montenegro	 2003	 strong	Poland	 1987	 strong	Romania	 1991	 medium	Serbia	 2005	 strong	Slovakia	 1993	 medium	Slovenia	 1991	 medium	Turkey	 2012	 weak		
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	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 strength	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions,	 the	 findings	from	the	analysis	point	to	EU	conditionality	as	a	factor	with	a	statistically	significant	effect	on	governments’	choice	of	design	strength.	In	both	logit	models,	the	variable	that	measures	whether	a	 country	 is	an	EU	member	since	2004	and	 thus	has	been	objected	 to	 accession	 conditionality	 is	 statistically	 significant.	 In	 the	 multinomial	
logit	model,	the	effect	is	only	statistically	significant	in	the	case	of	a	change	from	a	weak	 design	 or	 no	 institution	 at	 all	 as	 a	 baseline	 category	 to	 a	 strong	 institution.	Similar	 to	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 other	 indicator	 measuring	 incentive-setting	 as	 a	mechanism,	 namely	 overseas	 development	 assistance	 disbursed	 by	 the	 US,	 the	results	 indicate	 that	 the	 EU	 conditionality	may	 impact	 on	 a	 country’s	 decision	 to	adopt	 a	 strong	 institution	 but	 does	 not	 appear	 equally	 able	 to	 account	 for	improvement	 of	 institutional	 strength	 over-time	 for	 countries	 that	 have	 weak	 or	medium	 level	 institutions.	 The	 findings	 of	 the	 analysis	 are	 in	 line	 with	 the	conclusions	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 European	 integration	 about	 the	 sustainability	 of	compliance	 with	 EU	 conditionality	 post-accession.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 a	 significant	coefficient	that	measures	the	effect	of	EU	conditionality	 indicates	a	clear	 impact	of	EU	 driven	 incentive-setting	 on	 institutional	 design,	 the	 findings	 do	 not	 appear	 as	conclusive	for	over-time	capacity	building	in	countries	where	institutions	are	not	as	strong.			 The	 results	 of	 the	 statistical	model	 do	 not	 lend	 support	 for	 the	 hypothesis	that	 links	 countries’	 commitments	 to	 preferential	 trade	 agreements	 with	 strong	human	rights	standards	 to	 institutional	design.	On	 the	basis	of	 the	global	analysis,	we	 can	 conclude	 that	 incentive-based	 systems	at	 the	 international	 level	 appear	 to	
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have	stronger	effects	when	enforced	at	the	regional	level,	as	evidenced	by	the	EU,	or	coordinated	by	nation	states	that	offer	financial	incentives	for	development	as	part	of	 their	 foreign	 policy,	 as	 illustrated	 by	 the	 US	 and	 its	 overseas	 development	assistance	programmes.		
	
4.9.4.	Cost	and	benefit	calculations		A	 fourth	 hypothesis	 seeks	 to	 explain	 the	 effects	 of	 rational	 domestic	 factors	 on	institutional	 design.	 Viewed	 through	 the	 theoretical	 lens	 of	 republican	 liberalism,	countries’	 decisions	 to	 establish	 and	 maintain	 strong	 national	 human	 rights	institutions	are	often	strongly	determined	by	 the	actions	of	a	number	of	domestic	political	 actors.	The	main	 rationale	 for	 supporting	a	 strong	 institution	 is	domestic	self-interest	 –	 a	 government	 decides	 to	 establish	 a	 strong	 institution	 if	 the	 costs	incurred	by	such	a	decision	are	low	and	the	benefits	are	high.	A	rational	decision	to	delegate	 to	 an	 independent	body	 such	 as	 a	 human	 rights	 institution	 charged	with	the	 promotion	 and	protection	 of	 human	 rights	 requires	 that	 a	 sitting	 government	weigh	 two	 crosscutting	 considerations,	 namely	 restricting	 government	 discretion	and	 reducing	 domestic	 political	 uncertainty	 (Moravcsik	 2000).	 These	 calculations	provide	 an	 explanation	 of	 state	 behaviour	 for	 governments	 in	 transitional	democracies.	 Their	 decisions	 to	 establish	 strong	 institutions	 that	 promote	 and	protect	 human	 rights	 could	 be	 aimed	 at	 securing	 a	 certain	 state	 of	 institutional	development	 and	 safeguarding	 democracy	 in	 their	 country	 against	 the	 uncertain	actions	of	future	governments.	
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	 In	 our	 analysis,	 we	 find	 no	 statistically	 significant	 evidence	 that	 cost	 and	benefit	 calculations	account	 for	 the	establishment	of	 strong	national	human	rights	institutions.	Whether	 a	 country	 transitioned	 to	 democracy	 in	 the	 five	 years	 after	1989	does	not	have	a	statistically	significant	effect	on	institutional	strength.	In	fact,	the	statistical	effect	is	negative	in	both	the	ordinal	model	and	the	multinomial	model	with	 the	 ‘weak’	 level	 of	 design	 as	 its	 baseline	 level	 –	 in	 other	 words,	 whether	 a	country	 is	 a	 transitional	 democracy	will	make	 it	 less	 likely	 for	 it	 to	 have	 a	 strong	national	human	rights	institution.	It	is	more	likely,	then,	for	these	countries	to	have	weaker	 designs.	 This	 conclusion	 is	 further	 supported	 by	 the	 result	 of	 the	multinomial	model	with	the	baseline	level	of	analysis	at	‘medium’.	More	specifically,	countries	 that	 are	 new	 democracies	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 have	 weak	 rather	 than	medium	level	institutions.	At	the	global	level,	the	higher	political	and	financial	costs	of	 establishing	 strong	 human	 rights	 bodies	may	 be	motivating	 the	 lower	 levels	 of	institutional	design.	This	finding	is	in	agreement	with	the	findings	of	Beth	Simmons,	where	she	sought	to	test	whether	Moravcsik’s	theory	would	apply	to	states	outside	of	Western	Europe	in	the	case	of	human	rights	treaty	ratification	(Simmons	2002).	She	 finds	 that	neither	normative	 explanations	nor	democratic	 lock-in	 theory	offer	statistically	 significant	predictors	of	 ratification	of	 the	 core	United	Nations	human	rights	treaties.	Similarly,	a	country’s	transitional	democratic	state	does	not	provide	strong	 evidence	 that	 cost	 and	 benefit	 calculations	 can	 account	 for	 decisions	 to	support	strong	designs	of	national	human	rights	institutions.		
4.10.	Conclusion	
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The	 analysis	 finds	 evidence	 for	 three	 mechanisms	 that	 can	 help	 us	 understand	countries’	decisions	to	have	strong	national	human	rights	institutions.	Socialization	processes	 tell	 a	 story	 of	 norm	 and	 policy	 learning	 taking	 place	 across	 borders.	Sharing	knowledge	leads	to	countries	with	less	strong	institutions	or	no	institution	at	 all	 learning	 from	 stronger	 peer	 institutions	 situated	 in	 the	 same	 region,	 thus	increasing	 the	 chance	of	 having	 a	 higher	number	 of	 stronger	 institutions	 globally.	Membership	in	global	peer	review-based	networks	such	as	the	group	of	accredited	NHRIs	 can	 also	 lead	 to	 the	 activation	 of	 shame	 linked	 to	 a	 type	 of	 appropriate	behavior	set	according	to	standards	of	members	within	the	network.	The	adoption	of	a	strong	institution	or	the	efforts	to	build	the	capacity	of	a	national	human	rights	institution	 that	 was	 weaker	 are	 linked	 to	 undergoing	 the	 UN-coordinated	 peer	review	process.			 Governments	 can	 also	 decide	 to	 establish	 strong	 institutions	 as	 a	 result	 of	being	offered	 financial	 incentives.	Development	assistance	programs	 that	 focus	on	the	 promotion	 of	 liberal	 democracy	 place	 great	 importance	 on	 institutions	 and	 in	particular	on	their	capacity	to	work	independently	from	government	in	promoting	and	protecting	human	rights.	National	human	rights	 institutions	are	 the	only	such	domestic	 bodies	 that,	 when	 fully	 functional,	 are	 charged	 with	 operating	autonomously	 from	 government	 intervention	 that	 could	 keep	 them	 from	 carrying	out	 their	mandate.	 They	 play	 an	 important	 role	 domestically	 and	 have	 also	 been	central	to	development	efforts	led	by	Washington	and	Brussels	in	the	past	decades.	At	the	global	level,	the	impact	of	ODA	disbursed	by	the	US	on	institutional	strength	is	greater	than	the	one	of	the	EU,	although	both	international	actors’	funding	efforts	
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have	 a	 generally	 positive	 impact	 on	 institutional	 strength.	 A	 special	 and	 Europe	specific	 regional	 effect	 emerges	 from	 the	 data	 and	 the	 analysis	 as	 well	 –	 the	European	 Union	 set	 up	 a	 reward-based	 incentive	 system	 of	 conditionality	 for	candidate	 and	 new	 member	 states	 since	 before	 the	 2004	 wave	 of	 accession.	Requirements	 for	 accession	 appear	 to	 have	 a	 statistically	 significant	 effect	 on	institutional	 strength	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 19	 states	 located	 in	 Eastern	 and	 Central	Europe.				 Cross-border	 factors	tell	only	part	of	 the	story	of	global	 institutional	design	in	the	case	of	national	human	rights	institutions.	One	domestic	factor	is	particularly	important,	 namely	 a	 country’s	 identity	 as	 a	 supporter	 of	 democratic	 values	 and	liberal	 institutionalism,	 which	 include	 the	 promotion	 and	 protection	 of	 citizens’	rights.	Early	adopting	countries	provide	such	an	example,	of	states	that	established	independent	 bodies	 in	 charge	 of	 defending	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 monitoring	 the	enforcement	of	rights	at	the	national	level	before	the	creation	of	the	Paris	Principles	as	an	international	regulatory	framework	or	UN-led	peer	review	system	that	 leads	to	NHRI	accreditation.	In	line	with	their	own	liberal	democratic	values,	governments	that	 created	 such	 bodies	 early	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 have	 strong	 institutions	 today.	Early	 adopting	 countries	 can	 also	 be	 role	 models	 for	 other	 institutions	 in	 their	region,	 by	 providing	 an	 example	 of	 a	 successful	 institution	 to	 be	 copied	 by	neighbouring	 countries.	 Cross-border	 learning	 in	 conditions	 of	 geographic	proximity	can	lead	to	rule	transfer	and	institutional	isomorphism.		 The	results	of	global	and	regional	determinants	of	institutional	design	bring	to	 light	 important	 causal	 stories	 about	 cross-border	 institutional	 change	 and	
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regionally	 clustered	 tendencies	 toward	 institutional	 isomorphism.	 Successful	 rule	and	 institutional	 transfer	 is	 highly	 context-dependent,	 with	 each	 country	representing	a	different	environment	for	the	more	or	less	effective	and	sustainable	compliance	with	 conditionality.	 Case	 study	work,	whether	 comparative	 or	within-case,	 is	best	suited	to	 investigate	the	causal	pathways	at	work	in	each	context	and	explore	country	specific	responses	to	EU-driven	cross-border	governance.																
4.11.	Annex	
A.	Additional	post-estimation	tests	for	the	ordinal	logit	model	
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In	sample	predicted	probabilities	for	ordinal	logit	model	
	
Figure	4.24.	Average	predicted	probabilities	for	the	three	outcome	categories		As	a	form	of	model	assessment,	computing	the	in-sample	predictions	is	a	tool	to	get	a	 general	 sense	 of	 the	model	 and	whether	 there	 are	problems	with	 the	data.	 	We	specify	 three	different	 variables	 for	 each	outcome	 category	 and	plot	 the	 values	 of	their	 predicted	 probabilities.	 The	 range	 of	 predicted	 probabilities	 plotted	 for	 our	model	appear	larger	for	the	extreme	categories	and	smaller	for	the	middle	category,	which	 is	common	for	ordinal	regression	models.	This	plot	offers	a	general	view	of	distribution	 of	 predicted	 probabilities	 but	 does	 not	 allow	 for	 a	 substantive	interpretation	of	results,	which	can	be	achieved	by	calculating	marginal	effects.			
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B.	Test	 of	parallel	 regression	assumption	 (with	values	 for	 each	 independent	
variable)	
Table	4.8.	Brant	test	results	
	 chi2	 p>chi2	 df	All	 16.49	 0.086	 10	NewDem_89/93	 0.06	 0.811	 1	ICCCATop	 0.30	 0.584	 1	PTAhard	 2.63	 0.105	 1	EUem2004	 0.09	 0.767	 1	ODAEU	 0.00	 0.962	 1	ODAUS	 2.15	 0.142	 1	Adopt	 1.17	 0.280	 1	Adens	 2.00	 0.157	 1	UNAccr	 0.01	 0.906	 1	logGDPcap	 0.00	 0.967	 1		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
B.	Additional	post-estimation	tests	for	the	multinomial	logit	model	In	sample	predicted	probabilities	for	multinomial	logit	model	
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Figure	4.25.	Predicted	probabilities	for	each	outcome	category		Similar	to	the	steps	taken	for	measuring	model	fit	for	the	ordinal	logit	model	above,	we	specify	three	different	variables	for	each	outcome	category	and	plot	the	values	of	their	 predicted	 probabilities.	 The	 range	 of	 predicted	 probabilities	 plotted	 for	 our	model	 appear	 to	 be	 distributed	 evenly	 across	 the	 three	 categories,	 with	 slightly	larger	values	 for	 the	weak	and	 strong	 categories.	A	plot	of	predicted	probabilities	offers	 a	 general	 view	 of	 the	 model	 but	 does	 not	 allow	 for	 a	 substantive	interpretation	of	 results,	which	can	be	achieved	by	calculating	marginal	effects	on	outcome	probability.		
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C.	 An	 alternative	 test	 for	 the	 hypotheses	 that	 the	 effects	 of	 all	 independent	
variables	in	the	models	are	equal	to	0	is	the	Wald	test:		
Table	 4.9.	 Likelihood	 ratio	 test	 on	 all	 independent	 variables	 in	multinomial	
model	
	 chi2	 p>chi2	 df	NewDem_89/93	 0.82	 0.663	 2	ICCCATop	 1.23	 0.541	 2	PTAhard	 2.55	 0.280	 2	EUmem2004	 8.17	 0.071	 2	ODAEU	 0.11	 0.948	 2	ODAUS	 9.69	 0.008	 2	Adopt	 2.80	 0.246	 2	Adens	 3.93	 0.140	 2	UNAccr	 51.287	 0.000	 2	logGDPcap	 0.03	 0.984	 2									
Table	4.10.	Wald	test	results	
	 chi2	 p>chi2	 df	
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NewDem_89/93	 0.81	 0.666	 2	ICCCATop	 1.221	 0.543	 2	PTAhard	 2.52	 0.284	 2	EUmem2004	 6.59	 0.038	 2	ODAEU	 0.11	 0.948	 2	ODAUS	 2.66	 0.264	 2	Adopt	 2.65	 0.266	 2	Adens	 3.79	 0.150	 2	UNAccr	 36.64	 0.000	 2	logGDPcap	 0.03	 0.984	 2	
	
D.	The	average	discrete	change	 in	odds	 for	each	 increase	 in	one	of	SD	of	 the	
explanatory	variables	
	
Figure	4.26.	Logit	Coefficient	Scale	Relative	to	Category	1	
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In	 order	 to	 see	 patterns	 in	 coefficients	 more	 easily	 across	 the	 three	 outcome	categories,	we	fit	a	plot	of	odds	ratios.	Such	graphs	provide	a	quick	way	to	assess	all	the	parameters	in	the	model	and	to	get	a	general	sense	of	what	is	going	on	to	help	plan	 further	analyses.	Such	 insights	can	 inform	more	detailed	analyses	 focused	on	only	 some	 of	 the	 variables,	 using	 other	 methods	 of	 interpretation.	 We	 fit	 two	additional	 graphs	 that	 contain	 information	 about	 odd	 ratios	 and	 different	 in	 two	main	aspects	–	the	former	plots	only	the	magnitude	of	the	coefficient	in	the	distance	between	 individual	 pairs	 and	 its	 statistical	 significance	 through	 connecting	 lines,	and	the	second	one	includes	also	information	about	the	marginal	effects.	While	the	factor	 change	 in	 the	 odds	 is	 constant	 across	 levels	 of	 all	 variables,	 the	 marginal	effect	gets	larger	or	smaller	at	different	values	of	the	variables,	so	the	second	graph	marks	 visually	 this	 change	 in	 probability	 by	 making	 the	 area	 of	 a	 square	 drawn	around	 a	 letter	 proportional	 to	 the	 discrete	 change	 in	 the	 probability.	 Sign	 is	indicated	by	underlining	the	letter	if	the	marginal	effect	is	negative.										
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E.	Robustness	check	for	the	measure	of	democracy/autocracy,	making	use	of	
Polity	IV	data	to	replace	the	Freedom	House	data	in	the	full	model	reported	in	
the	analysis.			Due	 to	 the	smaller	number	of	 countries	 for	which	Polity	 IV	data	are	available,	 the	models	 generated	 as	 robustness	 checks	 include	 a	 smaller	number	of	 observations	(159)	 instead	 of	 187	 included	 in	 the	 analysis	 including	 Freedom	House	 data.	 The	first	 robustness	check	 includes	 the	 indicator	Polity	2	as	presented	 in	 the	Polity	 IV	dataset.	 The	 second	 the	 robustness	 check	 includes	 a	 variable	 of	 New	 Democracy	developed	by	Grewal	 and	Voeten	 (2015)	on	 the	basis	 of	 the	Polity	 IV	dataset	 and	building	 on	 the	 measurement	 scale	 proposed	 by	 Moravcsik	 (cited	 in	 Grewal	 and		Voeten,	2015).	The	two	authors	define	stable	democracies	all	countries	that	have	a	Polity	 score	of	6	or	higher	 for	over	30	years.	New	democracies	 are	 countries	 that	have	a	Polity	score	of	6	or	higher	but	have	not	reached	the	score	of	10	in	the	past	thirty	years.	Non-democracies	are	countries	that	have	a	Polity	score	of	less	than	6	in	2013	(Grewal	and	Voeten,	2015).			 The	 results	 of	 both	 robustness	 checks	 confirm	 the	 finding	 of	 the	 analysis	using	Freedom	House	data.	Higher	levels	of	democratisation	on	the	Polity	scale	are	not	 correlated	 with	 stronger	 institutions.	 The	 analysis	 of	 the	 multinomial	 logit	model	 including	 the	 second	measure	 of	 democracy	 for	 newly	democratised	 states	broadly	confirms	the	same	finding.	The	one	finding	that	indicates	a	significant	effect	is	for	the	change	from	a	weak	institution	to	a	medium-strength	institution,	but	this	change	is	only	significant	at	the	p<0.10	level.		
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Table	4.11.	Ologit	(full)	model	including	Polity	IV	data		
Strength	 Coef.	 St.	err.	 p	value	Polity	 0.0535	 0.0349	 0.126	ICCCATop	 0.1386	 0.4258	 0.745	PTAhard	 -0.4633	 0.4410	 0.293	EUmem2004	 1.2354*	 0.6904	 0.074	ODAEU	 -0.0002	 0.0013	 0.872	ODAUS	 0.0016**	 0.0008	 0.046	Adopt	 0.8566	 0.5565	 0.124	Adens	 3.3477**	 2.2642	 0.018	UNAccr	 2.6827***	 0.4262	 0.000	logGDPcap	 -	0.0456	 0.1329	 0.732	/cut	1	/cut	2	 2.0580	4.5452	 	 	Prob	>	chi2	=	0.0000,	N	=	159		***	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.01	level	**	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.05	level	*	indicates	values	significant	at	the	p<0.10	level				
Table	4.12.	Multinomial	model	including	Polity	IV	data	
	
Strength	 Coef.	 St.	err.	 p	value		1	 base		 	 	2	Polity	2	 	-	0.0065	 	0.0513	 	0.898	ICCCATop	 0.0912	 0.6557	 0.889	PTAhard	 1.2290*	 0.7179	 0.087	EUmem2004	 1.4619	 1.2212	 0.231	ODAEU	 -0.0012	 0.0026	 0.646	ODAUS	 0.0168*	 0.0096	 0.081	Adopt	 -0.9987	 0.9883	 0.312	Adens	 3.9783	 3.5102	 0.257	UNAccr	 2.3652***	 0.7028	 0.001	logGDPcap	 -3.9531	 2.5826	 0.126	
		 234	
3	Polity	2	 	-	0.0541	 	0.0605	 	0.371	ICCCATop	 0.3763	 0.7398	 0.611	PTAhard	 0.0109	 0.7852	 0.989	EUmem2004	 2.3920**	 1.2464	 0.055	ODAEU	 -0.0006	 0.0028	 0.820	ODAUS	 0.0164*	 0.0096	 0.089	Adopt	 -0.1319	 0.9744	 0.892	Adens	 6.0097	 3.8916	 0.123	UNAccr	 4.1402***	 0.7630	 0.000	logGDPcap	 0.1693	 0.2422	 0.018	Prob	>	chi2	=	0.0000,	N	=	159		***	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.01	level	**	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.05	level	*	indicates	values	significant	at	the	p<0.10	level		
	
Table	4.13.	Ologit	model	including	categorical	specification	of	Polity	IV	data	
	
Strength	 Coef.	 St.	err.	 p	value	PolityCat	 0.4722	 0.2830	 0.095	ICCCATop	 0.2042	 0.4117	 0.620	PTAhard	 -0.5377	 0.4456	 0.228	EUmem2004	 1.4637**	 0.6792	 0.031	ODAEU	 5.71e-06	 0.0014	 0.997	ODAUS	 0.0016**	 0.0008	 0.046	Adopt	 0.8977	 0.5561	 0.106	Adens	 5.4690**	 2.2705	 0.016	UNAccr	 2.6709***	 0.4261	 0.000	logGDPcap	 -	0.1182	 0.1455	 0.417	/cut	1	/cut	2	 1.6853	4.1715	 	 	Prob	>	chi2	=	0.0000,	N	=	159		***	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.01	level	**	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.05	level	*	indicates	values	significant	at	the	p<0.10	level				
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Approximate	likelihood-ratio	test	of	proportionality	of	odds:		Chi2(20)	=26.80	Prob	>	chi2	=	0.0028	
	
	
Table	4.14.	Multinomial	model	including	categorical	specification	of	Polity	IV	
data	(Grewal	and	Voeten,	2015)	
	
Strength	 Coef.	 St.	err.	 p	value		1	 base		 	 	2	PolityCat	 	-	0.5667	 	0.4507	 	0.209	ICCCATop	 0.3026	 0.6251	 0.628	PTAhard	 1.2953*	 0.7204	 0.072	EUmem2004	 1.4582	 1.2105	 0.228	ODAEU	 -0.0016	 0.0026	 0.555	ODAUS	 0.0181*	 0.0102	 0.077	Adopt	 -0.9293	 0.9801	 0.343	Adens	 4.7450	 3.4955	 0.175	UNAccr	 2.4940***	 0.7261	 0.001	logGDPcap	 0.1987	 0.2380	 0.404	3	PolityCat	 	-0.2534	 	0.4872	 	0.603	ICCCATop	 0.5611	 0.7066	 0.427	PTAhard	 -0.0680	 0.8060	 0.933	EUmem2004	 2.7094**	 1.2316	 0.028	ODAEU	 -0.0006	 0.0028	 0.833	ODAUS	 0.0176*	 0.0102	 0.085	Adopt	 -0.1311	 0.9721	 0.893	Adens	 6.6040*	 3.9234	 0.092	UNAccr	 4.2729***	 0.7862	 0.000	logGDPcap	 0.1471	 0.2674	 0.582	Prob	>	chi2	=	0.0000,	N	=	159		***	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.01	level	**	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.05	level	*	indicates	values	significant	at	the	p<0.10	level			
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Annex	F.	Alternative	specifications	of	the	dependent	variable,	NHRI	strength	Please	 note	 that	 these	 results	 present	 different	 specifications	 of	 the	 dependent	variable	 simply	 as	 alternatives,	 but	 ought	 not	 to	 be	 viewed	 as	 more	 accurate	measurements	 of	 institutional	 strength	 in	 the	 case	 of	 national	 human	 rights	institutions.	They	are	merely	suggested	as	alternative	forms	of	measurement	of	the	dependent	 variable,	 with	 particular	 relevance	 when	 discussing	 the	 inclusion	 of	countries	without	a	national	human	rights	institution	in	the	analysis.			 The	main	definition	and	operationalisation	of	the	dependent	variable	 in	the	
ologit	 and	 multinomial	 models	 included	 in	 the	 body	 of	 this	 chapter	 proposes	 an	aggregate	measure	of	‘weak	institutions’	that	groups	countries	with	weak	NHRIs	in	the	 same	 category	 as	 countries	 without	 a	 human	 rights	 institution	 that	 operates	with	a	human	rights	mandate	at	the	country	level.	Based	on	the	indicators	included	in	 the	 definition	 of	 institutional	 strength,	 all	 C-level	 institutions	 are	 ‘weak’,	 by	lacking	 de	 jure	 independence,	 a	 human	 rights	 mandate,	 by	 not	 operating	autonomously	from	government	or	by	having	very	limited	activity	of	promotion	and	protection.			 The	first	alternative	specification	of	the	dependent	variable	includes	a	four-point	 ranked	 categorical	 variable	 of	 NHRI	 strength.	 Strong	 and	 medium-strength	institutions	remain	the	same	as	in	the	main	specification	of	the	model.	However,	the	‘weak’	category	includes	only	countries	that	have	a	weak	institution,	while	the	‘non-existent’	 category	 comprises	 countries	 that	 do	 not	 have	 a	 national	 human	 rights	institution.	The	results	of	the	ologit	model	are	relatively	similar	to	the	ones	included	in	the	analysis	of	three	degrees	of	strength.	In	the	case	of	the	multinomial	model,	the	
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results	 indicate	 that	none	of	 the	 independent	variables	are	statistically	 significant.	Some	of	the	very	large	values	of	coefficients	and	standard	errors	indicate	also	that	a	multinomial	model	may	not	be	the	appropriate	fit	for	a	four-point	ranked	dependent	variable	measuring	institutional	strength.			 The	 second	 alternative	 specification	 of	 the	 model	 includes	 fewer	observations	 (145),	 as	 it	 is	 restricted	 to	 countries	 that	 have	 a	 national	 institution	after	excluding	 the	countries	without	an	 institution	 from	the	analysis	dataset.	The	results	of	this	analysis	are	different	from	the	results	of	the	full	model,	likely	due	to	sensitivity	of	the	model	to	the	reduction	in	the	number	of	observations.			
Table	4.15.	Ologit	 full	model	with	 institutional	 strength	operationalised	as	a	
four-point	ranked	categorical	variable	
Strength	(1-4)	 Coef.	 St.	err.	 p	value	NewDem	 0.0637	 0.4675	 0.892	ICCCATop	 0.2524	 0.3577	 0.480	PTAhard	 -0.0616	 0.3622	 0.865	EUmem2004	 1.5876**	 0.6575	 0.016	ODAEU	 -0.0006	 0.0013	 0.649	ODAUS	 0.0019**	 0.0008	 0.011	Adopt	 1.2258**	 0.5084	 0.016	Adens	 4.3659**	 1.7711	 0.014	UNAccr	 2.8476***	 0.3925	 0.000	logGDPcap	 -	0.0695	 0.1199	 0.562	/cut	1	/cut	2	/cut	3	 1.3884	1.8634	4.2565	
	 	
Prob	>	chi2	=	0.0000,	N	=	187		***	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.01	level	**	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.05	level	*	indicates	values	significant	at	the	p<0.10	level	
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	Approximate	likelihood-ratio	test	of	proportionality	of	odds:		Chi2(20)	=	53.27	Prob	>	chi2	=	0.0001			
Table	4.16.	Multinomial	model	including	Strength	1-4	(base	1/no	institution)	
	
Strength	(1-4)	 Coef.	 St.	err.	 p	value		1	 base		 	 	2	NewDem_89/93	 	0.4021	 	1.1859	 	0.735	ICCCATop	 0.0251	 0.9782	 0.979	PTAhard	 -0.4193	 1.0266	 0.683	EUmem2004	 16.0487*	 1.1337.85	 0.099	ODAEU	 -0.0025	 0.0056	 0.658	ODAUS	 0.0067	 0.0162	 0.680	Adopt	 18.6087	 1189.612	 0.988	Adens	 11.0467**	 5.1737	 0.033	UNAccr	 17.6573	 659.7285	 0.979	logGDPcap	 -0.2232	 0.3620	 0.538	3	NewDem_89/93	 	0.0268	 	0.7623	 	0.972	ICCCATop	 -0.0247	 0.6140	 0.968	PTAhard	 0.6549	 0.6903	 0.343	EUmem2004	 15.8860	 1337.85	 0.991	ODAEU	 -0.0013	 0.0031	 0.674	ODAUS	 0.0158	 0.0126	 0.208	Adopt	 16.4595	 1186.611	 0.989	Adens	 8.3308**	 3.2529	 0.010	UNAccr	 16.8076	 659.7281	 0.980	logGDPcap	 -0.0401	 2.4882	 0.081	4	NewDem_89/93	 	0.0659	 	0.9183	 	0.943	ICCCATop	 0.4188	 0.7925	 0.567	PTAhard	 0.0903	 0.7925	 0.909	EUmem2004	 17.1367	 1337.85	 0.990	ODAEU	 -0.0017	 0.0035	 0.612	
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ODAUS	 0.0162	 0.0126	 0.200	Adopt	 17.7221	 1189.61	 0.988	Adens	 8.4004	 3.9185	 0.032	UNAccr	 18.9805	 659.728	 0.977	logGDPcap	 -0.0088	 0.2629	 0.973		Prob	>	chi2	=	0.0000,	N	=	187			***	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.01	level	**	indicates	values	significant	at	p<0.05	level	*	indicates	values	significant	at	the	p<0.10	level				 															
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Chapter	5:	A	Qualitative	Comparative	Analysis	of	
Institutional	Strength	in	Europe	
	
5.1.	Introduction	
	The	 chapter	 proceeds	 as	 follows:	 first,	 it	 justifies	 the	 selection	 of	 Europe	 as	 the	regional	 case	 study.	Europe	 is	 a	pathway	 case	 (Gerring	2007),	which	 allows	us	 to	examine	 more	 closely	 the	 relationship	 between	 explanatory	 factors	 and	 the	outcome	 at	 the	 regional	 level.	 Of	 particular	 interest	 are	 the	 variables	 that	 were	found	to	be	significant	in	the	global	statistical	analysis,	three	of	which	having	direct	regional	relevance	for	institutional	design	in	Europe	–	the	region	has	a	high	number	of	early	adopting	institutions,	also	a	high	density	of	strong	institutions,	and	the	EU	as	a	powerful	actor	both	for	socialization	and	through	its	conditionality	imposed	on	candidate	states	prior	to	accession.	The	second	section	of	the	chapter	introduces	the	method	 of	 analysis,	 Qualitative	 Comparative	 Analysis,	 presenting	 its	 main	characteristics	and	 the	appropriateness	 for	 the	 type	of	 regional	data	and	research	question	this	analysis	is	aiming	to	answer.	In	the	third	section,	I	review	briefly	the	main	 four	 analytical	 explanations	 proposed	 in	 the	 theory	 chapter	 and	 the	hypotheses	that	test	the	effects	of	factors	relevant	for	Europe.			 The	analysis	in	this	chapter	focuses	on	only	four	explanatory	factors	linked	to	the	four	main	mechanisms	tested	also	in	the	global	analysis	–	UN	accreditation,	early	adopter	status,	EU	conditionality,	and	newly	democracy	status.	No	new	factors	that	are	region	or	country	specific	are	introduced	at	this	stage.	Thus	the	chapter	merely	
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presents	an	illustrative	discussion	of	explanatory	factors	at	the	European	level	and	identifies	 country	 cases	 in	 which	 the	 combination	 of	 these	 factors	 leads	 to	 two	different	levels	of	the	outcome	–	strong	institution	or	weak	institution.	QCA	does	not	introduce	further	analytical	nuance	by	considering	other	region-specific	factors,	but	rather	allows	to	investigate	the	interplay	of	factors	at	the	regional	level	in	a	case	of	particular	importance	for	the	global	analysis.	This	chapter	paves	the	way	for	a	more	fine-grained	 qualitative	 exploration	 of	 factors	 that	 account	 for	 the	 reasons	 why	governments	 decide	 to	 sustain	 a	 certain	 institutional	 design	 for	 their	 national	human	rights	 institution.	QCA	opens	also	the	discussion	of	country	cases	based	on	the	combination	of	 factors	that	are	necessary	for	them	to	have	strong	institutional	designs.	The	next	natural	step	of	research	will	be	to	carry	out	interview-based	work	in	cases	of	institutions	identified	by	QCA	and	complete	the	examination	of	the	causal	pathway	through	process	tracing	and	in-depth	case	analyses.				 The	 fourth	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 presents	 the	 binary	 data	 for	 the	 36	countries	in	the	truth	table	and	the	results	of	the	Qualitative	Comparative	Analysis.	The	analysis	observes	the	sets	of	conditions	linked	to	two	main	outcomes	-	 ‘strong	vs.	 not	 strong’	 and	 ‘weak	 vs.	 not	weak’.	 The	 fifth	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 discusses	briefly	all	 country	 cases	 that	have	 strong	and	medium	 institutions	and	 the	 factors	that	are	relevant	for	explaining	their	choice	of	institutional	design.	The	case	studies	are	 based	 on	 report	 and	 survey-based	 information,	 and	 are	 intended	 to	 present	illustrative	evidence	for	the	QCA.				
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5.2.	Method	and	case	selection		
5.2.1.	Case	selection	
	Europe	 is	 a	 pathway	 case	 for	 our	 argument	 at	 the	 regional	 level	 of	 analysis.	 The	statistical	 analysis	 provided	 statistically	 significant	 evidence	 for	 three	 indicators	that	operationalise	a	regional	dimension	linked	to	Europe	–	a	high	regional	density	of	 strong	 institutions	 quantifies	 information	 about	Europe	 and	Latin	America;	 the	‘early	 adopter’	 status	 of	 countries	 that	 established	 classical	 ombudsmen	 prior	 to	most	other	 countries	describes	 a	 characteristic	 of	 a	 larger	number	of	 countries	 in	Europe	compared	to	other	regions;	and	European	Union	membership	conditionality,	which	gives	 the	most	direct	 conceptual	 link	 to	Europe	and	 the	most	unambiguous	causal	pathway	between	explanatory	 factor	 and	outcome	of	 all	 three	 independent	variables	 of	 interest.	 The	 results	 of	 the	 statistical	 analysis,	 which	 find	 three	independent	 variables	 linked	 to	Europe	 to	 have	 significant	 effects	 on	 institutional	design	underlies	the	selection	of	country	cases	included	in	the	csQCA	dataset.		 A	 pathway	 case	 is	 form	 of	 crucial	 case	 study,	 which	 as	 Eckstein	 (1975)	describes,	is	a	case	that	“must	closely	fit	a	theory	if	one	is	to	have	confidence	in	the	theory’s	validity,	or,	conversely,	must	not	 fit	equally	well	any	rule	contrary	to	that	proposed”	 (Eckstein	 1975,	 p.	 118).	 The	 crucial	 case	 has	 become	 the	most	widely	recognised	as	a	staple	of	case	study	method	for	single-case	work	(Levy	2002;	George	and	Bennett	2005).	Building	on	Eckstein’s	definition,	Gerring	(2007)	proposes	that	a	pathway	case	has	a	slightly	different	technique	and	underlying	purpose	–	it	presents	
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an	 opportunity	 to	 examine	more	 closely	 the	 relationship	 between	 an	 explanatory	factor	and	the	outcome	and	see	them	interact	in	isolation	from	other	possible	causes	(Gerring	2007).	 For	 such	 cases,	 the	 covariational	 pattern	between	 a	 cause	 and	 an	effect	 is	 already	 well	 known	 and	 has	 been	 investigated	 across	 a	 broad	 range	 of	cases,	but	the	causal	mechanism	may	be	ambiguous	(Seawright	and	Gerring	2008).		 In	other	words,	pathway	case(s)	help	 to	 illuminate	 the	causal	pathway	that	link	 an	 independent	 variable	 to	 the	 outcome,	 providing	 qualitative	 evidence	 that	confirms	 the	 findings	 of	 a	 large-N	 study.	 The	 evidence	 provided	 by	QCA	does	 not	allow	an	in-depth	analysis	of	cases,	but	does	provide	insight	into	the	combinations	of	different	factors	that	are	linked	to	strong	institutional	design	in	Europe	and	paves	the	 way	 for	 a	 closer	 investigation	 of	 institutions	 through	 in-case	 analyses.	 QCA	allows	 both	 to	 explore	 the	 causal	 pathways	 at	 work	 at	 the	 regional	 level	 and	 to	identify	 cases	 for	 further	 country	 level	 analysis.	 Further	 qualitative	 work,	 in	 the	form	of	ethnographic	research	would	provide	further	evidence	of	how	cross-border	explanatory	 variables	 impact	 on	 the	 national	 institution’s	 design	 and	 can	 also	provide	further	insight	into	domestic	factors	that	cannot	be	captured	by	the	large	N	analysis.	 Before	 we	 discuss	 more	 in	 depth	 the	 QCA	 model	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	institutional	 design	 in	 Europe,	 I	will	 introduce	 briefly	 the	main	 principles	 of	 QCA	and	the	set-theoretic	logic	underlying	it.						
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5.2.2.	What	is	QCA?	
	Qualitative	 comparative	 analysis	 is	 a	 set-theoretic	 method	 for	 the	 analysis	 of	qualitative	data.	All	set-theoretic	models	share	three	main	features:	first,	they	work	with	membership	scores	of	cases	in	sets.	Sets	are	a	kind	of	‘data	container’	(Sartori	1970)	 is	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 “boundaries	 that	 define	 zones	 of	 inclusion	 and	exclusion”	 (Mahoney	 2010).	 Set-theoretic	 methods	 operate	 on	 data	 that	 is	 coded	with	 the	 help	 of	 case	 membership	 scores	 in	 sets	 that	 represent	 social	 science	concepts,	through	a	process	called	‘calibration’	(Schneider	and	Wagemann	2012,	p.	32).	In	the	case	of	crisp	sets,	as	the	one	used	for	the	analysis	of	European	cases,	all	variables	are	coded	as	dichotomous	(i.e.	either	0	or	1),	based	on	whether	or	not	a	case	 belongs	 in	 a	 certain	 set.	 Second,	 they	 perceive	 relations	 between	 social	phenomena	as	set	relations.	Categories	that	describe	the	characteristics	of	a	country	or	 a	 number	 of	 countries,	 such	 as	 ‘newly	 democratised’	 or	 ‘early	 adopter	 of	 an	institution’	 represent	 sets	 in	 which	 different	 countries	 belong.	 This	 allocation	 to	certain	sets	is	closely	linked	to	the	third	feature	of	set-theoretic	models,	namely	the	interpretation	of	set	relations	in	terms	of	sufficiency	and	necessity,	as	well	as	forms	of	causes	 that	can	be	derived	 from	them	(Schneider	and	Wagemann	2012,	pp.	65-66).	For	instance,	if	we	observe	that	all	European	Union	members	are	democracies,	but	that	not	all	democracies	are	European	Union	members,	then	the	set	of	European	Union	members	is	a	subset	of	the	(global)	supra-set	of	democracies.	In	other	words,	all	European	Union	member	states	are	necessarily	democracies,	but	the	condition	of	
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a	state	being	a	democracy	is	not	sufficient	for	membership	in	the	set	of	countries	in	the	European	Union.		 The	data	used	 in	 this	 regional	set	model	of	 institutional	strength	 in	Europe	are	in	the	form	of	a	crisp	set.	Crisp	sets	have	been	the	object	of	criticism	due	to	their	necessary	simplification	 into	dichotomous	categories	of	 fine-grained	social	science	concepts	 for	 which	 more	 detailed	 and	 nuanced	 information	 is	 available	 (Bollen,	Entwisle,	and	Alderson	1993;	De	Meur,	Rihoux,	and	Yamasaki	147AD).	As	such,	they	can	 represent	 a	 loss	 of	 empirical	 information.	 A	 crisp	 set,	 however,	 is	 the	appropriate	 format	 for	 the	 set	 conceptualisation	 and	 calibration	 of	 data	 in	 this	analysis	 and	matches	 the	 operationalization	 of	 the	 four	 variables	 in	 the	 statistical	dataset	 used	 for	 the	 global	 analysis.	More	nuance	 could	 certainly	 be	 added	 to	 the	analysis	if	one	were	interested	in	capturing	more	detail	in	the	categories	of	factors	that	could	have	an	effect	on	the	outcome.	However,	one	of	the	goals	of	this	analysis	is	first	and	foremost	to	capture	variation	within	the	sets	that	make	up	the	outcome,	–	 institutional	 strength.	 The	 binary	 coding	 of	 the	 main	 variables	 of	 interest	 for	Europe	in	the	global	statistical	dataset	overlaps	in	conceptualisation	with	the	binary	operationalization	in	terms	of	conceptual	sets	for	the	QCA	analysis.			
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5.3.	Explanatory	factors	and	causal	mechanisms		Four	categories	that	capture	set	membership	in	the	factors	that	have	an	effect	on	the	outcome	 are	 included	 in	 the	 model,	 and	 their	 selection	 is	 theory	 driven:	 UNAC	 -	whether	or	not	a	country	has	undergone	the	accreditation	process	overseen	by	the	International	 Coordinating	 Committee	 provides	 a	 measure	 of	 socialisation	 at	 the	global	 level.	 ADOPT	 –	whether	 or	 not	 a	 country	 is	 an	 early	 adopter	 of	 a	 classical	ombudsman	 or	 hybrid	 ombudsman	 is	 an	 indicator	 of	 a	 country’s	 strong	 human	rights	 identity.	 Whether	 a	 state	 is	 newly	 democratised,	 which	 is	 defined	 as	belonging	to	the	set	of	countries	that	moved	from	being	autocratic	in	the	aftermath	of	1989	to	becoming	transitional	or	fully	democratic,	provides	a	measure	of	the	role	that	domestic	benefit	 and	 cost	 calculations	may	play	 in	governments’	decisions	 to	adopt	a	certain	institutional	design	for	their	national	human	rights	institution.	Some	of	the	independent	variables	in	the	global	dataset	were	not	carried	over	to	the	crisp	set	as	they	do	not	show	variation	across	cases	at	the	regional	level	more	generally,	and	 in	 Europe	 more	 specifically.	 For	 instance,	 all	 countries	 in	 the	 crisp	 set	 are	already	members	of	the	Council	of	Europe,	thus	rendering	the	inclusion	of	this	factor	in	 the	model	meaningless.	The	selection	of	 the	 four	main	 factors	 to	be	 included	as	set	categories	in	the	QCA	model	is	theory	driven	with	each	of	them	linked	to	one	of	the	four	causal	mechanisms	tested	also	through	statistical	hypothesis	testing	in	the	global	analysis.			 The	analytical	framework	we	propose	offers	four	main	ideal	types	that	seek	to	explicate	the	effect	of	a	number	of	factors	on	governments’	decisions	to	establish	
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and	 support	 strong	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions.	 These	 causal	 explanations	build	on	two	major	lines	of	debate	in	international	relations	theory	as	relevant	for	the	 discussion	 of	 institutions	 –	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 domestic	 versus	 international	factors	and,	on	the	other	hand,	material	versus	ideational	factors.	The	mechanisms	tested	in	the	QCA	are	identical	to	the	ones	tested	for	in	the	global	analysis,	seeking	to	 identify	 the	 interplay	 of	 factors	 at	 the	 regional	 level	 in	 Europe.	 The	 indicators	included	 in	 the	 statistical	 model	 that	 are	 not	 carried	 over	 into	 the	 regional	 QCA	model	are	 the	ones	 that	do	not	present	much	variation	at	 the	European	 level	–	all	European	 states	 included	 in	 the	 analysis	 are	 signatories	 of	 strong	 human	 rights	treaties	 and	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 them	 have	 also	 entered	 preferential	 trade	agreements	with	strong	human	rights	standards.	Similarly,	they	are	members	of	the	Council	 of	 Europe.	 This	QCA	 analysis	 intends	 to	 find	 the	 combinatory	 logic	 of	 the	main	 conditions	 of	 sufficiency	 and	 necessity	 accounting	 for	 institutional	 design	choices	 in	 countries	of	 the	European	Union	and	 candidate	 states	 for	2013.	At	 this	point,	we	will	review	briefly	the	main	causal	mechanisms	proposed	for	the	study	of	national	 human	 rights	 institutional	 strength	 and	 emphasise	 also	 their	 regional	explanatory	in	the	case	of	Europe.			 	
Incentive-setting:	 The	 EU	 uses	 positive	 and	 negative	 incentives	 routinely	 to	introduce	 institutional	change	in	accession	candidates	and	in	 its	neighbourhood	in	pursuit	 of	 its	 own	 instrumental	 interests	 (Börzel	 and	 Risse	 2012)	 –	 security,	prosperity,	 environmental	 protection,	 human	 rights	 as	 well	 as	 minority	 rights	promotion	 and	 protection.	When	 seeking	 to	 determine	 other	 actors	 to	 adopt	 and	
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accept	its	institutions,	the	EU	and	the	member	states	rely	on	external	incentives	in	the	form	of	conditionality	and	capacity	building	(Kelley	2004;	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier	 2005;	 Vachudová	 2005).	 Conditionality	 aims	 to	 manipulate	 the	 cost-benefit	 calculations	 of	 target	 actors	 through	 creating	 negative	 and	 positive	incentives,	while	capacity-building	provides	additional	resources	enabling	targeted	actors	 to	make	 strategic	 choices	 (Börzel	 and	Risse	2012,	p.	 7).	This	mechanism	 is	particularly	powerful	 in	the	case	of	accession	candidates	and	manifests	also	 in	the	case	of	national	human	rights	institutions.		
	
Table	5.1.	Countries	subjected	to	EU	conditionality	
(levels	of	institutional	strength)	
	
Country	 Strength	Albania	 A	Bosnia&Herzegovina	 A	Bulgaria	 B	Croatia	 A	Cyprus	 A	Czech	Republic	 A	Estonia	 A	Hungary	 B	Latvia	 A	Lithuania	 A	Macedonia	 B	Malta	 B	Montenegro	 A	Poland	 A	Romania	 B	Serbia	 A	Slovakia	 B	Slovenia	 B	Turkey	 C		
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	 Over	 the	 years,	 the	European	Commission	made	 clear	 recommendations	 to	candidate	 states	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 establishment	 and	 consolidation	 of	 national	human	rights	ombudsmen	and	human	rights	 commissions	 (European	Commission	2016).	 The	 EU	 maintains	 a	 system	 of	 monitoring	 and	 support	 through	recommendations	 through	 the	use	of	 annual	 reports	on	 the	progress	of	 candidate	states	since	the	2004	wave	of	accession.	 In	 these	reports,	ombudsman	and	human	rights	 commissions	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 efforts	 to	 implement	 international	human	 rights	 law	 in	 domestic	 environments,	 to	 harmonise	 legislation	 about	 the	promotion	and	protection	of	minority	rights,	combat	corruption,	or	handle	cases	of	torture	 by	 police	 forces	 and	 seek	 to	 support	 governments’	 efforts	 to	 improve	conditions	 in	 prisons	 and	 protect	 the	 rights	 of	 prisoners.	 The	 roles	 of	 these	institutions	 vary	 according	 to	 national	 context,	 responding	 to	 individual	 domestic	society	 needs.	 Their	 health	 and	 robustness	 is	 also	 an	 important	 concern	 for	 the	European	 Commission	 –	 whenever	 necessary,	 clear	 recommendations	 are	 made	about	 an	 increase	 in	 their	 strength,	 whether	 in	 their	 independence	 from	government	intervention,	sufficient	funding	for	infrastructure	and	staff,	or	increased	effectiveness	of	their	collaboration	with	state	bodies.	Their	establishment	and	good	independent	 operation	 represent	 a	 clear	 priority	 for	 the	 process	 of	 institutional	alignment	and	development	–	they	are	targets	of	 incentives	through	conditionality	and	 capacity	 building	 offered	 to	 member	 states	 by	 the	 European	 Commission.	Hence,	 one	 can	 hypothesise	 that	 countries	 which	 have	 been	 the	 object	 of	 EU	conditionality	are	more	likely	to	have	strong	national	human	rights	institutions.			
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Hypothesis:		Countries	that	have	had	membership	candidate	state	status	since	the	2004	wave	of	accession	are	more	likely	to	have	strong	national	human	rights	institutions.			
Identity:	 In	 line	with	 the	 constructivist	 school	 of	 thought,	 some	 societies	 identify	collectively	as	liberal	democratic	and	consider	support	for	human	rights	promotion	and	protection	as	part	and	parcel	of	a	country’s	history	and	tradition.		Governments	in	these	countries	decide	to	establish	strong	human	rights	ombudsmen	and	national	human	 rights	 commissions	 because	 they	 believe	 in	 the	 norms	 these	 institutions	embody	 and	 also	 because	 the	 political	 costs	 incurred	 in	 their	 establishment	 and	strong	 design	would	 be	minimal	 or	 non-existent.	 The	 Scandinavian	 countries,	 for	instance,	have	some	of	the	oldest	ombudsman	institutions	in	the	world	and	over	the	years	 have	 remained	 strong	 promoters	 of	 democracy	 and	 human	 rights	 across	borders.			 As	Wendt	(1999)	defines	it,	 identity	is	“a	property	of	intentional	actors	that	generate(s)	motivational	and	behavioral	dispositions	(Wendt	1999).”	State	identity	is	essentially	subjective	and	grounded	 in	a	nation’s	self-understanding,	although	 it	does	incorporate	both	internal	and	external	structures.	Certain	essential	properties	constitute	 the	 national	 identity	 of	 each	 state	 –	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	 consists	 of	 a	material	base,	many	physical	bodies	and	a	territory,	complementing	a	consciousness	and	memory	of	a	collective	self	(Wendt	1999).	Human	rights	identity	has	not	been	conceptualized	or	measured	 in	prior	studies	of	national	human	rights	 institutions’	diffusion.	Most	 studies,	 however,	 do	mention	 a	 domestic	 dimension	 that	 captures	
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support	for	human	rights	–	such	as	a	country’s	Western	heritage	or	its	human	rights	record,	 as	 indicators	 of	 a	 commitment	 to	 the	promotion	 and	protection	of	 human	rights	 (Koo	 and	 Ramirez	 2009).	 This	 domestic	 aspect	 is	 not	 found	 statistically	significant	and	thus	does	not	account	for	states’	decision	to	create	NHRIs	in	the	first	place	 (Koo	 and	 Ramirez	 2009).	 Countries’	 religious	 affiliations	 are	 not	 good	predictors	of	 commitment	 to	human	 rights	 treaties	 or	 to	 their	 implementation	on	the	ground	(Simmons	2002;	Cole	2009b).		 Europe	is	the	region	with	the	most	countries	that	established	an	ombudsman	institution	 prior	 to	 the	 institutional	 boom	 of	 the	 early	 1990s.	 In	 fact,	 the	Scandinavian	 countries	 are	 the	 oldest	 adopters	 of	 a	 classical	 parliamentary	ombudsman	worldwide,	 with	 Finland	 in	 1919,	 Demark	 in	 1955,	 Norway	 in	 1962	(Reif	2004).	Importantly,	also,	Sweden	is	the	country	that	designed	the	ombudsman	institutional	 model	 and	 created	 the	 first	 one	 in	 the	 world	 in	 1809,	 called	 the	‘Ombudsman	for	Justice.’	Although	the	Swedish	model	of	the	Ombudsman	for	Justice	has	little	to	do	with	our	understanding	of	human	rights	promotion	and	protection	or	indeed	with	 the	 current	 ombudsmen	 system	 in	 Sweden,	 the	 institutional	 concept	became	 a	 reference	 point	 for	 all	 subsequent	 countries’	 decisions	 to	 establish	 on	their	territories	a	similar	independent	body	concerned	with	the	protection	of	their	citizens’	 rights.	 Most,	 if	 not	 all,	 institutional	 histories	 of	 national	 human	 rights	commissions	or	ombudsmen	cite	 the	historical	Swedish	ombudsman	 institution	as	the	 model	 that	 provided	 the	 inspiration	 for	 their	 own	 governments’	 decision	 to	create	a	similar	body.			
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Table	5.2.	Early	adopting	countries	in	Europe		
(levels	of	institutional	strength	and	year	of	establishment)	
	
Country	 Year	 Strength	Austria	 1982	 medium	Denmark	 1955/02/13*	 strong	Estonia	 1938	 strong	Finland	 1919	 strong	France	 1947	 strong	Hungary	 1989	 strong	Poland	 1987	 strong	Portugal	 1975	 strong	Spain	 1978	 strong	Sweden	 1809/2009*	 medium	Switzerland	 1976	 weak	*The	first	date	corresponds	to	the	creation	of	the	ombudsman	and	the	second	to	the	institution	in	existence	today,	when	different.			 A	 country	 that	 is	 an	 early	 adopter	 of	 a	 classical	 ombudsman	 institution	 is	more	likely	to	have	a	strong	national	human	rights	institution	in	2013,	whether	this	institution	 is	 a	 stronger	 version	 of	 the	 existing	 classical	 ombudsman,	 which	 was	given	 a	 broader	 human	 rights	mandate	 as	well,	 or	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 human	 rights	commission	 established	 after	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 Paris	 Principles	 framework	 that	promotes	their	establishment.	The	presence	of	an	early	adopter	in	a	region	can	also	prompt	a	cross-border	effect	causing	social	learning	and	imitation.	We	will	return	to	this	discussion	in	the	section	dedicated	to	socialisation	dynamics	and	the	measures	we	propose	for	it.		Hypothesis:		Countries	that	are	early	adopters	of	a	human	rights	ombudsman	are	more	likely	to	have	stronger	institutions.		
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Cost	 and	 benefit	 analysis:	What	can	we	expect	 to	occur	 in	countries	 that	do	not	have	 a	 strong	 human	 rights	 identity	 manifest	 through	 longstanding	 tradition	 of	democratic	or	a	history	of	a	consistently	strong	human	rights	record?	Governments	in	 newly	 democratized	 states	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 focus	 their	 efforts	 to	 lock	 in	democratic	 reform	 through	 supporting	 human	 rights	 institutions	 for	 fear	 of	destabilization	by	future	governments	and	backsliding	in	the	longer	run	(Moravcsik	2000).	 Cost	 and	 benefit	 calculations	 drive	 decision-making	 processes	 when	supporting	the	establishment	and	consolidation	of	institutions	that	could	constrain	the	 potentially	 undemocratic	 behaviour	 of	 subsequent	 national	 governments.	 A	rational	 decision	 to	 delegate	 to	 an	 independent	 body	 such	 as	 a	 human	 rights	institution	charged	with	the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights	requires	that	a	 sitting	 government	 weigh	 two	 crosscutting	 considerations,	 namely	 restricting	
government	discretion	and	reducing	domestic	political	uncertainty	(Moravcsik	2000).		 In	contrast	to	the	view	that	hypothesizes	that	social	actors	are	responsive	to	external	socialization	and	often	altruistically	motivated,	republican	liberal	theories	work	 under	 the	 assumption	 that	 states	 are	 self-interested	 and	 rational	 in	 their	pursuit	of	different	national	interests.	These	national	benefits	reflect	variation	in	the	nature	of	domestic	pressures	and	representative	 institutions	(Doyle	1986;	Russett	1993;	 Snyder	 1991;	 Bailey,	 Goldstein,	 and	 Weingast	 1997;	 Moravcsik	 1997;	 Van	Evera	 1999;	 Legro	 and	Moravcsik	 1999;	Moravcsik	 2000).	 National	 human	 rights	institutions	 are	 domestic	 bodies	 set	 up	 by	 governments	 in	 response	 to	 different	national	environments	and	political	pressures.	The	design	and	mandate	of	national	
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human	 rights	 institutions	 are	 such	 that	 these	 bodies	 have	 de	 jure	 power	 to	 hold	governments	 accountable	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 international	 human	 rights	agreements	and	 for	violations	of	human	rights	 they	have	carried	out	against	 their	own	citizens.	Generally	speaking,	 the	 lower	the	costs,	 the	more	 likely	states	are	 to	establish	 strong	 institutions.	 Depending	 on	 the	 type	 of	 political	 regime	 at	 the	domestic	 level,	such	costs	can	potentially	be	very	high	and	higher	even	than	when	ratifying	 international	 or	 regional	 human	 rights	 treaties	 that	 “lack	 teeth.”	 Costs	incurred	as	linked	to	policy	change,	unintended	consequences,	and	limited	flexibility	of	were	found	significant	explanatory	factors	that	states	weigh	against	the	benefits	of	 democratic	 lock-in	 when	 they	 commit	 to	 the	 international	 Convention	 Against	torture.	In	the	case	of	country	commitment	to	the	CAT	through	signing	or	ratifying	it,	 Goodliffe	 and	 Hawkins	 find	 that	 normative	 conformity	 and	 costs	 both	 matter	(Goodliffe	and	Hawkins	2006).												
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Table	5.3.	New	democracies	in	Europe		
(levels	of	institutional	strength)	
	
Country	 Strength	Albania	 A	Bosnia&Herzegovina	 A	Bulgaria	 B	Croatia	 A	Czech	Republic	 A	Estonia	 A	Hungary	 B	Latvia	 A	Lithuania	 A	Macedonia	 B	Montenegro	 A	Poland	 A	Romania	 B	Serbia	 A	Slovakia	 B	Slovenia	 B			 With	a	large	number	of	newly	democratised	countries	in	the	region,	Europe	is	 the	 regional	 setting	 where	 we	 could	 expect	 to	 observe	 such	 behaviour.	Establishing	 a	 strong	 national	 human	 rights	 institution	 would	 be	 perceived	 as	 a	commitment	to	human	rights	promotion	and	protection	at	the	domestic	level	and	an	effort	both	to	consolidate	democracy	in	response	to	domestic	pressures	and	to	gain	legitimacy	 at	 the	 regional	 and	global	 level.	A	 strong	 such	 institution	 complements	country	commitments	to	international	and	regional	human	rights	treaties,	granting	states	 access	 to	 membership	 in	 country	 networks	 and	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	Council	 of	 Europe	 or	 OECD.	 Importantly,	 also,	 governments	 in	 countries	 with	popular	pressure	 for	reforms	that	strengthen	democracy	would	also	garner	public	
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legitimacy	 and	 increased	 electoral	 support	 through	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 strong	ombudsman	 or	 national	 human	 rights	 commission,	 or	 sometimes	 also	 an	 entire	human	rights	ombudsman	system	addressing	different	categories	of	 rights	 (this	 is	the	case	in	the	Czech	Republic,	Hungary,	Lithuania,	or	Poland).		 	Hypothesis	Countries	that	are	newly	democratised	are	more	likely	to	have	strong	human	rights	institutions.		
	
Socialisation:	 Socialisation	explains	 cross-border	diffusion	as	a	process	driven	by	normative	 and	 socially	 constructed	 institutional	 and	 policy	 properties	 (Checkel	2005;	Gilardi	2013).	Processes	of	 socialization	often	result	 in	complex	 learning	by	which	actors	reconfigure	their	interests	and	identities	(Checkel	2005).	Acculturation	is	one	type	of	socialisation	processes	can	lead	to	a	more	incomplete	(or	superficial)	kind	of	learning,	in	which	actors	adapt	beliefs	and	behaviours	that	they	face	in	their	environment	without	 evaluating	 either	 the	merits	 of	 those	 beliefs	 of	 the	material	costs	and	benefits	of	conforming	to	them	(Kelman	1958;	Goodman	and	Jinks	2013).	Unlike	 socialisation,	 acculturation	 stops	 short	 of	 producing	 attitude	 change	 as	 a	result	of	the	interaction	with	the	group	to	which	one	belongs	(J.	R.	Smith	and	Hogg	2008).	 From	 this	 perspective,	 the	 EU	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 large	 scale	 socialisation	agency	 which	 actively	 tries	 to	 promote	 rules,	 norms,	 practices	 and	 structures	 of	meaning	 to	 which	member	 states	 are	 exposed	 (Börzel	 and	 Risse	 2012).	 The	 end	result	of	such	a	process	is	the	full	incorporation	of	these	new	norms	and	practices	in	
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domestic	 structures	 (Checkel	 2005).	 In	 its	 relationship	 with	 member	 states,	accession	candidates,	and	countries	 in	 its	neighbourhood,	 the	EU	can	be	seen	as	a	“teacher	 of	 norms	 (Finnemore	 1993).”	 Epistemic	 communities	 or	 advocacy	networks	 can	 act	 as	 norm	 entrepreneurs	 that	 socialise	 domestic	 actors	 into	 new	norms	 and	 rules	 of	 appropriateness	 through	 social	 learning,	 aiding	 in	 the	redefinition	of	domestic	interests	and	identities	(Börzel	and	Risse	2007).		 Four	main	actors	can	facilitate	learning	at	the	regional	level	in	Europe	–	(1)	institutional	 networks	 such	 as	 the	 European	 Network	 for	 National	 Human	 Rights	Institutions	or	the	Asia	Pacific	Forum;	(2)	the	global	network	of	accredited	national	human	 rights	 institutions	 coordinated	 by	 the	 UN’s	 International	 Coordination	Committee	 for	 NHRIs;	 (3)	 early	 adopting	 countries	whose	 influence	will	manifest	strongly	on	countries	in	their	proximity;	and	(4)	in	the	case	of	Europe	in	particular,	the	European	Union	and	its	institutions.	Other	regional	network-based	actors,	such	as	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe,	 can	 also	 facilitate	 the	 formation	 of	 environments	 that	promote	learning	across	borders	at	the	regional	level,	but	their	impact	on	member	states	 is	much	more	diffuse	 and	does	not	present	 enough	within-region	variation.	The	effect	of	 the	European	Union	 is	 expected	 to	be	different	on	member	 states	as	opposed	to	accession	candidates.	 			 Moreover,	 early	 adopting	 countries	with	 long-standing	 traditions	 of	 liberal	democracy	in	Western	Europe	play	an	important	role	in	learning	processes,	as	they	represent	 role	models	 for	other	 countries	 in	 their	proximity.	The	most	prominent	example	 is	 Sweden,	 as	 it	 is	 the	 country	 that	 created	 the	 very	 first	 model	 of	 an	ombudsman	in	the	early	1800s	–	even	though	no	modern	version	of	an	ombudsman	
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is	an	institutional	replica	of	the	initial	Swedish	Ombudsman	of	Justice,	the	majority	of	human	rights	institutions	mandated	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights	at	the	national	 level	 point	 to	 Swedish	 institutional	 model	 as	 their	 inspiration.	 Another	early	adopted	 institution	that	played	an	 influential	role	 in	promoting	cross-border	learning	is	the	Danish	Human	Rights	Institute,	which	has	run	a	long	campaign	of	not	simply	promoting	and	promoting	human	rights	domestically	in	Denmark	but	rather	by	 coordinating	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 ENNHRI	 and	 also	 by	managing	 international	development	 programmes	 focused	 on	 institutional	 capacity	 building	 around	 the	world.	 In	other	words,	 early	 adopting	 countries	 can	 also	be	 role	models	 for	 other	institutions	in	their	region,	by	providing	an	example	of	a	successful	institution	to	be	copied	by	neighbouring	countries.	Geographic	proximity	can	facilitate	cross-border	learning	and	can	lead	to	rule	transfer	and	institutional	isomorphism.		 Of	 particular	 interest	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 institutional	 change	 is	 the	understanding	that	socialisation	processes	are	particularly	effective	when	countries	are	embedded	in	dense	networks	of	transnational	and	international	social	relations	that	 shape	 their	perceptions	of	 the	world	and	 their	 role	 in	 that	world	 (Finnemore	1996;	 Ruggie	 1988).	 Networks	 of	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 are	 both	regional	 and	 global	 in	 reach	 –	 the	 European	 Network	 for	 National	 Human	 Rights	Institutions	(ENNHRI)	is	a	relatively	recent	institution,	founded	in	2013,	compared	to	 its	 equivalent	 body	 in	 Asia,	 the	 long-standing	 Asia	 Pacific	 Forum,	 founded	 in	1996.	For	over	a	decade	prior	to	the	establishment	of	the	ENNHRI,	its	predecessor,	the	European	Group	of	National	Human	Rights	Institutions	was	a	small	and	loosely	structured	body	affiliated	with	the	Council	of	Europe	with	the	main	role	of	assisting	
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in	the	accreditation	process	for	national	human	rights	institutions	located	in	Europe.	Given	its	very	recent	establishment	and	overall	unstructured	operation	until	2013,	the	 European	 network	 cannot	 be	 considered	 a	 key	 facilitator	 of	 cross-border	learning.				 Given	the	particularly	significant	effect	that	the	accreditation	process	has	on	the	establishment	globally	(Linos	and	Pegram	2016)	and	the	 institutional	strength	of	national	human	rights	 institutions	as	demonstrated	by	the	statistical	analysis	at	the	global	level,	an	equally	strong	impact	is	expected	to	be	manifest	at	the	regional	level	in	Europe.	Hence	having	undergone	the	accreditation	process	five	years	prior	to	the	year	of	data	collection	is	hypothesised	to	have	an	impact	on	the	governments’	decisions	 to	 establish	 and	 support	 strong	 institutions	 that	 promote	 and	 protect	human	rights	domestically.			Hypothesis	Countries	 that	 have	 undergone	 the	 accreditation	 process	 five	 years	 by	 2008	 are	more	likely	to	have	stronger	institutions	mandated	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights	in	2013.							
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5.4.	A	QCA	model	of	institutional	design	in	Europe		
5.4.1.	Outcome:	strong	institutional	design		Seeking	to	capture	the	variation	across	the	three	levels	of	the	outcome,	I	propose	a	model	that	seeks	to	capture	different	degrees	of	variation	in	institutional	strength.	The	 outcome	 of	 QCA	 is	 always	 in	 binary	 form,	 indicating	 whether	 or	 not	 a	 case	belongs	in	the	outcome	set.	The	outcome	of	the	statistical	analysis	at	the	global	level	is	 ordinal	 and	 made	 up	 of	 three	 different	 categories	 (weak,	 medium,	 strong).	 In	order	 to	 capture	 this	 variation	 in	 outcome	 ranks,	 I	 propose	 three	 different	definitions	 of	 the	 outcome	 category	 –	 strong	 versus	 non	 strong	 (i.e.	 weak	 and	medium);	medium	versus	non	medium	(i.e.	strong	and	weak);	and	weak	versus	non	weak	 (i.e.	 strong	 and	 medium).	 The	 first	 truth	 table	 and	 formal	 proposition	presented	have	 as	 outcome	 the	 set	 of	 institutions	 that	 are	 ‘strong,’	 so	 institutions	that	do	not	belong	in	that	set	are	either	‘medium’	or	‘weak.’	A	second	model	has	as	outcome	the	set	of	institutions	that	are	‘weak,’	so	institutions	that	do	not	belong	in	that	set	are	either	‘strong’	or	‘medium.’	A	third	model	includes	an	outcome	with	the	set	 of	 ‘medium’	 versus	 ‘strong’	 and	 ‘weak’	 institutions,	 but	 the	 results	 are	inconclusive,	so	I	will	 include	the	truth	table	for	information	purposes	but	will	not	incorporate	the	results	in	the	analysis.		 The	model	below	shows	the	results	of	the	analysis	for	the	outcome	‘STRONG’	presenting	two	combinations	of	conditions	sufficient	for	a	country	to	belong	to	the	strong	(versus	weak	and	medium)	outcome	set.	A	country	being	a	new	democracy	
		 261	
and	 subjected	 to	 EU	 accession	 conditionality	 without	 having	 undergone	 the	 UN	accreditation	process	has	met	sufficient	conditions	for	the	outcome.			
	 Model	1:	un.ac*NEWDEM*EUCOND	+	UN.AC*newdem*eucond	=>	STRONG		The	sufficient	conditions	and	the	cases	which	meet	them	is	as	follows:	
Table	5.4.	Model	(outcome	=	STRONG)	
	 PRI/incl	 cov	 Cases	un.ac*NEWDEM*EUCOND	 0.833	 0.238	 Czech	Rep,	Latvia,	Lithuania,		Montenegro,	Romania;	Estonia	UN.AC*newdem*eucond	 0.714	 0.476	 Belgium,	Germany,	Greece,	Ireland,	Luxembourg,	Netherlands,	United	Kingdom;	Austria,	Denmark,	Finland,	France,	Portugal,	Spain,	Sweden		M1	 0.750	 0.714	 	Total:	35;	No.	of	multiple-covered	cases:	0;	inclusion	cut:	0.7			 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 first	 path	 to	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 strong	 institution,	 all	countries	 are	 new	 democracies	 that	 have	 been	 objected	 to	 European	 Union	conditionality.	All	of	these	countries	have	strong	institutions,	with	the	exception	of	Romania,	whose	Ombudsman	has	medium	level	design.	Estonia	is	the	only	case	of	a	new	democracy	that	has	also	taken	part	in	the	EU	accession	process	and	that	is	an	early	 adopter	 of	 a	 Parliamentary	 Ombudsman.	 None	 of	 the	 cases	 included	 in	 the	minimal	 solution	 has	 undergone	 the	 UN	 accreditation	 process.	 The	 analysis	 finds	that	 a	 strong	human	 rights	 identity	 does	not	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 explaining	why	countries	establish	national	institutions	with	a	strong	design.	However,	some	of	
		 262	
the	 cases	 that	 illustrate	 the	 minimal	 solutions	 are	 early	 adopting	 countries	 –	Sweden,	 Denmark,	 Estonia.	 The	 case	 discussions	will	 highlight	 this	 factor	 in	 their	case	 and	 further	 qualitative	 work	 will	 allow	 to	 uncover	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 this	condition	plays	a	role	for	strong	institutional	design.		 On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 results	 of	 the	 QCA	 analysis,	 we	 can	 be	 reasonably	confident	 that	 the	 first	 identified	 path	 supports	 a	 rational	 story	 of	 strong	institutional	design	of	national	human	rights	institutions	in	Europe.	This	path	leads	to	strong	institutions	 in	almost	all	 identified	cases,	with	the	exception	of	Romania,	which	has	a	medium	strength	institution.	None	of	the	cases	illustrating	this	path	has	undergone	 the	 UN-coordinated	 accreditation	 process,	 but	 ‘no	 UN	 accreditation’	 is	not	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 the	 outcome.	 The	 easy	 counterfactual	 combination	includes	newly	democratic	countries	that	have	been	the	object	of	EU	conditionality	and	have	also	undergone	the	UN	accreditation	process	by	2013.	This	is	observed	in	reality	 and	 included	 also	 among	 the	 combination	 of	 logical	 remainders	 in	 the	analysis.	 Line	12	 in	 the	 truth	 table	 contains	 the	 following	 cases	Albania,	Bosnia	&	Herzegovina,	Bulgaria,	Croatia,	Macedonia,	Serbia,	Slovakia,	and	Slovenia.	Although	the	 UN	 accreditation	 has	 not	 led	 to	 a	 strong	 outcome	 in	 their	 cases,	 half	 of	 the	countries	do	have	institutions	with	strong	designs	(Albania,	Bosnia	&	Herzegovina,	Croatia,	 and	 Serbia).	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 other	 half	 of	 the	 countries	 have	institutions	of	medium	strength	(Bulgaria,	Macedonia,	Slovenia,	and	Slovakia),	with	no	 institution	 among	 these	 cases	 that	 has	 a	 weak	 design.	 Thus,	 not	 having	 UN	accreditation	 is	not	a	necessary	condition	 for	countries	 that	are	newly	democratic	and	have	been	subjected	to	EU	conditionality	to	have	strong	institutions.		
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	 Recent	developments	in	institutional	strength	in	the	particular	case	of	Latvia	lend	additional	support	to	our	rationalist	story	about	institutional	design	in	the	case	of	some	newly	democratised	states	that	have	been	subjected	to	EU	conditionality.	In	March	 2015,	 the	 Sub-Committee	 on	 Accreditation	 granted	 Latvia	 A	 status.	 This	institutional	 development	 linked	 to	 accreditation	 confirms	 the	 finding	 in	 our	analysis	based	on	data	collected	 in	2013	–	 the	UN	accreditation	 is	not	a	necessary	condition	for	a	strong	design	in	the	case	of	a	newly	democratised	state	that	is	also	a	new	EU	member	 state.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 combination	 of	 the	 two	 factors	 –	 new	democracy	and	EU	conditionality	–	is	likely	to	lead	to	the	outcome	‘strong	design’.		 The	 second	 path	 lends	 support	 for	 an	 ideational	 narrative	 of	 strong	institutional	design	 as	 linked	 to	UN	accreditation	 in	 the	 case	of	 countries	 that	 are	not	 newly	 democratised	 and	 that	 have	 never	 been	 at	 the	 receiving	 end	 of	 EU	accession	 conditionality.	 Denmark,	 Finland,	 France,	 Germany,	 Greece,	 Ireland,	Luxembourg,	Portugal,	Spain,	and	 the	United	Kingdom	are	old	member	states	 that	have	 strong	national	 human	 rights	 institutions.	Austria,	 Sweden,	Belgium,	 and	 the	Netherlands	 are	 countries	 with	 institutions	 of	 medium	 level	 strength.	 Further	qualitative	research	will	offer	a	more	fine-grained	view	of	the	domestic	factors	that	have	not	been	 included	 in	 the	analysis	which	can	offer	a	more	detailed	account	of	the	medium	level	of	design	in	their	cases.			 Support	 for	 the	 second	 path	 is	 confirmed	 by	 considering	 the	 easy	counterfactuals	 among	 the	 logical	 remainders.	 The	 easy	 counterfactuals	 for	 the	second	 path	 include	 combinations	 that	 have	 countries	with	 UN	 accreditation	 that	are	new	democracies	but	have	not	been	part	of	EU	conditionality	programmes	(Line	
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11	 in	 truth	 table).	 An	 additional	 counterfactual	 path	 includes	 countries	 with	 UN	accreditation	 that	 are	 not	 new	 democracies	 but	 have	 been	 objected	 to	 EU	conditionality	 (Line	 10	 in	 truth	 table).	 As	 the	 truth	 table	 indicates,	 these	combinations	of	factors	leading	to	a	strong	outcome	are	not	observed	empirically.		
	
Table	5.5.	Truth	table	for	outcome	STRONG	(after	minimisation)		 UN.
AC	
ADOP
T	
NE
WD
EM	
EUC
OND	
OU
T	
INCL
/PRI	
Cases	
1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0.000	 Iceland,	Italy	2	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0.333	 Cyprus,	Malta,	Turkey	4	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1	 0.800	 Czech	Rep,	Latvia,	Lithuania,	Montenegro,	Romania	8	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1.000	 Estonia	9	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0.714	 Belgium,	Germany,	Greece,	Ireland,	Luxembourg,	Netherlands,	United	Kingdom	12	 1	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0.500	 Albania,	Bosnia	&	Herzegovina,	Bulgaria,	Croatia,	Macedonia,	Serbia,	Slovakia,	Slovenia	13	 1	 1	 0	 0	 1	 0.714	 Austria,	Denmark,	Finland,	France,	Portugal,	Spain,	Sweden	16	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0.500	 Hungary,	Poland	
	
	
5.4.2.	Outcome:	weak	institutional	design		The	analysis	of	the	combinations	of	conditions	that	are	sufficient	for	the	outcome	to	be	a	weak	institutional	design	indicate	one	path	–	countries	without	strong	human	rights	 identities	 that	 are	 not	 newly	 democratised,	 have	 never	 undergone	 the	 UN	
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accreditation	 process	 and	 have	 not	 been	 objected	 to	 EU	 conditionality.	 The	 two	country	cases	that	illustrate	this	path	are	Italy	and	Iceland	have	different	histories	of	human	 rights	 and	 ombudsman	 institutions	 and	 different	 relationship	 with	 the	European	Union..	The	model	below	shows	the	results	of	the	analysis	for	the	outcome	‘WEAK’	 presenting	 one	 combination	 of	 conditions	 sufficient	 for	 a	 country	 to	 have	the	outcome	‘weak’.			
Model	2:	un.ac*adopt*newdem*eucond	=>	WEAK		
Table	5.6.	Model	(outcome	=	WEAK)	
	 PRI/incl	 cov	 Cases	un.ac*adopt*newdem*eucond	 1.000	 0.667	 Iceland,	Italy	M1	 1.000	 0.667	 	Total:	35;	No	of	multiple-covered	cases:	0;	inclusion	cut:	0.7				 Italy	 does	 not	 have	 a	 unique	 national	 human	 rights	 institution	 or	 an	ombudsman,	but	rather	a	well-developed	regional	and	local	ombudsman	system.	In	1994,	 the	 National	 Coordination	 Body	 of	 Regional	 Ombudsmen	 in	 Italy	 was	constituted,	 holding	 regular	 conferences	 with	 all	 of	 its	 members.	 The	 general	functions	of	each	regional	and	local	ombudsman	are	broadly	similar	to	the	one	of	a	national	ombudsman,	but	 the	 implementation	of	 its	measures	 respond	 to	 regional	and	local	needs	and	realities.	Italy	has	no	other	independent	body	that	performs	the	functions	of	a	national	human	rights	institution.			 Iceland	presents	a	different	case	from	Italy,	with	different	factors	accounting	for	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 national	 human	 rights	 institution.	 Iceland	 has	 a	 Parliamentary	
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Ombudsman,	 the	 Althing	 Ombudsman,	 which	 monitors	 the	 activity	 of	 public	administration	 offices	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 regulating	 the	 relationship	 between	public	offices	and	citizens.	It	does	not	have	a	wide	remit	of	fundamental	or	human	rights	 protection.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 Althing	Ombudsman,	 Iceland	 has	 one	Human	Rights	 Centre	 that	 is	 an	 independent	 NGO	 carrying	 out	 human	 rights	 promotion	work	 and	 research	 (Icelandic	 Human	 Rights	 Centre	 2016).	 Iceland	 is	 not	 an	 EU	member	 state	 but	 does	 belong	 to	 the	 European	 Economic	 Area.	 It	 applied	 for	accession	 in	 2009	 and	 began	 negotiations	 in	 2010,	 but	 in	 2013,	 the	 Government	suspended	its	application	and	dissolved	the	accession	team.	In	March	2015,	Iceland	has	officially	withdrawn	its	application	for	membership.				
Table	5.7.	Truth	table	for	outcome	WEAK	(after	minimisation)		 UN.
AC	
ADOP
T	
NE
WD
EM	
EUC
OND	
OU
T	
INCL
/PRI	
Cases	
1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	 1.000	 Iceland,	Italy	2	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0.333	 Cyprus,	Malta,	Turkey	4	 0	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0.000	 Czech	Rep,	Latvia,	Lithuania,	Montenegro,	Romania	5	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0.000	 Finland	8	 0	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0.000	 Estonia	9	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0.000	 Belgium,	Germany,	Greece,	Ireland,	Luxembourg,	Netherlands,	United	Kingdom	12	 1	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0.000	 Albania,	Bulgaria,	Croatia	,	Macedonia,	Serbia,	Slovakia,	Slovenia	13	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0.000	 Austria,	Denmark,	France,	Portugal,	Spain,	Sweden	16	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0.000	 Hungary	Poland		
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5.5.	Illustrative	Case	Discussions		
	This	section	presents	a	few	brief	case	studies	intended	to	provide	illustrations	of	the	interplay	of	factors	found	to	be	sufficient	for	the	outcome	‘strong’.	The	case	studies	build	 on	 information	 based	 on	 publicly	 available	 documentary	 evidence	 including	annual	 reports,	 country	 constitutions	and	national	 legislation	used	also	 for	 coding	purposes.	 Additional	 sources	 include	 also	 country	 surveys	 I	 carried	 out	 over	 the	Internet	and	via	surface	post	and	country	progress	reports	issued	by	the	European	Commission	assessing	the	performance	of	states	that	are	candidates	to	membership	in	the	EU.	These	cases	provide	an	illustration	for	the	analysis	and	are	intended	to	lay	out	 a	 case	 study	agenda	 for	 further	qualitative	work	 that	 can	provide	an	 in-depth	look	at	the	institutional	and	domestic	dynamics	in	each	country.			 The	first	cases	under	discussion	present	countries	that	illustrate	the	first	and	the	 second	 combinatory	 paths	 despite	 not	 having	 strong	 institutions	 –	 Sweden,	Romania,	Austria,	and	Montenegro.	These	cases	offers	preliminary	 insight	 into	 the	reasons	 why	 these	 institutions	 do	 not	 have	 strong	 institutional	 designs	 despite	meeting	 all	 other	 conditions	 to	 have	 the	 outcome	 ‘strong’.	 The	 subsequent	 case	studies	 present	 a	 preliminary	discussion	 of	 countries	with	 strong	national	 human	rights	institutions	which	illustrate	the	two	paths	to	having	a	strong	outcome.	Some	of	 the	 countries	 share	 historical	 legacies	 that	 are	 also	 visible	 in	 the	 institutional	models	 they	 adopt	 for	 the	 promotion	 and	 protection	 of	 citizens’	 rights	 and,	more	recently,	for	their	national	human	rights	institutions.	
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5.5.1.	Institutions	with	Medium	Strength			
5.5.1.1.	Sweden’s	Ombudsman	System	
	The	very	first	country	to	establish	an	ombudsman,	Sweden	is	the	globally	credited	role	model	of	 rights	protection	 institution.	The	country	has	a	strong	human	rights	identity	evident	 through	 its	 longstanding	 tradition	of	 liberal	democracy,	grounded	in	 the	 protection	 of	 citizens’	 rights	 as	 well	 as	 the	 control	 and	 monitoring	 of	government	 work.	 Despite	 its	 well-developed	 national	 and	 regional	 ombudsman	system,	 Sweden	 does	 not	 have	 a	 single	 independent	 national	 human	 rights	institution.	Upon	 accreditation	 in	 2011,	 the	 ICC’s	 Sub-Committee	 on	Accreditation	recommended	 the	 strengthening	 of	 institutional	 design	 for	 the	 Equality	Ombudsman	 and	 an	 increased	 collaboration	 with	 the	 bodies	 that	 coordinate	 the	NHRI	networks	at	 the	European	 level	 (ECNHRI)	and	 the	global	 level	as	well	 (UN’s	OHCHR).		 The	 country	 with	 the	 very	 first	 ombudsman	 –	 the	 Justice	 Ombudsman	(Justitieombudsmannen)	established	 in	1809	–	Sweden	 is	universally	credited	with	the	creation	of	a	unique	institutional	model.	Since	its	inception,	the	ombudsman	has	come	 to	 be	 adopted	 by	 over	 150	 countries	 in	 the	world.	 Although	 the	 designs	 of	ombudsman	 are	 diverse	 and	 respond	 to	 country	 specific	 needs,	 all	 subsequent	models	retain	 the	main	 functions	of	 the	 initial	 institution	–	safeguard	the	rights	of	citizens,	 handle	 complaints,	monitor	 the	 judiciary	 and	 oversee	 the	work	 of	 public	administration	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 supporting	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 securing	
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accountability.	Although	a	new	institutional	model	through	its	direct	subordination	to	 Parliament,	 the	 institutional	 concept	 of	 the	 ombudsman	 had	 already	 been	 in	existence	 in	 the	 18th	 century.	 In	 1713,	 King	 Karl	 III	 established	 the	 King’s	 High	Ombudsman,	 in	 charge	 of	 overseeing	 the	 activity	 of	 personnel	 in	 public	administration	institutions.	At	the	time,	he	had	been	abroad	for	over	13	years	and	appointed	the	King’s	Ombudsman	as	his	representative	in	the	country	whose	main	responsibility	 was	 to	 restore	 order	 and	 oversee	 the	 work	 of	 public	 bodies	(Riskdagens	 Ombudsmaen	 2016).	 Another	 such	 body	 was	 the	 Attorney	 General,	(Justitiekansler),	 which	 was	 established	 in	 the	 early	 17th	 century	 as	 a	 domestic	official	who	was	empowered	to	supervise	the	application	of	the	 law	by	 judges	and	other	 officials	 and	whose	 office	 had	 long	 been	 a	 part	 of	 the	 royal	 administration	(Jaegerskjoeld	 1961).	 For	 most	 of	 its	 existence,	 the	 Attorney	 General	 was	subordinated	 to	 the	 government,	 although	 the	 Parliament	 did	 succeed	 to	 have	 a	degree	of	power	over	it	for	short	periods	of	time.	Nearly	a	century	later	King	Gustav	III,	 who	 believed	 in	 the	 principles	 of	 separation	 of	 state	 powers,	 established	 the	Justice	 Ombudsman	 as	 ‘the	 prosecutor	 in	 actions	 of	 impeachment’	 (Jaegerskjoeld	1961)	through	inclusion	in	the	1809	Constitution,	subordinated	it	to	Parliament	and	mandated	it	with	the	powers	to	inspect	the	work	of	government.			 The	Ombudsman	played	a	prominent	 role	 in	 the	 realm	of	 rights	protection	even	 prior	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 human	 rights	 regime	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	World	War	 II.	On	many	occasions,	 the	Ombudsman	pioneered	work	 in	 the	 field	of	civil	 rights,	 playing	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 development	 of	 rules	 about	 freedom	 of	assembly,	 speech,	 religion	and	press,	as	well	as	about	access	 to	public	documents.	
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Its	role	was	even	more	noteworthy	in	times	of	political	unrest,	such	as	the	general	strike	 of	 1909	 and	 the	 two	world	wars	 (Jaegerskjoeld	 1961).	 In	many	 civil	 rights	areas,	where	the	Ombudsman	was	involved	in	complaint	handling,	the	courts	have	since	 adopted	 his	 opinion.	 Today	 Sweden	 does	 not	 have	 a	 single	 national	 human	rights	 institution,	 but	 rather	 a	 system	 of	 ombudsmen	 bodies	 mandated	 with	 the	decentralised	protection	of	rights.	The	Justice	Ombudsman	continues	its	work	with	the	primary	 function	of	overseeing	 law-making,	 the	activity	of	 the	courts,	with	the	goal	 to	 insure	 the	 protection	 of	 fundamental	 rights	 (Riksdagens	 Ombudsmaen	2016).			 In	 addition,	 the	 Equality	 Ombudsman	 (Diskrimineringsombudsmannen)	 is	charged	with	supervising	the	laws	relating	to	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	sexual	orientation,	ethnicity,	religion	or	other	belief,	disability,	or	sexual	orientation	or	age.	It	 began	 its	 activity	 in	2009,	 as	 a	 result	 of	merging	 four	 existing	ombudsmen	 that	were	 mandated	 with	 the	 protection	 and	 promotion	 of	 different	 types	 of	 human	rights.	 In	 2011,	 the	 Equality	 Ombudsman	 underwent	 the	 UN-led	 accreditation	process	for	the	first	time,	and	the	International	Coordination	Committee	granted	it	B	status.	 The	 recommendations	 included	 in	 the	 accreditation	 report	 target	 the	mandate	 and	 independence	of	 the	 institution.	Although	more	 centralised	 than	 the	earlier	 institutional	 network	 charged	 with	 rights	 protection,	 the	 focus	 of	 the	Equality	Ombudsman’s	work	 is	 too	narrowly	centred	on	antidiscrimination	 issues,	leaving	 unaddressed	 a	 spectrum	 of	 human	 rights.	 Thus,	 the	 peer-review	recommendation	 is	 to	 give	 the	 institution	 a	 broad	 human	 rights	mandate,	 in	 line	with	 the	 Paris	 Principles.	 Moreover,	 the	 institution	 is	 now	 under	 the	 control	 of	
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government	–	the	accreditation	report	proposes	the	strengthening	of	the	institution	by	 increasing	 its	 independence	 through	direct	subordination	 to	Parliament.	 It	also	notes	the	requirement	for	“a	clear,	transparent	and	participatory	selection	process	that	promotes	the	independence	of,	and	public	confidence	in	the	senior	 leadership	of	a	national	human	rights	institution	(ICC	Sub-Committee	on	Accreditation	Report	2011,	pp.9-10).”	In	order	to	have	a	strong	institution,	the	ICC	recommends	that	the	Swedish	 Equality	 Ombudsman	 seek	 advice	 and	 assistance	 from	 OHCHR	 and	 the	European	Coordinating	Committee	of	NHRIs.		 		
5.5.1.2.	The	People’s	Advocate	of	Romania		Romania	 is	 a	 newly	 democratised	 country	 that	 joined	 the	 EU	 in	 2007,	 alongside	Bulgaria.	 It	has	a	 relatively	 strong	ombudsman	 institution,	The	People’s	Advocate,	assessed	 at	 medium	 level	 of	 design	 –	 the	 focus	 of	 its	 activities	 has	 been	 on	 the	protection	 fundamental	 and	 human	 rights	 in	 citizens’	 interactions	 with	 state	officials	and	all	staff	in	the	public	administration.	The	medium-level	evaluation	of	its	strength	is	justified	by	the	missing	capacity	to	carry	out	any	promotional	work	that	would	 raise	 awareness	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 of	 its	 own	 activities,	 any	 research	 or	educational	 activities.	 The	 People’s	 Advocate	 is	 the	 first	 such	 institution	 to	 be	established	 in	 a	 post-communist	 country,	 through	 inclusion	 alongside	 the	Constitutional	Court	in	the	first	democratic	Constitution	of	Romania	passed	in	1991	(Romanian	Ombudsman	 2016).	 The	 Swedish	Ombudsman	 provided	 inspiration	 to	policymakers	 at	 the	 time,	while	 the	model	 of	 the	People’s	Advocate	 is	 of	 a	hybrid	
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ombudsman	charged	with	both	oversight	of	government	and	public	administration	and	the	protection	of	human	rights	 (Romanian	Ombudsman	2016).	The	 ICC’s	Sub-Committee	 for	 Accreditation	 assessed	 a	 different	 Romanian	 institution,	 the	Romanian	Institute	for	Human	Rights	(IRDO),	established	in	2003	with	the	purposes	of	 carrying	 out	 research,	 training,	 dissemination	 of	 information	 and	 consultancy	(IRDO	2016).	The	Institute	has	been	assessed	as	having	C	status,	and	has	had	very	limited	 activity	 overall.	 The	 ICC	never	 assessed	 the	performance	 of	 the	Romanian	Ombudsman.		 The	People’s	Advocate	is	one	of	the	key	institutions	included	in	the	country	progress	 reports	 drafted	 by	 the	 European	 Commission,	 as	 a	 pillar	 in	 the	 national	efforts	 to	 increase	 the	 protection	 of	 fundamental	 and	 human	 rights.	 From	 1998	when	the	first	progress	reports	was	published,	until	2007	when	Romania	joined	the	EU,	 the	 remit	 of	 the	 Ombudsman	 institution	 increased	 to	 cover	 not	 only	 the	protection	 of	 civil	 and	 social	 rights,	 but	 also	 individual	 rights	 linked	 to	 land	restitution,	 issues	 linked	 to	 the	 equality	 of	 men	 and	 women,	 minority	 rights	protection	 (with	 a	 focus	 on	 the	protection	of	 the	Roma	 community’s	 rights),	 anti-discrimination,	and	child	rights	protection.	A	later	addition	to	the	People’s	Advocate	is	the	office	dedicated	to	the	protection	of	personal	data,	entitled	the	Data	Protection	Directorate	–	this	body	was	created	in	order	to	address	the	accession	requirements	linked	 to	Convention	108	of	 the	Council	of	Europe,	 ratified	 in	2002,	 regarding	 the	processing	of	personal	data	and	the	free	movement	of	this	data.	The	Ombudsman	is	independent	and	autonomous,	can	carry	out	investigations	on	cases	on	the	basis	of	
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individual	 complaints,	 reports	 to	 Parliament	 annually	 and	 can	 also	 advise	policymakers	on	areas	of	its	legal	competency.		 Romania	 has	 a	 generally	well-functioning	Ombudsman	 institution.	 In	 order	to	 strengthen	 its	 design	 and	 also	work	 toward	 compliance,	 the	 People’s	 Advocate	would	benefit	 from	either	a	broadening	of	 its	mandate	 to	 incorporate	also	human	rights	 promotional	 and	 research	 capacity,	 or	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 existing	 (or	the	creation	of	a	new)	Institute	for	Human	Rights	with	which	to	collaborate	closely.	A	 newly	 democratised	 country	 of	 the	 post-Soviet	 block,	 Romania	 showed	 its	commitment	 to	 democratic	 transition	 through	 establishing	 the	 Ombudsman	relatively	 early,	 in	 1991.	 The	 strengthening	 of	 Ombudsman’s	 institutional	 design	occurred	 through	 a	 coordination	 of	 domestic	 political	will	 and	 continued	 support	from	 the	 European	 Union	 throughout	 the	 accession	 process	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	country	progress	reports.		
	
5.5.1.3.	Austria’s	Ombudsman	Board	
	As	 indicated	 by	 the	QCA	 results,	 Austria	meets	 the	 sufficient	 conditions	 to	 have	 a	strong	national	 human	 rights	 institution	 –	 namely,	 it	 adopted	 its	 institution	 early,	prior	 to	 1980,	 and	 has	 also	 undergone	 the	 accreditation	 process.	 Nonetheless,	Austria’s	Ombudsman	Board	is	an	institution	with	B	level	accreditation	status	by	the	ICC’s	Sub-Committee	on	Accreditation,	 granted	both	 in	2000	and	once	again	upon	re-accreditation	in	2011.		
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	 Political	 disagreement	 on	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 Board	 and	 lack	 of	Parliamentary	support	impacted	negatively	on	the	strengthening	of	the	institution’s	design	 in	 the	 early	 years.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 insufficient	 effort	 to	 increase	 the	capacity	 and	 independence	 of	 the	 human	 rights	 protection	 and	 promotion	component	 has	 prevented	 the	 institution	 from	 achieving	 a	 strong	 design.	 The	Ombudsman	Board	was	established	 through	a	governmental	decision	 in	1970	and	represented	the	culmination	of	decades	of	public	calls	for	its	creation	after	the	end	of	World	War	II.	Although	a	draft	for	an	amendment	to	the	Federal	Constitution	at	the	 start	 of	 1971	 stipulated	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 new	 “federal	 attorneyship”,	 party	representatives	did	not	reach	an	agreement	on	the	composition	of	the	Board	at	the	time	 (AOB	 2016).	 After	 a	 new	 government	 attempt	 in	 1975,	 all	 members	 of	Parliament	 reached	 an	 agreement	 in	 early	 1977	on	 a	 new	Federal	 Law	 specifying	the	existence	and	powers	of	the	Board.	The	Law,	however,	was	only	provisional	 in	nature	 until	 1981,	 when	 public	 support	 for	 the	 Ombudsman	 Board	 incentivised	Parliament	 to	 include	 the	 provisions	 on	 the	 institution	 in	 the	 Austrian	 Federal	Constitution.			 In	 July	 2012,	 the	 capacity	 of	 the	 Board	 was	 extended	 to	 include	 also	 an	explicit	mandate	 for	 protecting	 and	 promoting	 human	 rights.	 In	 the	 2011	Report,	the	Sub-Committee	on	Accreditation	assesses	the	efforts	to	include	a	human	rights	mandate	 as	 insufficient.	 While	 the	 Ombudsman	 Board	 now	 includes	 also	 an	instrument	 dedicated	 to	 providing	 preventive	 human	 rights	 monitoring	 in	 the	country	and	oversees	the	enactment	of	OPCAT	implementation	legislation,	the	scope	of	 its	 human	 rights	 mandate	 is	 still	 not	 general	 enough.	 The	 remit	 of	 the	
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Ombudsman	Boars	is	restricted	to	state	powers	and	does	not	have	competence	over	the	 private	 sector	 (ICC	 Sub-Committee	 on	 Accreditation	 Report	 2011	 p.11).	Additionally,	 the	 independence	 of	 the	 institution’s	 mandate	 and	 activities	 from	political	 interference	is	not	secured	as	the	members	of	the	Board	are	elected	upon	recommendation	of	the	three	major	political	parties	and	often	the	members	of	the	Board	 are	 former	 elected	 representatives.	 The	 transparency	 and	 participatory	nature	of	the	Ombudsman	Board’s	selection	and	appointment	are	key	conditions	for	the	independence	and	pluralism	of	the	Board	as	an	NHRI.	The	Austrian	Ombudsman	lacks	 also	 a	 structured	 approach	 to	 establishing	 strong	 relationships	 with	 civil	society	 (ICC	 Sub-Committee	 on	 Accreditation	 Report	 2011,	 p.11).	 Closer	 ties	with	the	OHCHR	and	the	European	Coordinating	Committee	of	NHRIs	are	also	part	of	the	recommendations	 by	 the	 Sub-Committee	 on	 Accreditation	 to	 the	 Austrian	Ombudsman	Board.			 Austria	 is	 an	established	 liberal	democracy	and	an	EU	member	 since	1995.	Its	Ombudsman	Board	has	undergone	the	accreditation	process	twice	being	granted	B	 status	 twice.	 Despite	 meeting	 all	 sufficient	 conditions	 for	 having	 a	 strong	institution,	other	necessary	factors	appear	to	be	preventing	the	Ombudsman	Board	from	reaching	the	strongest	level	of	institutional	design.	Direct	political	interference	in	 the	 leadership	 of	 the	 institution	 jeopardises	 its	 independence.	 Moreover,	 the	scope	 of	 the	 mandate	 on	 human	 rights	 promotion	 and	 prevention	 is	 still	 rather	limited.	 Given	 that	 provisions	 to	 expand	 on	 the	 Board’s	 mandate	 to	 incorporate	human	rights	are	very	recent	(2012),	it	is	possible	that	the	coming	years	will	see	a	further	strengthening	of	institutional	power	and	the	human	rights	remit.		
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5.5.1.4.	Protector	of	Human	Rights	and	Freedoms	of	Montenegro		The	 Montenegrin	 Ombudsman,	 the	 Protector	 of	 Rights,	 is	 an	 independent	 and	autonomous	 institution	 charged	with	protecting	 and	promoting	human	 rights	 and	freedoms	 in	cases	of	violations	by	government	authorities	and	all	other	holders	of	public	offices	(EQUINET	2015).	Established	 in	2003	by	Law	passed	by	Parliament,	the	Ombudsman	performs	 its	duties	 as	protector	of	human	 rights	 in	 line	with	 the	provisions	 in	 the	 country	 Constitution.	 One	 of	 its	 functions	 is	 to	 raise	 awareness	regarding	the	importance	of	the	rule	of	law	and	the	importance	of	legal	certainty,	as	well	 as	 the	 lawful	 and	 partial	 work	 of	 state	 authorities	 when	 interacting	 with	citizens.	The	Ombudsman	is	also	active	 in	the	field	of	anti-discrimination,	where	it	carries	out	promotional	and	protection	work	as	well,	handling	complaints	and	also	supporting	awareness	raising	efforts.			 Based	 on	 survey	 results,	 the	 analysis	 of	 official	 documentation,	 and	 the	country	progress	reports,	 the	Ombudsman	of	Montenegro	 is	a	generally	 functional	and	strong	 institution.	 It	 is	relatively	young	and	operating	 independently	 from	the	Serbian	 equivalent	 since	 only	 2006,	 but	 its	 efforts	 to	 carry	 out	 investigations	 and	casework	 have	 been	 significant.	 In	 the	 country	 progress	 reports,	 the	 European	Commission	assesses	the	institution	today	as	functional	but	in	need	of	strengthening	both	 through	 higher	 levels	 of	 funding,	 consolidation	 of	 its	 independence	 through	legislation,	 and	 increased	 respect	 for	 its	 work	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 state	 offices	responsible	for	 implementing	the	measures	it	recommends.	The	overall	evaluation	of	the	Ombudsman’s	activities	has	been	positive.	However,	the	recommendation	to	
		 277	
strengthen	 institutional	 design	 has	 remained	 a	 constant	 since	 the	 first	 progress	report	 in	 2007.	 Over	 the	 years	 covered	 by	 the	 country	 reports,	 the	 remit	 of	 the	Ombudsman	has	expanded	 to	 incorporate	a	 range	of	different	 rights	–	 from	being	mandated	 with	 the	 protection	 of	 citizens’	 rights	 more	 broadly	 in	 2007,	 it	 also	becomes	responsible	for	the	prevention	of	torture	and	ill-treatment	in	particular	in	cases	 of	 detention,	 minority	 rights,	 anti-discrimination,	 as	 well	 as	 women’s	 and	children’s	rights.	The	reports	assess	the	general	country	situation	and	institutional	performance	 on	 all	 of	 the	 above	 rights,	 making	 recommendations	 for	 their	improvement.			 	Montenegro	 is	 the	 only	 country	 in	 the	QCA	 cluster	 of	 newly	 democratised	states	 that	 are	 objected	 to	 EU	 conditionality	 undergoing	 today.	 Its	 Ombudsman	meets	 the	 conditions	 sufficient	 for	 a	 strong	national	human	 rights	 institution.	The	institution	existed	prior	to	the	start	of	the	accession	negotiations	with	the	European	Union,	 but	 it	 has	 achieved	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	 its	 powers	 since	 2010,	 when	Montenegro	 was	 granted	 candidate	 country	 status.	 The	 country	 progress	 reports	focus	extensively	on	the	institution	and	call	for	its	strengthening	as	it	is	considered	a	pillar	in	the	efforts	to	align	legislation	and	ensure	the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	 rights	 in	 the	 country.	 The	 Ombudsman	 has	 been	 actively	 involved	 in	 a	number	of	international	networks,	both	European	and	sub-regional	with	a	focus	on	the	Balkans	or	the	Mediterranean,	and	is	in	the	final	stages	of	accreditation	with	the	Global	Alliance	of	National	Human	Rights	Institutions	(formerly	ICC).		
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5.5.2.	Institutions	with	strong	design		
	
5.5.2.1.	The	Ombudsman	of	the	Republic	of	Latvia	
	The	 Latvian	Ombudsman	 follows	 a	 hybrid	 institutional	model	 that	 combines	 both	the	case-based	functions	of	a	classical	ombudsman	in	charge	of	fundamental	rights	protection	against	violations	of	the	state	administration	and	the	broad	human	rights	promotion	 and	 protection	 functions	 of	 a	 national	 human	 rights	 institution.	 At	 the	time	 data	 was	 collected	 on	 all	 countries	 and	 institutions	 included	 in	 this	 study,	Latvia	 had	 not	 applied	 for	 accreditation	 with	 the	 ICC’s	 Sub-Committee	 on	Accreditation.	In	March	2015,	however,	the	Ombudsman	was	reviewed	and	received	A	 status.	 This	 outcome	 of	 the	 peer-review	 process	 confirms	 the	 findings	 of	 the	qualitative	assessment	of	documentation	and	 the	 survey	 results,	which	 found	 that	the	design	of	the	Ombudsman	institution	is	strong.			 The	Ombudsman	of	the	Republic	of	Latvia	is	an	official	elected	by	Parliament	on	a	remit	“to	encourage	the	protection	of	human	rights	and	the	promotion	of	a	legal	and	 expedient	 State	 authority,	 which	 observes	 the	 principles	 of	 good	administration”	 (Latvian	 Ombudsman	 2013).	 The	 Ombudsman	 Law,	 adopted	 in	April	 2006,	 regulates	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 Ombudsman,	 which	 came	 into	 force	 in	January	2007.	Appointed	 for	a	 five-year	 term,	 the	Ombudsman	acts	 independently	and	 without	 influence	 from	 any	 other	 person	 or	 public	 institution,	 being	 only	governed	by	the	law.	The	Ombudsman	is	organised	in	four	main	legal	divisions	and	two	 assisting	 divisions	 –	 the	 division	 of	 civil	 and	 political	 rights;	 the	 division	 of	
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social,	 economic	 and	 cultural	 rights;	 the	 division	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 children	 and	 the	division	of	equality	before	the	law,	all	supported	by	the	Administrative	Division	and	the	Chancery	(Latvian	Ombudsman	2013).	The	institution	is	also	in	charge	with	the	national	 implementation	 of	 European	 law	 promoting	 the	 principle	 of	 equal	treatment	between	persons	irrespective	of	racial	or	ethnic	origin	(Council	Directive	No	 2000/43/EC);	 equal	 treatment	 between	 men	 and	 women	 in	 the	 access	 and	supply	of	goods	and	services	(Council	Directive	No	2004/113/EC)	and	the	Council	Directive	 No	 2006/54/EC	 on	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 equal	opportunities	 and	 equal	 treatment	 of	men	 and	women	 in	matters	 of	 employment	and	occupation.			 The	oversight	and	guidance	of	the	European	Union	is	arguably	most	visible	in	the	 process	 of	 creating	 the	 Ombudsman	 institution.	 The	 European	 Commission’s	country	progress	 reports	 recommended	 that	 the	Latvian	government	build	on	 the	institutional	 foundation	 of	 the	 existing	 and	 independent	 National	 Human	 Rights	Office	that	had	been	established	 in	1996,	 to	create	an	Ombudsman	institution	that	could	be	in	charge	of	both	promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights	in	the	country.	In	 1998,	 the	 Cabinet	 adopted	 a	 medium-term	 strategy	 that	 included	 a	 series	 of	systemic	 reforms	 to	 improve	 the	 efficiency	 and	 design	 of	 public	 administration	institutions.	 One	 of	 the	main	 tasks	was	 to	 create	 an	 Ombudsman	 office.	With	 the	support	 and	 encouragement	 of	 the	OSCE	 country	 office,	 an	 expert	 committee	was	formed	in	order	to	collaborate	with	similar	types	of	institutions	abroad	and	acquire	information	 about	 the	 design	 and	 functions	 of	 ombudsmen	 based	 on	 their	experiences.	The	committee	recommended	that	the	National	Human	Rights	Office	be	
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transformed	 into	 an	 Ombudsman	 office.	 The	 government	 had	 not	 made	 much	progress	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 committee’s	 decision	 by	 the	time	the	OSCE	country	mission	closed	down	or	by	2004,	when	Latvia	joined	the	EU.	In	 2006,	 however,	 the	 Law	 of	 the	 Ombudsman	 was	 passed	 and	 the	 institution	became	 functional.	 Over	 the	 span	 of	 the	 following	 decade,	 the	 cooperation	 with	international	 peer	 institutions	 as	 part	 of	 international	 networks	 increased,	 and	 in	particular,	active	collaboration	with	European	networks	intensified.			 The	Ombudsman	of	the	Republic	of	Latvia	provides	an	example	of	a	body	that	morphed	 over	 the	 years	 into	 a	 full-fledged	 A	 status	 institution.	 At	 the	 strong	encouragement	 of	 European	 institutions,	 the	 Ombudsman	 became	 operational	 in	2006,	on	the	basis	of	an	existing	institutional	foundation	of	a	National	Human	Rights	Office,	which	was	modified	 to	 include	also	rights	protection	duties	and	case-based	investigations.	 The	 creation	 of	 an	 Ombudsman	 was	 a	 priority	 for	 the	 EU	 that	remained	 a	 constant	 in	 the	 monitoring	 of	 country	 progress	 in	 the	 annual	 pre-accession	 reports.	 Deliberate	 effort	 on	 the	 part	 of	 domestic	 actors	 to	 collaborate	with	external	partners	and	 learn	 from	 institutional	 experiences	 in	other	 countries	was	a	key	element	to	learning	and	policy	change.				
5.5.2.2.	Estonia’s	Chancellor	of	Justice	
	Estonia’s	 Chancellor	 of	 Justice	 is	 a	 unique	 institution	 in	 the	 cluster	 of	 newly	democratised	 European	 countries.	 Established	 as	 early	 as	 1938,	 the	 Chancellor	 of	Justice	 makes	 Estonia	 an	 early	 adopting	 country.	 The	 institutional	 design	 of	 the	
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Chancellor’s	 office	 follows	 an	 institutional	 model	 in	 existence	 in	 the	 Sweden	 and	Finland	 countries	 since	 the	 early	 18th	 century,	 illustrating	 a	 likely	 cross-border	learning	process	 facilitated	by	 the	close	cultural	and	historic	 ties	between	Finland	and	 Estonia.	 In	 its	 first	 iteration,	 the	 Chancellor	 of	 Justice	 was	 established	 to	guarantee	 the	 legality	 of	 public	 authority	 and	 provide	 legal	 assistance	 to	 the	President	of	the	Republic	(Chancellery	of	the	Chancellor	of	Justice	2015).	During	the	time	Soviet	era,	the	institution	was	closed	down,	but	the	continuity	of	the	institution	was	preserved	from	1949-1981	by	Artur	Maegi,	who	was	Chancellor	of	Justice	with	the	Estonian	government-in-exile	and	one	of	the	authors	of	the	1938	Constitution	of	the	Republic	 of	 Estonia.	 In	 1992	 Constitution,	 the	 institution	was	 restored	 on	 the	basis	of	continuity.	The	Chancellor	of	Justice	widened	its	remit	through	inclusion	of	explicit	ombudsman	functions	in	1999,	when	it	was	assigned	the	duties	to	guarantee	the	protection	 of	 the	 constitutional	 rights	 and	 freedoms	of	 people	 (Chancellery	 of	the	 Chancellor	 of	 Justice	 2015).	 Since	 2007,	 it	 is	 also	 the	 national	 preventative	mechanism	implementing	the	provisions	of	the	Optional	Protocol	to	the	Convention	against	Torture	and	Other	Cruel,	Inhuman	or	Degrading	Treatment	or	Punishment.			 The	 design	 of	 the	 institution	 is	 unique,	 as	 it	 combines	 fundamental	 and	human	 rights	 protection,	 government	 advisory	 roles,	 and	 the	 preservation	 of	constitutionality	in	the	country.	In	other	words,	in	addition	to	classical	ombudsman	functions,	it	has	the	power	to	review	the	application	of	the	legislative	and	executive	powers	 of	 the	 state	 and	 of	 local	 governments	 to	 assess	 conformity	 with	 the	Constitution	and	national	laws.	The	European	Commission	mentions	the	institution	extensively	 in	 four	of	the	five	country	progress	reports	prior	to	accession	in	2004.	
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The	main	 focus	of	 the	reports	 is	on	 the	ombudsman	 functions,	especially	 the	ones	centred	on	 rights	 protection,	which	were	 added	onto	 the	 institutional	mandate	 in	1999.	 The	 major	 challenges	 the	 institution	 had	 were	 the	 integration	 of	 the	ombudsman	 functions	 with	 the	 existing	 activities	 of	 the	 Chancellor	 of	 Justice,	 an	increase	in	public	visibility	and	activity,	higher	funding,	and	an	improvement	in	the	capacity	to	handle	issues	related	to	minority	rights	protection.	In	its	early	stages	of	development,	 the	 institution	 received	 support	 from	 the	 national	 OSCE	 office.	 In	2002,	 when	 the	 country	 office	 closed,	 the	 European	 Commission	 in	 its	 progress	report	 called	 for	 strengthened	 capacity	 and	 financial	 independence	 of	 the	Ombudsman	with	the	help	of	the	government.	Following	the	accession	of	Estonia	in	the	EU,	the	capacity	of	the	 institution	continued	to	strengthen	both	financially	and	through	further	integration	of	all	of	its	functions.			 On	 the	 basis	 of	 survey	 and	 report-based	 data,	 Estonia’s	 Chancellor	 has	 a	strong	 design.	 Among	 the	 cases	 discussed	 in	 this	 analysis,	 Estonia’s	 Chancellor	 of	Justice	 is	 a	 distinctive	 institution.	An	 earlier	model	 of	 the	 institution	was	 adopted	early,	in	1938,	following	the	example	of	Finland	and	Sweden	that	had	a	longstanding	tradition	 of	 these	 consultative	 bodies	 to	 the	 king	 or	 the	 government.	 Despite	 the	facilities	closed	down	during	the	Soviet	era,	the	institutional	model	continued	in	the	diaspora	 and	 was	 reactivated	 after	 Estonia	 declared	 independence	 in	 the	 post-Soviet	era.	Rights-centred	ombudsman	functions	were	added	to	the	mandate	of	the	Chancellor	 in	 1999	 and	 subsequent	 years,	 as	 a	 response	 to	 pre-accession	requirements	by	the	European	Commission.	The	further	integration	of	the	two	main	
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functions	as	well	 as	efforts	 to	 strengthen	 the	capacity	of	 the	Chancellor	 continued	after	Estonia	became	an	EU	member.		
	
5.5.2.3.	Lithuania	
	Lithuania	 has	 a	 strong	 system	 of	 ombudsman	 institutions	 safeguarding	 human	rights	 an	 individual	 freedoms	 through	 both	 promotion	 and	 protection	 work,	grouped	 under	 the	 Seima’s	 Ombudsmen	Office.	 The	 ombudsman	 offices	 include	 a	general	 Ombudsman	 focused	 on	 complaint	 handling,	 and	 Children’s	 Ombudsman	and	 an	 Ombudsman	 for	 Equal	 Opportunity	 of	 Women	 and	 Men.	 The	 three	 main	independent	institutions	as	well	as	specialised	government	offices	and	commissions	provide	 both	 case-based	 protection	 and	 promotion	work	 on	 both	 general	 human	rights	 and	more	 specialised	 rights	 that	 are	 a	 priority	 for	 the	 government,	 such	 as	gender	 equality	 and	 children’s	 rights.	 Lithuania	 has	 not	 sought	 accreditation	with	the	 ICC’s	Sub-Committee	on	Accreditation.	All	 three	Ombudsman	offices,	however,	state	as	a	priority	their	active	involvement	in	international	networks,	primarily	the	Europe-based	ones.	 In	the	case	of	 the	Seima’s	Ombudsman,	such	networks	are	the	International	 Ombudsman	 Institute,	 the	 European	 Ombudsman	 Institute,	 the	European	 Ombudsman,	 the	 European	 Network	 of	 Ombudsman,	 the	 European	Network	 of	 National	 Human	 Rights	 Institutions,	 the	 European	 Union	 Agency	 for	Fundamental	Rights	and,	through	information	sharing	and	event	participation,	also	the	Office	of	the	United	Nations	High	Commissioner	for	Human	Rights.		
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	 The	Parliament	(Seimas)	of	the	Republic	of	Lithuania	passed	the	Law	on	the	Seimas	Ombudsmen	 in	1994	 (to	be	 amended	 in	1998	and	again	 in	2004)	 and	 the	institution	became	operational	in	1995.	The	institutional	mandate	encompasses	the	“protection	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 freedoms	 by	 developing	 respect	 for	 them	 and	promoting	personal	and	public	dialogue	 in	order	 for	 the	state	authorities	 to	 serve	better	 the	people”	 (Seimas	Ombudsmen	2016).	The	Ombudsmen	are	appointed	by	the	 Parliament.	 Beginning	 in	 2003,	 the	 institution	 issues	 also	 an	 annual	 report	 of	activities	 and	 in	 2014,	 it	 published	 the	 first	 report	 on	 the	 national	 efforts	 for	 the	prevention	of	torture.			 The	European	Commission’s	overall	assessment	of	the	institutional	health	of	the	Ombudsman	in	Lithuania	was	positive	throughout	the	seven	years	of	monitoring	prior	to	accession.	Unlike	other	countries	in	the	region,	the	Ombudsmen’s	Office	was	already	in	existence	at	the	time	the	European	Commission	began	its	assessment	of	the	country’s	performance	in	1998.	In	the	following	year,	the	Equality	Ombudsman	was	also	established	and	in	2000,	Parliament	passed	the	law	founding	the	Children’s	Ombudsman.	 The	 progress	 reports	 present	 the	 Government	 and	 Parliament	 as	responsive	to	policy	priorities	in	the	domain	of	human	rights	set	by	the	Commission.	The	main	areas	of	import	are	children’s	rights,	equality	of	opportunity	between	men	and	women,	 in	particular	 in	the	work	force,	as	well	as	human	trafficking,	minority	rights	and	the	protection	of	human	rights	more	broadly.			 Lithuania	is	a	newly	democratised	state	with	a	successful	and	well-developed	Ombudsman	system.	The	Seimas	Ombudsmen’s	Office	is	an	institution	with	a	broad	human	 rights	 protection	 and	 promotion	 mandate,	 while	 associate	 ombudsmen	
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offices	focus	their	activity	on	specific	types	of	rights	that	represent	areas	of	legal	and	institutional	 priority	 in	 the	 process	 of	 accession	 to	 the	 EU	 (i.e.	 equality	 of	opportunity,	children’s	rights,	and	minority	rights).	The	 institutions	are	 integrated	in	 international	networks	and	particularly	active	 in	 the	European	organisations	of	ombudsmen	and	national	human	rights	institutions.	Lithuania	offers	an	example	of	a	post-communist	 country	 that	 began	 forming	 an	 institutional	 framework	 for	 the	independent	 promotion	 and	 protection	 of	 human	 rights	 early	 in	 the	 transitional	period.	 European	 conditionality	 and	 active	 participation	 in	 regional	 and	 other	international	networks	of	similar	institutions	provided	the	appropriate	support	for	strengthening	 existing	 bodies	 and	 also	 for	 creating	 specialised	 institutions	 that	target	certain	rights-based	policy	areas	that	are	European	priorities.	
	
5.5.2.4.	The	Czech	Republic’s	Public	Defender	of	Rights		
	The	 institutional	 system	 for	 the	 promotion	 and	protection	 of	 human	 rights	 in	 the	Czech	Republic	 is	well	developed	and	 includes	both	governmental	bodies,	 such	as	the	 Secretariat	 of	 the	Government	Council	 for	Human	Rights	 and	 the	Government	Commissioner,	 and	 the	 independent	 ombudsman	 institution	 called	 the	 Public	Defender	of	Rights.	The	work	of	the	Government	Commissioner	is	focused	primarily	on	providing	council	to	the	government	for	policymaking	purposes	and	reporting	to	the	Executive	on	the	human	rights	situation	in	the	country.	The	government	Council	and	the	Commissioner	do	not	have	the	authority	to	handle	individual	complaints	or	monitor	 the	 activity	 of	 public	 officials.	 The	 Czech	 Republic	 has	 an	 independent	
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ombudsman	 institution,	 the	 Public	 Defender	 of	 Rights,	 which	 carries	 out	investigations	 in	 cases	 of	 violation	 of	 fundamental	 rights	 when	 interacting	 with	members	 of	 the	 public	 administration,	 which	 are	 brought	 to	 their	 attention	 by	individuals,	and	reports	on	them	to	the	Parliament	and	the	public.	The	Defender	of	Rights	suggests	methods	of	remedy	and	changes	that	the	institutions	ought	to	make	in	order	to	remedy	the	cause	of	the	malpractice.		 The	Czech	Public	Defender	of	Rights	was	established	by	a	1999	Act	approved	by	the	Chamber	of	Deputies	of	the	Parliament	by	a	tight	majority	and	later	that	year	also	by	the	Senate.	A	first	draft	of	the	founding	legal	act	had	been	proposed	in	1993	but	 was	 not	 successful	 in	 the	 initial	 form.	 In	 the	 years	 prior	 to	 its	 passing,	 the	preparation	 of	 the	 1999	draft	was	 the	 object	 of	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 public	 debate	 and	political	opposition.	National	debate	was	also	fuelled	by	the	fact	that	access	to	other	institutional	 models	 across	 borders	 was	 not	 seen	 as	 appropriately	 conducive	 to	learning,	 as	 other	 institutions	 had	 stemmed	 from	 socio-political	 contexts	 that	 are	very	different	from	the	one	in	the	Czech	Republic	(Czech	Public	Defender	of	Rights	2016).	Moreover,	 resistance	 to	 the	 very	 idea	 of	 an	 independent	 ombudsman	was	strong.	Institutional	documents	mention	EU-level	input	as	crucial	support	in	favour	of	 the	 decision	 to	 pass	 the	 Act.	 The	 statement	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Ministers	 of	 the	Council	of	Europe	on	its	Recommendation	R/97/14	(Council	of	Europe,	Committee	of	 Ministers	 1997)	 on	 establishment	 of	 independent	 national	 institutions	 for	 the	promotion	 and	 protection	 of	 human	 rights	 in	 particular	 in	 countries	 that	 have	experiences	political	and	economic	transformation	provided	a	strong	argument	tin	favour	of	the	political	argument	for	establishing	the	Ombudsman.	Additionally,	 the	
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Council	 of	 Europe’s	 Recommendation	 R/85/13	 (Parliamentary	 Assembly,	 COE	2013)	 on	 the	 strengthening	 of	 the	 ombudsman	 in	 Europe	 without	 institutional	duplication	 that	 could	 undermine	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 one	 independent	 national	human	rights	institution	have	offered	additional	endorsement	for	member	countries	to	support	strong	institutional	designs.			 Although	 the	 Ombudsman	 has	 never	 undergone	 the	 UN	 Accreditation	process,	 survey-based	and	documentary	evidence	 shows	 that	 the	 institution	has	a	generally	 strong	 design.	 Its	 activity	 is	 largely	 focused	 on	 case	 handling	 and	 the	protection	 of	 fundamental	 rights,	 without	 including	 explicit	 responsibilities	 to	coordinate	promotion	activities	or	research	on	human	rights	in	the	country.	It	does	report,	 however,	 on	 its	 investigations	 and	 casework	 in	 four	 different	 reports	presented	 to	 the	Chamber	of	Deputies.	Annually,	 it	writes	an	annual	 report	which	presents	 findings	and	conclusions	 in	a	more	general	 form	to	Chamber	of	Deputies,	Senate,	 the	 President,	 ministries	 and	 government	 departments,	 as	 well	 as	 other	administrative	 bodies	 with	 national	 powers.	 The	 appointment	 of	 the	 Public	Defender	and	the	Deputy	Public	Defender	 involves	 the	election	by	the	Chamber	of	Deputies	 of	 the	 best	 candidate	 from	 two	 sets	 proposed	 by	 the	 President	 and	 the	Senate.	An	area	of	 further	 legal	 strengthening	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 functioning	and	 the	structure	 of	 the	 Office	 assisting	 the	 Public	 Defender	 of	 Rights,	 which	 are	 not	included	in	the	Act	of	the	Ombudsman	and	are	left	at	the	discretion	of	the	Defender.	Based	 on	 official	 documentation	 and	 survey-data,	 we	 have	 found	 no	 evidence	 of	infrastructural	weakness.	
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	 The	 European	 Commission	monitored	 the	 activity	 of	 both	 the	 Government	Commissioner	 for	Human	Rights	 and	 the	Ombudsman	 from	1998	 until	 2003,	 one	year	prior	to	the	accession.	The	early	reports	mention	the	legal	framework	and	the	establishment	of	the	two	institutions,	calling	for	more	funding	and	support	in	order	to	 strengthen	 their	 capacity.	 The	 EC	 sees	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 two	 bodies	 as	complementary,	 combining	 promotion	 and	 research	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 with	protection	and	case-based	investigative	work	on	the	other	hand.	They	also	share	the	responsibility	of	overseeing	enforcement	of	 legislation	on	different	sets	of	rights	–	the	Commissioner	is	focused	on	issues	such	as	the	freedom	of	speech	and	the	media,	minority	rights	and	equal	opportunity.	The	Ombudsman’s	work	is	centred	on	cases	of	 land	 and	 property	 restitution	 claims,	 disputes	 over	 social	 insurance,	 as	well	 as	mistreatment	 by	 the	 police,	 the	 army	 or	 prison	 personnel.	 In	 2003,	 EC’s	 general	assessment	of	 the	 functioning	of	 the	Ombudsman	and	 the	 institutional	 framework	for	the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights	in	the	country	was	positive.			 The	 Czech	 Republic	 is	 an	 example	 of	 a	 newly	 democratised	 country	 from	Central	Europe	which	established	a	strong	system	of	human	rights	promotion	and	protection	and	consolidated	an	Ombudsman	office	that	is	functional	and	cooperates	well	 with	 other	 state	 bodies.	 Its	 mandate	 on	 human	 rights	 protection	 is	 not	 as	developed	as	the	protection	one,	thus	the	Ombudsman	itself	would	perhaps	require	a	degree	of	change	to	its	mandate	or	legislation	in	order	to	broaden	the	scope	of	its	work	 and	 comply	 fully	with	 the	 Paris	 Principles	 as	 assessed	 by	 the	 ICC-led	 peer-review	process.	In	the	EC’s	pre-accession	assessment	of	the	human	rights	promotion	and	protection	activities,	the	Czech	Republic	performed	well,	seeing	the	work	of	the	
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Government	 Commissioner	 for	 Human	 Rights	 and	 the	 one	 of	 the	 Ombudsman	 as	complementary,	successful	and	widely	respected.		
5.5.2.5.	Finland’s	Parliamentary	Ombudsman	and	Human	Rights	Centre		Finland	 is	 an	 early	 adopting	 country	 and	 a	member	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 since	1995.	 Finland	 has	 two	 main	 institutions	 mandated	 to	 supervise	 the	 exercise	 of	public	 power	 –	 the	 Chancellor	 of	 Justice	 and	 the	 Ombudsman.	 The	 Chancellor	 of	Justice	existed	as	early	as	the	18th	century,	when	Finland	was	an	autonomous	part	of	Sweden.	King	Karl	III	established	it	at	the	same	time	as	the	Swedish	Parliamentary	Ombudsman	in	order	to	have	a	representative	on	Finish	territory	who	would	ensure	oversight	of	public	administration	and	responds	to	citizens’	complaints	about	rights	violations	(Gellhorn	1966).	In	1919,	a	Government	Act	established	the	Ombudsman	and	 integrated	 its	 legal	 functions	 in	 Finland’s	 Constitution.	 The	 institution	 was	modelled	 after	 the	 Swedish	Ombudsman	 (Finland	 et	 al.	 2010).	 The	Ombudsman’s	mandate	overlaps	to	some	degree	with	the	one	of	the	Chancellor	of	Justice,	which	is	a	 post	 fully	 integrated	 in	 the	 system	 of	 public	 administration.	 Charged	 with	 the	oversight	of	government	and	public	administration,	the	Ombudsman	can	follow	up	on	 individual	 complaints,	 carry	 out	 investigations	 and	 inspections	 of	 his/her	 own	initiative,	 specialising	 in	 handling	 complaints	 by	 members	 of	 the	 military,	conscripts,	prisoners	and	other	persons	in	closely	connected	institutions	(Gellhorn	1966).		
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	 The	Ombudsman’s	duties	have	always	 incorporated	an	 important	 aspect	of	fundamental	 rights	 protection,	 scrutinising	 the	 work	 of	 the	 state	 authorities	 for	possible	violations.	A	broad	human	rights	mandate	was	not	explicitly	added	to	the	institutional	mandate	until	 2011,	when	 the	Ombudsman	Act	was	 amended	 to	 add	also	 the	 Human	 Rights	 Centre	 as	 an	 independent	 and	 autonomous	 body	 that	 is	administratively	part	of	the	Parliamentary	Ombudsman’s	Office.	The	Centre’s	role	is	focused	 on	 human	 rights	 promotion	 activities,	 such	 as	 carrying	 out	 research	 and	training,	 drafting	 reports	 on	 human	 rights	 implementation,	 participating	 in	European	 and	 international	 cooperation	 associated	 with	 promoting	 and	safeguarding	 fundamental	 and	 human	 rights	 (Finland’s	 Ombudsman	Office	 2016).	The	 Centre	 does	 not	 handle	 complaints	 or	 deal	 with	 other	 individual	 cases	 that	belong	to	the	remits	of	the	supreme	overseers	of	legality.	Finland’s	National	Human	Rights	Institution	consists	of	the	shared	efforts	of	both	the	Ombudsman	Office	and	the	 Human	 Rights	 Centre.	 The	 explicit	 intention	 to	 establish	 an	 NHRI	 in	 full	compliance	 with	 the	 Paris	 Principles	 motivated	 the	 efforts	 to	 create	 the	 Human	Rights	Centre,	which	began	 in	 the	early	2000s	and	culminated	with	 its	 recognised	operation	 in	 compliance	 with	 the	 Paris	 Principles.	 In	 2014,	 the	 International	Coordination	 Committee	 of	 NHRIs	 granted	 the	 Finish	 National	 Human	 Rights	Institution	A	status	following	the	accreditation.			 Finland’s	 independent	human	 rights	body	 charged	with	 the	promotion	 and	protection	of	human	rights	 is	an	example	of	how	a	 longstanding	domestic	 identity	grounded	in	the	respect	for	human	rights	can	complement	the	efforts	to	align	with	international	standards	of	institutionalisation	of	national	human	rights	institutions.	
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The	Parliamentary	Ombudsman	is	now	a	hybrid	case	of	ombudsman	institution,	as	a	result	 of	 the	modification	 of	 its	 traditional	 remit	 based	 on	 complaint	 handling	 to	incorporate	 also	 human	 rights	 promotion	 efforts	 and	 an	 active	 cooperation	 with	similar	institutions	across	borders.	
	
5.5.2.6.	France’s	Consultative	Commission	for	Human	Rights		France	 presents	 a	 different	 institutional	 history	 from	 the	 Scandinavian	 countries	and	the	other	early	adopting	countries	in	the	region.	Although	not	a	country	with	a	long	 history	 of	 an	 ombudsman	 institution	 like	 the	 Scandinavian	 countries	 (the	Mediateur	institution	was	founded	in	the	mid-1970s),	France	is	one	of	the	founders	of	 the	 international	 human	 rights	 regime	 in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 World	 War	 II.	 Its	Human	 Rights	 Commission	 was	 particularly	 active	 in	 international	 fora,	representing	 also	 France’s	 national	 interests	 and	 shaping	 the	 formulation	 of	international	 human	 rights	 laws.	 Over	 the	 years,	 France	 has	 remained	 one	 of	 the	stalwarts	 of	 global	 and	 regional	 human	 right	 networks.	 On	 27th	 March	 1947,	 a	decree	of	the	Minister	of	Foreign	Affairs	give	birth	to	the	‘Consultative	Commission	for	the	Codification	of	International	Law	and	the	Definition	of	the	Rights	and	Duties	of	 States	 and	 Human	 Rights’,	 which	 quickly	 came	 to	 be	 called	 the	 Consultative	Commission	 on	 Human	 Rights	 (CNCDH	 2016).	 It	 was	 made	 up	 of	 ten	 members,	among	which	diplomats,	magistrates,	lawyers,	and	academics)	and	played	a	key	role	in	 the	 formulation	 of	 the	 Universal	 Declaration	 of	 Human	Rights	 (adopted	 by	 the	General	Assembly	 in	1948)	 and	 the	 creation	of	 the	United	Nations’	Human	Rights	
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Commission.	The	Commission	played	a	key	role	in	researching	the	implications	for	France	of	 entering	 into	 international	 human	 rights	 agreements	preparing	 also	 the	official	position	France	would	in	the	process	of	elaborating	treaties	and	conventions.			 After	one	decade	of	 limited	activity,	the	institution	re-opened	in	1984.	With	its	re-activation	came	an	expansion	of	its	mandate	to	include	not	only	international	issues	 but	 also	 a	 national	mandate	 of	 human	 rights	 promotion	 and	 protection.	 In	1989,	 the	national	Commission	came	under	 the	direction	supervision	of	 the	Prime	Minister	and	gained	the	power	to	oversee	all	questions	related	to	human	rights	 in	the	 Executive’s	 decisions	 and	 policies.	 In	 1990,	 the	 Commission	 became	 also	France’s	equality	body,	vested	with	 the	power	 to	support	 the	 fight	against	 racism,	anti-Semitism	or	xenophobia.	This	new	capacity	requires	that	the	Commission	write	an	annual	report	and	present	it	to	Parliament.	In	1993	the	Commission’s	design	was	strengthened	by	granting	it	institutional	independence	and	aligning	its	mandate	and	activity	 with	 the	 Paris	 Principles.	 In	 1996,	 the	 mandate	 of	 the	 Commission	incorporated	 also	 humanitarian	 emergency	 response.	 In	 1999,	 the	 Commission	received	A	accreditation	status	following	accreditation	by	the	ICC	Sub-Committee	on	Accreditation.	 In	 the	 late	2000s	at	 the	 recommendation	of	 the	 ICC	Sub-Committee	on	 Accreditation,	 the	 appointment	 structure	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 leadership	changed	 in	 order	 to	 increase	 its	 independence	 from	 the	 Prime	 Minister’s	involvement	 in	decision-making.	 In	2007	and	2013,	 the	 re-accreditation	 re-newed	the	A	status.		 The	 historical	 path	 of	 France’s	 national	 human	 rights	 commission	 is	 an	indisputable	example	of	a	country	with	a	strong	national	liberal	democratic	identity.	
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Moreover,	 the	 French	 political	 elites	 have	 been	 long	 committed	 to	 creating	 an	international	human	rights	regime	and	to	maintaining	human	rights	networks	that	are	active	both	regionally	and	internationally.	At	the	national	level,	its	involvement	with	cross-border	networks	has	resulted	in	a	strengthened	design	of	the	institution	as	a	response	to	recommendations	by	the	ICC	Sub-Committee	on	Accreditation.			
	
5.5.2.7.	Denmark’s	Ombudsman	and	the	Danish	Institute	for	Human	Rights		Denmark’s	Ombudsman	 is	 one	 of	 the	 oldest	 in	 the	world,	 established	 in	 1955.	 Its	current	mandate	is	focused	on	handling	complaints	by	citizens	in	cases	where	there	is	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	members	 of	 the	 public	 administration	may	 have	 caused	errors	 (The	 Danish	 Ombudsman	 2016).	 Complementing	 the	 work	 of	 the	Ombudsman	with	respect	to	human	rights	is	the	Danish	Institute	for	Human	Rights,	which	has	national	human	rights	institution	status	and	A-level	accreditation.	The	Act	on	the	Danish	Institute	for	Human	Rights	entered	into	force	on	1	January	2013	re-establishing	the	institute	as	an	institution	on	its	own	after	ten	years	of	being	part	of	a	 joint	 institution	with	 the	 Danish	 Institute	 for	 International	 Studies	 (The	 Danish	Institute	 for	 Human	 Rights	 2016).	 The	 Danish	 Institute	 for	 International	 Studies	continues	its	work	as	a	research	body	with	a	promotional	and	academic	profile.		 With	a	shorter	history	than	its	other	Scandinavian	counterparts,	 the	Danish	Ombudsman	 has	 received	 much	 more	 international	 attention	 in	 the	 English	speaking	world	 (Christensen	1961)	 –	 given	 that	Denmark,	 unlike	 Sweden,	 had	 no	tradition	of	free	inspection	of	the	public	records	at	the	time	it	decided	to	support	the	
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establishment	of	an	Ombudsman,	public	officials	 in	England	and	 the	United	States	saw	 the	 Danish	 experience	 as	 potentially	 more	 instructive	 when	 considering	 the	establishment	 of	 equivalent	 bodies	 in	 their	 own	 countries	 (Blom-Cooper	 1960).	Unlike	 the	 Swedish	 Parliamentary	 Ombudsman,	 also,	 the	 Danish	 institution	 was	created	 during	 peaceful	 times,	 providing	 an	 example	 to	 other	 countries	 of	 a	democratic	 government	 decision	 to	 include	 the	 control	 of	 an	 expanding	administration	 and	 the	 protection	 of	 individual	 rights	 in	 the	 Constitution.	 With	strong	support	from	the	Labour	Party	members,	the	Ombudsman	was	seen	as	"the	protector	 of	 the	 man	 in	 the	 street	 against	 injustices,	 against	 arbitrariness,	 and	against	the	abuse	of	power	(Christensen	1961)."		 In	 its	 current	 form,	 the	Danish	 Institute	 for	Human	Rights	 is	 a	 very	 recent	institution,	 created	 and	 strengthened	 in	 2013	 to	 be	 fully	 in	 compliance	 with	 the	Paris	 Principles.	 Its	mandate	 is	 broad	 in	 scope,	 covering	 human	 rights	 promotion	and	 protection	 in	 general,	 as	 well	 as	 equality	 and	 antidiscrimination,	 both	 in	Denmark	 and	 abroad.	 In	 its	 advisory	 role,	 the	 Institute	 advises	 Government,	Parliament,	ministries	and	other	authorities	on	human	rights	by	preparing	reports	on	specific	human	rights	situations	in	the	country,	designing	projects	that	promote	equal	 treatment,	and	maps	national	areas	of	human	rights	challenges	 (The	Danish	Institute	 for	 Human	 Rights	 2016).	 It	 also	 monitor’s	 the	 government’s	 efforts	 to	follow	 up	 on	 recommendations	 from	 the	 UN.	 The	 Danish	 Institute	 has	 also	 an	international	development	agenda,	working	with	governments,	NGOs,	business	and	industry	to	strengthen	their	capacity	to	advance	human	rights	in	their	countries.	As	a	national	equity	body,	the	Institute	concentrates	on	improving	ethnic	equality,	the	
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equal	treatment	of	women	and	men	as	well	as	the	equal	treatment	of	persons	with	disabilities	(The	Danish	Institute	for	Human	Rights	2016).			 Denmark	provides	an	example	of	a	long-term	member	of	the	European	Union	with	a	 longstanding	 liberal	democratic	history	and	a	 tradition	of	 rights	protection	and	 promotion	 as	 evidenced	 by	 the	 activity	 of	 the	 Ombudsman.	 Responding	 to	expectations	of	human	rights	institutionalisation	from	the	international	community	coordinated	by	the	UN,	Denmark	strengthened	the	design	of	the	Danish	Institute	for	Human	 Rights	 in	 recent	 years	 by	 giving	 it	 full	 financial	 and	 operational	independence	and	expanding	 its	mandated	powers	 to	go	beyond	promotional	and	research	 activities.	 As	 of	 2013,	 the	 Institute	 is	 in	 full	 compliance	 with	 the	 Paris	Principles.	 In	 addition,	 the	Danish	national	 human	 rights	 institution	 is	 also	one	of	the	 main	 regional	 actors	 coordinating	 the	 work	 of	 the	 newly	 formed	 European	Network	for	National	Human	Rights	Institutions.			
5.5.2.8.	Portugal’s	Provedor	de	Justica		Portugal’s	Provedor	de	Justica	provides	an	example	of	an	early	adopted	institution	in	a	country	that	has	been	committed	to	liberal	democracy	prior	to	the	1989	wave	of	democratisation.	 Portugal	 has	 also	 been	 a	 member	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 since	1986,	 when	 Portugal	 joined	 alongside	 Spain.	 Similar	 to	 Spain,	 at	 the	 time	 of	accession,	 the	 country	 had	 left	 behind	 a	 Fascist	 past	 one	 decade	 earlier.	 The	Ombudsman	institution	was	one	of	the	 liberal	democratic	bodies	to	be	established	in	the	country,	with	efforts	to	create	one	being	made	public	even	prior	to	the	1974	
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regime	 change,	 with	 the	 intention	 to	 consolidate	 democracy,	 the	 control	 of	 the	public	administration,	and	the	protection	of	human	rights	at	the	national	level.	The	Ombudsman	 institution	had	an	explicit	human	rights	mandated	 from	 its	 inception	and	was	among	the	first	to	undergo	the	accreditation	process	and	achieve	A	status	in	1999.			 In	the	early	1970s,	three	of	the	most	renowned	Portuguese	intellectuals	and	anti-Fascist	 politicians	 –	 José	 Magalhães	 Godinho,	 Vasco	 da	 Fernandes	 Gama	 and	Mário	Raposo	–	proposed	the	idea	of	founding	an	Ombudsman,	following	the	model	of	the	Nordic	national	institutions.	This	institution	would	play	an	important	role	in	protecting	human	rights	and	overseeing	the	activity	of	government	preventing	the	abuse	of	power	in	the	relationship	of	public	administration	bodies	with	citizens.	One	year	after	the	Carnation	Revolution,	in	1975,	the	Government	issued	the	decree-law	that	established	 the	Ombudsman.	Before	 the	Government	decided	on	 the	mandate	and	design	of	the	Ombudsman	the	first	Ombudsman,	Lieutenant	Colonel	Manuel	da	Costa	 Brás,	 visited	 Denmark	 and	 France,	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 how	 existing	institutions	 in	 these	 countries	 worked	 and	 the	 model	 that	 would	 work	 best	 for	Portugal	(Provedor	de	Justica	2016).	In	March	1976,	the	Government	set	in	national	law	 the	 structure	 of	 technical	 and	 administrative	 support	 for	 the	 Provedor	 de	Justica.	 Mandate	 law	 safeguards	 the	 body’s	 independence	 from	 political	intervention.	 The	 institution	 has	 maintained	 full	 compliance	 with	 the	 Paris	Principles	reflected	in	an	A	accreditation	status	since	1999.	Parliament	appoints	the	Ombudsman	for	a	four-year	tenure.	The	mandate	of	the	Ombudsman	is	centred	on	
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complaint	handling	in	cases	of	unfair	or	illegal	acts	by	public	administration	as	well	as	other	violations	of	fundamental	rights.			 The	history	 and	mandate	 of	 the	Portuguese	Provedor	 the	 Justica	 provide	 a	perfect	 illustration	 of	 the	 processes	 of	 social	 learning	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	establishing	a	national	human	rights	 institution	with	a	strong	design.	The	decision	to	 establish	 the	 institution	 was	 the	 result	 of	 both	 political	 mobilisation	 at	 the	national	level	and	of	learning	from	successful	models	of	similar	bodies	in	France	and	Sweden.	Moreover,	the	hybrid	ombudsman	model	of	the	Provedor	would	be	in	itself	a	model	 for	other	 countries	 to	 follow,	 such	as	 the	Provedores	 in	Angola	and	Cape	Verde.	Cross-border	learning	would	allow	take	place	with	Spain	and	other	Hispanic	countries	that	have	established	very	similar	hybrid	ombudsman	models	as	people’s	advocates,	 or	 defensorias	 del	 pueblo.	 Looking	 back,	 Portugal	 is	 a	 country	 with	 a	tradition	 of	 liberal	 democracy	 and	 respect	 for	 human	 rights,	 especially	 by	comparison	with	 the	 newly	 democratised	 countries	 of	 the	 post-Soviet	 era.	 At	 the	same	time,	the	establishment	of	the	Provedor	de	Justica	in	the	mid-1970s	provides	an	example	of	the	efforts	that	political	elites	made	at	a	time	of	regime	transition	to	solidify	the	institutional	foundation	for	democracy	and	make	possible	its	long-term	consolidation.		
5.5.2.9.	Spain’s	defensor	del	pueblo		During	the	same	times	of	transition	from	dictatorship	to	democracy	experienced	by	Portugal,	 Spain	 established	 its	 first	 defensor	 del	 pueblo.	 The	 1978	 Constitution	
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introduces	the	Ombudsman	in	Spain’s	body	of	law,	granting	it	mixed	powers	of	both	oversight	 over	 government	 activities	 addressing	 potential	 violations	 of	 citizens’	rights	as	well	as	the	capacity	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights	more	broadly	in	the	country.	Although	the	institution	was	generally	modelled	after	the	Scandinavian	ombudsman,	 Spain	 boasts	 a	 longstanding	 tradition	 of	 similar	 bodies	 set	 up	 on	 its	territories	throughout	history.	For	instance,	perhaps	a	distant	relative	can	be	found	in	Muslim	Spain,	which	had	a	representative	of	the	Sultan	by	the	name	of	Sahib-al-Mazalim,	in	charge	of	handling	complaints	about	state	institutional	abuses	(UNESCO	2016).	 In	 addition,	 the	 corregidores	 (or	 justicia	mayor)	was	 a	 local	 administrative	and	judicial	official	in	Spain	and	its	overseas	empire	in	the	Americas.	Inspired	by	the	late-medieval	 revival	 of	 Roman	 law,	 these	 bodies	were	 the	 representatives	 of	 the	royal	jurisdiction	over	a	town	and	its	district	and	acted	independently	in	the	interest	of	overseeing	local	affairs.	King	Felipe	V	abolished	this	role	in	1711	(UNESCO	2016).			 The	modern	Defensor	del	Pueblo	is	the	High	Commissioner	of	the	Parliament,	vested	 with	 power	 to	 monitor	 the	 activity	 of	 the	 Administration	 and	 public	authorities	 with	 the	 goal	 to	 defend	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 and	 civil	 liberties	 of	citizens	 (UNESCO	 2016).	 Congress	 and	 Senate	 elect	 the	 Defensor	 for	 a	 five-year	term.	The	Ombudsman	 is	 independent	and	 impartial	 in	 its	 activities	and	decision-making,	 enjoying	 inviolability	 and	 immunity	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 his/her	 office.	 The	activity	 of	 the	 Ombudsman	 is	 primarily	 complaint-based,	 although	 they	 can	intervene	also	ex	officio	in	cases	that	come	to	their	attention.	In	November	2009,	the	Parliament	attributed	the	 functions	of	a	Spanish	National	Preventative	Mechanism	to	 the	 Defensor	 as	 a	 result	 of	 Spain	 having	 ratified	 the	 Optional	 Protocol	 to	 the	
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Convention	 against	 Torture	 and	 other	 cruel,	 Inhuman	 or	Degrading	 Treatment	 or	Punishment	adopted	by	the	UN	General	Assembly	in	New	York	in	December	2002.	The	Defensor	has	maintained	A	status	 through	three	rounds	of	accreditation	since	its	first	one	in	2000.			 The	 Spanish	 Defensor	 institution	 bears	 similarities	 of	 design	 with	 the	Portuguese	 Provedor	 –	 as	 hybrid	 ombudsman	 models,	 they	 perform	 both	 the	function	of	oversight	of	government	activities	with	the	goal	of	combatting	violations	of	 fundamental	 rights	 and	 cases	 of	 abuse	 of	 power	 and,	 in	 addition,	 the	 human	rights-centred	 mandate	 of	 protection	 and	 promotion.	 They	 were	 created	 in	 the	context	of	the	countries’	transition	from	authoritarianism	to	democracy	in	the	mid-1970s,	reflecting	the	political	commitment	to	the	establishment	of	solid	institutions	that	would	ensure	 the	 long-term	preservation	of	 liberal	democracy.	 Similar	 to	 the	political	conditions	that	favoured	the	creation	of	the	first	Swedish	ombudsman-like	bodies	in	pre-modern	times,	Spain	has	a	rather	distant	historical	tradition	of	a	pre-modern	institutional	model	that	resembles	the	one	of	the	modern	ombudsman	in	its	power	 to	 represent	 the	 king	 in	 regional	 and	 national	 territories	 and	 oversee	 the	activities	 of	 the	 public	 administration.	 The	 Defensor	 joined	 the	 international	networks	 of	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 from	 their	 inception	 –	 it	 has	maintained	A	accreditation	status	since	1999.	Moreover,	 the	defensor	 institutional	model	was	also	adopted	in	the	former	overseas	territories	in	Latin	America,	so	the	Spanish	 institution	 provided	 a	 model	 for	 cross-border	 learning	 of	 institutional	design.		
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5.6.	Conclusion		Europe	 is	 the	 region	 with	 the	 highest	 number	 of	 strong	 national	 human	 rights	institutions	and	 the	most	countries	 that	adopted	 their	 institutions	earlier	 than	 the	1990s	global	‘boom’	of	interest	in	independent	institutions.	It	is	also	home	of	the	EU,	one	 of	 the	 strongest	 regional	 promoters	 of	 neoliberal	 democratic	 values	 and	 the	institutionalisation	 of	 human	 rights	 protection	 both	 inside	 Europe	 and	 outside	 of	the	EU’s	borders.	Hence	it	is	also	the	region	whose	patterns	of	institutional	adoption	and	strength	can	tell	us	a	more	nuanced	story	about	the	regional	factors	that	play	a	role	in	countries’	decisions	to	establish	and	sustain	a	strong	national	human	rights	institution.			 The	qualitative	comparative	analysis	has	helped	to	lay	out	a	research	agenda	for	the	qualitative	exploration	of	institutional	design	in	the	case	of	national	human	rights	 institutions	 in	 Europe.	 Its	 findings	 lend	 support	 for	 two	main	 paths	 to	 the	outcome	 ‘strong’,	which	are	 in	 line	with	rationalist	and	constructivist	explanations	respectively.	The	combination	of	being	a	new	democracy	and	having	been	objected	to	EU	conditionality	while	not	having	UN	accreditation	is	sufficient	for	a	number	of	European	 countries	 to	 be	 more	 likely	 to	 have	 stronger	 (strong	 and	 medium)	institutional	 designs.	 The	 second	 path	 to	 a	 strong	 outcome	 is	 made	 up	 of	 the	combination	 of	 having	 UN	 accreditation,	 while	 not	 being	 a	 new	 democracy	 and	never	having	experienced	EU	membership	conditionality.	The	unique	path	to	weak	institutional	design	consists	of	 the	combination	of	 the	absence	of	all	 four	 factors	–	countries	 that	 are	 not	 new	 democracies	 and	 have	 never	 experienced	 EU	
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conditionality,	 are	not	 early	 adopters	 and	do	not	 have	UN	accreditation	 also	have	weak	institutional	designs.	Italy	and	Iceland	are	the	two	country	cases	that	illustrate	this	 combination	 of	 conditions.	 QCA	 has	 provided	 an	 example	 of	 the	 regional	interplay	 of	 different	 factors	 that	 were	 tested	 for	 in	 the	 global	 analysis	 as	 well,	laying	 out	 the	 beginnings	 of	 a	 mode	 developed	 qualitative	 analysis.	 Further	qualitative	 work	 would	 make	 possible	 the	 more	 fine-grained	 exploration	 of	variation	 in	 institutional	 design	 within	 Europe,	 by	 introducing	 new	 regional	 and	domestic	 factors	while	keeping	 constant	 some	of	 the	 indicators	used	 in	 the	global	analysis.																												
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5.7.	Annex			
A.	Table	5.8.	Truth	table	for	outcome	=	STRONG	
		 UN
.AC	
ADOP
T	
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EM	
EUC
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OU
T	
INCL
/PRI	
Cases	
8	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1.000	 Estonia	4	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1	 0.800	 Czech	 Rep,	 Latvia,	 Lithuania,	Montenegro,	Romania		9	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0.714	 Belgium,	 Germany,	 Greece,	Ireland,	Luxembourg,	Netherlands,	United	Kingdom	13	 1	 1	 0	 0	 1	 0.714	 Austria,	Denmark,	Finland,	France,	Portugal,	Spain,	Sweden		12	 1	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0.500	 Albania,	 Bosnia	 &	 Herzegovina	Bulgaria,	 Croatia,	 Macedonia,	Serbia,	Slovakia,	Slovenia	16	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0.500	 Hungary,	Poland	2	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0.333	 Cyprus,	Malta,	Turkey		1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0.000	 Iceland,	Italy	3	 0	 0	 1	 0	 ?	 -	 	5	 0	 1	 0	 0	 ?	 -	 	6	 0	 1	 0	 1	 ?	 -	 	7	 0	 1	 1	 0	 ?	 -	 	10	 1	 0	 0	 1	 ?	 -	 	11	 1	 0	 1	 0	 ?	 -	 	14	 1	 1	 0	 1	 ?	 -	 	15	 1	 1	 1	 0	 ?	 -	 	
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B.	Table	5.9.	Truth	table	for	outcome	=	WEAK				 UN
.AC	
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/PRI	
Cases	
1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1.000	 Iceland,	Italy	2	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0.333	 Cyprus,	Malta,	Turkey		12	 1	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0.000	 Albania,	 Bosnia	 &	 Herzegovina	Bulgaria,	 Croatia,	 Macedonia,	Serbia,	Slovakia,	Slovenia	9	 1	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0.000	 Belgium,	 Germany,	 Greece,	Ireland,	Luxembourg,	Netherlands,	United	Kingdom	13	 1	 1	 0	 0	 1	 0.000	 Austria,	Denmark,	Finland,	France,	Portugal,	Spain,	Sweden		4	 0	 0	 1	 1	 1	 0.000	 Czech	 Rep,	 Latvia,	 Lithuania,	Montenegro,	Romania		16	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0.000	 Hungary,	Poland	8	 0	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0.000	 Estonia	3	 0	 0	 1	 0	 ?	 -	 	5	 0	 1	 0	 0	 ?	 -	 	6	 0	 1	 0	 1	 ?	 -	 	7	 0	 1	 1	 0	 ?	 -	 	10	 1	 0	 0	 1	 ?	 -	 	11	 1	 0	 1	 0	 ?	 -	 	14	 1	 1	 0	 1	 ?	 -	 	15	 1	 1	 1	 0	 ?	 -	 																	
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C.	Table	5.10.	Truth	table	for	outcome	=	MEDIUM	(after	minimisation)	
		 UN
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/PRI	
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12	 1	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0.500	 Albania,	 Bosnia	 &	 Herzegovina	Bulgaria,	 Croatia,	 Macedonia,	Serbia,	Slovakia,	Slovenia	16	 1	 1	 1	 1	 0	 0.500	 Hungary,	Poland	9	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0.375	 Belgium,	 Germany,	 Greece,	Ireland,	Luxembourg,	Netherlands,	United	Kingdom	2	 0	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0.333	 Cyprus,	Malta,	Turkey	13	 1	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0.286	 Austria,	Denmark,	Finland,	France,	Portugal,	Spain,	Sweden	4	 0	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0.200	 Czech	 Rep,	 Latvia,	 Lithuania,	Montenegro,	Romania	1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0.000	 Iceland,	Italy	8	 1	 0	 1	 1	 0	 0.000	 Estonia	
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Chapter	6:	Conclusions	
	For	nearly	 three	decades,	 independent	national	 institutions	mandated	 to	promote	and	 protect	 human	 rights	 have	 become	 commonplace	 around	 the	world	 and	 also	key	 upholders	 of	 human	 rights	 at	 the	 national	 level.	 In	 the	 first	 decade	 of	 their	existence,	 they	 were	 a	 harbinger	 of	 renewed	 UN	 efforts	 to	 coordinate	 the	implementation	 of	 human	 rights	 in	 nations	 around	 the	 world.	 They	 have	 gained	increased	prominence	 in	 international	efforts	 to	support	 the	 institutionalisation	of	human	 rights	 commitments	 and	 to	 consolidate	 liberal	 democracy.	 The	 UN-coordinated	peer	review	process	 for	accreditation	has	continued	successfully	over	the	 years	 and	 has	 seen	 the	 numbers	 of	 accredited	 and	 re-accredited	 institutions	grow	by	 the	year.	Additionally,	 the	European	Union	has	placed	at	 the	centre	of	 its	accession	 conditionality	 monitoring	 the	 establishment	 and	 capacity	 building	 of	national	 ombudsmen	 and	 human	 rights	 commissions	 in	 all	 prospective	 member	states.	They	are	not	only	a	sign	of	candidate	countries’	 intentions	 to	develop	 their	institutional	 frameworks	 and	 align	 them	with	 the	 standards	 set	 by	 the	 European	Commission,	but	also	represent	a	measure	of	sustained	effort	to	protect	the	rights	of	citizens’	and	support	progress	in	the	direction	of	the	transition	to	liberal	democracy.	We	 can	 safely	 regard	 the	 developments	 of	 the	 past	 decade	 as	 an	 indication	 of	increased	interest	in	the	establishment	and	consolidation	of	strong	national	human	rights	institutions.		 Academic	 scholarship	 of	 the	 past	 decade	 has	 dedicated	 accredited	 NHRIs	limited	 but	 steadily	 growing	 attention,	 aiming	 to	 understand	 the	 factors	 that	
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determine	countries	to	establish	them	in	the	first	place	(Koo	and	Ramirez	2009;	D.	W.	Kim	2009;	D.	Kim	2013b).	Insight	into	their	diffusion,	however,	only	tells	part	of	the	 story	 of	 country	 commitment	 to	 the	 institutionalisation	 of	 independent	 rights	protection.	 The	 systematic	 investigation	 of	 institutional	 design	 offers	 a	 more	nuanced	 view	 of	 the	 degree	 of	 a	 country’s	 commitment	 to	 institutionalise	 the	promotion	 and	 protection	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 allows	 us	 to	 investigate	more	 in-depth	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 factors	 that	 determine	 different	 levels	 of	 design	 strength.	This	 thesis	 is	 the	 first	 to	 explore	 the	 strength	 of	 national	 institutions	 set	 up	 to	promote	 and	 protect	 human	 rights,	 as	 linked	 to	 their	 design.	 It	 seeks	 to	 explains	global	patterns	of	variation	in	institutional	strength.	To	this	end,	it	proposes	the	first	index	 of	 institutional	 strength,	 made	 up	 of	 six	 different	 categories	 of	 design,	 and	ranks	 187	 countries	 according	 to	 a	 three-point	 scale	 (weak,	 medium,	 strong).	Subsequently,	 it	presents	 the	 first	global	model	of	 institutional	design,	building	on	the	literatures	of	institutional	design,	cross-border	diffusion	and	Europeanisation.				
6.1.	Main	findings	and	contributions	to	academic	scholarship	
	The	research	makes	two	main	contributions	to	International	Relations	scholarship.	The	dataset	of	institutional	design	features	consists	of	original	design	data,	and	the	index	 of	 institutional	 strength	 is	 the	 first	 of	 its	 kind	 in	 the	 scholarship	 about	institutional	 design.	 The	 conceptual	 scheme	 represents	 an	 original	 synthesis	 of	information	 on	 the	main	 characteristics	 of	 activity	 set	 out	 by	 the	United	Nations-
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coordinated	 international	community	 in	 the	 form	of	 the	Paris	Principles	 (Meagher	2004;	International	Coordinating	Committee	of	NHRIs	2016).	Institutional	strength	is	understood	as	a	function	of	an	institution’s	design	features	and	is	measured	as	a	ranked	categorical	variable	with	three	values	(weak,	medium,	strong).	In	the	case	of	national	human	rights	institutions,	I	proposed	a	conceptual	scheme	that	consists	of	six	design	dimensions	representing	a	synthesis	of	the	main	characteristics	of	these	institutions:	 1)	 de	 jure	 independence;	 2)	 nature	 of	 institutional	 mandate;	 3)	autonomy	 from	 government	 intervention;	 4)	 predominant	 de	 facto	 duties;	 5)	pluralism	of	representation,	and	6)	staff	and	financial	resources.				 Existing	 data	 on	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 focuses	 on	 only	accredited	institutions,	thus	containing	data	for	approximately	100	countries,	and	is	not	 structured	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 capturing	 institutional	 design	 features	 but	rather	 structural	 and	 behavioural	 elements	 (Conrad,	 DeMeritt,	 and	Moore	 2016).	Another	existing	dataset	is	yet	to	be	made	public	and	has	informed	a	recent	article	by	Linos	and	Pegram	(2016);	the	data	captures	a	few	dimensions	of	design	included	in	 the	 accreditation	 reports	 of	 the	 Sub-Committee	 for	 Accreditation	 of	 the	International	 Coordination	 Committee	 for	 countries	 that	 have	 undergone	 the	accreditation	process.	The	dataset	 informing	 this	doctoral	project	differs	 from	 the	above	both	in	scope,	as	it	covers	global	level	information	about	187	countries,	and	contains	data	operationalized	 from	 institutional	 report	data,	 country	 constitutions	and	legislation.			 Moreover,	 this	 doctoral	 project	 seeks	 to	make	 a	 theoretical	 contribution	 to	the	 literatures	of	cross-border	diffusion	and	Europeanisation.	The	past	decade	has	
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seen	 an	 increase	 in	 research	 on	 cross-border	 diffusion	 processes.	 International	Relations	scholars	have	explored	more	closely	the	determinants	of	institutional	and	policy	transfer	and	identified	a	large	number	of	explanations	for	countries’	decisions	to	replicate	the	decisions	of	other	governments.	Work	on	human	rights	diffusion	has	focused	 largely	 on	 international	 treaty	 ratification	 and	 the	 effectiveness	 of	governments’	 treaty-based	 commitments	 in	 improving	 national	 human	 rights	records	on	the	ground	(Simmons	2002;	Simmons	2009;	Elkink	2011;	Gilardi	2013).	Only	very	few	studies	explored	the	reasons	why	countries	establish	national	human	rights	institutions	(Koo	and	Ramirez	2009;	Pegram	2010;	D.	Kim	2013b;	Linos	and	Pegram	 2016).	 No	 work	 to	 date	 has	 offered	 a	 systematic	 investigation	 of	institutional	 strength,	 more	 specifically	 of	 countries’	 reasons	 to	 establish	 strong	national	human	rights	institutions.	In	other	words,	no	research	has	gone	beyond	the	binary	 measure	 of	 countries’	 commitment	 to	 institutionalised	 human	 rights	promotion	 and	 protection	 through	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 to	 explore	governments’	choice	of	institutional	design.			 The	 research	 in	 this	 thesis	 furthers	 the	 existing	 scholarship	 on	 the	establishment	 and	 diffusion	 of	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 by	 providing	 a	complementary	 framework	 for	 analysis	 of	 institutional	 design	 and	 by	 quantifying	some	of	its	arguments.	On	the	one	hand,	the	thesis	builds	on	the	premise	that	work	on	 the	 establishment	 of	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 that	 measures	 their	diffusion	 with	 the	 help	 of	 a	 binary	 variable	 only	 tells	 part	 of	 the	 story	 about	governments’	reasons	to	support	such	an	independent	body	on	their	territories.	In	effect,	the	strength	of	these	institutions	as	a	function	of	their	design	can	be	viewed	
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as	a	proxy	of	countries’	commitments	to	human	rights	promotion	and	protection	in	response	to	domestic	and	cross-border	pressures.	In	this	sense,	the	findings	in	this	thesis	build	on	existing	work	(Koo	and	Ramirez	2009;	Pegram	2010;	D.	Kim	2013b;	Linos	 and	 Pegram	 2016)	 and	 provide	 complementary	 insight	 into	 both	 the	dimensions	of	institutional	design	for	national	human	rights	institutional	design	and	their	domestic	and	cross-border	determinants.			 On	the	other	hand,	the	thesis	operationalizes	some	of	the	arguments	that	the	literature	 on	 the	 diffusion	 of	 human	 rights	 has	 advanced	 so	 far.	 It	 proposes	 four	different	possible	analytical	explanations	for	countries’	decisions	to	establish	strong	institutions	 and	 proposes	 original	 measures	 for	 them.	 Existing	 diffusion-focused	work	has	 advanced	and	discussed	 these	mechanisms	 in	work	about	human	 rights	treaty	 ratification	 (Simmons	 2002;	 Hathaway	 2007;	 Hafner-Burton	 2009),	 the	domestic	 impact	of	 countries’	 commitments	 to	 international	human	rights	 treaties	(Simmons	 2009),	 and	 the	 diffusion	 of	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 (Pegram	2010;	 Kim	 2013b).	 This	 thesis	 proposes	 original	 measurements	 of	 human	 rights	institutional	design	determinants	that	can	test	for	the	occurrence	of	these	main	four	causal	 mechanisms.	 The	 indicators	 used	 for	 the	 measurement	 of	 theoretical	arguments	about	the	creation	and	design	of	national	human	rights	 institutions	are	presented	in	more	detail	below.		 	Four	 explanations	 of	 interest	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 this	 project	 draw	 on	diffusion	scholarship	to	understand	the	reasons	why	governments	decide	to	support	a	strong	design	for	an	institution	set	up	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights.	First,	a	strong	human	rights	identity	in	countries	with	a	 longstanding	tradition	of	 liberal	
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democracy	 is	 expected	 to	 drive	 countries	 to	 have	 stronger	 national	 human	 rights	institutions.	As	such,	a	strong	human	rights	identity	is	operationalized	as	a	country	having	 established	 its	 independent	 ombudsman	 institutions	 early,	 prior	 to	 the	consolidation	of	the	regulatory	framework	of	the	Paris	Principles	and	the	widened	support	 for	 the	 NHRIs	 in	 the	 1990s.	 Second,	 domestic	 political	 cost	 and	 benefit	calculations	 could	 be	 informing	 governments’	 decisions	 to	 establish	 and	 support	strong	 such	 institutions.	 This	 is	 particularly	 the	 case	 in	 countries	 that	 are	 newly	democratised,	 and	 where	 some	 governments	 seek	 to	 consolidate	 support	 for	democracy	in	the	process	of	transition	and	safeguard	it	against	changes	in	political	preferences	 of	 future	 governments.	 Third,	 social	 learning	 can	 take	 place	 in	favourable	 environments,	 such	 as	 in	 regions	 with	 a	 high	 density	 of	 strong	institutions	(like	Europe	and	the	Americas)	and	in	countries	that	are	located	in	the	proximity	 of	 early	 adopting	 countries.	 Learning	 can	 also	 occur	 when	 countries	participate	 in	 specialised	 international	 networks	 that	 promote	 and	 support	 the	strengthening	of	 institutional	design	–	 the	UN	Office	of	 the	High	Commissioner	 for	Human	 Rights	 coordinates	 such	 a	 network	 and	 promotes	 institutional	 strength	through	the	peer-review	accreditation	process.	A	 fourth	 international	determinant	measures	 the	 influence	of	material	 incentives	and	rewards	offered	 to	countries	by	other	 states	 or	 international	 organisations	 such	 as	 the	 EU.	 The	 two	 indicators	measuring	 such	 cross-border	 influence	 are	 the	 amount	 of	 Overseas	 Development	Assistance	that	the	EU	or	the	United	States	offer	other	states	and,	more	specifically	in	 Europe,	 the	 accession	 conditionality	 offered	 by	 the	 EU	 to	 countries	 that	 are	candidates	to	membership.		
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	 The	project	follows	a	multi-method	research	design	that	combines	two	levels	of	analysis.	 It	begins	with	a	quantitative	analysis	at	 the	global	 level	and	continues	with	QCA	for	the	regional	level	of	analysis	with	a	focus	on	Europe.	It	also	presents	case	 studies	 for	 illustrative	purposes,	which	allows	 to	 capture	 the	 interplay	at	 the	national	level	of	factors	that	are	found	to	be	relevant	at	the	European	level.		 The	findings	of	the	global	analysis	provide	evidence	in	support	of	three	of	the	above	 ideal	 types:	 socialisation,	 incentive-setting,	 and	 human	 rights	 identity.	Countries	 that	 have	 undergone	 the	 accreditation	 process	 are	more	 likely	 to	 have	strong	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions,	 providing	 support	 for	 socialisation	 and	acculturation	 explanations	 of	 institutional	 design.	 Additionally,	 countries	 with	 a	strong	human	rights	identity,	which	have	established	their	independent	institutions	for	 the	 promotion	 and	 protection	 of	 human	 rights,	 are	 also	 more	 likely	 to	 have	strong	 institutions	 currently.	 Finally,	 countries	 that	 have	 been	 subjected	 to	 EU	conditionality	due	 to	 their	accession	candidate	 status	are	also	more	 likely	 to	have	institutions	 with	 a	 stronger	 design.	 These	 findings	 provide	 evidence	 that	 cross-border	 processes	 can	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 explaining	 patterns	 of	 strong	 design	 of	national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 around	 the	 world.	 International	 factors	 alone,	however,	cannot	account	for	governments’	decisions	to	support	strong	independent	human	 rights	 institutions	 on	 their	 territories.	 Domestic	 environments	 can	 also	 be	more	 or	 less	 conducive	 to	 supporting	 strong	 designs,	 especially	 in	 countries	with	longstanding	 traditions	 of	 liberal	 democratic	 values	 and	 practices.	 Additionally,	 a	particular	kind	of	 international	 factors	make	 their	effects	 felt	at	 the	regional	 level.	High	 density	 of	 strong	 human	 rights	 institutions	 in	 a	 region	 is	 likely	 to	 lead	 to	
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governments	 deciding	 to	 establish	 stronger	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions.	 In	the	case	of	Europe,	 the	 influence	of	 the	EU	 is	 felt	 strongly	 in	 the	case	of	 countries	that	have	applied	to	become	member	states	and	have	been	the	object	of	accession	conditionality.			 The	 fourth	chapter	of	 the	thesis	explores	 the	dynamics	of	 international	and	domestic	 factors,	 both	 of	 ideational	 and	 material	 nature,	 in	 Europe.	 The	 chapter	sketches	 a	 qualitative	 research	 agenda	 to	 be	 continued	 in	 future	 research.	 In	 its	current	 form,	 the	 analysis	 explores	 the	 regional	 interplay	 of	 factors	 that	 were	included	 in	 the	 global	 analysis	 and	 finds	 cases	 for	 which	 some	 combinations	 of	ideational	 and	 rationalist	 factors	 are	 meaningful	 and	 sufficient	 to	 explain	 strong	institutional	 design.	 The	 analysis	 at	 the	 regional	 level	will	 be	 continued	 in	 future	research	by	considering	other	determinants	of	institutional	design	in	addition	to	the	ones	in	the	global	analysis,	giving	a	more	fine-grained	perspective	of	international,	regional,	and	domestic	dynamics	of	support	for	national	human	rights	institutions	in	Europe.			 The	qualitative	comparative	analysis	(QCA)	makes	use	of	a	crisp	dataset	with	binary	data	that	captures	whether	or	not	a	country	belongs	to	the	set	of	countries	with	particular	characteristics	 represented	by	 the	 factors	of	 the	analysis.	The	QCA	tested	 four	main	hypotheses,	 following	 the	 same	conceptual	model	as	 the	analytic	framework	for	the	global	analysis.	The	findings	of	the	analysis	provide	evidence	for	two	 types	 of	 combinations	 of	 factors	 that	 can	 explain	 the	 occurrence	 of	 stronger	institutions.	 Newly	 democratised	 countries	 that	 have	 been	 subjected	 to	 EU	conditionality	 and	 never	 underwent	 the	 UN	 accreditation	 process	 have	 strong	
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institutions.	Romania	is	the	only	country	that	meets	all	three	main	criteria	but	does	not	have	a	strong	institution	–	however,	 it	does	have	a	medium	level	 institution	in	the	form	of	a	functional	national	ombudsman.	Additionally,	QCA	generated	a	second	solution	 that	 finds	 that	 the	 UN-led	 accreditation	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	explaining	the	occurrence	of	the	outcome	in	countries	that	are	not	new	democracies	and	that	have	not	been	subjected	to	EU	conditionality.		 The	chapter	continues	with	a	discussion	of	country	case	studies	intended	to	provide	a	more	detailed	illustration	of	the	creation	and	strength	of	national	human	rights	 institutions’	 strength	 as	 well	 as	 to	 lay	 out	 a	 research	 agenda	 for	 future	qualitative	 research.	 The	 case-based	 analyses	 serve	 only	 an	 illustrative	 purpose,	offering	country	and	 institution	specific	details	about	 the	history	and	 formation	of	each	 institution	 and	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	main	 factors	 included	 in	 the	 analysis	played	 out	 in	 the	 development	 of	 each	 national	 human	 rights	 institution.	 QCA	proposes	two	main	combinations	of	conditions	sufficient	for	European	countries	to	have	strong	institutions.	These	QCA	solutions	consist	of	three	factors	that	interact	to	explain	 the	 outcome	 and	 provide	 illustration	 that	 three	 out	 of	 the	 four	 analytical	explanations	are	relevant	for	understanding	strong	institutional	design	in	Europe.	A	country’s	 status	 as	 a	 new	 democracy,	 combined	 with	 EU	 conditionality	 and	 the	absence	of	UN	accreditation	make	up	 the	 first	 solution	proposed	by	 the	QCA.	This	first	 combination	 of	 conditions	 shows	 that	 rational	 explanations	 tell	 a	 compelling	story	of	institutional	strength	in	Europe	by	means	of	cross-border	incentive-setting	as	well	as	domestic	cost	and	benefit	calculations.	The	second	solution	identified	by	the	 qualitative	 comparative	 analysis	 finds	 that	 UN	 accreditation	 can	 account	 for	
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strong	institutional	design	in	the	case	countries	that	are	not	new	democracies	and	that	have	not	been	subjected	 to	EU	conditionality.	This	second	path	 illustrates	 the	combination	 of	 conditions	 that	 offers	 support	 to	 an	 ideational	 explanation	 of	institutional	 strength.	 In	 the	QCA,	 early	 adoption	 status	 is	 the	 only	 condition	 that	cannot	account	for	strong	institutional	design,	thus	not	finding	that	a	strong	human	rights	identity	plays	an	important	role	in	explaining	strong	design	in	Europe.				 An	 important	methodological	 implication	 of	 the	multi-level	 analysis	 is	 that	findings	 in	 the	 two	 analyses	 are	 complementary	 and	 allow	 for	 a	 more	 nuanced	understanding	of	 the	 causal	pathways	 from	 the	global	 to	 the	national	dimensions.	The	QCA	analysis	offers	a	closer	look	at	the	interplay	of	sufficient	conditions	that	can	explain	 the	 adoption	 of	 strong	 institutions	 in	 Europe.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 causal	inference-making	 in	 a	 multi-method	 design,	 the	 existing	 QCA	 will	 be	 best	complemented	 with	 further	 qualitative	 work	 in	 the	 form	 of	 semi-structured	interviews	 including	 other	 indicators	 that	 capture	 variation	 of	 sociocultural	determinants	 at	 the	 domestic	 and	 regional	 levels	 and	 offer	 a	 more	 fine-grained	image	of	the	conditions	for	institutional	design.		
6.2.	Policy	implications	
	While	every	national	human	rights	 institution	 is	unique	and	has	 its	particularities,	the	findings	of	my	thesis	have	some	policy	ramifications	that	apply	across	different	cases	and	which	can	be	relevant	to	the	general	use,	design,	and	implementation	of	human	 rights.	 A	 first	 conclusion	 of	 my	 thesis	 is	 that	 international	 institutional	
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networks	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	 creation	 of	 strong	 national	 institutions	 (Alderson	2001;	 Whitehead	 2001;	 Bearce	 and	 Bondanella	 2007;	 Linos	 and	 Pegram	 2016).	Networks	 such	 as	 the	 global	 community	 of	 NHRIs	 created	 through	 the	 UN-led	accreditation	process	can	provide	opportunities	for	socialisation	(Finnemore	1993)	and	acculturation	(Goodman	and	Jinks	2013).	Direct	interaction	at	regular	meetings	can	 lead	 to	 learning	 from	 peers	 and	 sharing	 best	 practices	 that	 can	 increase	 the	strength	of	national	human	rights	institutions	and	enhance	the	effectiveness	of	their	activities,	 ultimately	 leading	 to	 stronger	 domestic	 human	 rights	 records.	International	organisations	and	national	governments	can	pay	particular	attention	to	the	important	role	that	peer	review	plays	in	cross-border	learning	(Milewicz	and	Goodin	 2016).	 The	 peer	 review	 process	 as	 part	 of	 the	 accreditation	 generates	concrete	feedback	on	the	design	and	effectiveness	of	each	institution	with	targeted	recommendations	for	improvement.	In	many	countries	the	national	ombudsman	or	human	rights	committees	are	often	 the	only	 independent	bodies	charged	with	 the	promotion	and	protection	of	human	rights,	thus	national	governments	that	wish	to	strengthen	their	institutions	would	benefit	from	entering	the	accreditation	process	and	joining	the	UN-coordinated	network.			 Fostering	 cross-border	 learning	 is	 also	 possible	 through	 participation	 in	regional	networks.	One	such	example	is	the	longstanding	Asia-Pacific	Forum,	which	has	 coordinated	 the	 activity	 of	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 in	Asia	 for	 over	two	decades.	Government	and	institutional	representatives	meet	annually,	offering	all	 participating	members	 the	 chance	 to	 discuss	 domestic	 challenges	 they	 face	 as	they	carry	out	their	mandates.	The	leadership	of	the	APF	is	ensured	on	a	rotational	
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basis,	 and	 the	 network	 has	 also	 assisted	 with	 the	 UN	 accreditation	 process	 of	countries	 in	 the	region.	The	European	equivalent	regional	structure,	 the	European	Network	for	NHRIs,	is	a	more	recent	institution	on	the	regional	landscape,	created	in	its	current	form	in	2013.	Working	in	coordination	with	other	human	rights	bodies	in	Europe	 such	 as	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe,	 the	 network	 can	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	strengthening	of	 institutional	design	and	 the	domestic	 implementation	of	 regional	and	international	human	rights	law.			 These	 regional	 and	 international	 networks	 can	 also	 benefit	 from	 the	experience	 of	 early	 adopting	 countries.	 Moreover,	 geographic	 proximity	 and,	whenever	 existent,	 shared	 cultural	 backgrounds,	 can	 facilitate	 cross-border	learning.	 As	 countries	 decide	 to	 establish	 new	 human	 rights	 commissions	 or	strengthen	the	design	of	their	national	human	rights	institutions,	the	experience	of	countries	located	in	their	geographic	proximity	can	prove	instrumental.			 A	 second	 conclusion	 of	 my	 thesis	 is	 that	 material	 incentives	 offered	 by	international	organisations	and	certain	national	governments	through	international	development	programmes	can	lead	to	stronger	independent	national	human	rights	institutions.	Concerted	efforts	by	the	European	Commission	to	monitor	and	advise	the	 progress	 of	 candidate	 countries	 in	 the	 process	 of	 accession	 to	 the	 European	Union	has	proven	effective	 in	 fostering	stronger	designs	for	national	human	rights	institutions.	 Country	 progress	 reports	 present	 an	 annual	 assessment	 of	 country	progress	 toward	 policy	 and	 institutional	 targets	 which	 each	 candidate	 state	 is	required	 to	 meet.	 The	 prioritisation	 of	 independent	 national	 institutions	 in	 the	efforts	 of	 ensuring	 human	 rights	 promotion	 and	 protection	 motivates	 domestic	
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governments	 to	 strengthen	 national	 human	 commissions	 and	 ombudsmen.	Ultimately,	 these	 institutions’	 activities	 leads	 to	 legislative	 harmonisation	 with	European	requirements	and	a	better	domestic	human	rights	performance.		 A	 different	 form	 of	 financial	 incentive,	 the	 allocation	 of	 overseas	development	 funds,	has	also	been	 found	 to	be	 connected	 to	 stronger	 independent	institutions	globally.	My	analysis	finds	that	the	United	States	overseas	development	assistance	 funds	 are	 associated	 with	 stronger	 institutional	 designs	 around	 the	world.	 With	 special	 attention	 given	 to	 national	 socio-political	 contexts	 and	collaboration	 with	 domestic	 actors	 in	 charge	 of	 using	 these	 disbursed	 funds,	international	development	efforts	can	make	a	difference	in	national	contexts.	They	can	foster	the	establishment	and	capacity	building	of	stronger	national	human	rights	institutions	and,	through	that,	contribute	actively	to	strengthening	domestic	human	rights	records.				
6.3.	Future	directions	of	research	
	The	 thesis	 research	 charts	 new	 avenues	 for	 future	 research.	 One	 direction	 of	research	will	 involve	carrying	out	 interview-based	qualitative	research	 in	selected	countries	in	Europe,	in	order	to	explore	more	in-depth	the	effects	that	international	factors	 have	 on	 domestic	 context.	 I	 will	 begin	 by	 establishing	 the	 analytical	framework	 and	 incorporating	 new	 factors	 not	 included	 in	 the	 global	 or	 regional	analyses,	 thus	making	a	 significant	 empirical	 contribution	 to	 the	 study	of	national	human	 rights	 institutions.	 Domestic	 determinants	 such	 as	 the	 strength	 of	 civil	
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society	would	 allow	us	 to	measure	 the	 support	 of	 civil	 society	 actors,	 such	 as	 the	general	public	or	NGOs,	for	national	human	rights	institutions.	An	additional	cross-border	determinant	to	be	considered	at	the	regional	level	measures	the	influence	of	neighbouring	 countries	 with	 strong	 historic	 ties	 on	 institutional	 change.	 Such	geographic	 proximity	 doubled	 by	 shared	 historic	 ties	 would	 allow	 us	 to	 examine	sub-regional	 patterns	 of	 institutional	 design	 such	 as	 the	 ones	 occurring	 in	 the	Nordic	countries.			 Another	 new	 route	 of	 research	 lays	 out	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 of	institutional	 strength	 in	 different	 regions	 of	 the	 world.	 Factors	 that	 are	 region-specific	 would	 be	 introduced	 in	 the	 QCA	 model	 for	 each	 region,	 thus	 testing	 for	different	regional	effects.	For	 instance,	 the	EU	 is	a	critical	presence	 in	the	regional	context	in	which	it	exerts	influence.	In	Asia,	however,	no	such	regional	IO	is	the	main	actor	 coordinating	 learning	 across	 borders	 or	 incentivising	 governments	 to	 align	behaviour	with	fellow	candidate	countries	as	future	members	of	the	Union.	The	Asia	Pacific	 Forum,	 however,	 is	 a	 much	 powerful	 network	 of	 national	 human	 rights	institutions,	 which	 has	 been	 in	 existence	 for	 much	 longer	 that	 its	 European	counterpart	 the	 European	 Network	 for	 NHRIs	 and	 has	 been	 an	 active	 force	 in	supporting	 UN	 accreditation	 efforts	 in	 the	 region	 and	 facilitating	 cross-border	learning.	Moreover,	the	early	adopters	and	model	states	in	each	region	are	different	and	 bring	 to	 bear	 different	 kinds	 of	 influence	 on	 other	 states	 in	 their	 proximity.	Powerful	actors	such	as	China	and	Japan,	which	have	no	clear	official	support	for	the	institutionalisation	 of	 human	 rights	 and	 alignments	 with	 international	 policy	practices,	counteract	the	influence	that	Australia,	India	or	New	Zealand	may	have	as	
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early	adopters	and	long-term	coordinators	of	the	Asia	Pacific	Forum.		Of	course,	the	context	 in	 a	 different	 region	 is	 different	 and	 would	 open	 up	 new	 paths	 for	exploration	 –	 on	 a	 continent	 like	 Africa,	 where	 the	 influence	 of	 regional	 human	rights	 networks	 on	 domestic	 politics	 is	 rather	 limited	 and	 no	 powerful	 regional	organisation	 coordinates	 efforts	 to	 align	 institutional	practices	 across	borders,	we	expect	 the	 effect	 of	 United	 Nations	 programmes	 on	 governments’	 decisions	 to	establish	 strong	 institutions	 to	 be	 the	 one	 of	 the	 strongest	 international	 factors	complementing	the	power	of	the	domestic	political	actors.	Similar	to	the	European	analysis,	 all	 of	 the	 cross-regional	 comparisons	 could	 be	 complemented	 with	ethnographic	work.		 A	 third	 direction	 of	 research	 represents	 a	 natural	 continuation	 of	 the	quantitative	 analysis,	 which	 would	 entail	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 dataset	 to	 include	over-time	 data.	 The	 lack	 of	 publicly	 available	 documents	 provided	 by	 the	institutions	themselves	would	make	the	collection	of	global	over-time	data	a	nearly	impossible	endeavour	in	all	countries.	Such	a	dataset	would	probably	be	more	likely	to	 be	 developed	 in	 some	 of	 the	 regions	 (i.e.	 such	 as	 Europe	 and	 the	 Americas),	depending	on	available	reports	and	institutional	documents.	Qualitative	interviews	and	surveys	could	complement	report-based	data	collection.			 A	fourth	direction	of	research	would	seek	to	expand	the	dataset	by	increasing	variation	in	institutional	design	features	across	more	than	one	type	of	independent	regulatory	 institution.	 For	 instance,	 such	 bodies	 could	 be	 central	 banks	 and	anticorruption	 agencies.	 A	 study	 of	 these	 institutions’	 variation	 in	 strength	would	offer	 a	 systematic	 view	of	 governments’	 preferences	 in	 liberal	 democratic	designs	
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and	different	degrees	of	commitment	to	the	institutionalisation	of	liberal	values	and	practices.	 This	 research	 design	 places	 national	 human	 rights	 institutions	 in	 the	broader	context	of	democratisation	and	institutionalisation	efforts	integrated	in	the	foreign	policy	agenda	of	the	United	States,	the	European	Union	and	the	development	programmes	supported	by	the	Washington	Consensus	and	the	United	Nations.				 A	 generally	 important	 and	 interesting	 issue	worth	 exploring	 further	 is	 the	effectiveness	of	national	human	rights	institutions	as	linked	to	their	design.	In	other	words,	does	an	institution’s	design	make	a	difference	in	terms	of	the	human	rights	record	of	the	country	where	it	is	based?	Is	a	stronger	institution	more	effective	in	its	collaboration	with	the	government?	Does	it	address	more	adequately	the	needs	and	interests	of	a	wider	spectrum	of	the	population?	Does	it	represent	adequately	also	the	interests	of	NGOs	and	civil	society	more	broadly?	Research	on	the	effectiveness	of	human	rights	policies	as	 linked	to	their	diffusion	finds	mixed	evidence	of	either	‘radical	 decoupling’	 (Meyer	 et	 al.	 1997)	 or	 of	 partial	 impact	 in	 the	 case	 of	 human	rights	 treaty	 ratification	 (Simmons	 2009).	 Research	 to	 date	 has	 not	 address	 the	issue	of	NHRI	effectiveness	systematically	although	some	case	study-based	work	has	found	evidence	of	some	success	at	the	national	level	(Talwar	1997;	Norchi	1998).	To	the	best	of	my	knowledge,	no	one	has	investigated	the	link	between	the	institutional	design	and	the	effectiveness	of	national	institutions	created	to	promote	and	protect	human	rights.		
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